The new rules came about after intense negotiations by public safety union leaders and local governmental officials. Police officers also must pass similar fitness and medical testing. A compromise resulted in the fitness standards applying only to persons hired after November 1, 1996. The law covers about 30 percent of fire fighters in 189 Massachusetts communities. Another 162 communities are not participating in the program but set their own standards.

Individuals who fail the fitness test will have 16 weeks to train and try again. If they fail a second time, termination proceedings may be instituted.

Fire fighters and police officers agreed to the fitness law in 1987 as part of a pension reform

To pass the fitness test, fire fighters must complete a stair-climbing event, a ladder-raising exercise, a hose advance, a forcible entry event, a search, a rescue through a doorway, and a ceiling hook exercise. These tests will be conducted under job simulation conditions. In addition, every four years a standard medical examination with cholesterol screening and body fat measurements must be passed.

Union officials suggested that the new rules will put the burden on local departments to keep their fire fighters healthy by providing fitness equipment and time to exercise. 

Municipal officials noted that state statute, the so-called heart _ lung law, provides that cardiovascular diseases in fire fighters and police officers is presumed to be job related for workers compensation purposes. Thus, it is only fair that public safety personnel maintain an appropriate level of physical fitness.

Vicksburg Mayor Robert Walker issued the memo last summer stating that only basic cable

Fire fighters, who sometimes spend as much as 48 hours straight at the station, claim it is none of the city's business what they watch if they pay for the connection themselves. "We live there for one-third of our life; we should be able to watch what we want," said Vicksburg fire fighter David Richards.

David Ingebretsen, Mississippi ACLU executive director, said the organization has

Earlier this month, Jennifer Manzella charged that she performed oral sex on as many as five fire fighters a night over an 11-year period. In her statement, Manzella said she was paid $25 for each sex act she performed and claimed that sex for pay occurred at several firehouses. She is currently being held in the Cook County Jail on charges she burglarized the home of a retired fire fighter with whom she shared an 11-year relationship. According to Manzella's statement to investigators, the alleged

"The firehouse is a workplace _ not a clubhouse and not a fraternity house. These are serious allegations and, if true, these men have violated the public trust," Fire Commissioner James Joyce said.

Bill Klugelman, president of Chicago Firefighters Union, Local 2, accused the city administration of using flimsy evidence against the fire fighters. "It's a knee-jerk reaction to placate the press. Show me the proof. This is craziness. . . I know this didn't happen," he told the newspaper.

Commissioner Joyce used the incident to renew his call for changing fire fighter work shifts of 24 hours on and 48 hours off, an alteration that can occur only at the bargaining table. Kugleman responded, "Put it on the table. I'll sign it. Eight hours (a day), whatever they want. I'm calling his bluff. I'm getting tired of having people try to negotiate this contract in the press."

Officials of Local 2334 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, say Mayor A. Ralph Mollis berated a fire fighter for not saluting him at a structural fire last September. The fire fighter was operating the pump on fire apparatus at the time of the incident.

Regulations of the North Providence Fire Department state that a ranking officer, which includes the mayor, ". . . shall be saluted . . . at least

Union president James Grande, claimed that the mayor said the fire fighter could be terminated if he did not salute. A similar incident took place three years ago during the mayor's first term when fire fighters at an Independence Day celebration failed to salute. The events only recently came to light when a copy of the union's protest letter to the mayor became public.

Mollis defended his actions saying, "None of the incidents are over saluting. These are incidents of respect: my respect for them, their respect for the public and their respect for their superiors. Nothing more; nothing less.

Many of the nation's fire departments require

Last year, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) filed a petition to create a union of 38 members, including 27 call fire fighters. A Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) hearing officer subsequently ruled that the union could include call fire fighters, saying they did not fall into the category of on-call workers

Municipal officials claim that permitting call fire fighters to unionize would set a risky precedent and could result in widespread changes in the relationship between fire departments and the many small towns that rely on call fire service personnel. An estimated 60 New Hampshire communities rely heavily on volunteer and call personnel in addition to paid fire fighters. None of these groups currently operates under a labor contract, although many paid departments do bargain.

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest

HELD: District chiefs argue that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata dictate that the court rule the same way in their favor as it did in the first round of litigation. The city argues, however, that an intervening Supreme Court decision renders the application of those two doctrines inappropriate. According to the law of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that issue may not be relitigated in a different suit involving parties to the first case. The doctrine of collateral estoppel and res judicata, however, apply only in cases where controlling facts and law remain unchanged. The 1997 Supreme Court decision in Auer v. Robbins constituted an intervening change to the law sufficient to render collateral estoppel and res judicata inapplicable to the present case. In Auer the Supreme Court ruled that the salary basis test denies exempt status when employees are covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or other deductions in pay, as a practical matter. The standard is met if it is either an actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy exists that creates a significant likelihood of such deductions. There must be a clear and particularized policy that communicates that deductions will be made in specific circumstances. Prior case law holds that a general personnel manual saying that pay deductions are possible for all employees does not effectively communicate to salaried individuals that they are subject to that rule. In the present case, the written policy applies both to the district chiefs and other fire department employees who are not paid on a salary basis. This policy does not effectively communicate that pay deductions are an anticipated form of punishment for the district chiefs. No clear inference can be drawn as to the likelihood of the sanction being applied to the district chiefs. The evidence in the first trial established that no

HELD: The Professional Rescuers Doctrine bars those engaged in rescue work as part of their employment from recovering money damages for injuries sustained on the job as a result of the negligence of the person rescued. This case presents the question of what exceptions may exist to that doctrine. Prior case law holds that the proper test for determining whether the doctrine applies to bar recovery is whether the hazard ultimately responsible for causing the injuries is inherently within the coverage of those dangers which are unique to, and generally associated with, the particular rescue activity. Every other state that has considered the question has found that the doctrine is inapplicable to cases involving an independent tort. Those cases hold that there must be some nexus between the negligence and the emergency, either through a connection with the negligent person rescued or the site of the emergency. The negligence of a third party in a place remote from the location and unrelated to the cause of the emergency is an independent tort unconnected to the Professional Rescuers Doctrine. Although EMTs regularly ride in emergency vehicles as part of their employment

HELD: The U.S. Supreme Court has established a set of principles governing arbitration. The first principle is that arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute that he has not agreed to so submit. The second principle is that the question of whether an agreement creates a duty to arbitrate is undeniably an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakenly provide otherwise. The third principle is that in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, the court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. The final principle is that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is broad. In this case, however, the arbitration clause cannot be called broad because it contains