Of the 159 officers who died, 70 were shot to death, 40 died in automobile accidents, 17 were struck by vehicles, 9 succumbed to job-related illnesses, and the others lost their lives in bombing

For the fourth straight year, California was the deadliest state for peace officers with 14 fatalities. Texas followed with 10, Illinois with 9, and Florida with 8.

NLEOMF Chairman Craig W. Floyd said the rise in police fatalities was due to "a sharp increase in firearms-related deaths (70 vs. 56 in 1996), an unusually high number of traffic fatalities (57), and 10 multiple death incidents resulting in 22 officers killed."

Line of duty death data is also collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Association of Chiefs of Police. Often totals reported by the groups vary slightly due to different definitions used in determining which personnel and events to include.

The data examined came from 300 cities, many of whom are operating under federal court

Professor Lott suggested that proponents of

The Heritage Foundation is a politically conservative group that opposes affirmative action.

City council members responded favorably to the mayor's call for additional officers. Some long time New York City political observers have suggested that it would not be surprising if the city council added additional officers to Guiliani's

The additional manpower would initially be used to increase personnel assigned to anti-drug initiatives. Since Guiliani first took office 4 years ago, reported crime in the city has dropped by 44 percent. The mayor has stated that part of the decline was due to the success of several police anti-drug programs. 

NYPD numbers have grown sharply in the last decade with federal funding of 2,000 officers and the integration of several of the city's specialty law enforcement agencies, such as the transit police, into the NYPD. 

In a recent letter to law enforcement agencies and organizations, Secretary Cuomo stated, "Right now, HUD owns properties in cities and towns across America. If you're interested in buying one of these homes, we will sell it to you at a 50 percent discount

HUD subsidized housing often is located in lower socio-economic areas. The plan, patterned after pilot programs in Los Angeles; Columbia, South Carolina; and several other cities, seeks to induce police officers to become residents of these neighborhoods as a community policing and crime prevention strategy.

Interested officers can obtain application details by contacting their local HUD office or by calling 1-800-217-6970.

Supreme Court update

First Amendment protection from politically-based dismissal is also the topic of the request for review in Jenkins v. Medford, No. 97-792. Here again is an effort to get the Supreme Court to revisit the permissible scope of non-reappointment of at will deputy sheriffs upon election of a new sheriff. A lower court ruled that under North Carolina law, deputies are the alter ego of the sheriff, are policymakers, and, therefore, are not entitled to First Amendment protection against patronage-based dismissals.

A totally different question is raised in the petition of the State Police Association of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 97-833. The police union is seeking review of a tax court determination that over $1,000,000 in back taxes are owed on the sale of advertising in the group's yearbook. Federal tax law requires otherwise tax-exempt organizations to pay taxes on income derived from business ventures not substantially related to its tax-exempt purposes. The labor group contests its tax obligation.

HELD: The FLSA generally requires a payment of overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate for all hours in a work week longer than 40. A special provision, however, states that a law enforcement employer does not have to pay overtime to law enforcement employees until the employee works 43 hours in a seven-day work period. The regulations further provide for several methods of paying overtime. The county chose to use a fluctuating work week method of overtime payment. Under this procedure, an employee is paid a salary for the hours he works, whether few or many, and is entitled to overtime for hours worked over 40, but such overtime is paid at one-half of his regular hourly rate as opposed to time and one-half. The logic under this method is that the salary has already compensated him for the actual hours worked, and therefore, he is entitled to only one-half the regular rate of pay for hours over 40. The use of the fluctuating workweek method is not lawful unless the employer complies with the mandates and conditions of FLSA regulations. Here, the jailers and deputies allege the county fails to meet the regulations because they are not paid on a salaried basis. An individual is paid on salary basis if he receives each pay period the same amount of compensation, which is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of work performed. Prior case law holds that an individual loses salaried status if there is an actual practice or significant likelihood of the employer making deductions for partial day absences. Here, the county points out that its policy, though permitting deductions in sick and annual leave for partial day absences, still guarantees that each of the employees will be provided a full day of pay for each day worked. During each pay period, the employee's pre-determined pay is not subject to reduction but his leave time and holiday pay are subject to partial reductions. The employees argue that their "wages" include their vacation, holiday, and sick payments and, thus, the county is in

Cases of interest

HELD: In order to state a claim under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and show that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. The traditional definition of acting under color of law requires that a defendant have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. The Supreme Court has recognized that mere employment by the state, although relevant, is not conclusive on this matter. Liability has been found where a police officer, off duty, nonetheless invoked the apparent power of the police department. The courts will look at the nature of the officer's act, however, not simply his duty status. While it is clear that personal pursuits of police officers do not give rise to such liability, there is no bright line test for distinguishing personal pursuits from activities taken

