Smallpox vaccine would be offered first to hospital emergency workers
and slowly extended to other doctors, nurses, fire fighters, police, and,
eventually, the general public, under a Bush administration plan in the final
stages of development. The plan would begin vaccinations for those
at the greatest risk of contacting a patient with the highly contagious disease.
That includes infectious disease specialists and emergency room personnel,
including doctors, nurses, technicians, even security officers working at
hospitals and clinics, according to officials familiar with the administration’s
planning.
This first group probably will include more than one million people, one
official told the Associated Press. Precise numbers won’t be known
until states are given guidelines and determine how many people they cover.
The vaccinations carry risk of serious side effects, including death, so
authorities estimate that only about a third to a half of those offered vaccinations
will take them. In the end, they believe that several hundred thousand
- maybe half a million - will wind up getting the vaccinations.
Smallpox hasn’t been seen in this country in decades, and routine vaccinations ended in 1971. In 1980, the disease was declared eradicated from the globe, but experts fear hostile nations or terrorist groups might acquire the virus and unleash it in a bioterror attack.
The plan on the table would vaccinate people in stages, based on risks they face. In the second stage, vaccinations would be offered to other health care workers, including those in private practice and others who work in hospitals but are not at direct risk, officials said. At some point, emergency personnel, such as police and firefighters, also would be offered the vaccinations.
For federal officials - including President Bush, who will have the final say - the challenge is balancing the risk of the vaccine, which is known, with the risk that smallpox might return, which is not known. Top health officials say they have to assume that would-be terrorists have the virus and might use it.
About one in 1,000 people vaccinated will face complications, some serious, and the vaccine will kill one or two out of every million people who get it. Using this logic, in July a federal advisory committee recommended limited vaccinations. They recommended vaccinating small response teams for each state and a few caregivers at designated hospitals - probably 10,000 to 20,000 altogether. People can be vaccinated effectively against smallpox for several days after they are exposed; so an urgent round of vaccinations would begin as soon as a patient had been diagnosed.
Earlier this summer representatives from the Health and Safety Department of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, participated in a federally sponsored meeting to assess the need for smallpox vaccination among emergency responders. At the meeting, medical experts suggested that no reason existed to believe that preventive smallpox vaccination would pose a significant health risk to emergency responders, a group of individuals who are generally considered to be a healthy population.
After two years of effort, a Berkeley fire fighter has been granted an exemption to Cal/OSHA regulations regarding use of a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) in early September granted him and his department an experimental variance.
Harry Vernon, a 24-year veteran of the department, has been prevented from working in fire suppression because he cannot shave. Vernon suffers from pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), a painful skin condition that forces him to wear a beard.
The Berkeley Fire Department sought a variance from a Cal/OSHA regulation relevant to the situation two years ago, but the Cal/OSHA Standards Board reluctantly denied it. State safety rules say that employers shall not permit employees to wear respirators if they have facial hair that interferes with the sealing surface. The department asked the board to allow fire fighters who can document that they suffer from PFB to keep their facial hair and use SCBAs with tight-fitting face pieces.
Vernon subsequently filed suit against the State of California and the City of Berkeley, claiming discrimination. Vernon is seeking an experimental variance and a revision of the standard. Presumably the litigation will be held in abeyance while the experiment is conducted.
In the petition decision denying the permanent variance in December 2000, the board staff supported a possible experimental variance, noting that it “could give rise to equivalent safety.”
The variance allows the fire department to conduct phased experiments developed with the assistance of the University of California and other researchers. The first phase is designed to confirm the hypothesis that having one day’s growth of facial hair will not affect the ability of a fire fighter to pass a quantitative SCBA fit test. Fifteen Berkeley fire fighters will undergo two fit tests, one clean-shaven and the other with 24 hours of facial hair. In the next phase, Vernon will complete fit testing over several days to determine if he can pass at beard lengths between one and five millimeters. If he does, Vernon will return to fire suppression duties, but he would not be allowed to enter the exclusion zone of a hazardous materials incident if Level A protection is required.
PFB, also known as razor bumps, is a condition that primarily affects
African-American males. The condition has been the basis of previous
unsuccessful litigation challenging “no beard” policies in the fire service.
