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Volume 15, Number 8 

Orlando, IAFF square off over hidden medical records 

A visit this month by national union officials heated up the dispute between Orlando fire fighters and city officials over fire fighter health and safety issues. Harold Schaitberger, General President of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO, and Vice President Dominick Barbera visited the Florida city in support of local fire fighter claims that for many years city officials have withheld critical health information from them. 

Referring to the controversy over failing to reveal medical records as a "20-year conspiracy," Schaitberger, in a prepared statement, said, "Because of the city's cover up there are fire fighters dying of hepatitis C, an illness that has been recognized by the State of Florida as one of many job-related ailments that attack fire fighters and paramedics." 

At the core of the dispute are allegations that city health officials failed to advise fire fighters that they had health problems, including symptoms of hepatitis C, following their annual physical exams. The issue came to the forefront last year when Bob Flamily, a 23- 

year veteran fire fighter, learned from his personal physician that he had hepatitis C in its final stages. City medical records obtained by Flamily's attorney revealed indications of the disease as far back as 1978 but the fire fighter was never told. Subsequently, 33 fire fighters have sued the city over failure to disclose to them abnormal annual physical examination results. 

Officials of IAFF Local 1365 have called on the city to immediately conduct hepatitis C testing of all fire fighters and authorize an outside investigation of the allegations. Union officials estimate that 400 active and 400 retired fire fighters could be affected by the non-disclosure of the medical data. The IAFF is also pressing the state attorney general to initiate an investigation of the city's conduct. 

Mayor Glenda Hood recently indicated that she has changed her mind about an outside investigation and is moving to authorize such an inquiry. "The bottom line is, we want to get the facts and we want to get them as soon as possible," said the mayor who originally opposed an investigation because of the lawsuits. 

Minimum manning standard? No problem in Kansas City 

As national debate continues about how to pay for four fire fighters per apparatus, Kansas City, Missouri, fire personnel figured out that the quickest way to comply with the newly recommended manning standard: was go to the voters for more money. And the voters said "yes," this month, approving a ¼ cent sales tax to fund 135 additional fire fighters. About half of the $276 million that the 15-year tax will generate will be used for fire station construction and renovation, a new dispatch system, and a new fire academy. Over $140 million will be used to fund the employment of the additional fire fighters. 

Voters approved the tax following a relatively low-key campaign by fire department officials and union 

members. Members of Local 42 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, contributed about $85,000 to the campaign but the union was not as politically active as in prior elections. The union president repeatedly declined to discuss the tax with reporters, leaving all comments to the fire chief. Voters in the same election rejected a light rail tax proposal, apparently believing that fire fighter safety was the more important issue. 

The Kansas City Fire Department, which has an authorized strength of 774, will reportedly assign 30 new fire fighters to two new stations but use the other 105 to reach the four fire fighter minimum manning standard recently adopted by the National Fire 


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Protection Association (NFPA). The NFPA standard mandating four firefighters at structural fires has received criticism from several quarters, primarily for fiscal and local control reasons. Additionally, critics argue that  equipment manning levels is an issue best decided by local fire officials. IAFF officials have long supported minimum manning requirements on the basis of fire fighter safety. 

Federal fire fighters fight age dilemna 

"I'm not going to let the U.S. Forest Service win at their game," said Kathy Hudak, when asked why she is not again working as a seasonal wildland fire fighter. The "game" involves the fact that Hudak, an experienced fire fighter, can be employed as a part-time fire fighter by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) but is ineligible for a full time position. The reason? The maximum hiring age for USFS fire fighters is 35 and Hudak is 41. 

In the 1970s Congress enacted a statute requiring federal fire fighters to retire at age 55. To receive full pension benefits, however, they must log 20 years of service. Consequently, the USFS established a maximum hiring age of 35, regardless of experience. 

After Hudak received official notice that she was too old for full-time employment, she was offered seasonal work by four different ranger districts. 

Unions representing USFS employees have asked Secretary of the Interior Ann Veneman to waive 

the age requirement. To date, the Secretary has declined to do so. A department official noted that granting an age waiver would only "screw" the employee at age 55 when they would be required to retire and would receive a reduced pension. 

