February 2001 
Volume 15, Number 2 

Utah passes legislation barring PAC check-off 

The Utah Legislature on February 15, sent to the state's governor a bill that bars public employers from serving as a collection point for an employee's contribution to political action committees (PAC). In addition, the bill requires unions to keep separate dues and political activity funds. Political-based solicitations must be made in written form. The bill, named the "Voluntary Contributions Act," deems it a criminal act for a labor organization to coerce political contributions or to solicit contributions from anyone other than its members or their families. The proposal, which awaits the signature of Governor Mike Leavitt, a Republican, does require a public employer to collect union dues upon written request of an employee. 

If enacted into law as expected, the new statute would directly affect fire fighters, police officers, and public school personnel and their respective labor organizations. 

Critics of the bill claim it holds public employees to a different standard than the private sector, while supporters insist they are simply trying to get the government out of the role of collecting political contributions. 

Michael McCoy, General Counsel for the Utah Education Association, labeled the bill "a civil rights attorney's dream," asserting that it violated both the state and federal constitutions. Even the legislature's legal staff recognizes the potential constitutional problems. In a legislative review note the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel observed that the bill was subject to challenge on First Amendment and equal protection grounds. The legal advisor noted, however, that in 1998, a federal appeals court upheld portions of a similar Ohio law. 

Voluntary donations to PAC by public employees would be permitted under the new law. 

Buffalo stress claims being scrutinized 

Two Buffalo, New York, fire fighters, a male and female, could not get along. Each time they encountered each other in the fire hall, the stress built up. Ultimately, they had a heated argument. The result: workplace violence? No, stress-related injury on duty (IOD) status! He was off the job for three weeks; she is still at home a year later. 

According to The Buffalo News, the fire fighters are only two of several questionable examples of IOD status based on stress. The two fire fighters took advantage of a New York statute that grants IOD disability benefits solely for mental stress without a corresponding physical injury. Many states do not fund so-called "mental-mental" injuries, requiring a physical injury as a predicate to mental disability. 

The contentious fire fighters join a list that includes a fire fighter who claimed a stress-related injury as a result of being disciplined for violating department policies and another who claimed that after his application for an IOD physical disability pension was rejected, he was left stressed out and unable to work. 

"The vast majority of fire fighters are honorable, hard-working people. We're talking about a handful of misfits," said Buffalo Fire Commissioner Cornelius Keane. The commissioner said he is certain some fire fighters are manipulating the system. 

Under the current labor agreement between the city and the fire fighters' union, the department must disprove an IOD claim before the fire fighter 


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may be ordered back to work. Investigation and hearings on claims can take six months or more. Currently, 12 of the 23 fire fighters out on IOD status claimed stress. 

Changing the agreement is a priority with the city, according to city officials. The procedure requiring the city to disprove the claim was originally negotiated in 1993 as part of a plan to expedite IOD determinations. Under the agreement hearings are supposed to occur within seven days of the injury but rarely do. 

The problem is insufficient hearing officers and overloaded schedules, according to Vincent Gugliuzza, president of the Buffalo Professional Fire Fighters Association, who favors the requirement that the city disprove claims. 

A city labor official said a sure-fire way to correct the problem would be reforming the worker's compensation system to adequately cover injuries suffered on the job that are not directly related to fire fighting. He gave as an example a fire fighter who injures his back shoveling snow in front of the fire hall. Currently, worker's compensation benefits are so small that applying for IOD status at full pay becomes highly tempting to the injured fire fighter. 

Last year, about 500 IOD claims were filed with the fire department, many being minor in nature. City officials estimate that 18 percent of those claims could qualify as worker's compensation cases because the injuries did not directly relate to fire fighting. 

Court orders pay parity for Baltimore fire fighters 

A Maryland appeals court this month ordered the City of Baltimore to abide by an arbitration award and provide fire fighters the same pay raises that police officers have received. A city spokesman said the ruling will be appealed because, "We just don't have the money." Mayor Martin O'Malley said if the city loses the appeal, "Then we lay off people." 