Courts have generally found that safety concerns over the fit of SCBA justify
such policies even if only African-American males are affected.
Seattle fire fighters rallied in the city’s Pioneer Square September 12 to draw attention to proposed budget cuts for the department. About 34 fire fighting jobs are expected to be trimmed next year to save about $3.3 million and help cut city expenses by $60 million. The fire department also has proposed decommissioning two medic runs and one engine company.
The fire fighters union, Local 27 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, recently compiled statistics that claim emergency calls in the city have increased by 880 percent since the 1960s, but the number of on-duty fire fighters has declined by 29 positions, a 13 percent drop. In 2000, Seattle Fire Department personnel responded to over 73,000 emergency calls, compared to 8,200 in 1965. The department handles about 200 emergency dispatches daily.
Despite union claims of increased response times, Seattle Fire Chief Gary Morris has said the proposed staffing cuts will have a negligible impact on the delivery of fire services.
Houston Fire Chief Chris Connealy has demanded that about 2,800 fire fighters reimburse the city for extra pay they received as a result of an accounting error. The chief claimed September 10 that some fire fighters had been overpaid by as much as $400 and should either repay the money or cash in equivalent vacation days.
Leaders of Local 341 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, reacted quickly by threatening a lawsuit. “Our lawsuits are going to say we’re entitled to it, and you shouldn’t be docking that money,” said union president Steve Williams.
The paycheck error occurred about one year ago when the workweek was increased from an average of 46.7 hours to 49 hours. The increase was the product of ensuring four fire fighters on each piece of fire apparatus. Under this “extra board” plan, fire fighters were to be paid overtime for one extra day of work per month, but only if they actually worked the tour. However, all fire fighters received the premium pay even if they were out sick or on vacation on their extra day.
Connealy says that should not have happened and those fire fighters should refund the payments. It is unclear what will happen if the fire fighters refuse to reimburse the city.
The uproar is the latest in a series of disputes between the city administration and the union. Local 341’s contract expired over two years ago. Negotiations have essentially been at a standstill for some months.
After the city decided that all fire fighters must be certified as paramedics, the city and the fire fighters’ union agreed that one-third of any necessary training would occur during normal work hours, one-third would be treated as overtime at the contractual overtime rate, and the remaining third would be treated as donated time. Subsequently, the city learned that by virtue of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) time required of an employee may not be treated as donated. Thus, the city decided to compensate the fire fighters at half of their regular hourly rate. Additionally, the deal with the union included a three percent wage increase for fire fighters who held paramedic certificates plus an agreement that any fire fighter leaving the city’s employment within the next three years would reimburse the city for the cost of the training. Two and a half years after beginning his training, Heder, a fire fighter, quit his job. The city withheld all of Heder’s pay for his last two pay periods. Heder filed suit under the FSLA. The trial court ruled that the FSLA required the city to pay time and a half for the donated hours and forbade recoupment of the training costs. Additionally, the judge found that under Wisconsin law an employer must reduce any reimbursement obligation as time passes and amortize it over the reimbursement period. The city was directed to pay Heder his full wage for the last two periods plus whatever extra compensation he was due for the donated time. City appeals.
