August 2000
Volume 14, Number 8

IAFF selects Schaitberger as General President
Delegates to the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO, biennial convention this month selected Harold Schaitberger as the union's new leader. Schaitberger ran unopposed for the position. Schaitberger worked as a fire fighter in Fairfax County, Virginia, and has been active in the IAFF for nearly three decades. He told delegates that passage of a national collective bargaining bill will be his main objective. Most recently, Schaitberger served as executive assistant to Alfred K. Whitehead, the individual he succeeds as General President. 

Conventioneers, meeting in Chicago, heard addresses by Whitehead and by International Association of Fire Chiefs President Luther Fincher. In his remarks, Whitehead, who served as union head for a dozen years, recounted the IAFF's successes during his tenure and thanked his family members

 for their years of support. In a poignant moment, Whitehead noted, "I've been to too many funerals over these 12 years," referring to the loss of fellow fire fighters in the line of duty.

Fincher praised Whitehead for his cooperation over the years on issues of mutual concern. The chiefs' leader cited creation of the joint Wellness-Fitness Initiative and the Candidate Physical Ability Test as examples of a positive working relationship that has developed between IAFC and IAFF in recent years. 

In other business, the delegates reelected Vincent Bollin as General Secretary-Treasurer. Delegates also selected Boston as the convention host city for 2004. Raises in members' per capita dues as well as a $5,000 pay hike for the union's 16 district vice presidents were also approved as was an enhanced line of duty death research program.

Senate holds hearing on national bargaining bill
A Senate committee, following the lead of the House of Representatives, last month held a hearing on proposed legislation that would grant collective bargaining rights to all of the nation's fire fighters and police officers. Representatives of the major national public safety unions urged adoption of the proposal while an attorney representing various municipal government groups urged retaining local control of public sector labor matters.

In opening the hearing before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Senator Mike DeWine (R.-Ohio) stated that public safety officers should have the basic rights of most U.S. citizens, including the right to form unions and bargain collectively. Currently, state laws vary widely on union rights of fire fighters and police

 officers with about two dozen states having comprehensive bargaining laws on the books. 

The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (S. 1016) would authorize the Federal Labor Relations Authority to oversee collective bargaining by fire fighters and police officers in those states that do not have bargaining laws in place. A hearing on the House version of the bill (H.R. 1093) was held in May.

Appearing in support of the measure was Frederick Nesbitt of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO. Testimony was also provided by Gerald Flynn, National Vice President of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and Gilbert Gallegos, Grand Lodge President of the Fraternal Order of Police. 
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Opposing the bill was Chicago attorney R. Theodore Clark, Jr., of the law firm Seyfarth Shaw. Clark testified on behalf of the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and several other management organizations.

The public safety labor leaders called the legislation "crucial" and said it would not require federal intervention in local affairs, only that states modernize "outdated" labor laws. Clark, in

 opposition, suggested that the proposal would not pass constitutional scrutiny in light of recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing the states' right to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The summer hearings mark the first time both houses of Congress have taken any action on a public safety bargaining law. While the House version enjoys fairly wide bipartisan support, far fewer Senate sponsors have come forward. The measure faces an uncertain future. 

Birmingham discrimination case finally ends - sort of
It went to the U.S. Supreme Court twice and involved so many parties and complicated legal issues that it became known simply as the "Birmingham Fire Fighters Litigation." Now after 25 years, the reverse race discrimination case against the Alabama city may be reaching at least a partial conclusion. Last month, 17 fire fighters and five other city employees agreed to accept approximately $1.4 million from the city and end their part of the litigation. 

The case began in 1974 when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and several black fire fighters filed a class action suit claiming race discrimination in the fire department. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) later entered the suit on behalf of the black fire fighters. In 1981, a federal District Judge approved a consent decree that established an affirmative action plan. Under the plan, half of the new hires

 for the fire department and half of the new lieutenant positions were to be filled by African Americans. A group of 42 white fire fighters later sought to intervene in the case on reverse discrimination grounds. Initially rebuffed in their efforts, the white fire fighters gained a favorable Supreme Court ruling in 1989. On remand, and after much litigation, a federal appeals court ruled that indeed the consent decree had created unlawful reverse discrimination and the white fire fighters were due monetary damages. 