Critics have suggested that inexperience may have played a role in the deaths of four wildland fire fighters last month in Washington. Three of the four were 21 years old or younger. Additionally, the USFS has denied having difficulty finding seasoned personnel. 

Earlier this month the Senate unanimously passed and sent to the President a bill raising the retirement age for federal fire fighters to 57, the same as federal law enforcement officers. The House of Representatives had unanimously passed the bill earlier in the year. The President has not as yet signed it. The new law will only marginally improve the situation. For Kathy Hudak and other experienced fire fighters of similar age, full time employment remains unavailable. 

NFPA announces on-line hepatitis C course 

In an effort to reduce exposure to firefighters from diseases like hepatitis C and HIV, NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) announced last month the availability of a basic, complimentary Internet-informational training session on blood-borne pathogen safety, targeted to all North American firefighters, effective immediately. The 45-minute interactive session, one of a number of online OSHA-compliant training courses offered by TargetSafety.com, an Internet learning partner of NFPA, delivers training on universal precautions to minimize exposure. 

There is no known vaccine for hepatitis C. Recent news accounts present the prevalence of blood-borne pathogen diseases, mostly hepatitis C, among first-responders to vehicular crashes and other medical emergencies. Devoid of mandatory implementation of 

universal precautions in the past, fire fighters have acquired hepatitis C, a slowly developing infection that leads to chronic or fatal liver disease. Current treatment is expensive and not completely successful. 

"As an association committed to safety training and especially fire fighter safety, NFPA is pleased to offer this technology-based tool as a simpler way for fire fighters to learn how to protect themselves from blood-borne diseases" said Gary O. Tokle, assistant vice president of Public Fire Protection, NFPA. "We hope that by using the Internet, this training can take place virtually any time of the day or night." 

Fire fighters may log on to the free training site, www.targetsafety.com/nfpabbp. Information about other online firefighter courses can also be found at the same site. 



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Litigation  Under this standard Bechtel can assert a claim if he first shows that the municipality acted to inflict an injury through official policy or custom and that he indeed suffered some constitutional injury. "Policy" is an official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters. Bechtel argues the court should have allowed him to show that the actions taken against him were in fact the result of official policy and that the fire chief qualified as an official policymaker for the purposes of federal law. The evidence reveals that the fire chief was not a policymaker but an employee whose responsibility was limited to the operation of the fire department and subject to review by the city administrator. Hence, any actions he took in this matter did not constitute official policy of the city. Independent of that issue is the fact that Bechtel has failed to prove a constitutional injury because he did not show that any action of the city administrator resulted in adverse employment action against him. In order to establish a claim for unlawful First Amendment retaliation a public employee must show that, in addition to participation in protected activity, he suffered an adverse employment action and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. An adverse employment action must effectuate a material change in the terms or conditions of employment. None of the alleged adverse employment actions taken against Bechtel can be linked to any effort by the city to infringe upon his First Amendment rights. Lacking establishment of this linkage, trial court appropriately granted summary judgment to the city. Affirmed for the city. [Bechtel v. City of Belton, Missouri, 250 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 2001)] 

Cases of interest 

Disciplinary grounds 

The fire department operations were divided into three shifts: A, B and C. Bechtel, an assistant fire chief, was in charge of B-shift. He reported through the department chain of command that ultimately reached the city administrator. Beginning in 1993, Bechtel spoke at the fire department meetings, to an assistant city administrator, and to a city councilman about his concerns related to fire department's deficiencies in pre-fire planning for public buildings, physical fitness requirements, radio communication equipment, operating procedures, and alleged faults in new ambulances. Bechtel claimed that the city retaliated against him for this speech by denying him merit pay increases and placing him on secret probation. He subsequently sued the city for violating his First Amendment free speech rights. Trial court granted summary judgment for the city and assistant fire chief appeals. 

