May 1999
Volume 13, Number 5

New Orleans fire fighters stage second sickout

New Orleans fire fighters called in sick, May 5, for the second time in a month. The job action continues the dispute with City Hall over a $5 million budget surplus and the permanent shuttering of eight engine companies. The Fire Department reported 113 fire fighters called in sick, requiring closure of four fire companies and the retention of 86 fire personnel on overtime to provide fire suppression services. Seventy-six fire fighters scheduled to work did report to their stations.

Mayor Marc Morial characterized the sickout, like the one last month, as an "illegal job action." The mayor stated that he was consulting with lawyers regarding taking punitive action against the fire fighters involved.

New Orleans Fire Fighters Association President Bill Sanchez said the union did not

sanction either sickout, but refused to criticize the fire fighters who participated. "I understand their frustration in dealing with a mayor who continually refuses to honor our contract."

The union charges that since 1977 the city has refused to honor a contract provision that would decrease by two hours the amount of accumulated time to reach overtime eligibility. Additionally, fire fighters are seeking a portion of the city's budget surplus to fill a reported 70 vacancies caused by retirements and resignations. Further, the Morial administration has eliminated eight engine companies as a cost savings move. 

In a touch of irony, reportedly the 86 individuals who received overtime pay earlier this month are the same persons who called in ill April 13 but were denied sick pay.

National study on smoke hazards slated

The Fire Protection Research Foundation (FPRF), an affiliate of the non-profit National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) announced last month the launching of a major private/public fire research initiative to study the effects of fires on preventing fire fighters and victims from escaping smoke and other toxic products. The two-year, $1,000,000 study will explore the relatively uncharted field of how smoke and heat impede survival during fires. While many studies have been conducted on the lethal effects of smoke inhalation - the leading cause of death from fires - much less is known about the effect smoke has on a resident's ability to escape or a fire fighter's potential for incapacitation. 

Safety measures aimed at fire-caused incapacitation and health effects were first

introduced in the European Community (EC). Recently, members of the EC placed the regulations before the International Standards Organization (ISO). But regulators found information upon which to base decisions to be scarce. "Unfortunately, knowledge and data are virtually non-existent in this area," said FPRF President Rick Mulhaupt. "Presently, no one can tell whether the policy would help or hurt public and fire fighter safety, or building and furnishings fire safety. Proposing the regulation in the ISO puts fire safety questions in the middle of international trade considerations, with potentially far-reaching consequences. There is an urgent need for scientific data." 

A research team at the National Institute of Standards and Technology will lead the study. The research, scheduled to start in late summer, will


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gather data on the known effects of fire smoke from official reports and laboratory studies. The study will develop a standard method for measuring the gases generated when everyday products burn and will assemble a database of the results. Fire smoke is made up of tiny particles and hundreds of gases, some lethal, some not. Smoke can lead to mental disorientation, coughing, and eye irritation. These factors could impede a victim or fire fighter in escaping from a burning structure. 

Chicago fire fighters sue siren manufacturer

A psychologist conducting a word association examination with a patient says "fire engine." The patient is likely to respond "red" or "siren." The bright color and the piercing sound are synonymous with the public's perception of the fire service. Chicago fire fighters apparently have no problem with the color of their apparatus but do have a complaint with the noise. Last month, over two dozen fire fighters filed suit against the provider of sirens for the city's fire apparatus and ambulances. Reportedly, at least 500 other fire fighters have registered with their union in case attorneys are successful in making the suit a class action.

The suit accuses the Federal Signal Corporation of negligence. The petition alleges that the company's sirens are "defective . . . in that repeated exposure to the intense noise . . . causes permanent, irreversible hearing loss." The sirens operate at 125 decibels. In comparison, a gasoline-powered lawnmower produces about 100 decibels

at a point four feet from the exhaust muffler. One source characterized the siren's volume as somewhere between a rock concert and a jet engine.