Over the next few years many of the claims were resolved through negotiations. The announced $1.4 million amount will cover back pay to the white plaintiffs whose claims have not been otherwise resolved.

And now, the rest of the story — the original suit by the NAACP and the DOJ is continuing, closing in on its third decade! 

Kansas City fire supervisors gain union rights
A federal court ruled earlier this month that Kansas City, Missouri, Fire Department supervisors have the right to belong to a union that also serves rank and file fire fighters. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a subordinate judge's earlier decision that a city ordinance which prohibits such membership is unconstitutional. The unanimous panel ruled that application of the ordinance to the supervisors violated the First Amendment right of freedom of association. 

The city council passed the ordinance in 1976 following a decade of job actions by fire fighters, including an illegal strike in 1975. The ordinance barred fire service supervisors from being members of the same union as fire fighters. City leaders enacted the ordinance out of concern that if further job actions occurred, the community would be left without fire protection because supervisors might be sympathetic to line fire fighters. In 1997,
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some supervisors formed their own union, which later was chartered as Local 3808 of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO. Rank and file fire fighters were already represented by Local 42 of the IAFF. Citing the ordinance, the city refused to meet and confer with Local 3808 representatives. Local 3808 sued and won at the trial level.

In reviewing the appeal, Judge Pasco M. Bowman wrote that despite the city's fears, it had

 failed to establish that management-level personnel who are members of the IAFF would be more sympathetic to rank and file fire fighters in case of a strike or other job action because they were once members of Local 42. In fact, the judge noted, Local 3808 members served on the city's bargaining team during negotiations with Local 42. Consequently, Kansas City failed to show that its infringement on the associational rights of the fire supervisors is reasonable. 
Litigation

Cases of interest
homosexual. Consequently, Greer sent a self-styled news release to a number of local media outlets. The news release insinuated that Amesqua had treated the division chief differently because of an alleged lesbian conspiracy. In his press release, which was printed in the local newspaper, Greer concluded that the two women were homosexuals, apparently because they both belonged to a female fire fighter support group. Following the printing of the story another internal investigation was launched. This investigation resulted in dismissal proceedings being instituted against Greer for violating department rules concerning bringing the department into disrepute and harassment of a person based on sexual orientation. Amesqua explained that Greer's news release was equivalent to spitting in the department's face and his continued presence on the work site could no longer be tolerated. An eight day dismissal hearing was conducted wherein Greer was represented by a lawyer, submitted evidence, and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, including the fire chief. The police and fire commission found just cause for the termination. Instead of appealing the case, Greer sued the fire chief, the police and fire commission, and the city alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights, as well as violations of due process and equal protection of the laws. Trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on

Dismissal grounds
Greer was a veteran fire fighter who also served as a pastor of a fundamentalist church congregation. In 1995, Amesqua, a female, was appointed fire chief. Greer and Amesqua almost immediately began to have conflict. Greer objected to Amesqua's appointment believing she was unqualified for the job. He also asserted that her appointment was due solely to affirmative action. Greer further believed that Amesqua, a Native-American woman, was a homosexual. At Amesqua's swearing-in ceremony Greer appeared wearing a large placard decreeing, "Injustice is just wrong. Not affirmative action." Greer believed that Amesqua lacked character and leadership ability because of her alleged sexual orientation. As part of his church ministry he was an anti-homosexual crusader. In 1996, a local television station aired a video of a female division chief making physical contact and screaming at a fire recruit during a training session. A few days later the fire fighters' union formally requested that the division chief be suspended and reprimanded for the incident. An internal affairs investigation was launched and ultimately Amesqua found the division chief's conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances but did extend her probation for six months. The division chief was an admitted
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all claims. Former fire fighter appeals.