HELD: The parties agree that Heder is entitled to time and a half for any overtime under the FSLA, but the parties do not agree on what this means in practice, as the fire fighters do not work an ordinary 40-hour week. Rather, the city uses a base period of 216 hours on the job over a span of 27 days. This is lawful under the FSLA. The collective bargaining agreement, however, specifies that the first 204 hours are paid a regular rate and any excess is overtime. The question presented is whether the employees are working a fluctuating workweek as defined by the FSLA. In a fluctuating workweek, an employee may be paid 50 percent of the regular wage for overtime under the theory that the base wage covers any number of hours of straight time. But a person working a flexible workweek must be paid at least 150 percent over overtime hours. Here, the city insists that the fire fighters work a fluctuating workweek because the number of tours varies from week to week. The city is in error, however, because fire fighters never work fewer than 216 hours in a 27 day period. There is no shortfall of time in one pay period that may make up for longer work in another. Likewise, the city may not use the fluctuating workweek approach because the union has never explicitly agreed to such a concept. The Wisconsin law concerning a repayment obligation is based on the idea of competition. However, the purported obligation for the fire fighters to repay their training costs is not based on the concern of the city that they might go to work for a competing fire department. The obligation is unconditional: a fire fighter departing before three years must pay training costs even if he goes back to school, changes his occupation, or retires. Competition has nothing to do with the matter. The day Heder quit, his paramedic skills were as valuable as the day he received the certification. The paramedics’ skills have a useful life that can be extended indefinitely. They do not decline over time. Because the collective bargaining requirement of repayment is valid under state law, Heder must repay the full cost of his books and tuition. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. [Heder v. City of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, 295 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2002)]
Two fire fighters resigned from the department under conditions that led them to sue the city for constructive discharge. Ultimately, they prevailed at trial on their claims of constructive discharge and were awarded monetary damages. However, the court did not order their reinstatement. Nonetheless, the two former fire fighters reapplied to the fire department. The city, however, refused to hire them. The union filed a grievance on their behalf under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The union sought to enforce the contract’s arbitration provisions before the Alaska Labor Relations Agency (ALRA). The city responded claiming that the grievance was not arbitrable because the two former fire fighters were no longer employees of the city when the grievance arose. Additionally, the city argued that the ALRA did not have the power to decide the issue of arbitrability and only the court could decide which issues were and were not arbitrable. The ALRA disagreed with the city on both points. In its ruling, the ALRA held that it had jurisdiction to determine what cases are arbitrable under the labor agreement and further ruled that the underlying grievance of the two former fire fighters was indeed arbitrable. City appealed the decision. The trial court held that the grievance was subject to the arbitration provisions of the contract even though the ALRA did not have the power to determine arbitrability. Union appeals as to the latter point.
HELD: The union argues that there are statutory, contractual, and public policy reasons that support the agency’s power to decide the arbitrability of this dispute. Prior Alaska case law holds that questions of arbitrability should be determined by the court unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. That case focused, however, on the role of a court versus that of an arbitrator. Here, the issue is whether the court or the ALRA, an administrative agency, has jurisdiction to determine questions of arbitrability. An Alaska statute seems to cover the circumstance. The statute requires that collective bargaining agreements include a grievance procedure with binding arbitration. Further, either party has a right to enforce the agreement by petitioning the ALRA. Given that the ALRA has statutory authority to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, including the requirement of grievance arbitration, the ALRA has the ability to decide arbitrability. Because arbitrators have broad discretion, it is often problematic for them to decide their own jurisdiction. On the other hand, a decision of the ALRA goes through an administrative appeals process which is subject to varying standards of scrutiny that allow for a much more piercing review than the review of an arbitrator’s decision. Therefore, the concerns about the non-appealability of an arbitrator’s award are not present with an administrative decision. The ALRA has jurisdiction to decide questions of arbitrability presented to it. Reversed for further proceedings. [Fairbanks Fire Fighters Association, Local 1324, IAFF v. City of Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2002)]
Mitchell was a fire fighter for twelve years. During most of that time his primary responsibility was to create openings in burning buildings to allow gases, smoke, and toxins to escape so that other fire fighters could enter the premises. In 1993, he began having difficulty swallowing. This led to the discovery of a cancerous tumor in his esophagus. The tumor was surgically removed and Mitchell returned to work. For several years following, he had an annual physical exam. That annual check confirmed the absence of cancer. However, in late 1997, he began to experience back pain and weight loss. Exploratory surgery revealed pancreatic cancer. Mitchell applied for special disability benefits under Maryland law alleging he was disabled by the pancreatic cancer. Ultimately, the hearing examiner ruled that Mitchell had indeed suffered “an injury” as required under the city’s retirement plan and was entitled to special benefits. City appeals.