An attorney for the fire fighters claims that the design of the siren produces an excessively loud sound that travels in all directions instead of being focused forward. A shroud on the siren could still alert on-coming motorist while protecting fire fighters' ears. Attorney Jordan Margolis claimed that fire sirens are louder than those on police vehicles. Additionally, fire fighters assigned to older apparatus are more exposed to the blaring sound because they ride outside. 

Sirens on newer fire apparatus are generally mounted on the front bumper instead of on the cab roof. Additionally, newer engines and ladder trucks allow fire personnel to ride inside an enclosed cab. Some Chicago fire fighters reportedly are wearing ear protectors designed for target shooting to reduce the sound. 

Union leave time may cost Omaha fire chief

The labor agreement between the City of Omaha, Nebraska, and its fire fighters' union permits organization officers to use up to 1,200 hours of "union leave." In 1998, union officials exceeded the permissible level, allegedly costing the city about $180,000. What to do? Send the union a bill? Offset the leave against time in the next year of the contract? Dock the pay of the fire fighters who used the leave? No, Mayor Hal Daub has a better idea _ take it out on the former fire chief! 

Mayor Daub has withheld $17,715 in unpaid vacation leave due the city's retired Fire Chief Tom Graeve. The Daub administration points to a provision of city law that calls for withholding

unused vacation money from a departing employee who is "guilty of fraud or other activities resulting in monetary loss to the city."

The union, Local 385, of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, has come to the ex-chief's defense. Union officials claim that Daub's administration knew they were taking leave in excess of the permissible contract amount and that some of the time was actually used in 1997 to campaign for Daub! The mayor denies the allegation.

The Douglas County Sheriff's Office has conducted an investigation of the matter. The county prosecutor is reviewing the results of the inquiry



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although it is unclear what criminal charges could flow from the incident.

City council is apparently unimpressed by the Mayor's view of the problem and has scheduled

a May 25 meeting to consider the matter. Preliminary indications are that the council favors paying the retired chief the value of his accumulated vacation time. 

Indianapolis fire fighters disciplined over magazine photos

The Indianapolis fire chief has eased up on discipline of several fire fighters involved in a photo session of questionable taste. Chief Keith Smith has decided to suspend eight-year veteran Chris Hanner for six months instead of firing him. Two other fire fighters who had originally received 24-hour suspensions have seen their penalties withdrawn. The action came one day after the Indianapolis Police Department disciplined several officers in connection with the same incident.

The matter started last December when a city fire truck stopped at a downtown newsstand that was hosting an autograph session for a female model often featured in Club, a hard-core men's magazine. After the fire fighters arrived, the model posed for photos in front of the fire apparatus. Then, the model and a Club magazine photographer accompanied fire fighters to Station 5 where the female model posed for more pictures, including some where the model exposed her breasts. Several of the photos

subsequently appeared in two issues of Club, including one photo of the model and Hanner. The department uniform patch was visible in some of the pictures.

Following an investigation of the incident, Chief Smith initially sought termination of Hanner and suspensions for six other fire fighters. Hanner's discipline was reduced after he expressed remorse for his involvement. He also did not expect his image to appear the magazine. The suspension will cost the fire fighter about $25,000 in salary. 

In addition to the suspension, Hanner must complete 160 hours of community service, transfer to another station, and surrender supervisory duties for one year. He will be placed on departmental probation for one year. 

The department and the Indianapolis Professional Fire Fighters Association plan to offer training on ethics and professional conduct to help prevent future incidents. 