HELD: Greer claims a due process violation because his pre termination hearing was inadequate and that three of the police and fire commissioners were biased against him. Additionally, he alleges that the department rules under which he was prosecuted did not give prior notice of the proscribed conduct. Due process requires that a government employer provide a pre-termination hearing in which the employee receives notice of the reasons for the prospective termination and has the opportunity to respond to the charges. The hearing need not constitute a full evidentiary hearing that definitively resolves the propriety of the discharge. During this eight day hearing, Greer was represented by a lawyer and had the opportunity to hear his charges, present his evidence, and confront witnesses. This hearing satisfied the basic requirements of procedural due process. Greer alleges that three of the commissioners had a conflict of interest because they were defendants with Amesqua in another lawsuit. Legally, Greer must overcome a strong presumption of honesty and integrity in assessing whether the adjudicators were impartial. He failed to produce any real evidence of personal bias or animosity to him on the part of the commissioners. His case has no bearing on the case in which the fire chief and the commissioners are defendants. Similarly, there was no due process violation on the alleged vagueness of department regulations. Although a government regulation is void for vagueness if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the government, acting in the role of employer, enjoys much more latitude in drafting reasonable work regulations for its employees. Administrative regulations governing employees need not have the precision of the criminal code. The rules being challenged in this case, while written in general language, sufficiently define a range of inappropriate conduct that a reasonable employee could understand. Greer claims that the department violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution by treating him, a male heterosexual,

 different from female homosexual employees who had likewise criticized the department. When an employee has an undisputed record of gross insubordination as Greer does, the employee must show that another grossly insubordinate worker was treated better than he to defeat the presumption that the comparatively harsher punishment was attributable to his poor disciplinary history. Greer has failed to carry this burden. Greer also claims a violation of his First Amendment free speech rights based on his termination for issuing his press release. While it is undisputed that the department fired Greer because of his news release, the department violated Greer's rights under the First Amendment only if the speech addressed a matter of public concern and his interest in speaking outweighed the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service. The police and fire commission correctly ruled that Greer's speech did regard a matter of public concern. The news release primarily addressed the issue of favoritism within the department and the lenient disciplinary action taken against the division chief. Whether public officials are operating the government ethically and legally is a big issue of public concern. Even with speech involving matters of public concern, the public employer may still discipline the employee if the speech creates problems in maintaining harmony among co-workers. Greer's letter circulated his accusations to mass media outlets for broad public consumption and tended to indict the integrity of the department's leadership publicly. As a fire fighter known through the community as an outspoken department critic, Greer likely anticipated and intended the damaging effect of his news release. The department reasonably felt that Greer's speech, if left unpunished, particularly in the light of his disciplinary history, would disrupt the operation of the department by degrading the department's standing with the public, undermining the fire chief's authority, and inciting disharmony within the ranks. Although Greer protested that the news release did not establish actual disruption in the work place, an employer need not establish actual disruption before
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disciplining the employee when the threat of future disruption is obvious. Similarly, the truth or falsity of Greer's allegations are not determinative in this matter. Recklessly false statements by a public employee enjoy no First Amendment protection. It does not necessarily follow, however, that factually true statements are absolutely protected. The Pickering balancing test only applies to speech that is true, or believed to be true, because recklessly false speech is unprotected by the First Amendment. Even if Greer's comments were true, the department was justified in terminating him. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2000)] district arguing that he had been denied due process of law. The fire district moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Greenwalt was an at-will employee and not entitled to any process prior to termination.