Last year, the city agreed to raise police officer pay by 33 percent over three years, beginning with 7 percent this year. During negotiations the city's two fire unions sought a pay parity provision in their contracts. The city refused, saying that parity was not a mandatory bargaining subject despite the fact that parity clauses had been included in fire fighter labor contracts since 1992. When the contract went to binding arbitration, the city sought a court order barring a parity requirement. The court refused to consider the matter until the arbitration panel made its decision. Subsequently, the panel adopted the fire fighter unions' parity proposal. 

On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the question of parity was included within the statutory duty to bargain over terms and conditions of employment. The court rejected the 

city's argument that parity for fire fighters would illegally affect its ability to bargain in good faith with the police. The city claimed that it would not be able to negotiate the police contract without considering the effect the contract would have on fire service pay. The intermediate appeals court noted that parity provisions had been included in public safety contracts sporadically all the way back to 1974 without apparently unduly affecting negotiations. 

The city estimates that paying its 1,650 fire fighters a retroactive 4 percent wage hike would cost $3.2 million. Baltimore is already facing a $28 million budget shortfall. A payment to fire fighters could affect the city's ability to fund the 8 percent raise due police officers in 2002. 

Baltimore fire fighters are represented by Baltimore City Fire Fighters, Local 734, of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO, while the fire officers bargain through the Baltimore City Fire Officers, Local 964 of the IAFF. The fire unions negotiate annual contracts while police officers operate under a multi-year pact. Bargaining sessions for the upcoming year will begin in the next few weeks. 



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Volume 15, Number 2 

Winnetka fire applicants may need voter registration 

The village council in Winnetka, Illinois, is considering requiring fire fighters, police officers, and other municipal job applicants be registered to vote. The proposal being considered by the Chicago suburb is not grounded in notions of good citizenship or patriotism but in practicality. Village officials are considering the move as a means to verify a job seeker's citizenship. 

Don Derning, a member of the village fire and police commission who proposed the requirement, said, "It's gotten to the point where you need a degree in immigration law to determine whether someone is a citizen or not." Derning noted that illegal aliens seeking jobs is not yet a widespread problem. Village Attorney Katherine Janega told the council that the fire and police board 

has trouble obtaining sufficient legal documents to verify that an employee passes federal immigration laws. Proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate or passport, is required in order to register to vote. 

If the plan is adopted, Winnetka would apparently be the first municipality in the country to take such a step. 

A spokesman for the state American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) told the Chicago Sun-Times that a mandate from the government compelling a person to register to vote is "troubling." Ed Yohnka of the Illinois ACLU suggested that some persons express their political beliefs by purposefully not registering or voting. 

No date has been set for the village council's consideration of the proposal. 

Retirement threat brings movement in Boston bargaining 

The administration of Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino, frustrated with the lack of movement in negotiations with the city's fire fighters, last month raised the specter of forced retirements. The threat, the latest in an 18-month effort to reach a negotiated settlement with Local 718 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, apparently brought action as the parties earlier this month reached preliminary agreement on curbing IOD leave. The parties remain far apart on economic issues, however. The union is seeking a 21 percent raise over 3 years while the city is offering only 13.8 percent. 

During 2000, about 400 of the city's 1,600 fire fighters claimed IOD status at some point. The monthly number was down to about 150 for December. According to Acting Fire Commissioner Dennis DiMarzio, abuse of injured on duty (IOD) status has caused city overtime costs to balloon to over $9 million in recent years. 

Union officials claim the city's numbers on disability and overtime are phony because half of the IOD fire fighters have filed for disability retirement and the city has failed to maintain 

appropriate staffing levels. "They haven't hired enough people to do the job," Local 718 president Jack McKenna told the Boston Herald. Despite the addition of 100 new fire fighters over the last year, the force is still below the mandated 1,600. 

For its part, the fire fighters' union, which angered the mayor when it picketed his Christmas tree lighting ceremony and the state-of-the-city speech, apparently is changing its strategy. The union sponsored a Valentine's Day "Have a Heart" peaceful gathering at City Hall Plaza and is launching a public awareness campaign. "We're going back to the people. We intend to . . . do a grassroots campaign that gets to the heart of what we do," McKenna said. Fire fighters will be meeting with neighborhood groups and distributing information pamphlets. 

Fire fighters, who have worked without a contract since June 1999, are anxious to wrap up a pact with pay raises. Mayor Menino is set to run for a third term in November and apparantly wants to regain labor support. 

