During his tenure as the IAFF leader Whitehead has been widely praised for his cooperation at the national level with various fire fighter professional organizations. He has worked closely with the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) in pressing for fire fighter safety legislation and increased federal funding for fire departments. Under his leadership the IAFF and IAFC developed a joint fire fighter fitness and wellness initiative.

Recently, a tribute dinner was held in Washington, D.C., honoring Whitehead. Among the

Whitehead has served as the General President since his election at the 1988 IAFF convention where he defeated the incumbent, John Gannon. Prior to his election, he held the position of Secretary-Treasurer. Whitehead was reelected by acclamation at the last two fire fighter conventions. He also serves as a Vice President on the AFL-CIO's Executive Council, giving the IAFF a voice at the highest level of the labor federation. President Whitehead was a Los Angeles County fire fighter for 28 years, retiring as a captain. He previously was president of Local 1014, IAFF, for more than a dozen years. 

In a ruling last month, U.S. District Judge Bernice Donald found that the 1987 statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as well as the state constitution. Fatal to the statute was the exclusion of five of the state's 95 counties from its coverage.

The case arose in 1998 when Local 3858 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, requested recognition and mandatory dues collection from the City of Germantown, a Memphis

City lawyers countered that the union was not "an employee association" within the meaning of the statute and that the statute was unconstitutional anyway. As to the first question, the court found that the union was indeed "an employee association" as defined by the common meaning of the term. However, the judge agreed with the city on the second question.

Both the federal and state constitutions

An appeal is expected. Until a higher court overturns the ruling or the legislature changes the law, Tennessee municipalities apparently will be under no statutory obligation to deduct fire fighter union dues as part of the payroll process. 

In 1976, the South Carolina legislature enacted a "right-to-work" law that deemed it unlawful for "any employer" to require "any employee" to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor organization. In 1993, the City of Myrtle Beach fire chief issued a directive barring supervisory fire fighters from joining a labor organization that represents the interests of non-supervisory fire fighters. Two fire lieutenants, Larry Branch and James Phalen, both members of Local 2345 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, brought suit claiming that the policy violated the state right-to-work statute.

Trial court ruled that the right-to-work statute

The fire fighters apparently presented no First Amendment freedom of association claim in their suit. 

The decision appears to end a battle that began last October with a community group's petition drive calling for a referendum on bargaining. The city council rejected the petition claiming such

In ruling for the city, Judge Stone noted that the council is free to enter into a collective bargaining contract with its employees but has apparently chosen not to. "The remedy for petitioners would appear to be political, not legal," the judge said. 

Off duty police officer Elton Jackson died in the April 1993 collision when the fire truck struck his personal motorcycle. The truck was responding to a fire alarm with lights and siren activated. Subsequent blood-alcohol tests showed that both the deceased and the fire engineer driving the apparatus were legally intoxicated.

A lawsuit last year ended in a mistrial. Prior to the retrial, the presiding judge ruled that fire engineer Robert Janozik's blood-alcohol level could be admitted as evidence but not the alcohol level of the deceased. City legal counsel, apparently fearing a large jury award in the case, offered to settle the matter.

Janozik was not criminally prosecuted in the incident. Fire department officials sought to terminate his employment but he continues on the

Some city officials expressed unhappiness with the application of the "last chance" provision in this case, suggesting it would be a topic in the next round of bargaining. City Alderman Ray Suarez told the Chicago Sun-Times, "A guy loses his life, killed by a man under the influence driving a large, powerful vehicle, and because of a last chance, he's still driving for the city. I find that really unacceptable." 

Bill Kugelman, president of the Chicago Fire Fighters Union, said, "He (Janozik) should not have been driving. He should have known better, but do we help people or do we just fire them? We've helped many people _ exempt rank people who are running the department now." Kugelman indicated that the union would not negotiate away the "last chance" policy.