HELD: The former fire fighter alleges that his employment was based on a contract implied in fact. In support of this argument he quotes the language of the job offer letter, "We would be happy to have you in our family," and similar verbal statements made to him upon commencement of his employment with the fire district. He also asserts that one of his supervisors told him that the fire district could fire individuals only for cause and that this was the general belief and understanding among the employees. The fire district argues, however, that Greenwalt was an at-will employee as articulated in the district's personnel policy statement. At the time Greenwalt was employed, Arizona law provided that employment contracts for an indefinite period of time were presumed to be terminable at-will. The characteristic feature of employment at-will is the ability of either party to terminate the employment relationship for good cause or no cause. The presumption of at-will employment may be overcome if an employee can establish the existence of a contract term, either express or implied. A review of the department policies reveal statements asserting that employment with the fire district was at-will and asserting the existence of a disciplinary procedure. However, the disciplinary procedure is labeled non-mandatory and can be invoked by management at its sole discretion. The fire district also asserted that it would attempt to use progressive discipline where appropriate but that management retained discretion to determine what discipline would be implemented. These written statements clearly establish an at-will employment relationship. Similarly, there is no implied contract because of alleged verbal statements to Greenwalt. Under Arizona law oral statements of job security must be clear and unequivocal to overcome the presumption of employment at-will. In summary, when Greenwalt

Dismissal procedures
In 1981, the fire district was created to provide fire protection and emergency medical services to the area. It contracted with Rural Metro for personnel needed in the operation. Greenwalt was employed by Rural Metro as a fire fighter and worked for the fire district through Rural Metro. In 1994, the fire district terminated the contract with Rural Metro and decided to operate the fire department itself. At that time Greenwalt was sent a letter extending to him the opportunity to stay on as an employee of the fire district. The letter said, "We would be happy to have you in our family." Greenwalt took advantage of the offer and continued to work as a fire fighter after the change over. Some time later, the fire district adopted a policy manual. In the chapter devoted to disciplinary procedures the policy manual stated that employment with the fire district was at-will and that discharge may occur "for cause" or for "no cause." The policy was not distributed to department employees but was made available for review. While Rural Metro employees had been required to sign a statement acknowledging at-will employment, no statement was required to be signed upon commencement of employment with the fire district. Consequently, Greenwalt did not receive a copy of the policy and did not see it until he was ultimately terminated by the fire district. Following Greenwalt's termination, he sued the fire
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commenced employment with the fire district, he became an at-will employee and the at-will contract did not change into a for cause contract at any time. Since he was an at-will employee, Greenwalt did not hold a constitutionally protected property interest necessitating application of due process of law. Summary judgment for fire district. [Greenwalt v. Sun West Fire District, 95 F.Supp.2d 1062 (D. Ariz. 2000)] to the incident in question. He had previously been rated as an outstanding employee. The commission concluded that while this was a serious disciplinary infraction, the penalty should be reduced to a 120-day suspension. Under Louisiana law, a reviewing court should not reverse a civil service commission conclusion as to the presence or absence of cause for dismissal unless the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The commission had rational reasons for reducing the penalty from dismissal to suspension. No doubt a serious penalty was warranted for a serious infraction, but the 120-day suspension is a serious penalty. It cannot be said that the commission abused its discretion. Reduction of penalty affirmed. [Burckel v. New Orleans Fire Department, 757 So.2d 850 (La. App. 2000)] 

Dismissal grounds
Burckel was a veteran fire fighter with a clean disciplinary record. He was hired to work a fire watch at a New Orleans casino. Fire department regulations required fire watches when any of the fire safety equipment malfunctioned in buildings housing large groups of people. In this instance, the sprinkler system at the casino had been damaged as a result of flooding earlier in the month. Fire department personnel working fire watches were considered to be off duty and were paid directly by the casino. While working at the casino Burckel apparently consumed an alcoholic beverage. The district chief learned of the incident and instituted an investigation. Subsequently, administrative charges were filed against Burckel for violating department policy concerning consumption of alcohol. He was terminated from the department. On appeal, the termination was overturned on the grounds that department policy required termination for individuals who drank while on duty and in uniform, but did not specify the level of disciplinary action for individuals who consumed alcohol while off duty and in uniform. The case was remanded to the civil service commission for a second hearing. At that hearing the commission reduced Burckel's sanction to a 120-day suspension and ordered him reinstated. The fire department appeals.

