The case, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., concerned twin sisters with uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other. With corrective lenses they could see normally. The airline rejected their applications as commercial pilots because they did not meet the company's 20/100 vision requirement. The sisters sued, claiming that the policy violated the ADA. Lower courts held that the sisters were not disabled within the meaning of the law; rather, they simply were unable to meet the qualifications of a particular job, global airline pilot.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the court's majority, concluded that determination of disability must be made after considering corrective measures, such as eyeglasses and medication. "ADA coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures," she wrote. "A `disability' exists only where an impairment `substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it `might,' `could,' or `would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken." The justice noted that Congress made a specific finding that 43 million individuals were disabled. Yet, 100 million people have some level of vision impairment. Congress did not intend extension of the ADA to all persons with some level of physical or psychological impairment but only to those substantially disabled. 

In Alden, a group of probation officers had sought overtime compensation under the FLSA. They first sued in U.S. District Court but when, in 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that states enjoy sovereign immunity as to many acts of Congress, the case was refiled in state court. The state courts ruled that Maine was also immune from suit in that forum. On appeal, a five-justice Supreme Court majority ruled that sovereign immunity bars private FLSA lawsuits against states. Justices noted, however, that the immunity did not extend to local governmental entities. The court suggested that the federal government could pursue the overtime claim on behalf of the state probation officers. Critics of the decision asserted that reliance upon the federal government to enforce individual FLSA claims is unrealistic because the lack of sufficient government lawyers. 

The decision blocks claims filed against state governments based on federal legislation enacted

Legal scholars suggest that the Alden decision is the latest in a line of Supreme Court cases wherein a conservative majority has sought to reestablish the balance of power between the federal government and the states through the use of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In the short run, the decision would seem to indicate that sex and race discrimination claims against state governments will have to be pursued by the EEOC or DOJ, rather than individuals. Over the long term, some scholars see the case as inevitably leading to the implementation of broader restrictions on the power of Congress to enact legislation affecting state and local governments. If the decision is taken to its logical extreme, proposals for a public safety officer's bill of rights, a national public employee bargaining law, and extension of occupational safety laws to public entities may be viewed as beyond the power of Congress. 

Under the proposed law, bargaining rights over wages and working conditions would be granted to fire fighters and other public safety officers in jurisdictions that do not currently permit labor contracts. The Federal Labor Relations Authority would oversee implementation of the law. The IAFF claims that 57,000 of its 225,000 members work without a formal labor agreement. 

Cosponsors of the legislation include 180

The bill is currently in the House Education

The ruling was a political victory for Johnson, a Republican, who several times rejected efforts by Democratic members of the state legislature to give new life to the 1992 public employee bargaining law. When enacted, the statute, which obligated state and local governments to bargain in good faith with employee unions, was

Without the law, New Mexico returns to permissive bargaining. Governmental entities will no longer be legally obligated to bargain nor to provide union dues check-off. However, the old law also specifically prohibited strikes and picketing of elected officials' homes. The absence of a statute prohibiting bargaining does permit voluntary negotiations and contracts. Local communities can also enact their own collective bargaining ordinances. Contracts currently in force presumably will continue until their expiration dates. Over 150,000 state and local governmental workers had been covered by the statute.

Some individuals, including construction

Fire fighters have been without a contract for more than two years. Negotiations have stalled because of the town's proposal to combine fire and police dispatch services.

Officials of the two events are reportedly contemplating legal action against the pickets. The town and the union began mediation in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 

Labor talks between the union, Local 345 of the International Association of Fire Fighters,

Fire fighters are asking for 12 percent raises in each of the next 3 years. The city has offered 5 percent raises. 

Supreme Court update

Equally interesting is the Christensen case. In April, the justices asked the Solicitor General, the official who represents the federal government before the court, to submit a brief on whether the court should consider the case. Apparently, that

Christensen raises the question of whether a public employer can control when a deputy sheriff uses accumulated compensatory time. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the employer could require the deputy to use his compensatory time. Another federal appeals court in an earlier case held that once earned the time belongs to the employee and the employee generally controls when to use compensatory time. When the court reconvenes October 4, it may choose to hear both, either, or neither of the cases. 

