Newsnotes
Litigation
January 1998
Volume 12, Number 1

"Buddy system" now mandated by OSHA regulations

The most important advance in fire fighter safety in decades - that is how the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO, has described a new regulation issued by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The new 2-in/2-out rule was lauded by IAFF President Alfred K. Whitehead, saying the rule will save the lives of hundreds of fire fighters in the future. Whitehead predicted that the death rate for fire fighters will be cut by 25 to 40 percent.

The 2-in/2-out rule mandates a "buddy system" whenever fire fighters enter a burning structure. They must do so in teams of at least two, operating in direct voice or visual contact. In addition, at least two other fully-equipped and trained fire fighters must remain outside the structure, monitoring those inside and prepared to rescue them. The new rule, issued by OSHA as part of a comprehensive change in respiratory standards, also requires all personnel engaged in interior structural fire fighting to use self-contained breathing apparatus.

Because the federal Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 does not apply to publicly employed fire fighters, the new regulations will be enforced for federal fire fighters, members of industrial fire brigades, and private incorporated fire companies. However, public sector fire fighters in 25 states and territories that operate their own OSHA-approved safety programs are required to extend the provisions of the regulations to these workers or adopt equivalent standards. Consequently, the regulations, which have a start-up date of October 5, 1998, will apply to publicly employed fire fighters in Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. Eighteen of these jurisdictions also consider volunteer fire fighters to be covered by their safety regulations. 

OSHA adopted the regulations after taking comments from fire service professionals, the IAFF, and other interested parties. OSHA also noted that various standards developed by the National Fire Protection Administration (NFPA) were consistent with the new 2-in/2-out requirement.

In announcing the rule, OSHA emphasized that the requirement for standby personnel does not preclude the incident commander from relying on his/her professional judgment to make assignments during a fire emergency. Although the standards require at least two standby persons during the attack on an interior fire, there are situations where more than two persons will be required both inside and outside the interior structure, a decision ultimately to be made by the incident commander. However, the assignment of standby personnel to other roles, such as incident commander or operator of fire apparatus, will not be permitted if abandoning their critical tasks clearly jeopardizes the safety and health of any fire fighter working at the incident. OSHA noted that the regulations do not specify the exact number of fire fighters that should staff apparatus.

Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman announced the new safety regulations at a press conference January 8. In attendance were IAFF President Whitehead and two Phoenix fire fighters who were burned in a fire last year. The Phoenix Fire Department has long practiced the 2-in/2-out procedure. Also attending was the widow of a Chesapeake, Virginia, fire fighter who died in a 1996


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Volume 12, Number 1

fire. At the time, that department reportedly did not utilize the 2-in/2-out tactic. 

At the press conference, Whitehead praised President Clinton for following through on a 1996

pledge to the fire fighters' union to pursue enactment of the safety rule. 

The new regulations may be found in the January 8, 1998, edition of the Federal Register.

OSHA has certainly been busy!

OSHA has been very busy in the last month! In addition to the new respiratory regulations mentioned above, the federal safety agency has mandated that hospitals take measures to protect certain health care workers - including fire fighters and paramedics - who respond to physical, chemical, biological, and radioactive hazards. In a pamphlet released last month, OSHA set forth procedures for hospitals to follow in responding to hazardous substance incidents. The publication emphasizes the need for hospitals to pre-plan responses in coordination with other emergency response organizations. The hospital should also establish appropriate decontamination procedures for exposed personnel.

As to the role of emergency medical service personnel (EMS), the publication notes, "EMS

personnel are often the first on the scene and should be given First Responder Awareness Level training as a minimum. There is no specific hourly minimum required but the training must be sufficient or the employees must have proven experience in specific competencies with an annual refresher. EMS personnel who have received only Awareness Level training should not be involved in the transport or treatment of contaminated patients. EMS personnel who might be exposed to hazardous substances because they are expected to transport or treat contaminated patients at the release area should be trained to the First Responder Operations Level."

The newly issued pamphlet is entitled, Hospital and Community Emergency Response - What You Need To Know and is available through OSHA or at www.osha.gov.