Litigation

Cases of interest

Sex discrimination

Epps graduated from the fire fighter academy in 1990 and was assigned to an engine and truck company. The firehouse to which she was assigned did not have separate sleeping quarters or bathroom or shower facilities for women. Although her male co-fire fighters had acted in a manner to allow her privacy when she needed to use the shower or bathroom, no such accommodation was made in the bunkroom. Consequently, Epps chose to sleep on an old couch in the garage of the facility. In 1995, she began working occasional overtime for a different platoon. During that time, the platoon captain allegedly dragged the couch out into the street and sawed it into pieces using a chain saw. Epps then began sleeping on a lounge chair but the fire captain ordered her to sleep in the bunkhouse with the men. She was allegedly subjected to a variety of other forms of mistreatment by the same fire captain. In 1995, Epps filed a complaint with the department. She was led to believe that the matter had been referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1997, she


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filed another complaint with the civil service commission. The fire chief subsequently met with her and apologized for the conduct of the platoon captain but took no other action. Epps then contacted the EEOC who told her that it had not been contacted by anyone from the city regarding her complaint and that the time for filing a complaint had expired. Epps then filed suit against the city alleging a variety of federal claims regarding sex discrimination. City moves to dismiss the case.

HELD: Epps files a claim of disparate impact discrimination based on the fire department's policy of not having separate sleeping, shower, and bathroom facilities for female fire fighters. As shocking as these claims may be, they must be dismissed because Epps did not comply with the procedural requirements that she file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to filing suit. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims under federal fair employment laws unless the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC. Given that Epps failed to comply with the EEOC administrative rules, her claim must be dismissed. Similarly, her claim of constitutional deprivation must be dismissed. Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitations for constitutional rights claims, federal courts borrow a state's statute of limitations governing analogous causes of action. Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for personal injury is two years and that statute is applied to civil rights claims. Epps' complaint was filed in 1998, but her cause of action arose out of incidents that occurred in 1995 and 1996. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations bars this suit as well. Case dismissed. [Epps v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 33 F.Supp.2d 409 (W.D. Pa. 1998)]

O'Callaghan entered a second fire fighter candidate course. Three weeks before graduation he fell while performing one of the training drills and tore the cartilage in his right knee. He was hospitalized and did not complete the course. O'Callaghan subsequently filed an application for a duty-related disability benefit. He claimed that he became disabled as a result of an act of duty when he injured his knee while taking part in a training drill as a candidate fire fighter. Retirement board denied his application. He then filed for an ordinary disability pension, which also was denied. Trial court affirmed the board's denial and fire fighter appeals.

HELD: Illinois statute provides for a duty disability pension for "an active fireman who is or becomes disabled on or after the effective date as the result of a specific injury, or accumulative injuries, or a specific illness incurred or resulting from an act or acts of duty." The pension board denied O'Callaghan's claim on the grounds that he was not disabled "as a result of an act or acts of duty." The statute defines "an act of duty" as any act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinance of a city, by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person." The pension board argues that the phrase "having for its direct purpose the saving of life or property of another" modifies each of the preceding clauses in the definition of "act of duty." Thus, the board says that fire fighter training has only an indirect purpose of saving life or property. This interpretation of the statute is erroneous. The word "or" is a disjunctive particle and requires that the subsections which it connects be read separately from one another. It has long been held that the word "or" as used in its ordinary sense marks an alternative indicating the various members of the sentence which it connects are to be taken separately. When this rule is applied to the statute at hand, the phrase "having for its direct purpose the saving of life or property of another person" only modifies the directly preceding clause "any act performed by

Disability eligibility

When he was 49 years old, O'Callaghan was hired by the Chicago Fire Department as a fire fighter. He began a three-month fire academy. A month into the course he suffered stomach problems and did not complete the training. He did, however, remain on the department payroll. Later in the year,


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an active fireman while on duty." Accordingly, it was the legislative intent to define "act of duty" as: (1) any act imposed on an active fireman by ordinance of a city; (2) any act imposed by department rules and regulations; or (3) any act performed by an active fireman while on duty that has for its direct purpose the saving of life or property of another person. Since O'Callaghan was injured while performing an act imposed on him by the rules and regulations of the department, he was not required to prove that the act also had for its direct purpose the saving of life or property. Reversed for fire fighter awarding duty related disability benefits. [O'Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 706 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1998)] subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging that the chimney presented an unreasonable risk of harm because it was constructed of one layer of bricks and did not contain a chimney liner. Trial court rejected Pora's claim that the suit was barred by the Fireman's Rule. Ultimately, a jury returned a verdict of over $500,000. Homeowner appeals.