Meanwhile, both sides met with the state labor board to prepare for arbitration proceedings. 



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Litigation  after suffering a stroke. Seven weeks later he underwent surgery to close a hole in his heart. Barringer then applied for occupational disease disability benefits pursuant to Illinois law. He did not apply for ordinary disability benefits. The pension board held a hearing on the application. Barringer testified that the basis for his claim was that he had a stroke and a hole in his heart. He said the doctors told him the hole had caused his stroke. A physician consultant to the board testified that indeed the stroke was caused by a small blood clot that traveled through a congenital hole in Barringer's heart. The physician stated, however, that since he had had surgery, Barringer was able to return to duty without restriction and that the stroke was absolutely not caused by anything related to his service with the fire department. The board considered various other evidence regarding Barringer's condition and ultimately ruled that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate his claim that he was "disabled" as defined by Illinois statute. The fire fighter/paramedic appealed. Trial court affirmed the denial of occupational disability benefits. Fire fighter/paramedic appeals. 

HELD: Barringer contends that the pension board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that he is entitled to occupational disease disability benefits because his stroke was caused by on-duty injuries that aggravated his otherwise dormant, preexisting congenital heart condition. It is not the function of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence presented to an administrative agency. Instead, the court's function is to ascertain whether the agency's findings and decision are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The decision of an administrative agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. The agency is due great deference in its determination. A review of the record in this case reveals that the board's decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The statute in question provides for disability benefits for a fire fighter who suffers certain injuries "resulting solely from his 

Supreme Court update 

In recent weeks the high court declined requests to review several fire service related cases. The justices said no to Barfus v. City of Miami, Florida, No. 00-524. This decision leaves in place a lower court refusal to entertain a reverse discrimination claim by white fire fighters regarding the city's race-conscious promotion procedures for the rank of fire lieutenant. The court also declined to consider Taylor v. Adams, No. 00-764. The refusal upholds a finding of discretionary and qualified immunity for fire department medics who did not provide treatment to a police arrestee who specifically declined treatment. The individual subsequently died after becoming unconscious in the police paddy wagon. Fire medics did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's condition and thus were immune from civil suit. Also being passed over was Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company v. Goldstein, No. 00-818. A federal appeals court found that the government-regulated, government-funded volunteer company acted under color of law when it discharged a fire fighter based on his speech. The former volunteer fire fighter can maintain a suit against the company for violation of his First Amendment rights. 

A recently filed matter awaiting a review decision by the court is Firefighter's Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, No. 00-1164. A group of African-American fire fighters are attempting to challenge a lower court ruling that the city did not violate federal fair employment laws in the manner in which it selected personnel for promotion to battalion chief. 

Cases of interest 

Disability eligibility 

Barringer was employed as a paramedic with the Chicago Fire Department. He was hospitalized 


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service as a fireman." Thus, the statute plainly and unambiguously requires that in order to be entitled to occupational disease disability benefits, a fire fighter's disabling condition must have arisen or resulted "solely" from his employment. The evidence in this case, as well as Barringer's own testimony, shows that the stroke was caused by a clot that traveled through a congenital heart defect. None of the evidence indicated the stroke was caused solely from Barringer's service as a fire fighter. Denial of disability benefits affirmed. [Barringer v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 738 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)]  suppress his test results from use as evidence. Trial court denied the motion and he appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the prosecutor lacked sufficient grounds to issue the subpoena. State appeals. 