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest

HELD: Howley argues she has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, she argues that the four-year requirement for promotion was arbitrary and the town selectively applied the requirement based upon her gender. To succeed on a sex discrimination charge, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action. The plaintiff must then show that the defendant's reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Here, there is no credible evidence of pretext. It is undisputed that Howley did not have the requisite number of years experience for promotion to assistant chief and that she scored second to last on the examination. Even though the exam board was composed entirely of males, this helps support the prima facie case of discrimination but does not defeat the other legitimate reasons for the decision. Similarly, Howley has not been the victim of sexual harassment through a hostile environment. Hostile environment sexual harassment claims must establish two elements. First, the victim must prove that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the condition of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, and second, the plaintiff must show that a specific basis exists for imputing that conduct to the employer. Case law holds that isolated remarks or occasional harassment do not rise to the level of a hostile work environment for which the employer is responsible. It is undisputed the Holdsworth verbally abused Howley at the fire fighters' association meeting and that such conduct is out of place in a civilized society. However, this one incidence of verbal harassment is insufficient to create a hostile work environment. There is no evidence Howley was ever harassed before or after that single event. Summary judgment for town granted. [Howley v. Town of Stratford, Connecticut, 87 F. Supp.2d 97 (D. Conn. 2000)]

HELD: It is well established that to prevail on a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show both that his speech was constitutionally protected and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's adverse action. To satisfy the first prong of this test the plaintiff must establish that his speech was made in his role as a private citizen, not as an employee, and touched on a matter of

HELD: The issue presented is whether the Public Duty Doctrine insulates the city from liability for the alleged negligence of a 911 operator and if so whether Lovelace alleged sufficient facts to support the "special duty" exception to the Public Duty Doctrine. For over 125 years the state and its agencies have been immune from tort liability under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. This doctrine, however, is subject to certain legislatively created exceptions allowing local governments to purchase liability insurance to protect the public and certain court made exceptions for public officials involved in conduct that is either corrupt, malicious, or outside the scope of their authority. North Carolina adopted the common law Public Duty Doctrine in a court decision in 1991. The North Carolina Supreme Court previously ruled that the common law rule known as the Public Duty Doctrine means that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public and, therefore, there is no liability for failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. This rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act. However, the court has never expanded the doctrine to any local governmental agency other than law enforcement agencies. The court similarly declines to expand the Public Duty Doctrine in this case. Rather, the Public Duty Doctrine, as it applies to North Carolina local governments, is limited to law enforcement agencies. Reversed for deceased's mother ordering reinstatement of case against fire department. [Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 526 S.E.2d 62 (N.C. 2000)] 

HELD: Under Ohio law, when a vacancy occurs in the ranks of a fire department and no eligibility list exists, the civil service commission has 60 days to conduct a promotional examination. An eligibility list will be established within 20 days of the grading of the exam and a certification list posted within 10 days. The person standing highest on the list shall be promoted. In reviewing this

HELD: Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, a municipality is immune from tort liability for its own acts or the acts of its agents unless the Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity. In order to recover damages from a governmental entity, a plaintiff's claim must fall within a specified exception allowed by the Texas Tort Claims Act. Under this statute, in claims that arise from the action of an employee of a municipality that involves a 911 emergency call, immunity is waived only if the action violates a statute or ordinance applicable to the action. It is undisputed that the paramedics in this case were responding to a 911 call. Guillen argues that their failure to yield to his medical authority violated fire department standard operating procedures regarding physicians on the scene. This policy dictates that when there is a physician on the scene, the emergency medical personnel must submit to the authority of the doctor. The department's standard operating procedures, however, were designed as guidelines and protocols for paramedics to follow in the event that a particular circumstance arises. Agency procedures are not, however, the equivalent of a "statute" or "ordinance" as required by the tort claims law. These policies are departmental guidelines and were not created by a legislative body. Since these guidelines are not "statutes", they do not lead to a waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Guillen v. City of San Antonio, 13 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000)]