HELD: Department procedures state that drinking on duty is cause for termination, while drinking off duty but in uniform is cause for disciplinary action to be taken. The civil service commission was apparently impressed by the fact that Burckel's 15-year career had been spotless up

Direct dealing
A memo was sent to all state employees stating that the administration was seeking to determine methods of reducing excessive sick leave or to eliminate sick leave all together. Accompanying the memo was a survey instrument asking employees about the number of sick days they used, the circumstances that led to taking sick leave, and incentives that might encourage better attendance. The survey was generally unsuccessful. Of the few employees who responded to it, a good many did so frivolously. Some of the surveyed employees belong to a bargaining unit represented by a union. At the time the survey was distributed, the union was negotiating with the state to arrive at a new collective bargaining agreement. Sick leave and sick leave use were major subjects of negotiation. Several months after the negotiations ended, changes were announced in the procedures by which sick leave was reported and verified. Both the union and its members objected to the announced changes. The changes were not made. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge regarding the survey claiming it violated the state prohibition against direct dealing with employees. The state labor commission, using decisions of the National 
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Labor Relations Board as guidance, concluded that there was no direct connection between the survey and the position the state sought to advance at the bargaining table. Thus, no unfair labor practice had occurred. Union appeals. 

HELD: Massachusetts statute imposes upon a public employer the obligation to negotiate in good faith with the union that the members of the collective bargaining unit have chosen as the unit's exclusive representative. This duty necessarily entails the duty to refrain from circumventing the union by dealing directly with bargaining unit employees as to mandatory subjects in negotiations. So-called direct dealing is impermissible for two reasons. First, direct dealing violates the union statutory right to speak exclusively for the employees who have elected it to serve as their sole representative. Second, direct dealing undermines the employees' belief that the union actually possesses the power of exclusive representation to which the statute entitles it. While an employer does not violate the law by merely communicating its bargaining positions to its employees, surveys of employees as to mandatory subjects of bargaining are a different matter. This is particularly true if bargaining discussions have already begun. Exchanging information about employees' views on these subjects is a crucial element of any negotiation between an employer and a union. Employers who solicit this information directly from employees undercut the union's role as the exclusive voice of employees in negotiations. This principle is true regardless of whether the employer intends to undermine the union's effectiveness by its actions. The good faith of the employer is not relevant. Paid sick leave is a term and condition of employment in Massachusetts and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Surveying employees on this topic after negotiations had begun constitutes direct dealing and is an unfair labor practice. Reversed for union. [Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 509 v. Labor Relations Commission, 729 N.E.2d 1100 (Mass. 2000)]

Disciplinary procedures
The mayor's chief of staff was purported to have been involved in an automobile accident. A police officer reported that when she responded to the scene, she was berated and threatened with loss of her job by the chief of staff. The chief of staff, however denied that she had been at the scene of the accident on the night in question and denied that she had ever encountered the police officer. The police department Professional Conduct and Internal Review Unit (PCIR) initiated an investigation of the alleged incident. In her report the responding officer alleged that an EMS unit had transported the other individual involved in the accident to a local hospital. The officer's report also provided a physical description of the two paramedics that she claimed responded to the scene. Because the officer's description of the paramedics did not match the description of the two paramedics actually assigned to the identified EMS unit, the PCIR investigation shifted to verifying the whereabouts of EMS employees who were on duty that night. Eighteen EMS paramedics were ordered to report to the PCIR office to fill out a questionnaire and have their pictures taken. The paramedic union's president objected to the order. Although the union president was told that the investigation had not centered on any particular EMS employee, that information was never relayed to the effected EMS personnel. The union representative was also told not to communicate with employees as they entered the PCIR office and if he attempted to do so, he would be ejected from the office or arrested for obstruction of justice. Lach was one of the employees assigned to the EMS unit that allegedly responded to the call. He was initially informed by union officials that he had no obligation to comply with the order to report to the PCIR office unless a subpoena was issued but was eventually ordered to attend the interview by his supervisor. Lach was not informed that he was not the subject of an investigation. The same supervisor told Lach that he need not worry about having a union
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representative with him. Lach was apprehensive about the interview because of the amount of publicity the incident had received. Coleman and Ali, two other paramedics, were also ordered to present themselves to the PCIR office. They were not told why they were to report but they were aware of the publicity surrounding the alleged accident. When Ali asked one of the police officers whether a union representative could be present, he was told that none of the other employees had requested a union representative and that if he persisted in requesting a union representative, he would be brought up on charges. Coleman witnessed the exchange and did not make a similar request. No charges were ever filed against any EMS employee stemming from the alleged incident. Subsequently the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the city. The state labor relations board ultimately determined that the city had committed an unfair labor practice by interfering with an employee's statutorily guaranteed rights. The labor board, however, rejected allegations that the city had engaged in other unfair labor practices. Union appealed and the trial court found that indeed the city had committed additional violations by denying union representation to Ali and Coleman and refusing to permit a union representative to be present during the interviews. City appeals.