HELD: An Indiana statute in place for 150 years provides that the district attorney, upon learning of a criminal violation, shall cause process to issue to the appropriate officer directing him to subpoena persons likely to be acquainted with the commission of the offense. This procedure is known as the prosecutor's investigative subpoena power. Oman contends that such subpoenas require court approval. A review of the scant case law existing on the power of prosecutors to issue investigative subpoenas leads the court to establish a new rule of criminal procedure. A prosecutor acting without a grand jury must first seek permission of the court before issuing a subpoena duces tecum to a third party for the production of documentary evidence. When such application is made to the court, the requirement of probable cause, such as necessary for a warrant, need not be met. The Fourth Amendment does, however, provide an overriding requirement of reasonableness. As such, subpoenas must pass a three-part test. The evidence sought must be relevant, admissible, and specific. This standard of reasonableness incorporates appropriate constitutional safeguards designed to limit overzealous prosecutors and at the same time minimize judicial second-guessing that would unnecessarily bog down pre-charge investigations. When applied to the case at hand it is clear that the subpoena was sufficiently limited in scope in that only Oman's test results and not those of the other driver were requested; it was specific in that it only sought the one set of test results and not others maintained by the lab; and finally, it was relevant to a valid criminal prosecution. Just as the subpoena was validly issued, also valid is the city's substance abuse testing ordinance. The Supreme Court has previously ruled that substance abuse testing is constitutional for public employees engaged in safety sensitive tasks. The Supreme Court has left 

Substance abuse testing 

Michigan City, Indiana, had in place a drug and alcohol-free workplace ordinance. The ordinance provided that upon the occurrence of certain events, employees must submit to a urine test and a breath test to screen for illegal substances and alcohol. Refusal to submit to the test resulted in an automatic 30-day suspension without pay and a risk of termination. The ordinance contained a confidentiality provision that stated that the test results would be maintained in the employee's confidential file and not disclosed to others without the employee's written consent. However, disclosure could take place when compelled by judicial or administrative process. Oman, a fire fighter, was the driver of one of two fire trucks that collided en route to a fire call. Pursuant to the ordinance, both drivers were directed by their supervisor to submit to post-accident toxicological testing. The evening after the test the police received a tip informing them that Oman's drug test was positive for marijuana. Based on this information and without seeking permission from the court, the prosecutor issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the testing lab to produce Oman's test results. The lab complied and the report revealed Oman had tested positive for marijuana. He was charged with operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in his blood. At his criminal trial, Oman moved to 


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open the question of government employers using their administrative testing programs to pursue criminal convictions against employees. The record shows, however, that did not occur in this case. The prosecutor was pursuing a criminal investigation based on the knowledge of the collision of the fire trucks and the tip that one driver had tested positive. Additionally the testing requirement did not violate Oman's Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. Toxicological samples are not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature protected by the Fifth Amendment. Prior case law holds that only testimonial or communicative matters are covered by the self-incrimination clause. Additionally, Oman had agreed to submit to post-accident testing as a condition of employment with the fire department. If he had objected to this policy, he could have sought employment elsewhere. In fact, he could have objected to testing at the time of the accident, although an automatic 30-day suspension would have resulted. The suspension might have been preferable to the criminal prosecution he later faced. Oman had alternatives to pursue and thus was not compelled to provide evidence. Similarly, the production of the test results to the prosecutor did not intrude upon Oman's privacy interest as protected by the state constitution. The fact that the tests were provided to the prosecutor should have come as no surprise to Oman. The ordinary driver operating a vehicle in Indiana impliedly consents to submit to toxicological testing as a condition of operating that vehicle. A driver, such as Oman, has little or no expectation of privacy in a post-accident test result that indicates the presence of marijuana. In summary, the city's drug testing ordinance is sound and typical of those government drug testing programs approved by the Supreme Court under its special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. The disclosure provision is not inconsistent with Oman's reasonable expectation of privacy and the results of the administrative test could be used in a criminal prosecution against him but only if obtained by valid legal process. In this case, the subpoena  was valid and the evidence useable. Remanded to trial court for further proceedings. [Oman v. State of Indiana, 737 N.E.2d 1131 (Ind. 2000)] 

Leave 

The town and the fire fighters' union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The contract established wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. However, the contract was silent on whether employees injured on duty (IOD) status were eligible to accrue vacation benefits. In 1993, Thomas, a fire fighter, was injured while on duty. The town placed him on IOD status and he began a leave without loss of pay pursuant to state statute. He remained on IOD status for an extended period of time. While on IOD leave, the town did not credit Thomas with vacation time or sick time, nor did they pay him for the time. Thomas filed a grievance on the issue. The town denied it. The matter went to arbitration. An arbitrator concluded the town had violated the collective bargaining agreement in refusing to permit the accrual of the vacation and sick leave while Thomas was on IOD leave. Thomas was awarded credit for all withheld leave. Trial court vacated the arbitrator's award and union appeals. 