ACLU challenges fire chief's gag order

An order to fire fighters to keep quiet about the controversial closing of a fire station has earned the Colorado Springs fire chief a lawsuit courtesy of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Earlier this month, attorneys for the ACLU filed a federal lawsuit against the city and Fire Chief Manuel Navarro claiming he is violating fire fighters' free speech rights by the order. 

The dispute originated last May when Chief Navarro recommended closing Fire Station No. 3, which serves one of the city's oldest neighborhoods. A citizens' group was formed to assess the impact of the closing and several fire fighters sought to provide input on the matter. Last June 6, Navarro issued a memo that reportedly read in part, "Once a decision is made, I expect all of you to support the decision, whether you agree with it or not. Publicly criticizing or supporting public criticism of a policy

or decision is not only wrong, it is grounds for discipline." The ACLU suit contends that order violates the First Amendment.

According to the suit, a battalion chief was given a "final warning" after speaking out against the closure to a member of the chief's staff and a fire fighter was issued a letter of reprimand for sending an E-mail survey on the issue to other fire fighters.

The ACLU attorney claims the station closing would increase response time to fire alarms and emergency medical calls. According to the suit, the station closing touches upon a matter of public concern and fire fighters "have a valuable perspective to contribute" on the issue.

Attorneys for the city dispute whether the station closing is a matter of public concern and that fire department employees possess a constitutional



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right to speak out on the matter. Steve Hook, an assistant city attorney, told a Denver newspaper that the fire chief's memo was justified. "There are different rules that apply when you're in a quasi-military department," he said. "There is the necessity to maintain order and discipline in the department." Hook also disputed the argument that the closing of a fire station was an issue of public concern, and that city employees have a right to speak out about it. "It's not that simple," he said. "It depends on the circumstances." Hook stated it was currently unclear whether fire fighters would be allowed to speak at the city council meeting later this month.

Case law interpreting the First Amendment permits public employees to comment upon matters of public concern providing the comments do not unreasonably disrupt the operation of the employing agency. Litigation on this issue is fairly frequent because no bright line rule has been established clearly delineating when comments are disruptive to a government organization.

Are staffing levels a question of safety?

Most collective bargaining laws make bargaining over working conditions mandatory. Likewise, the same laws specify that determination of staffing levels is a managerial right. So, what happens when the two areas conflict? That is what a south Florida city is asking the courts to determine.

The City of Hallandale has sued the Hallandale Professional Fire Fighters Union, IAFF Local No. 2238, requesting an injunction to prevent the union from seeking arbitration on the city's reduction from 16 to 15 the minimum number of fire fighters who will be on duty each shift. Reduction in staffing was an effort to save money but the fire fighters' union charges that the decrease occasionally leaves fire fighters without the use of the best equipped vehicle for fighting fires, an engine with a 75 foot ladder that cost the city $500,000. This, according to the union, creates safety problems for the fire fighters and the community.

Union officials claim the city must submit the change to arbitration, along with two other grievances that have been contentious. Countering the complaint is the city's assertion that the labor contract grants the employer the right to set staffing levels. The city attorney claims the grievances, including the question of staffing, are not arbitrable and is seeking court confirmation of his position.

Union president Barry McConaghey stated, "What good is having the [arbitration] clause in the contract if we can't use it?"

At the core of the dispute appears to be the amount of overtime money available. The city has reportedly budgeted 50 percent more overtime than last year. Union officials charged, however, that overtime is being given to superior officers such as battalion chiefs at the expense of line fire fighters.

Normal staffing level for the 70 member department is 22 fire fighters per shift.

Only in Hollywood!

Citizens frequently express gratitude to fire fighters by thank you notes, homemade pastries, or contributions to fire fighter-supported charities. Now comes word from the West Coast of an unusual thank you gift. A few years back singer Janet Jackson thanked Los Angeles County fire fighters for saving her Malibu estate from devastation by sending her own special present: two women to give the fire fighters deep, relaxing massages.  Now, the idea has reportedly become an annual event from the entertainer to the fire station nearest her home.

"It's a goodwill gesture, that's all," said Jackson.

A fire fighter spokesman stated, "It couldn't have made them any happier, and with all the accolades and congratulations we got from everyone, that was one of the best."