HELD: The facts of the case reveal that in 1997 city administration met with fire department executives and discussed issues relating to B-shift supervised by Bechtel. The exact scope of the discussion was unknown but thereafter the fire chief transferred a captain to B-shift where he was to report anything that he regarded as nonperformance or poor performance on B-shift. Subsequently, Bechtel received no performance evaluation or merit increase for that year. The city administrator had instructed the fire chief to review Bechtel's performance for that year but the chief failed to do so. Bechtel, however, neither complained nor notified the city administrator of the lack of performance evaluation or merit increase. Evidence also indicates that while the fire captain documented Bechtel's activities while working on B-shift, no written conclusions were placed in Bechtel's personnel file. For a public employee to maintain a federal suit against a municipality for violating his constitutional rights it must be established that the violation of the rights was by actions of an individual representing official policy. 

Liberty interest 

Cannon was a veteran fire fighter who sought promotion to fire suppression lieutenant. He sat for the promotion exam and received the highest score of any candidate. The city, however, passed over him for promotion and selected candidates who attained a lesser score on the test. The fire chief told Cannon that one of the reasons he was passed over was because of a 


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memorandum that an assistant fire chief had prepared and placed in his personnel file. The contents of the memorandum included stigmatizing statements about Cannon. Cannon filed suit against the city and the assistant fire chief complaining that by placing the stigmatizing information in his personnel file without giving him an opportunity for a name clearing hearing the city had violated Cannon's procedural due process rights under the Constitution. Trial court granted summary judgment for the city and fire fighter appeals. 

HELD: In order to establish that a deprivation of a public employee's liberty interest has occurred without due process of law, the employee must prove that: (1) a false statement; (2) of a stigmatizing nature; (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge; (4) was made public (5) by the governmental employer; (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing. The publication requirement is met in this case because under Florida law information in a public employee's personnel file is subject to public inspection. All other necessary elements for a cause of action are present except one: that the stigmatizing information was placed in Cannon's file during the course of his discharge from employment. This case presents the question of whether the right to a name clearing hearing is available only for termination of public employment or available for other adverse actions. In 1976, the U. S. Supreme Court held that defamation by the government, standing alone and apart from any other action, does not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court established what has become known as the "stigma plus" test, essentially requiring a public employee to show not only defamation but also the violation of some more tangible interest in order to gain the protections of the due process clause. Prior case law holds that there is no right to be promoted. Additionally, case law holds that where no loss of income or rank occurs, and absent a discharge or more, injury to reputation itself is not a protected liberty interest. This precedent requires a ruling that the denial of promotion to Cannon in connection with the stigmatizing injury he suffered when the memorandum was placed in his personnel file is insufficient to establish that the denial of an opportunity 

for a name clearing hearing violated his procedural due process rights. Trial court correctly dismissed the case. [Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida, 250 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001)] 

Selection procedures 

The City of San Antonio selected its fire fighter cadets pursuant to Texas civil service law. Individuals sat for a qualifying examination and then were ranked based on test scores and supplemental points, such as veteran's preference. In addition to the civil service requirements the fire department required applicants to clear a physical agility test, a physical and mental examination, a background investigation, an oral interview, and a polygraph examination. If an applicant failed any of these requirements, the file was reviewed by the fire chief and the applicant was notified that he had been automatically disqualified from further consideration. If the applicant was not automatically disqualified, the applicant was deemed suitable for consideration. As vacancies arose, the state civil service law required appointing of the individual with the highest grade, unless there was a valid reason that the second or third highest grade be appointed. This statutory process was known as the "rule of three." Individuals appointed to the fire academy served a probationary one-year period after which they became tenured civil service employees. Andrade sat for the fire fighter examination in 1996. He ranked number 87. He was then processed through the fire department's criteria. While he cleared most elements of the department requirements, his background investigation revealed questionable information about his driving record, his college transcript, and past employment. He also failed the polygraph examination. Andrade was administered a polygraph exam, which revealed deceptive answers relative to theft and withholding of information. The polygraph examiner notified Andrade of his failure and offered him the opportunity to explain his deceptive responses. He was also given the opportunity to retake the examination. Andrade elected to proceed and retake the polygraph examination. He signed a form acknowledging his understanding that if he failed the exam again, his application would be withdrawn from 