HELD: Under Ohio law, a court must defer to the labor board's interpretation of what behavior constitutes an unfair labor practice. The legislature has entrusted the labor board with the responsibility of administering the labor relations statute and has bestowed upon it the special function of applying the law's provisions to the complexities of Ohio's industrial life. Court review is limited to whether the labor board policy is unreasonable or is in conflict with explicit language of state statute. The United State Supreme Court has set forth the standards in determining whether an employee has a right to union representation. This so called Weingarten right arises when four elements exist: (1) an interview is investigatory; (2) the employee requests the presence of a union representative and

 the request is denied; (3) the employee reasonably believes the interview might result in disciplinary action; and (4) subsequent to the employer's denial of representation the employer compels the employee to continue the interview. In this case, the city alleges that the employees could not have reasonably believed the interview might result in disciplinary action because no such action ever occurred. However, the facts reveal that Ali was apprehensive about the possibility of discipline and made actual inquiry. When the police officer responded in an abrasive manner, Coleman observed the response. While he did not verbalize his own request, he apparently feared an even more abrasive response from the officer. Human experience tells us that if Coleman had made a request similar to the one made by Ali, the response of the officer would have been even more explosive. The law does not require the performance of a vain act. Even though municipal personnel had told the union president that no EMS employees were under suspicion, the EMS employees were unaware of this fact. Additionally, city personnel warned the union president against advising his members not to cooperate. There was an objective basis for the EMS personnel to believe that disciplinary action could result from the interview. The union representative appears to have been stymied in trying to do his job. An employer cannot prevent a union representative from communicating with bargaining unit members every time an employer feels that the representative may "interfere" with an investigation by apprising members of their rights. Given the aggressive nature of the interviewing officers, the EMS personnel could reasonably believe that they might be subject to discipline. Thus, they could assert a right to union representation and the city's denial of that representation constituted an unfair labor practice. Affirmed for union. [Cleveland Association of Rescue Employees v. State Employment Relations Board, 730 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio App. 1999)]
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Civil liability