HELD: To prevail on a claim of premises liability, a plaintiff must allege and prove the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty. Here, the homeowner claims that the fire fighter failed to present evidence establishing the existence of the duty because of the Fireman's Rule. The Fireman's Rule is a doctrine that limits the extent to which fire fighters may recover for injuries sustained when they enter into privately owned property in the discharge of their duties. Premised on the concept of assumption of risk, the Fireman's Rule places a limitation of landowner liability based upon the fact that fire fighters knowingly and voluntarily subject themselves to certain hazards while fighting fires. When a fire fighter enters upon a person's property to fight a fire, he assumes the risk of being injured by causes related to or arising out of the fire. Under Illinois law, however, a homeowner still has the duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain property in a safe condition so as to prevent injury to a fire fighter due to causes independent of the fire. The rationale supporting the Fireman's Rule is based on the fact that fire fighters receive specialized training to anticipate and encounter the risks associated with fire fighting. While a fire fighter may be able to recover for unexpected or hidden damages attributable to a landowner's negligence, he may not recover for injuries caused by obvious dangers or dangers which his training and experience would lead him to reasonably anticipate. The evidence at trial established that fire fighters recognize that falling objects and the collapse of building structures are inevitably associated with the task of fighting fires. Similarly, they are aware that fire can possibly weaken structures and a severely damaged house

Fireman's rule

Pora was the resident of a farmhouse that was approximately 100 years old. The house contained a chimney constructed primarily of cinder block except for a portion above the roof line. That portion was constructed of a single lay of brick. Over the years the interior of the house had been significantly renovated, but the chimney had not been altered. In 1994, sparks from a burning brush fire ignited the house. The volunteer fire company, including Bally, responded to the fire. The house burned for over two hours at extremely high temperatures. Significant portions of the walls, ceilings, floors and roof were burned away. Bally and his crew entered the house through a second floor window. Their job was to open up the area by removing the ceiling and wallboards so water could be applied to the fire. After a while, Bally's squad took a break while another crew continued their work. Bally subsequently rejoined the fire combat efforts and reentered the house through the first floor. While proceeding up the main staircase, which was located about four feet from the chimney, the top portion of the chimney collapsed, falling through a hole in the roof and striking Bally on the back. He suffered substantial injuries, including a broken back. He became paralyzed below his waist. Bally


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poses the risk of collapse. The evidence in the case overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the chimney collapsed on the staircase due to causes related to the fire and fire fighting activities, such as the high degree of heat and the water being placed on the house. It cannot be said that an ordinary citizen entering the property in absence of a fire faces the same risk of injury as the fire fighter. The fire and fire fighting activities caused the chimney to fall through the weakened roof. This is a risk that Bally, as a fire fighter, assumed when he entered on the property to combat the fire. Claim is precluded by the Fireman's Rule. Reversed for homeowner. [Bally v. Pora, 706 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1999)] for nearly three years. At that time, the commission rejected the findings of the hearing examiner and chose to sustain the 30-day suspension. Deputy fire chief appeals.

HELD: At the time of the civil service hearing, Patterson could not state with certainty that he had not said "food stamps" instead of "free food." He did state that whatever he said was said as an attempt at humor and not to disparage anyone on account of race or gender. A review of Patterson's service record as well as his personal relationship with the African-American community leads to the conclusion that the worst that Patterson could have said was a remark that was insensitive and unprofessional or a bad joke. The evidence does not establish that the comment was motivated by racial or gender animus. Similarly, the action of the civil service commission in waiting nearly three years to deal with the hearing examiner's report is outside the range of reasonableness. The written apology was appropriate punishment for what can best be characterized as a stupid and insensitive remark. Reversed for deputy fire chief restoring all pay and benefits. [Patterson v. New Orleans Fire Department, 727 So.2d 551 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998)]

