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filed another complaint
with the civil service commission. The fire chief subsequently met with
her and apologized for the conduct of the platoon captain but took no other
action. Epps then contacted the EEOC who told her that it had not been
contacted by anyone from the city regarding her complaint and that the
time for filing a complaint had expired. Epps then filed suit against the
city alleging a variety of federal claims regarding sex discrimination.
City moves to dismiss the case.
HELD: Epps files a claim of disparate impact discrimination based on
the fire department's policy of not having separate sleeping, shower, and
bathroom facilities for female fire fighters. As shocking as these claims
may be, they must be dismissed because Epps did not comply with the procedural
requirements that she file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior
to filing suit. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims under federal
fair employment laws unless the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC.
Given that Epps failed to comply with the EEOC administrative rules, her
claim must be dismissed. Similarly, her claim of constitutional deprivation
must be dismissed. Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitations
for constitutional rights claims, federal courts borrow a state's statute
of limitations governing analogous causes of action. Under Pennsylvania
law, the statute of limitations for personal injury is two years and that
statute is applied to civil rights claims. Epps' complaint was filed in
1998, but her cause of action arose out of incidents that occurred in 1995
and 1996. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations bars this suit as well.
Case dismissed. [Epps v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 33 F.Supp.2d
409 (W.D. Pa. 1998)] |
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O'Callaghan
entered a second fire fighter candidate course. Three weeks before graduation
he fell while performing one of the training drills and tore the cartilage
in his right knee. He was hospitalized and did not complete the course.
O'Callaghan subsequently filed an application for a duty-related disability
benefit. He claimed that he became disabled as a result of an act of duty
when he injured his knee while taking part in a training drill as a candidate
fire fighter. Retirement board denied his application. He then filed for
an ordinary disability pension, which also was denied. Trial court affirmed
the board's denial and fire fighter appeals.
HELD: Illinois statute provides for a duty disability pension for "an
active fireman who is or becomes disabled on or after the effective date
as the result of a specific injury, or accumulative injuries, or a specific
illness incurred or resulting from an act or acts of duty." The pension
board denied O'Callaghan's claim on the grounds that he was not disabled
"as a result of an act or acts of duty." The statute defines "an act of
duty" as any act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinance of a city,
by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed
by an active fireman while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving
of the life or property of another person." The pension board argues that
the phrase "having for its direct purpose the saving of life or property
of another" modifies each of the preceding clauses in the definition of
"act of duty." Thus, the board says that fire fighter training has only
an indirect purpose of saving life or property. This interpretation of
the statute is erroneous. The word "or" is a disjunctive particle and requires
that the subsections which it connects be read separately from one another.
It has long been held that the word "or" as used in its ordinary sense
marks an alternative indicating the various members of the sentence which
it connects are to be taken separately. When this rule is applied to the
statute at hand, the phrase "having for its direct purpose the saving of
life or property of another person" only modifies the directly preceding
clause "any act performed by |
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