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consideration. Once again, the polygraph examination showed deception that Andrade was unable to explain. Andrade did not object to any of the polygraph questions or to the examiner's conduct. As the eligibility list covering Andrade was about to expire, he and several other applicants filed a state suit challenging the city's alleged illegal hiring practices. State court issued a temporary injunction in favor of Andrade and allowed him to be placed in the fire training academy pending a final resolution of the claim. Even though the city had rejected Andrade's application based on the "rule of three," the court order nonetheless allowed him to proceed in the fire academy. Because the state appeals court subsequently ruled that a probationary fire fighter enjoyed no civil service protection, the city terminated Andrade and the other court-supported applicants on the day they graduated from the fire-training academy. The city stated it terminated Andrade for the same reason they initially recommended he be removed from the eligibility list as unsuitable. Andrade filed suit claiming that he was terminated because of his Hispanic national origin. The city and fire executives move for summary judgment. 

HELD: To establish a claim of discrimination Andrade must show initially that he was qualified for the position and failed to be selected because of his national origin. He argues, for example, that one fire official stated there were "too many Mexicans on the eligibility list." However, review of the evidence shows that Andrade has not brought forth competent proof that he was qualified for a beginning fire fighter position and that other similarly situated trainees, nonmembers of his protected class, remain employed by the department. It is undisputed that Andrade failed one of the requirements for a position, namely passing of the polygraph examination. The city required all applicants to pass the polygraph examination and there is no evidence that the examination given Andrade was different than that administered to other applicants. Additionally, he signed a form acknowledging his understanding that his application would be withdrawn if he failed the polygraph. He did not object to the exam questions nor to the behavior of the examiner. He was even afforded an opportunity to retake the 

examination. He thus failed to establish that he was discriminated against in the selection process. Andrade also claims that he was retaliated against because of his suit against the city. It is undisputed that the adverse action for which he claims retaliation occurred after he became employed as a fire fighter trainee. It is well established that a public employee may not be discharged for exercising his rights of free speech under the First Amendment. There are four elements of an employee's First Amendment claim against his employer: (1) the employee must suffer an adverse employment decision; (2) the employee's speech must involve a matter of public concern; (3) the employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern must outweigh the city's interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) the employee's speech must have motivated the employer's actions. The threshold question is whether the employee's speech touched on a matter of public concern. Here, Andrade argues that his lawsuit constitutes "speech" related to a matter of public concern, failure of the city to comply with state civil service law. Certainly, prior case law holds that disclosure of misbehavior by public officials is a matter of public interest and deserves constitutional protection. Andrade's actions move beyond a mere personal matter and touch upon a broader issue. Andrade should have the opportunity to litigate whether his expression indeed rises to the level of public concern and thereby provides a cause of action for a First Amendment violation. The city's motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim is denied. The city's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination claim is granted. [Andrade v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 43 F. Supp.2d 699 (W.D. Tex. 2001)] 

Substance abuse testing 

In 1994, the municipality enacted a policy that required fire fighters and police officers to submit to urine testing upon the occurrence of certain events. These individuals were subject to urinalysis upon employment application, promotion, demotion, and transfer, as well as following a vehicular accident. The policy also provided that they could be tested based on a reasonable suspicion and at random. Subsequently, 


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the municipality altered the policy such that fire fighters were not subject to the random testing provision. The police officers' and fire fighters' unions sued the city arguing that the suspicionless testing was unconstitutional. Trial court determined the policy to be constitutional and public safety employee unions appeal. 

HELD: The Alaska Constitution, like the U. S. Constitution, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. But, the Alaska Constitution also creates a right to privacy. These provisions afford broader protection to Alaskan citizens than their federal counterparts. Thus, the question presented in this case is whether the suspicionless substance abuse testing violates the state constitutional provisions. Prior case law has held that the primary purpose of these two Alaska provisions is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by governmental officials. Prior case law also holds that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy and are consequently a "search" within the meaning of the law. Case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment has allowed suspicionless testing of public safety employees under a "special needs" theory. A "special needs" theory attempts to balance an individual's constitutional interests with those of the government. A special needs theory that recognizes neither probable cause nor a warrant is required to govern searches is particularly appropriate in highly regulated safety essential fields of work. Workers employed in such fields necessarily expect reduced privacy in the job-related activities and implicitly agree to a diminished level of privacy when they accept employment. The fire fighters' union argues that fire fighting is not such a heavily regulated activity. This view, however, is not supported by prior case law. Both fire fighters and police officers undeniably hold safety sensitive positions in extensively regulated fields of activity where they discharge duties fraught with risk of injury to others and even a momentarily lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. The court believes that workers in such positions could reasonably expect that their conditions of employment would be subject to exceptionally close scrutiny. Likewise, the unions argue that there is no 