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Litigation duties. The Rhode Island legislature enacted the IOD to rectify the situation. In order to recover benefits under the IOD, the injured fire fighter is not required to show any fault on the part of the municipal employer. Instead, IOD benefits are triggered automatically upon the occurrence of a line-of-duty injury or death. Prior case law holds that the IOD benefits are an exclusive source of recovery for monetary damages for the fire fighter. A state court noted that it would be near chaos if a right of action existed for fire fighters to sue their superior officers and fellow employees. In a paramilitary organization, nothing could be more detrimental to good order and discipline than the encouragement of civil actions by emergency personnel against their superiors arising out of perceived shortcomings in preparing them for dangerous circumstances they must encounter on a daily basis. The fire fighter's widow in the case, however, contends that the exclusive remedy violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the law. Specifically, she points out that Rhode Island has one scheme of worker's compensation for fire fighters and police officers and another system for private employees. This two-tiered system, however, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is bedrock constitutional doctrine that absent the creation of a suspect classification, such as race or sex, a statute will be judged on a rational basis standard. There is certainly a rational basis for granting benefits to police and fire personnel, though different in kind than that available to other persons. Given the limited pool of resources, the legislature was required to decide how best to distribute available funds among the various heirs where relief might be needed. This is a legislative prerogative that must be given great deference. The widow also asserts that the exclusive remedy of the IOD violates her Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury in a civil case. Prior law holds, however, that the Seventh Amendment right does not exist in the abstract, but instead flows as an incident to a cause of action to which the right attaches. Thus, if there is no legal basis for a suit,

Cases of interest

Worker's compensation

Hargreaves was a veteran fire fighter who responded to a residential fire. While attending his pumper in accordance with his supervisor's orders, another superior officer ordered him into the structure. Subsequently, conditions worsened and the commanding officer decided to evacuate the building of all fire fighters. However, due to the confusion on the fireground, superior officers were unable to track the whereabouts of all personnel on the scene and Hargreaves was left in the building after the evacuation order. By the time he was finally able to find his way out of the structure, he had sustained severe injuries which proved to be fatal. The fire fighter's widow filed a wrongful death suit in state court against two superior officers and the city seeking to hold them liable for their alleged negligence in the management and supervision of the fireground. Shortly thereafter, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an opinion which concluded that the state's Injured on Duty (IOD) statute was intended to provide the exclusive remedy for this type of claim. The IOD law provided an annuity for surviving spouse and dependents of fire fighters and police officers who suffered line-of-duty deaths. As a result of this ruling, the fire fighter's widow refiled her suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the IOD. Parties move for summary judgment.

HELD: The deceased fire fighter's widow seeks to have the Rhode Island Injured On Duty statute struck down as an unconstitutional violation of due process rights. Specifically, she contends the statute violates her right of equal protection under the laws as well as her right to a trial by jury. Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, police officers and fire fighters were essentially left without a source of recovery for injuries sustained in the course of performing their



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there is nothing left to which the Seventh Amendment right can attach. Such is the case here, where no legal claim is recognized and thus, no right to trial by jury can be recognized. Summary judgment for city on constitutional claim. [Hargreaves v. Reis, 977 F. Supp. 123 (D.R.I. 1997)] preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of a person disciplined impaired the efficiency and orderly operation of the public service. The record in this case is sufficient to carry the city's burden of meeting the standard. The testimony of the waitress combined with the testimony of the district chief suffices. Burckel argues that he should not be terminated because, due to an evidence problem, no testimony was introduced at his hearing concerning the results of the blood test. Blood alcohol test results are not required, however, in this situation. Other competent evidence of Burckel's policy violation was present. However, the case must be remanded to the civil service commission for determination of appropriate discipline. Department policy establishes dismissal as the punishment for drinking while on duty. Policy also prohibits drinking while off duty and in uniform, but does not specify the level of disciplinary action. It is this second category in which Burckel's case falls as he was off duty when working the fire watch. Since Burckel is a 15 year veteran of the department who had never been subject to disciplinary action, the civil service commission should have given him the opportunity to argue that dismissal is too stringent an action for his violation. Discipline affirmed, but case remanded to civil service commission for determination of the appropriate level of disciplinary action. [Burckel v. New Orleans Department of Fire, 700 So.2d 553 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997)]