 that legislative intent. It is a basic rule of law, however, that a statute needs to be construed only when the language of the statute is ambiguous. The legislative intent is irrelevant when there is no ambiguity in a statute being interpreted. The best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the law. A clear reading of the law establishes that paramedics and other medical personnel are beneficiaries of the statute but a medical center, such as a hospital, is simply not mentioned. It was error for the trial court to interpret the statute to cover the medical center. The estate also argues that the volunteer fire company is not within the immunity statute because the statute excludes from its coverage negligent operation of motor vehicles. Specifically, the estate argues that the fire company negligently failed to follow the correct directions given by the 911 dispatcher. However, analogous prior cases hold that a police officer's decision to chase or not chase a law violator is unrelated to the issue of negligent operation of a vehicle. This case is similar. The decision of the paramedics not to follow the explicit directions given by the 911 dispatcher is similar to the decision of a police officer whether to engage in a chase. Such a decision does not constitute an act with respect to the "operation" of a vehicle but rather the decision whether or not to operate the vehicle at all. In the case at hand, Regester's death could not occur because of the negligent manner in which the vehicle was operated. Thus, the volunteer company may still take advantage of the immunity law. Reversed for further proceedings relative to the medical center. Affirmed for volunteer fire company dismissing case. [Regester v. Longwood Ambulance Company, Inc., 751 A.2d 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)]
Regester suffered a heart attack. His family called the county 911 operator and began administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The 911 dispatcher called the volunteer fire company that provided ambulance service in the area and the local medical center that also provided paramedic service. In response both the fire company and the medical center dispatched paramedics. Although the 911 dispatcher repeated directions to Regester's home twice, neither of the paramedic units followed the directions given them. Instead, for some unknown reason they traveled to the south end of the county and did not reach Regester's home until 15 minutes had passed. Normal travel time for the paramedics to reach the Regester home from their bases would have been three to four minutes. Although Regester survived the cardiac arrest, he vomited and choked to death on his vomit. His estate filed suit against the volunteer fire company and the medical center alleging that had the paramedics followed directions given them by the 911 dispatcher, Regester's airway would have been secured by intubation and his ability to survive would not have been compromised. Compounding the matter was the fact that medical center paramedics had responded to Regester's home nine months earlier when he had suffered a prior heart attack. Both the medical center and the fire company moved for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under the Pennsylvania tort claims law and emergency medical services law. Trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of the state statutes. Estate appeals.

HELD: Under Pennsylvania law no paramedic who in good faith renders emergency care is liable for damages unless guilty of gross or willful negligence. The deceased's estate argues that this statute applies only to the paramedics but not to the medical center itself. The medical center argues that the legislative intent of the law was to establish and maintain an efficient emergency medical system and the court should construe the statute to bring about
Settlements

Elkhart, Indiana

fire fighters
Last month, Elkhart fire fighters ratified a new labor agreement with the city. The pact calls
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for pay increases of 3 percent in 2001, 3.5 percent in 2002, 3.75 percent in 2003, and 4 percent in the final year. The agreement covers 115 fire fighters through the rank of captain. Eliminated from the labor agreement is a past practice of unlimited sick leave. Now fire fighters will be credited with five sick days per year. If two or more consecutive days are used, a physician's note must be provided. Also dropped from the agreement is a "me too" clause that subjected the fire fighters' union to accepting the same pay increase given to the first municipal union that agreed to a contract. A first class fire fighter, now making $34,519 will see a base wage jump to $39,707 in 2004. The pay is based on a 53-hour workweek. Local 338 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, served as bargaining agent. became necessary, despite an 8 percent pay jump last October, because the county continued to have trouble attracting fire fighter applicants. In addition, by August 12, 2001, the average workweek will decline from 56 hours to 48 hours. The reduction in hours, achieved by giving fire-rescue personnel an extra day off every third week, will require the hiring of 30 additional fire fighters. Other changes to the contract include adding a rescue lieutenant per shift at each station and expanding medical coverage.
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Leominster, Massachusetts

fire fighters
Local 1841 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, has approved a new three-year labor agreement with the City of Leominster. The agreement grants a 3 percent wage hike retroactive to July 1 and a 4 percent boost next year. The final year of the contract provides another 3 percent. The one percent difference in the middle year came in exchange for probable cause-based drug testing the city wanted. The agreement permits the city to test an employee if there is evidence of drug or alcohol abuse while on duty. If the fire fighter tests positive, rehabilitation, not termination, is mandated.

Martin County, Florida

fire fighters
Fire fighters and paramedics in Martin County have gained a new contract that will attempt to make their wages more competitive with surrounding communities. The three-year pact between Local 2959 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, and the county provides a six percent wage hike each year. The wage change