compelling government need absent a showing of a substance abuse problem in the public safety services. No such history of substance abuse is necessary to establish a "special need" for suspicionless testing in situations involving heavily regulated, safety sensitive job duties. The lower court was correct in finding that the municipality's interest in assuring public safety is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the relatively modest intrusion on the privacy of fire fighters and police officers that occurs when they are subject to suspicionless testing upon application for employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, or after a vehicular accident. However, the public employer has failed to meet its burden of establishing special need for its random testing provision. There is no documented history of substance abuse problems on police officers and fire fighters in the city and the city fails to establish that the policy's goals will not be adequately addressed by its remaining suspicionless testing provisions. Random testing under this circumstance is unreasonable and violates the state constitution. Affirmed for municipality except as to random testing of fire fighters and police officers. [Anchorage Police Department Employees Association v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001)] 

Dismissal grounds 

Jones, a New Orleans fire fighter, went to work at 7 a.m. At 4 p.m. he was relieved until 10 p.m. by Holmes under a mutual agreement whereby Jones would be paid for the hours between 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. and would pay Holmes for having worked those hours in his place. Jones left the fire station and went home to change out of his uniform and into shorts and a shirt. He then went to a family party where he consumed at least two beers. Shortly after 9 p.m., while driving home from the party, a neighbor stepped in front of his car in an unlit area. The neighbor was carrying a six-pack of beer, swinging it back and forth, when he was struck by Jones' truck, causing the beer to spray over the windshield. Jones claimed that when his windshield was cleared of the beer, he saw no one in front or in back of the truck. Fearing that the pedestrian had hit the truck in an effort to car-jack him, Jones did not stop and 


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continued home. At home he changed out of his shorts into long trousers similar to his department uniform and returned to the engine house. Upon arrival at the engine house, he determined that a man had been involved in a hit-and-run incident. Jones immediately told his captain what happened and expressed a need to call the police to find out if he should return to the scene. Subsequently, Jones was taken from the firehouse and a blood-alcohol test was conducted. The test found his level to be over the legal limit for driving. Because the fire department has a policy in place that prohibits members from being under the influence of alcoholic beverages while on duty, Jones was suspended. He later was found guilty of negligent homicide, a felony, and received a five-year probationary sentence. The fire department then terminated Jones from his position as a fire fighter. Civil service commission upheld the termination following a hearing. Former fire fighter appeals. 

HELD: At the civil service hearing the fire superintendent testified that Jones' failing to stop and render aid, or at least find out what happened at the time of the accident, showed lack of judgment. It also affected the fire department's ability to maintain public confidence as well as confidence of Jones' co-workers. The superintendent also testified that the police investigation had an impact on the fire department in that Jones' unit had to be taken out of service and was unable to respond to any emergency during the investigation. Finally, media accounts of the incident identified Jones as a New Orleans fire fighter. All of this had a disruptive effect on the morale of individuals in the department as well as the confidence of the public. In reviewing dismissal of a public employee, the court must determine whether there was good or lawful cause for taking the disciplinary action and whether the punishment imposed was commensurate with the offense. "Cause" includes conduct prejudicial to the public service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation. Disciplinary action against a civil service employee will be deemed arbitrary and capricious unless there is real and substantial relationship between the improper conduct and the efficient operation of the public service. Here, there is uncontradicted evidence that Jones pled guilty to a felony arising out of striking 

and killing a pedestrian while operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of the legal standard. It is likewise established that he reported back to the fire station while so impaired. The fire superintendent clearly established the effect the incident had on morale and the reputation of the department in the community. This evidence provides a rational basis for the civil service commission's conclusion that the conduct occurred and that it impaired the department's efficiency. Likewise, the penalty of dismissal was not excessive. Public safety employees have been terminated for other felonies and in light of this serious misconduct it cannot be said that discretion was abused in ordering Jones terminated. Dismissal of fire fighter affirmed. [Jones v. New Orleans Fire Department, 785 So.2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 2001)] 

