The standard specifies a minimum of four paid fire fighters per fire apparatus, with five and six in high density areas, and sets a four-minute response time for the first company to reach a fire. The standard also calls for two paramedics on each advanced life support call. For volunteers, the rule mandates four fire fighters to be at the scene before suppression efforts may begin. 

While the NFPA, a private organization that has been developing fire codes since 1886, cannot mandate its standards on communities, its rules are 

While the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs strongly endorse Standard 1710, the International City/County Management Association and the National League of Cities are opposed. At issue is the question of local control of fire department operations and the cost of implementation. Opponents argue that every community is different and that staffing levels are best devised at the local level. Additionally, for many communities full staffing would necessitate substantial increases in fire department budgets. Supporters claim that minimum staffing is crucial to fire fighter safety and the quality delivery of fire suppression and emergency medical services.. 

Under NFPA procedures, the final decision rests with the Standards Council, which will consider the matter at its July meeting in San Francisco. If approved, the standard will likely go into effect in mid-August. 

Under the legislation, an eleven-member Medal of Valor Board will be appointed by the 

Once a year the board will forward to the Attorney General the names of not more than five public safety officers who have demonstrated "extraordinary valor above and beyond the call of duty." The Attorney General will then select some 

The program is effective September 1 but no meeting of the board can occur until all members have been selected. The board is authorized to conduct hearings and take testimony as necessary 

Eligible for the award are both paid and non-paid individuals serving public agencies as fire fighters, emergency service officers, corrections officers, law enforcement officers, and court officers. 

The precipitating incident occurred last month when, for safety reasons, Webster police officers decided they needed to enter some drug suspects' apartment before the suspects realized the officers' identities. The police feared the suspects would dispose of cocaine when they realized the police were at the door. Officers hitched a ride to the address on a volunteer fire company's truck. The officers than told the occupants of the apartment that they were fire fighters responding to a report of smoke. Once inside, the officers seized the cocaine and arrested two suspects. 

As word of the ruse spread via the Internet, fire service professional and labor organizations responded with dismay. IAFC Executive Director said, "ICHIEFS is adamantly opposed to the use of fire fighters and other rescue personnel, their uniforms or likeness thereof, or fire apparatus to gain 

The Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts (PFFM), an IAFF-affiliated union of 12,000 paid fire fighters, will vote this month on whether to support legislation prohibiting police officers from posing as fire fighters. Robert McCarthy, president of the PFFM, said, "We (fire fighters) go into people's homes all the time. We go in on medical emergencies, too. We don't want people shutting their doors on us, preventing us from coming in. We don't want to jeopardize their lives, the lives we're trying to protect. We don't want them thinking `Are these fire fighters, are they police officers?'" 

All states have statutes declaring impersonation of a public servant to be a criminal offense. Such laws are most commonly used against civilians who pose as police officers in an effort to perpetrate a more serious offense, such as a sexual assault. 

In April, 2000, the activist, and plaintiff in the lawsuit, Andrea Lindsay, had placed a bicycle lock around her neck and attached it to a billboard atop a ten-story building. She unfurled a 50-foot banner advocating the boycott of a local department 

In her lawsuit, Lindsay asserts that rescuers from the San Francisco Fire Department inflicted emotional distress when they tried to coax her down. She claims that fire fighters and police officers used expletive-laden demands for here to unlock herself and climb down, which made her "feel concerned for her safety." She claims the harsh words ultimately elevated to a battery. Specifically, Lindsay charges that a fire fighter forced her feet 

Although Lindsay initially dropped the key to the bike lock, a fire fighter retrieved it and unlocked her. 

While activists frequently sue police officers for alleged battery during protests, authorities in San Francisco say no one in recent memory has sued a fire fighter. 