Cases of interest

HELD: The trial court concluded that Richards' pregnancy did not qualify her as "disabled" under the ADA. She concedes that her pregnancy does not impair a major life activity, but argues that the city regarded her as having an impairment. In addition, she cites the collective bargaining agreement that stipulates that pregnancies shall be considered as "temporary medical disabilities." Richards' claim, however, is premised upon a faulty reading of the ADA. To be regarded as having a "disability," federal regulations require that the employer believe the individual has a substantially limited impairment that the individual does not actually have. Richards concedes that her pregnancy is not a substantially limiting impairment under the ADA. Thus, her claim does not remotely fall within the definition. Likewise, use of the phrase "temporary disability" in the labor contract to describe pregnancy does not constitute illegal discrimination. The attachment of the word "disability" in the labor contract does not automatically transform the condition into one that is recognizable under the ADA. Certainly, a collective bargaining agreement that would allow discrimination against people with disabilities would

HELD: The governing premise of the ADA is that an employer shall not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. Discrimination occurs when the plaintiff proves that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is a qualified individual for the job in question; and (3) an adverse employment decision was made because of his disability. An employer is under an obligation to make reasonable accommodation to avoid discrimination under the ADA. The trial court determined that Burch had failed to prove that he was a qualified individual with a disability for the job of fire fighter. The court ruled that Burch could not perform the essential functions of the job, even with an accommodation. The law in this area is crystal clear . An otherwise qualified individual is one who is able to perform all the program's requirements in spite of his handicap. It is uncontested that Burch could not meet the essential physical demands of a fire fighter. He argues, however, that the department could have created a permanent light duty position or assigned him as a chauffeur to drive fire trucks. The city was under no obligation to make this type of accommodation. As a small department, no permanent light duty positions were available. All fire fighters were required to perform the task of fire fighting. Likewise, fire truck chauffeurs were expected to perform fire fighting duties at the scene. Burch could not perform the essential functions of the job, and the city is under no obligation under ADA to create a new job in order to reasonably accommodate someone with a disability. Likewise, Burch never specifically asked the city to transfer him to a light duty job. The city cannot be expected to know Burch's wishes absent his telling them. Even if Burch had requested reassignment to a particular job, the law requires him to also prove he is qualified for that position. This requires more than simply self-serving testimony that he could have performed

HELD: The issue presented is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to arbitration awards. The analysis of this issue begins with a restatement of familiar principles. Judicial review of arbitrable decisions is narrowly confined. When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrators through the terms of their submission, the extent of judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement. Because courts favor arbitration as a means of settling disputes, judicial review of arbitration awards is conducted in a manner to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrator's decision of the legal questions involved. It is the arbitrator's judgment that was bargained for and contracted for by the parties, and a court cannot substitute its own judgment merely because its interpretation might differ from that of the arbitrator. Arbitration awards can be overturned on questions of constitutionality of a statute or where the award convenes one or more of the statutory prohibitions. The doctrine of collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by, and validated in, a final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in the same lawsuit. Collateral estoppel expresses no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated and decided, it comes to rest. While this principle is well established in case law, it is not as established in arbitration law.

HELD: Pennsylvania statute and prior case law limit a fire department promotion list to a life of two years. The only legal remedy for irregularities on promotion is the awarding of a passing score or re-examination. Both remedies become meaningless when the eligibility list has expired. This process could create a situation where fire fighters challenging an oral exam would have no practical effect as the challenge would be subject to dismissal as moot. The two-year life span of the eligibility list affords insufficient time for a case such as this to receive appellate review. Since this problem is likely to reoccur, the court will exercise review of it. In general, promotion exams must be impartial, practical and deal with the duties and requirements of the position to be filled. State law permits the use of out-of-town raters to grade the oral portion on a promotion exam. The use of out-of-town raters is to avoid bias, and the appearance thereof, that may arise when grading is performed by personnel who may be familiar with particular

HELD: The commission initially asserts that Cassidy's First Amendment claim must fail because he has not suffered an adverse employment action sufficient to constitute a violation of his First Amendment right. Specifically, it is argued that refusal to promote does not constitute the required adverse employment action. A review of case law, however, reveals this to be too narrow a reading of the law. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects a public employee from "an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech rights." Clearly, non-promotion or a retaliatory failure to promote may indeed threaten to chill free speech. Established law holds that a public employer may not establish conditions that infringe on a public employee's right to free speech. In safeguarding that right, the courts

HELD: The retirees first contend that because retirees are not part of the bargaining unit that the labor union could not lawfully negotiate a change in retiree benefits. Prior case law stands for the proposition that a union has no duty to represent retirees but that retirees are free to make the union their agent if they so choose. There is no requirement in Wisconsin that retired employees be represented in collective negotiations. Here, the retirees did not affirmatively agree to have the union represent them, but they accepted the terms of the various collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the union after their retirement, and this acceptance implied that they consented to give the