Worker's compensation 

Schurlknight began work as a fire fighter in 1973. Between 1976 and 1997 he served as a captain and rode in the passenger seat of the fire truck between 5 and 15 times per week. On each call he was exposed to the sirens and air horns that were located a few feet from his seat. Schurlknight would leave his window down to listen for traffic and other emergency vehicles and turned the radio up to a volume that could be heard over sirens and horns. In 1995, as part of a routine physical examination his physician reported to Schurlknight that he had some hearing loss and that it would be monitored each year. Schurlknight had not noticed any hearing loss prior to the doctor's examination. The physician recommended that he wear hearing protection. He was also referred to a speech and hearing center for counseling. Schurlknight received counseling at the center regarding the adverse communication effects of his hearing impairment and was subsequently referred to vocational rehabilitation services for funding assistance for hearing aids. At the time he was told that his hearing loss would likely continue to worsen and he might ultimately need hearing aids. Schurlknight continued to work as a fire fighter and did not file any worker's compensation claim as he was still able to perform his job. A year later he had another hearing test and was once again told that he 


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had a minor hearing loss and could go back to work. He chose not to wear hearing protection, believing he could not hear the radio transmissions if he were wearing such protection. After leaving the fire department in 1997 Schurlknight began to experience difficulty hearing. Subsequent testing revealed moderate to severe hearing loss. He filed a worker's compensation claim in early 1998. The claim was denied on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations had elapsed. Trial court affirmed the denial of the claim and former fire fighter appeals. 

HELD: Under South Carolina law a worker's compensation claim is barred unless it is filed within two years after an accident. Prior case law holds that the two years begins to run from the date the claimant either knew or should have known of the compensible injury. Here, Schurlknight argues that in repetitive trauma claims such as his the date on which the claim arises should be the last date of exposure to the repetitive trauma. He argues that the statute of limitations should start after his last exposure to his noisy environment. Such is not the law, however. Schurlknight's medical records indicate that in May of 1995, when he was counseled at the hearing center, he was referred to vocational rehabilitation for funding assistance for hearing aids. At that point Schurlknight knew or should have known that he had suffered a compensable injury under worker's compensation law. Even if he was unaware at that time, his hearing test in early 1996 should have given him notice. In either case, more than two years lapsed from those tests and his filing of the worker's compensation claim. His efforts at obtaining worker's compensation benefits are barred by the statute of limitations. [Schurlknight v. City of North Charleston, 545 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)] 

will increase salaries by over 11 percent over the next four years. A retroactive three percent hike was gained for the first year followed by two percent boosts in both the first and the second halves of the second year. The pattern of paired two percent increases is repeated in the third year. Longevity pay is also increased. Top of scale salary will increase to $34,000 by the end of the contract term. The contract expires July 31, 2003. Fire protection in the city is provided by a combined staff of a dozen full-time fire fighters and about 25 volunteers. 

Rialto, California 

fire fighters 
Due to tight budget constraints, city officials and the Rialto Professional Firefighters Association have agreed to a two-year contract with a modest wage increase. Fire fighters will receive a one percent wage hike retroactive to July 1 followed by another one percent on January 1, 2002. A wage reopener exists for the second year. 

Worcester, Massachusetts 

fire fighters 
The more than 400 members of Local 1009 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, overwhelmingly approved a new pact with the City of Worcester. The contract, which runs from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, provides a four percent wage boost in each contract year. In addition to the pay increases, the union secured an increase in the eligibility for out-of-grade pay. Under the contract a junior officer will need to work only two tours, down from the previous four, in order to qualify for the pay rate of the rank being filled. The city gained more flexibility in making promotions and in scheduling certain employees. The parties also agreed to reduce the number of drivers for fire department executives from 16 to eight. 
Settlements 

Rensselaer, New York 

fire fighters 
Fire Service Labor Monthly archives and 
Salary Tracker data are 
available on the internet 
at www.justex.com 
Local 2643 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, and the City of Rensselaer have inked a new three-year labor accord. The pact