Cases of interest 

HELD: This case presents a conflict between a city ordinance, which purports to render ineligible fire fighter applicants who reach age 35, and an Illinois statute which allows eligible applicants to remain on the list even after their 35th 

HELD: The city is incorporated under an Arizona statute that provides that the duties of city manager shall be specified by ordinance. In the city ordinance creating the city manager's position he is granted authority to appoint, suspend, or remove subordinates in each city department. The city, however, also has adopted a merit system. The city council by resolution established the personnel rules. Under the personnel rules, the findings of the hearing officer are to be forwarded to the city manager for implementation. Additionally, the rules provide that 

HELD: The city participates in the countywide enhanced 911 system. The system provides the dispatcher with the telephone number of the person calling 911, the name of the person who has registered the phone number, and the address where the phone is located. The system also includes a computerized mapping program that displays the approximate location of the telephone source. The city protocol requires the dispatcher to check the e-911 map before giving directions to emergency personnel. In this case, however, the dispatcher admitted that he did not check the map. Burns contends the city is liable for negligence under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). In 1972, the state supreme court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Two years later the legislature enacted the ITCA. Under the ITCA, governmental entities are subject to liability for torts committed by them unless the activity falls within a specific enumerated exception. One of the exceptions to liability under the ITCA is the immunity granted a governmental entity if the loss results from the use of an enhanced emergency communication system. Burns argues that since the dispatcher did not consult the e-911 map, he was not "using" the system and, therefore, the city could not take advantage of the immunity statute. However, Burns' argument fails to take into account that e-911 embraces more than computer maps that help guide emergency vehicles. The system involves central processing computers, modems, power supplies, software, telephone lines, and the people who furnish the human support at the dispatch center. Given the interrelationship of each of these components, including the human operators, within a fully operational e-911 system, the court cannot say that the dispatcher's failure to check the map constituted nonuse of the e-911 system. Burns' loss resulted from the use of an enhanced emergency communication system and the city is immune from suit under the ITCA. Affirmed for city. [Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)] 

HELD: State law delegates to the city legislative body the authority to fix the annual compensation of members of the fire department. The statute provides that the city pay ordinance may grade the members of the department and regulate their pay "by rank as well as by length of service." According to the city pay ordinance the differences in pay and vacation time are due to rank and grade. Prior case law holds that the words "grade," "rank," and "classification" are synonymous for the purposes of state statute. The statute allows local governments to grade members of the fire department and regulate their pay by rank and length of service. The statute on its face contemplates that employees of the fire department are going to be compensated differently due to differing levels of experience and responsibilities. The different treatment of staff and line fire fighters seems reasonable in light of their relative responsibilities and has no apparent illegal basis for the treatment. Further, there is nothing in the law that prohibits compensating the various grades, ranks, or classes of fire fighters differently when their responsibilities are different. As to the issue of overtime availability, 

HELD: Brunken contends that because the city included the lump sum payment in his 1995 calculation for income tax purposes, the pension board is required to include the lump sum payment in the calculation of his pension benefit. A close look at the pension ordinance, however, reveals that the calculation is based upon the "highest average monthly compensation." The term "monthly" is defined as "of or relating to a month, payable or reckoned by the month." The plain ordinary meaning of the expression "monthly compensation" is that amount of income received regularly by the retiring employee every month. The happenstance receipt of the 1994 back pay did not alter Brunken's regular "monthly compensation" during 1995. If this back pay amount were included in the pension calculation, it would artificially inflate his pension benefits. Because the plain ordinary meaning of "monthly compensation" is limited to regular compensation received each month the trial court erred in directing that the lump sum payment be included. Pension board was correct in excluding the retroactive payment of wages earned in 1994 but paid in 1995 from the calculation of the pension benefit. Reversed for pension board. [Brunken v. Board of Trustees of Omaha Police and Fire Retirement System, 624 N.W.2d 629 (Neb. 2001)] 

HELD: A court's power to vacate a final, binding arbitration award is limited. As a matter of policy, the courts favor and encourage arbitration and will make every reasonable indulgence to avoid disturbing an arbitration award. An appeals court may not disturb the trial court's affirmation of an arbitration award absent evidence of material mistake or extensive impropriety in the arbitration. By agreeing to submit the dispute to binding arbitration, the parties agreed to accept the result regardless of its legal or factual accuracy. When a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract governs the rights of the parties. As long as the arbitration award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement the arbitrator has not overstepped his bounds. Here, the city asserts that the accumulated sick days should be counted as 8-hour days and that the arbitrator erroneously determined that under the labor agreement a sick day referred to a typical fire fighter's workday, or 24 hours. Additionally, the city asserts that the pay rate for accumulated sick hours should be $15 not