HELD: The word “injury” is not defined within the retirement statute. The city asserts that an “injury” is an event inflicted on the person at a discrete point in time. Certainly, various dictionary definitions refer to “injury” as a hurt, damage or loss. The common thread running through these definitions, however, is that injury can be broadly defined to encompass many types of harm and none of them limits the term to an occurrence that happens at a discrete point in time. The city’s effort to narrow the definition of “injury” serves no identifiable public policy. Such an interpretation would grant benefits to a fire fighter injured by a falling beam, but deny them to a fire fighter who develops cancer over time as a result of inhaled carcinogens. Such an approach seems entirely arbitrary. Maryland law requires a court to adopt a construction of a statute which avoids illogical or unreasonable results. Accordingly, Mitchell’s pancreatic cancer was an “injury” within the meaning of the retirement law. Case remanded for further proceedings. [Board of Trustees for the Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of City of Baltimore v. Mitchell, 800 A.2d 803 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)]
Omelenchuk suffered a heart attack at work. The person who found him called the fire department, which sent two trucks. On the trucks were two fire fighters, three paramedics, and an emergency medical technician. Resuscitation efforts were made including insertion of an endotracheal tube. All three paramedics checked to make sure the tube was properly placed. However, when Omelenchuk arrived at the hospital, the tube was found to be in his esophagus rather than his trachea. He subsequently died. Omelenchuk’s estate brought suit alleging gross negligence on the part of the fire department personnel. After some litigation, an intermediate appeals court ruled that the city was immune from suit. Deceased’s estate appeals.
HELD: The issue presented is one of interpretation of the Michigan statutes regarding sovereign immunity. The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that the court give effect to the intent of the legislature. To do so, the court begins with a statute’s language. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the legislature is assumed to have intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. In reviewing the statute, every word should be given meaning and the court should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute void or surplus. In this case, the Michigan Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA) provides that a governmental unit is immune from suit for the acts of its emergency medical services workers in treating a patient, unless the acts constitute gross negligence. Further, the Michigan Governmental Tort Liability Act provides that a governmental entity is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in a governmental function. The plaintiffs argue that since the general governmental immunity statute protects the city, the court would effectively nullify the EMSA unless the court reviewed the EMSA as being a stand-alone statute authorizing suit. While the plaintiffs are correct to the extent that the courts should strive to prevent any part of a statute from being a nullity, that principle is not implicated in this case. When read carefully, it is apparent that the immunity under the General Tort Liability Act relates only to the discharge of a governmental function. If a governmental agency provides emergency medical services in Michigan as part of its governmental function, it has immunity. However, if it provides such services as part of a proprietary function, it does not have immunity. In this case, the activities of the fire department are part of the discharge of a governmental function and not a proprietary function. Accordingly, fire department personnel and the city are immune from suit for the death of the plaintiffs’ decedent. [Omelenchuk v. City of Warren, 647 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 2002)]
One afternoon, a tenant from a third floor apartment informed the owners, who lived on the first floor, that he had disconnected a natural gas line causing an explosion. Within minutes, city fire fighters arrived and began to extinguish the fire. The fire scene commander directed the dispatcher to call all available fire fighters as well as the gas and electrical utility companies. The commander positioned the fire fighting equipment at the front of the building despite the owners’ request to fight the fire from the rear so as to protect their first floor possessions from water damage. Pursuant to department policy of having the utility company shut off gas lines, the fire fighters made no effort to shut off the gas line that was fueling the fire. Nearly an hour passed before gas company employees shut off the gas. Additionally, the fire fighters did not help the owners cover their first floor possessions though they did permit the owners to retrieve their cars from the garage. By the time the fire was extinguished, approximately 150,000 gallons of water had rained down on the first floor. The next day, the building owners learned that more water from a burst pipe had continued to leak on their possessions. The fire fighters had not shut off the water service or warned the owners to do so. The property owners sued the city and the fire department for damages. The city countered, arguing that it was immune from suit under the Public Duty Doctrine. Trial court agreed and building owners appealed.