Disciplinary grounds

Patterson was a senior deputy fire chief, a 30-year veteran. In 1994, he entered the fire fighters credit union. In addition to the white teller, there were perhaps an African-American male and four African-American females present. This was more than the normal complement of individuals usually found in the small office. The crowd prompted Patterson to comment aloud that they must be "giving away free food." Subsequently, three of the African-American females wrote letters of complaint to the department saying they were offended by Patterson's remarks. They alleged that Patterson said, "They must be giving away food stamps," which the individuals felt, both as females who had been on welfare in the past and as African-Americans, was disparaging. Patterson was charged with violating departmental rules regarding racist and sexist behavior. An internal hearing resulted in a recommendation that Patterson be issued a letter of reprimand and apologize to the complaining witnesses in writing. Despite this recommendation, the fire superintendent suspended Patterson for 30 days. Patterson appealed to the civil service commission. A hearing officer concluded that the city had failed to prove its allegations that the remarks were racial. The entire civil service commission, however, failed to act on the findings

Promotion procedures

Under Ohio statute a fire fighter becomes eligible to take the promotional examination if "he has served 24 months in the rank of regular fireman." Deemer and Gianantonio had worked for the Ashtabula Fire Department for one year. Prior to working in Ashtabula, however, they had worked in another city for over one year. Thus, they had total fire fighting experience in excess of two years. When the promotion exam for engineer was offered, they requested permission to take the test. The civil service commission granted the permission. The two fire fighters took the examination with two other fire fighters and attained the two highest scores. Seven days after the posting of the results, however, the fire fighters who finished third and fourth lodged a complaint claiming that Deemer and Gianantonio should not have been allowed to participate in the


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process because they had not served the 24 months on the Ashtabula Fire Department. Subsequently, the civil service commission certified the engineer promotion list without including the names of Deemer and Gianantonio. The city promoted the other two fire fighters to the rank of engineer. Deemer and Gianantonio filed suit. Trial court subsequently ordered the civil service commission to certify their names to the list and to promote them to engineer. Commission appeals.

HELD: The civil service commission argues the trial court made an error of law by concluding that the two fire fighters were eligible to sit for the promotion examination. A review of Ohio statute reveals nothing requiring that the 24 months of service be with the same department. The law is simply silent regarding whether credit is to be given for service in another fire department than the one in which the fire fighter is currently employed. When a statute contains ambiguous terms, a court interpreting the statute must determine what the legislature intended the statute to mean. Courts are not inclined to be technically restrictive in the matter of the eligibility to take examinations where the parties have acquired experience in the position of the next lower rank for a period of time sufficient to qualify them to take examination for the next higher rank. The purpose of the statute appears to be to ensure that fire fighters who are promoted have requisite fire fighting experience prior to promotion. The fire fighter may accumulate that experience with more than one fire department. Given the general view that such statutes should be liberally construed and the lack of any local rule requiring the experience to be obtained in a single agency, trial court was correct in determining that the fire fighters were eligible to take the exam and their names should have been certified on the promotion list. It is noteworthy that the statutory definition of "seniority" is limited to service in a single agency. Seniority is different than time in rank. Time in rank pertains to time accrued within a single job title, while seniority relates to time accumulated in a single municipal civil service system, regardless

of rank or job title. Affirmed for fire fighters ordering them promoted to engineer. [Deemer v. Ashtabula City Civil Service Commission, 707 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 1997)]

Dismissal procedures

Montemayor passed the fire academy test with a high score. She was also interviewed by a board of three high ranking fire fighters. When Montemayor learned she had failed the interview, she complained to the fire chief that she was asked inappropriate questions about sex and religion. In response, the fire department gave Montemayor a second interview, which she passed. She, however, was not selected for the academy. Instead, candidates with lower test scores were chosen. Montemayor filed suit against the city alleging a violation of state civil service law. Texas civil service law required the city manager to fill open fire fighter positions with the applicants having the highest test scores. Montemayor alleged she was passed over in retaliation for her complaints about the review board. Trial court found that the city had violated the civil service law and ordered the city to permit Montemayor to enter the fire academy. Montemayor attended the fire academy, became an employee of the fire department, and completed the course. The department, however, alleged that her performance was substandard and refused to place her in a fire station with other academy graduates. The fire chief terminated Montemayor's employment. As the former fire fighter attempted to maintain her suit, the trial court granted summary judgment for the city upholding the exclusive authority of the fire chief to terminate probationary employees. Montemayor appeals.