HELD: The evidence presented to the arbitrator showed that 16 fire fighters had been granted a total of 53 IOD leaves over the previous decade. With the exception of Thomas, all 16 fire fighters continued to accrue and be paid for vacation and sick leave. Only six of the leaves, including Thomas's, extended for two months or more. On this evidence the arbitrator concluded that there was a significant past practice of allowing a fire fighter on IOD leave to accrue and be paid for vacation and leave time. The city urges overturning of the arbitration award. However, Massachusetts's law contains a strong public policy favoring arbitration. Arbitrators have broad discretion in interpreting collective bargaining agreements and in providing complete relief to an aggrieved party. The role of courts in reviewing an arbitrator's award is limited. Thus, the court defers to the arbitrator's 



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determination that there was a clear past practice of crediting similarly situated individuals on an IOD leave with vacation and sick time. Initially, an arbitrator is governed by the plain meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. In instances where the agreement is unclear, the arbitrator may rightfully look to past practice to resolve ambiguities. The arbitrator in this case properly resorted to past practice when he could not conclude that the collective bargaining agreement was clear and unequivocal concerning the provision of accrual of leave to fire fighters on IOD leave. The parties received what they agreed to take, the honest judgment of the arbitrator. The labor agreement contained no provision precluding payment of vacation and sick time to individuals on IOD leave, although the parties might well have bargained for such a provision. The arbitrator's interpretation is not erroneous nor does it violate public policy. Vacated and judgment entered affirming arbitrator's award. [Town of Duxbury v. Duxbury Permanent Firefighters Association, Local 2167, 737 N.E.2d 1271 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)]  investigation. One investigation concerned an attempt by a fire fighter to obtain a higher pension benefit by fraudulently claiming he sustained a disabling injury in the line of duty. The scheme involved one fire fighter calling in a fire alarm to afford the injured fire fighter the opportunity to claim his injury occurred while responding to the alarm. Among the personnel interviewed were members of the fire officers' union. During one of the interviews a fire officers' union representative was excluded over his objection. In another interview, the union counsel questioned the adequacy of the notice. Ultimately, the union filed a request for arbitration of the grievance, claiming the city had violated the terms of the contract by the failure of its agency, the DOI, to abide by the employee rights provisions. The city labor board found the issue to be arbitrable. The city then filed suit seeking an injunction to prohibit arbitration. The city argued that it never agreed to arbitrate the procedures employed by the DOI in conducting its criminal investigations and that the contract cannot, as a matter of public policy, impair such procedures. Trial court enjoined the arbitration. Intermediate appellate court affirmed that holding and union appeals. 

HELD: Determining arbitrability requires a two-pronged inquiry. First a court must decide whether arbitration claims with respect to a particular subject matter of the dispute are authorized, and, second, the court must ascertain whether the authority to arbitrate was in fact exercised and the parties consented by the terms of their contract to refer disputes in this area to arbitration. Under the first prong, the court must determine that there is nothing in the statute, decisional law, or public policy that would preclude referring the matter to arbitration. The question of public policy is relevant in this case. The public policy at stake is DOI's ability to conduct a criminal investigation. The legislature has recognized that cities have the power to investigate corruption. Such power is vested in New York City to the DOI. The courts have long recognized the important role DOI 

Disciplinary procedures 

The city and the fire officers' union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Among the clauses in the labor contract were provisions of individual employee rights relating to interrogations, interviews, trials, and hearings. An employee was to be given a 10-day written notice prior to being interviewed and informed of the subject matter of the proceeding. The employee had to be informed if he was considered a suspect or non-suspect. Where an employee was a suspect, he had to be advised of his Garrity rights. The employee also had a right to legal representation and union representation. Finally, the contract provided that when the city failed to comply with its provisions, any questions put to the employee would be withdrawn and refusal to answer would not be prejudicial to the employee. In 1996, the city's Department of Investigation (DOI) subpoenaed several fire fighters as part of a criminal 