HELD: To establish negligence, the party must prove: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and 4) damages. The building owners argue that the fire fighters were negligent for not turning off the gas lines when they arrived since they knew the gas lines were fueling the fire and could have easily been shut off. They also argue that water from the fire hoses and the burst pipe caused property damage beyond that which was necessary because the fire fighters refused to protect their property. However, for over 100 years, Minnesota courts have recognized that fire fighting is a general duty rather than a special duty owed to individuals. This concept is known as the Public Duty Doctrine. Under the Public Duty Doctrine, a governmental entity is not liable to a citizen for negligent provision of public services such as fire fighting. This rule did not change even after sovereign immunity was abolished in the state. In order to prove negligence, an individual must show a breach of some duty owed to them in their individual capacities, not merely a breach of some obligation owed to the general public. The latter is all that the plaintiffs in this case can establish. Thus, the Public Duty Doctrine shields the city from liability for negligent fire fighting. In responding to the fire, the city owed a general duty to the public but not an individual duty to the property owners. Likewise, while the fire fighters may have had a duty to shut off the water or to inform the property owner about the need to do so, there is no evidence that subsequent water damage was distinct from the water damage initially caused in the course of fighting the fire. Because the fire fighters used about 150,000 gallons of water to fight the fire, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the property owners failed to prove additional damage caused by burst water pipes. Affirmed for fire department. [Woehrle v. City of Mankato, 647 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)]
Rosequist was a 12-year veteran fire fighter who was injured at work. He was examined by two doctors who concluded that he could no longer perform his duties as a fire fighter. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the county and the fire fighters’ union, Rosequist filed for disability benefits. However, to be eligible for the benefits, two doctors had to agree that the employee could not work in another position within the department. After reviewing his injuries, two doctors concluded that Rosequist could work as a fire inspector. Thus, he was ordered back to work where he performed the duties of a fire inspector until he re-injured himself. He reapplied for benefits and two doctors concluded that he was unable to perform the duties of fire inspector. At this point, a lengthy dispute arose between Rosequist and the county regarding his disability. Ultimately, the fire fighters’ union filed a grievance on his behalf. The matter was referred to an arbitrator who ruled that Rosequist was entitled to the disability benefits. The county appealed that decision and was successful in having the matter reviewed. Ultimately, a new arbitrator reheard the case and issued a decision denying Rosequist disability benefits. Fire fighter subsequently sued the county and the union alleging among other things a breach of the collective bargaining agreement as well as a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation. Trial court ruled that Rosequist had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required under the Nevada Employee Management Relations Act (EMRB). Rosequist appealed the ruling, while at the same time filing a complaint before the EMRB. However, because the complaint was beyond the six months statute of limitations established by state law, the EMRB dismissed his complaint, leaving Rosequist without a forum to address the merit of his lawsuit.
HELD: On appeal, fire fighter argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint because the allegations against the union do not fall within the jurisdiction of the EMRB. However, state law grants the EMRB broad authority to “hear and determine any complaint arising out of the interpretation of, or performance under, the provisions of this chapter by any employee organization.” Under the statute, it appears that two requirements must be met for the act to govern a complaint. First, the complaint must be against an employee organization, such as the fire fighters’ union in this case, and second, the complaint must arise out of the interpretation or performance of the employee organization. The union in this case is the exclusive bargaining agent and has a duty to not only represent its employees fairly in negotiating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, but also in its implementation as well. Fair representation of an employee by a union involves an implementation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and is a right arising under the public employee bargaining law. Consequently, the failure of a union to fairly represent an employee interferes with that right. Therefore, the allegations against the union are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EMRB. The legislative history of the Nevada Public Employee Labor Law shows that the EMRB was intended to relieve a burden on the courts to resolve disputes. Thus, the purpose of the EMRB is to apply its expertise to labor disputes and assist in resolving them before they reach the courts. Since Rosequist was required under state law to exhaust his administrative remedies before the EMRB prior to filing his complaint with the trial court, trial court was correct in dismissing the case. [Rosequist v. International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1908, 49 P.3d 651 (Nev. 2002)]
The city’s fire chief retired and Dorsey, a deputy fire chief, was appointed acting fire chief. The civil service commission scheduled a promotion examination for fire chief and an application deadline was set. Dorsey and another deputy chief submitted their applications to take the exam. However, the commission postponed the examination. Thereafter, Dorsey was removed as acting chief and Jenkins, then a captain in the department, was appointed acting chief. He was subsequently officially promoted from the position of captain to deputy chief and the civil service commission granted his request that it waive the normal requirement that an individual serve one year in the rank of deputy chief before being eligible to take the examination for fire chief. The commission then scheduled the promotion test. Jenkins applied to take the test. Subsequently, Jenkins indicated to Dorsey and the other deputy chief that any grievance filed regarding the promotional test would be denied. Dorsey and the other deputy chief withdrew their applications to take the test, leaving only Jenkins. Meanwhile, the fire fighters’ union requested the civil service commission open the promotional exam to the next lower rank to get the statutorily required number of individuals to take the test. The union filed suit seeking to delay the exam until it was open to all captains. Court denied an injunction and the civil service commission conducted the exam. Jenkins was the only person taking the exam and was subsequently certified and promoted to fire chief. Nearly a year later, the union sought a writ of mandamus to oust Jenkins from the office of fire chief. Trial court rejected the effort. But on appeal, the court of appeals held that Jenkins was not eligible to be fire chief but ruled that the challenge to his right to hold office should have proceeded under quo warranto, not by writ of mandamus. Jenkins was allowed to remain in office. Two years later, the union filed for a writ of quo warranto seeking the ouster of Jenkins and ordering him to repay the salary differential he had received. City moved for summary judgment. Trial court rejected the union effort as did the court of appeals, holding that the union lacked standing to bring quo warranto action. Union appeals.