HELD: Montemayor asserts the fire chief's discretion to terminate probationary fire fighters is limited to good cause, while the city contends the fire chief's discretion is absolute. Texas civil service law characterizes a fire fighter, police officer, or academy trainee as a one-year probationary employee. During the probationary period the department shall discharge the probationary person



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and remove them from payroll if the person's appointment was not regular or was not in accordance with the law or civil service commission rules. Prior case law holds that until a probationary fire fighter completes the probationary period, the fire fighter serves at the discretion of the fire chief. Similarly, the chief's decision to discharge a probationary employee is final and non-appealable. The statute's directive regarding discharge of employees with "irregular" appointments does not limit the authority of the fire chief to discharge probationary fire fighters. Thus, in this case the fire chief had sole discretion to retain or terminate Montemayor. Additionally, the collective bargaining agreement between the fire fighters' union and the city provides Montemayor no relief. The contract affords a probationary employee no protection beyond that of an at-will employee. Affirmed for fire department. [Montemayor v. San Antonio Fire Department, 985 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. _ San Antonio 1998)] for worker's compensation benefits. The insurance carrier contested the claim on the grounds that the death was not a work-related injury. The hearing commission, however, issued a ruling in favor of the dead volunteer fire fighter. Trial court confirmed the ruling and insurance carrier appeals.

HELD: The insurance carrier contends that Prueser was killed while attempting to save members of his family and was not acting within the course of his duties as a volunteer fire fighter. Deciding whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment under the Wisconsin worker's compensation law is a mixed question of law and fact. As to the facts, the hearing board's findings are conclusive on appeal, if they are supported by credible and substantial evidence. Credible evidence is that which excludes speculation and conjecture. The evidence established that Prueser was an active member of the volunteer fire department and trained in dealing with fires. All volunteers were required to immediately respond to a fire whenever they were confronted with one. They were also trained to protect life and property and to attempt rescues rather than wait for an officer to arrive at the scene. The board also found that Prueser acted more responsibly in a panic situation than would a person without fire training. This view was supported by testimony from his wife. Similarly, Prueser's behavior during the fire was consistent with that of a fire fighter. The procedures that he used in attempting to rescue his children as well as pounding on the wall to alert neighbors were consistent with the duties of a fire fighter. The findings of the hearing board are due great deference. It was rational for the board to conclude that Prueser was acting at least in substantial part to further his duties as a volunteer fire fighter. The fact that the citizens he was attempting to rescue were his family members should not make any difference in this determination. Awarding of worker's compensation death benefits affirmed. [Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Department v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, 589 N.W.2d 445 (Wis. App. 1998)]

Worker's compensation

Prueser was a volunteer fire fighter who awoke one night to find his own house ablaze. Besides himself, his wife and three children were asleep in the home. Prueser immediately woke his wife and daughter, who were in the bed next to him, and then went to find the younger son and daughter. Prueser ordered the wife and children to crawl on the floor and to press their noses to the screened window for air. He threw a desk through the window so that the wife and daughters could get enough fresh air. He then pounded on wall of the children's room and yelled to his neighbors that the building was on fire. At this point he began to hear his young son crying. He left the children's room to rescue the son. Prueser, however, was overcome by heavy smoke and collapsed. By this time members of the volunteer fire department were at the window of the children's bedroom and rescued the wife and two girls. Two fire fighters entered the house and found Prueser and the son overcome by smoke. Neither was able to be revived. Prueser's wife filed a claim