| December 2000 |
Volume 14, Number 12
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| fire fighters
had signed a petition expressing lack of confidence in Krentz. The petition
asked for his removal. In November 1997, following an investigation, the
board sent Krentz a letter detailing his substandard performance in previous
months. The letter announced the board's decision to terminate Krentz'
employment. The board offered Krentz an opportunity to present arguments
and evidence in his defense at a special board meeting. Krentz attended
the board meeting with his attorney. He presented the board with a letter
objecting to the procedures but not disputing the allegations levied against
him. Krentz stated that he wanted to hear the board's view of the situation
but the board's attorney insisted on speaking for the board. Krentz' attorney,
on the other hand, attempted to explain his side of the story but the board
demanded to hear from Krentz personally. Krentz refused to address the
board or answer questions. The two parties left the meeting. The district
removed Krentz from its payroll a week later. The former chief filed suit
alleging a variety of contractual and constitutional violations including
lack of due process in his dismissal. The trial court granted the district's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed other claims. Former fire chief
appeals.
HELD: The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Procedural due process requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the state deprived him of some life, liberty, or property interest and that the deprivation was without sufficient process. Here, Krentz can establish a property interest in his job as fire chief because of his contract. When a state deprives a public employee of a contractually-created property right to continued employment, that deprivation must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Prior case law divides procedural due process claims into three stages: an employee receives notice that he is terminated and is given an opportunity to respond - that is pre-termination process; then the employer actually fires the |
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| employee; and finally an employee has an opportunity to receive some measure of post-termination process, usually a hearing with heightened procedural safeguards. Prior case law requires only a limited pre-termination process, especially if post-termination proceedings are available. At the pre-termination level the tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Krentz' pre-termination process was twofold. First, he received a letter of termination that informed him of the charges against him. The letter also advised him of the opportunity to respond to the board at a special hearing. The meeting itself then offered Krentz an opportunity to present his side of the story. Krentz was provided a constitutionally adequate pre-termination process. While the district board refused to answer the ex-chief's questions, neglected to record the hearing, and insisted that Krentz' attorney not participate, nonetheless the hearing met the minimum requirements of a pre-termination proceeding. As to the question of post-termination process, the State of Missouri has enacted the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). The MAPA provides for a hearing in "contested cases." Krentz could have instituted a "contested case" proceeding under the MAPA after his termination became effective. He declined to pursue this available post-termination remedy. Prior law holds that an employee waives a procedural due process claim by refusing to participate in post-termination grievance procedures made available to him. It is not relevant that Krentz may have been personally unaware that the MAPA applied to personnel actions because persons are conclusively presumed to know the law. Even if the fire district neglected to give Krentz the process he was due, his sole remedy lay within the confines of the MAPA. Failing to pursue a MAPA claim in a timely fashion forecloses subsequent litigation over the matter. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Krentz v. Robertson Fire Protection District, 228 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2000)] | ||||||||
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