Dismissal procedures

Burckel was a 15 year veteran fire fighter who had not been subject to any prior disciplinary action during his career. He was hired to work a fire watch at a casino in New Orleans. Fire department regulations required such fire watches when any of the fire safety equipment malfunctioned in buildings housing large groups of people. In this instance, the sprinkler system at the casino had been damaged as a result of flooding earlier in the month. Fire department personnel working fire watches were considered to be off duty and were paid directly by the casino. A cocktail waitress was later to testify that during the course of the fire watch, Burckel asked her to bring him a drink containing alcohol. The second time Burckel asked for the drink she brought him one. Because she did not feel right about the matter, she took the problem to her supervisor. The supervisor told the shift manager of the incident, saying a fire fighter was drinking on duty. The shift manager went to a nearby fire station and reported the incident to the captain. The captain came to the casino to investigate the matter. The district chief who was supervising the fire watch decided there was a reasonable suspicion to believe that Burckel had violated department policy concerning consumption of alcohol. He arranged for the fire fighter to be taken to be tested for alcohol. A swab test was subsequently performed which registered a weak positive. A blood sample was also taken from the fire fighter. Dismissal charges were filed against Burckel on the grounds of consuming alcohol while working a private detail. Following a hearing, the dismissal was upheld. Former fire fighter appeals.

HELD: Under Louisiana law, the burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate by the

Dismissal procedures

On November 1, Rough, a San Antonio fire fighter, was arrested for prostitution, a misdemeanor under Texas law. The following January 7, based on the charge, he was suspended from the fire department. On January 19, pursuant to a plea bargain, Rough entered in a plea of no contest and was placed on deferred adjudication probation for six months. Rough returned to work on February 21, but was served with a notice of indefinite suspension without pay for violation of civil service rules. He filed suit a few days later seeking to enjoin the fire chief from going forward with the proposed


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indefinite suspension. The court denied the relief and on March 14, Rough was indefinitely suspended without pay. He unsuccessfully appealed to the civil service commission. An appeal to a trial court likewise was unsuccessful. Dismissed fire fighter appeals.

HELD: Under Texas civil service law, decisions of civil service commissions are subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. Under this standard, the party disputing the result has the burden to show that the agency's decision was not based on substantial evidence. The reviewing court may not set aside such a decision because it would reach a different conclusion; it may only do so if that decision was made without regard to the facts or the law and was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Rough argues that the indefinite suspension is void because it was imposed outside the jurisdictional time frames of state civil service law. State statute provides that if the disciplinary action related to a criminal complaint occurred or was discovered within 180 days before the complaint, the department must bring administrative charges within 30 days of the final disposition of the complaint. Rough contends the 30 day period began running the date he received deferred adjudication. In other words, Rough asserts that the granting of the deferred adjudication probation constitutes the final disposition of the complaint. Thus, he contends the notification of indefinite suspension on February 21 was 33 days from the order of deferred adjudication and outside the time

frame, thereby rendering the suspension void. Another state civil service law, however, provides that a fire fighter may be suspended if the action from which the charges are based occurred within the preceding six months. In construing a statute, the court is to determine, if possible, the intent of the legislature as expressed in the language of the statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, resort to rules of statutory construction are inappropriate and the statute should be given its common and every day meaning. Under the rules of statutory construction, a specific provision controls over a more general one. Applying these general principles, the court finds that the 30 day time frame as opposed to the 180 day time frame is applicable. The 30 day time frame specifically applies to disciplinary action taken in response to alleged criminal conduct that resulted in an indictment or complaint. This section thus controls the case. However, the 30 day time does not begin to run from the date of imposition of the deferred adjudication probation as argued by Rough. Rather, under Texas law, the mere granting of deferred adjudication probation does not finally dispose of the complaint; the complaint is live while the individual is completing the terms of the deferred adjudicated probation. Accordingly, when the fire chief notified Rough of the proposed indefinite suspension, he was not acting outside the 30 day jurisdictional time frame mandated by state law. Affirmed for fire department. [Rough v. Ojeda, 954 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. _ San Antonio 1997)]

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