HELD: Ohio statute provides that a quo warranto action may be brought
in the name of the state against a person who unlawfully holds a public office.
Statute authorizes the attorney general or a prosecuting attorney to initiate
a quo warranto action. The statute further authorizes persons claiming
to be entitled to the public office unlawfully held to bring the quo warranto
action. None of these potential plaintiffs cover the fire fighters’
union. Because the union does not claim title to the office and, in
fact, could not hold the office, the union lacks standing to bring the quo
warranto action. Even if the union had standing to bring the claim,
its efforts are barred because the claim was not pursued in a timely manner.
Ohio statute requires that all quo warranto claims be brought within three
years after the claim arises. Here, Jenkins was certified and promoted
to fire chief in late 1997 and the suit for his ouster was not filed until
February, 2001. Union efforts to ouster the fire chief were properly
rebuffed. Affirmed for city and fire chief. [State ex. rel. East
Cleveland Fire Fighters Association, Local 500, IAFF v. Jenkins, 771 N.E.2d
251 (Ohio 2002)]
fire fighters
A new three-year labor pact is in the offing for Indian River County fire fighters. Members of Local 2201 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, have approved the deal that grants a three percent pay boost retroactive to April followed by another 2.5 percent wage hike in October. A final 2.5 percent boost will be forthcoming in October 2003. A special $10 per day premium will be paid to all fire fighters who are trained in handling hazardous materials. The union gave up their ability to avoid working above their pay classification. Station commanders will no longer have to call personnel back on overtime to fill higher-ranking positions if a qualified, on duty fire fighter is available. Personnel who are required to work out of their classification will receive a flat $50 extra per shift. The contract covers about 130 fire service personnel through the rank of captain.
fire fighters
A summer of contentious negotiations has ended with Portland fire fighters gaining a tentative three-year labor agreement. The pact provides a cost-of-living raise each year. For 2002, the boost will be 2.2 percent. The yet to be calculated cost-of-living boost in the remaining years will be supplemented by an additional one percent each year. However, the hikes may not prove to be real wage gains as fire fighters will have to pay more for health insurance premiums. Fire fighters agreed to drop their traditional opposition to conducting fire inspections, activity previously viewed as extra work. Initially, fire fighters will conduct 150 inspections annually, growing to 216 by 2004. About a quarter of the fire fighters will receive a longevity pay boost granted to those with over 23 years or service. By the final year of the pact, a six-year veteran fire fighter will earn about $61,500. Local 43 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, represents fire service personnel through the rank of battalion chief.
fire fighters
Hampton City Council has agreed to provide the community’s fire fighters
with a 12 percent raise -- with one restriction. The amount of the
raise cannot exceed $4,000 annually. The pay boost, which is effective
October 5, 2002, will place fire fighter pay in the range of $31,089 to $46,633.
A fire lieutenant will draw between $39,281 and $58,921. Top of scale
for battalion chiefs goes to just under $80,000. Although fire fighters
have no labor contract with the city, many are members of Local 2450 of the
International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO.