The hepatitis C study authorization is contained in the Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement (FIRE) Act. This bill provides grants to fire departments to purchase equipment and improve training. Burn research is also funded under the legislation.

The study is unlikely to begin until funding is authorized. While the FIRE Act authorizes $10 million for the research, actual funds must be approved as part of the congressional appropriation process.

Blood-borne diseases, particular hepatitis C, have become of increasing concern to fire fighters and other public safety personnel providing emergency medical services. Recently, the Philadelphia fire fighters' union said that the

The Philadelphia fire fighters' union, Local 22 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, recently screened 2,112 of its members in anonymous testing. More than 4.5 percent were found to have the virus. Fire fighters say the only way they could have contracted the virus is through exposure with accident victims.

"My personal contact with several of these men as patients revealed that they each had substantial exposure," said Dr. Gillian Ann Zeldin, a University of Pennsylvania professor who specializes in liver ailments. "They tell stories of rescues where they have substantial blood exposure."

In July, California joined a handful of states that have presumption rules in their workers' compensation laws. The rules allow fire fighters who contract blood-borne diseases to collect worker's compensation unless their employer can prove that the fire fighter caught the disease elsewhere.

The department hired Professor Steven Loy as its wellness coordinator. Professor Loy, along

A sample exercise involves a fire fighter donning a 45-pound simulated breathing apparatus,

"It was a win-win-win for the fire department, CSUN and its faculty and the community of Los Angeles," the professor said. "If we can create a more safe, physically fit fire fighter, they are able to better serve the community." CSUN personnel reportedly developed the program free of

The United Firefighters of Los Angeles, representing about 2,750 fire service personnel, must okay the program before it is initiated in the city's104 firehouses. LAFD officials anticipate that all combat personnel from fire fighter to fire captain will perform the exercise program during each tour of duty.

The fire fighters claimed that Chief Bryan Sloan told them their attendance at Parma Heights Baptist Church was mandatory for Civic Appreciation Day, during which the congregation presented awards to fire fighters and police officers. Several said they did not wish to attend the service but were allegedly threatened with insubordination charges if they refused.

Raymond Vasvari, legal director for the Ohio ACLU, claimed that the fire fighters object to being

Council President Martin Zanotti said he believed the fire chief meant well but should not have compelled the fire fighters to attend the service. But he said he wished the fire fighters had first brought their complaint to the task force he heads. The city's mayor formed the task force last spring to improve relations between the fire fighters and the chief after fire fighters picketed city hall in an unsuccessful effort to oust Sloan.

The lawsuit is expected to be filed in federal court in the near future.

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest

HELD: The fire fighters claim that they are not liable in this case because of qualified immunity with respect to the constitutional claim and discretionary function immunity with respect to the state law claim. In order for the question of qualified immunity to be raised it must first be determined whether a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. A suit based on violation of that right requires conduct by public officials sufficiently serious to constitute a cruel or unusual deprivation and a subjective intent by the public officials involved to use the sufficiently serious deprivation in order to punish. To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff must show an objectively serious medical need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need, and an actual inference of required action from those facts. The plaintiff here cannot show a punitive intent in the form of deliberate indifference. The fire fighters acted upon the knowledge that they had of Mason's condition, they checked him out, and offered to administer aid. They questioned him repeatedly but he declined assistance. There is no indication that the fire fighters perceived him as lacking the ability to speak for himself. It cannot be said that the fire fighters were deliberately indifferent to Mason's condition. Thus, the constitutional claim fails. As to the state tort claim, Alabama law is unclear as to whether statutory immunity or common law immunity applies to discretionary decision making of public officials such as fire fighters. A review of the various cases and statutes reveals that the statutory immunity given public officers when performing discretionary functions does apply to fire fighters under these circumstances. The fire fighters are entitled to this discretionary function immunity if their acts at the scene were discretionary and they did not act with bad faith, malice, or willfulness. Discretionary acts

HELD: The ADA protects a qualified individual with a disability. The law defines a "qualified individual" as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment. The burden of proof is on a plaintiff to establish that s/he is an individual with a disability and otherwise qualified for the position. Hagan cannot be defined as "otherwise qualified" if he cannot perform the essential functions of the job. A paramedic in Kentucky is statutorily required to have authorization from the medical director of EMS. The physician in this case had withdrawn his authorization and the county was without jurisdiction to require him to readmit Hagan. Kentucky law specifically addresses the extensive practices that paramedics are to engage in with the authorization of the medical director. The statutory job requirements are clearly essential functions of the position. As applied to Hagan he is not qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation. He is likewise not otherwise qualified due to his incidence of misconduct. The ADA provides that an employer may hold an employee who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment and job performance that the entity holds other employees,

HELD: Connecticut law grants governmental immunity from tort liability to municipalities subject to limited exceptions. One of those exceptions is under circumstances where it is apparent to a public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an "identifiable person" to imminent harm. Trial court ruled that Tryon did not fit within this exception. Prior case law holds that an individual may be "identifiable" for purposes of the exception if the harm occurs within a limited temporal and geographical zone. Here, the harm -the dog bite - did occur within a time frame with a limited duration. Tryon fits within the identifiable person exception. Trial court ruled, however, that she was not subject to imminent harm at the time of the dog bite. A review of the depositions of the parties involved reveals a factual question as to whether Tryon was placed in imminent harm by Turner's actions or failure to act in failing to control the dog. A jury must determine this question of fact. The question is not whether a dog at a parade creates a condition of imminent harm but whether the failure of the owner in preventing his dog from being in close proximity to the injured plaintiff created a situation of imminent harm. Tryon also claims that the fire department is responsible for her injuries under the strict liability statute regarding dog bites. The department alleges that governmental immunity bars her claim. Under Connecticut law, a municipality is generally immune from liability for tortious acts. Governmental immunity may, however, be abrogated by a statute. A municipality is immune from liability unless the legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity. While certain statutes have abrogated governmental immunity, no express statute abolishes immunity relative to the dog bite law. Without express statutory language abolishing the doctrine of government immunity in this regard, the fire department retains immunity from suit. Reversed

HELD: The city asserts that after department reorganization the duties of the newly designated ranks materially changed, and with the elimination