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plays in facilitating the honest workings of the city. The city and its residents have a significant interest in ensuring that the inner workings of the machinery of public service are honest and free of corruption. Thus, the public policy restricts the freedom to arbitrate under the circumstances here. It is the DOI, not an arbitrator, which is the entity mandated by law to control all aspects of the criminal investigation. Permitting an arbitrator to dictate the procedures over who should be present at a DOI interview or to direct that notice be given to an employee concerning the subject matter of a DOI investigation would intrude upon the DOI's role as a fact finder and contravene the city charter's prohibition against interference with investigations. The court will not permit an arbitrator to determine when and how DOI investigations are to be conducted. Injunction prohibiting arbitration of issue affirmed. [City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Association, 739 N.E.2d 719 (N.Y. 2000)]  as longevity was concerned. He ordered back pay for fire fighters. Town sought vacation of the award but trial court confirmed it. Town appeals. 

HELD: In Rhode Island, the power of a court to review the merits of an arbitration award is very limited. Absent a manifest disregard of the contractual provisions or a completely irrational result, the arbitration award shall be upheld. It is only when the arbitration award fails to embody even a passably plausible interpretation of the contract that it must be struck down by the court. As long as the award draws its essence from the contract the court will uphold it. The arbitrator's award here was passably plausible because it was consistent with the plain language of the contract. Nothing in the contract restricts or defines what is meant by "gross pay." Given that words in a contract should be given their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings, the arbitrator could plausibly have determined that gross pay included holiday pay. Prior case law expressly states that past practice may not form the basis to prevent enforcement of an award unless the contract itself contains a sufficiently clear past practice provision. Such was not the case here. The traditional rule is that in event of conflict between the language of a contract and past practice, the language of the contract, which represents the most direct and best evidence of the parties' intentions, must govern. The arbitrator's award was grounded in the essence of the collective bargaining agreement. Affirmed for fire fighters' union. [Town of North Providence v. Local 2334, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 763 A.2604 (R.I. 2000)] 

Compensation 

The collective bargaining agreement between the town and the fire fighters' union contained a provision stating that upon completion of five years of service the employee would receive an additional three percent of their base salary for longevity. Eight-year employees received another three percent of their gross pay for longevity. Finally, 15-year employees received an additional two percent of their gross pay for longevity. For many years the parties operated under collective bargaining agreements containing precisely the same language. The parties had mutually interpreted this provision to exclude holiday pay from gross pay in the calculation of longevity pay. However, the union filed a grievance alleging the town had violated the contract by failing to include holiday pay in the calculation for longevity. The matter went to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, finding that the town and the union by past practice had misinterpreted the collective bargaining agreement. He ruled that the gross pay as set forth in the contract should include holiday pay insofar 

Civil liability 

Mooney was a passenger in an automobile that was involved in a one-car accident. He sustained head injuries as a result of the accident. Sneed and Atkinson, emergency medical technicians (EMT) employed by the City of Memphis were dispatched to the accident. They provided emergency medical care to Mooney and transported him to the hospital. Subsequently, Mooney sued 


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the city and the two EMTs alleging that they had negligently installed a breathing tube, which resulted in oxygen deprivation. The EMTs moved for a summary judgment asserting they were immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) that establishes government employee immunity for negligent acts except in "medical malpractice actions against health care practitioners." Trial court granted summary judgment for the EMTs. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held that the EMTs were "health care practitioners" and, thus, were not immune from suit. EMTs appealed. 

HELD: Under Tennessee law, municipalities are generally immune from suit for any injury resulting from tortious actions except in instances where the immunity is expressly removed by the GTLA. One such instance of express removal of immunity involves injuries through negligent acts. Even there, governmental employees are generally immune from individual liability. An exception exists to this rule, however. Individual liability still exists when the claim is one for medical malpractice brought against a "health care practitioner." The question raised by this case is whether EMTs are "health care practitioners" within the meaning of the GTLA and subject to suit. The statute does not provide a definition of "health care practitioner" and, thus, the court must resort to basic rules of statutory construction. The court must ascertain the intent of the legislature in making its ruling. The legislative intent and purpose are to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language without a forced or subtle interpretation that would limit or extend the statute's application. Courts are not authorized to alter or amend a statute. In this case it is clear that the EMTs are "health care practitioners." They are licensed under a state statute that defines an EMT as "an individual licensed to practice emergency care." Statute further defines an EMT paramedic as "an individual licensed to practice advanced emergency medical care." Given that the defendants in this case were licensed EMTs under state law and 

had received specialized training to attain that position and that they responded to the accident scene to assess the injuries of the patient and began treating him, they were clearly health care practitioners. Sneed and Atkinson argue that public policy supports the providing of immunity to government employees who provide emergency medical services. They assert that Tennessee is the only state to specifically impose unlimited personal liability upon EMTs. Further, they claim that a decision that EMTs are health care practitioners will subject low-salaried government employees to unlimited liability and will limit the delivery of emergency services to the public. While these public policy arguments are persuasive, they must be made to the legislature, not the court. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own policy judgments for those of the legislature. Reversed for plaintiff finding the immunity provisions of the state tort claims law do not protect EMTs. [Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. 2000)] 

Pension rights 

In the early 1960s the airport began operating its own fire department. At that time it put the fire fighters under the same Social Security system that covered other airport employees. Each employee paid 6.2 percent of his or her monthly salary for Social Security and 1.45 percent for Medicare. The airport matched these funds on behalf of the employees. Eventually, the fire fighters' union discovered that its members could withdraw from Social Security and the members subsequently voted to do so. The union then filed suit against the airport for wrongful conversion, demanding reimbursement for the sums withheld from the fire fighters pay checks for Social Security and Medicare as well as the matching sums paid by the airport. The airport obtained reimbursement from the Social Security Administration for the funds withdrawn from the fire fighters' paychecks and this amount was returned to the employees. However, the airport refused to reimburse the amount it had paid on the fire fighters' behalf. The 


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union moved for reimbursement of the airport contributions as well as a continuing contribution to the fire fighters' retirement plan through the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Trial court granted union's motion and airport appeals. 

HELD: The airport first contends that the union lacks standing to bring action for monetary damages. Under Washington law, a union has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members if it satisfies three elements: (1) its members have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual members in the lawsuit. Under this test, traditionally unions have been barred from bringing suits for monetary damages. This bar arises from the third prong of the associational standing test: the requirement that neither the claim nor the relief require the participation of individual members of the association. The logic is that a court would still have to determine the individual claims of union members if the suit were brought on behalf of the members by the union. However, in this case the evidence reflects that the records are easily available to determine the amounts due for each union member. As such, judicial efficiency suggests that allowing the union to maintain the lawsuit is a convenient and efficient method of litigating the issues. On the reimbursement issue, the airport contends the trial court erred because it ignored a prior case of virtual identical facts holding to the contrary. That case found that a pension granted to an employee is not a gratuity but a deferred compensation for services rendered. Under Washington law, a pension agreement is contractual in nature and once an employee has a vested right in a pension or retirement system, the employer cannot alter the system to the employee's detriment without corresponding benefit. Prior case law holds that pension plans are necessarily included in the total compensation package found in private collective bargaining agreements. The employer is 

obligated to pay the pension if an employee fulfills the specific conditions of the agreement. In this case, the existence of the airport's former agreement to match the Social Security payments is not in dispute. The airport complied with that obligation for many years. It cannot now refuse to comply simply because the form of the pension plan has been altered. As has been held in prior cases, the employer is obligated to pay an amount equal to its earlier Social Security contribution. Summary judgment for union affirmed. [International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 14 P.3d 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)] 
Settlements 

Miami-Dade County, Florida 

fire fighters 
The county commission has overridden two mayoral vetoes in order to provide fire fighters with an extra 4 percent pay raise. The boost, 2 percent in each of the next 2 years, is in addition to an 8 percent jump previously given to all county employees. Mayor Alex Penelas twice vetoed the wage premiums, fearing demands from other unions. But, commission members mustered sufficient votes last month for the override. Miami-Dade fire fighters are represented by Local 1403 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO. 

Wheaton, Illinois 

fire fighters 
The Wheaton Firefighters Association has negotiated its second contract since the union was established in 1997. The new three-year labor pact provides a 4.5 percent wage increase the first year followed by a 4.75 percent boost in year two. The final year of the contract will see wages move up by 5 percent. Also revised were department promotion procedures. Eliminated was pass/fail scoring in favor of a point system. The new contract covers 30 fire fighters.