HELD: The FLSA does not specifically mention when overtime compensation must be provided. However, the Department of Labor (DOL) interpretive regulations on the point assert that the general rule is that overtime compensation earned in a particular work week must be paid on the regular pay day for the period in which such work week ends. When the correct amount of overtime compensation cannot be determined until sometime after the regular pay period, the requirements of the FLSA are satisfied if the employer pays the excess overtime compensation as soon after the regular pay period as is practical. In this case, it is not disputed that the village failed to pay the officers for the overtime they worked in a week on the regular pay day for the week and instead paid them for that time at the end of the second week of the following month. Thus, a police officer who worked overtime hours during the first week of the month would have to wait up to six weeks to be paid for this additional time. The DOL interpretive regulations are to be given great deference by courts. The regulations appear consistent with the FLSA, which requires that overtime compensation be paid promptly on the regular payday for the work period. Thus, the village was tardy in its payments. The village argues, however, that the deferred payment schedule was included in the collective bargaining agreement between the police officers and the village. It is well-settled law, however, that FLSA rights take precedence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation arrangement. Allowing FLSA rights to be waived by agreement would nullify one of the primary purposes for enacting the statute, which was to protect certain basic employee rights from being violated by employers who are often in more powerful bargaining positions. The statutory requirement of prompt compensation cannot be waived by agreement. Summary judgment for police officers. Matter continued for trial to determine whether the

HELD: Burcham argues that it is a mathematical impossibility for three promotions to be made in one year without all three people who were originally named as "the three standing highest" being selected. Under his interpretation, the second time a position became available, only two names would be submitted by the civil service commission and the third time, only the third name would be submitted. This would assure that the third person would be selected for the position. The city on the other hand reads state law as requiring a new list of three be certified each time that the police chief makes a promotion. Once a selection is made from the first list of three, the officer ranking number four on this list moves up a notch and becomes one of the three for consideration for the next promotion. When interpreting a statute, a court will give words in the statute their ordinary meaning and common usage. If the statute is plain and unambiguous, the analysis need go no further. It is clear from the Arkansas statute that the one year requirement concerning the certified list applies to the entire

HELD: Public employees do not abandon their First Amendment rights upon entering the workplace. However, they do not have an unfettered right to free speech. The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for determining whether an employee may be disciplined for speech. The speech must be examined to determine whether it relates to a matter of public concern about which free and open debate is vital to the decision-making of the community; second, the reviewing court must balance the interest of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the state's interest as an employer in running an efficient operation; and third, the employee's protected conduct must be a motivating factor in the decision to discipline the employee. Here, the officer's comments about abuse of governmental power as well as fiscal policies of the mayor touch upon a matter of public concern. Speech about political matters are at the core of the free speech guarantee under the Constitution. Such speech must be balanced, however, between the interest of Heath and the interest of his employer. It is well established that the government as an employer possesses far broader power than it does as sovereign in regulating

HELD: The officer argues that the property owner breached a duty to keep the utility room safe from unreasonable hazards because it was a place of public access. No evidence, however, was presented to indicate that the utility room was open to the public. In fact, the pictures of the utility room clearly indicate the room was not and could not be used for public access. The officer was acting in his capacity as a police officer at the time of the injury. As such, he must be considered as a professional rescuer. Under Louisiana law, the professional rescuer rule states that a fire fighter or police officer who is injured in the performance of his duties assumes the risk of such injury and is not entitled to damages. The rule bars recovery for most risks except when the risks encountered by the rescuer are so extraordinary that it cannot be said that the parties intended the rescuer to assume them and the conduct of the defendant is so blameworthy that recovery should be imposed for the purposes of punishment or deterrence. Neither is the case here. As a police officer, Richter's duty was to protect citizens from criminals. As part of his job, he pursues suspects. His accident was entirely due to his own carelessness. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Richter v. Provence Royal Street Company, 700 So.2d 1180 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997)]

HELD: To receive retirement disability benefits, state law requires an officer prove that she was totally and permanently incapacitated by an accident incurred in the line of duty that was not caused by willful negligence on the officer's part. Ample evidence exists that she failed to prove that her condition was likely to be permanent. No inherent contradiction exists between the retirement board's determination that Murphy failed to prove her injuries were permanent and the police department's determination that she is unable to fulfill her duties as a police officer. All parties, including Murphy herself, agreed that she was disabled and unable to perform any police duties. Proof of permanency is what was lacking, however. As to her claim that she was denied due process in the dismissal, the Supreme Court has held that an individual with a vested right in continued employment must receive procedural due process prior to dismissal. Here, Murphy was given written notice of her imminent termination, she was told why, and given the option of a one-year medical leave. She was not, however, given the opportunity to tell her story, as would normally be the case. The purpose of due process procedural safeguards are to protect the employee from a mistaken decision. Here, the department and Murphy both agreed that her medical condition could not be accommodated. She was taking the position that she could not perform any type of police work. Thus, no factual

HELD: In 1987, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the common law Fireman's Rule as a matter of public policy. The rule prevents police officers and fire fighters from recovering for injuries sustained in the course of duty. The rule's scope encompasses both injuries resulting from the negligence that caused the incident requiring a public safety officer's presence and injuries resulting from those risks inherent in fulfilling the police or fire fighting duties. The public policy rationale behind the Fireman's Rule is that persons in the public safety professions necessarily face dangerous situations, and the public should not be liable for injuries that occur in the performance of the very function public safety officers are intended to fulfill. As a protection for these public safety officers and their families, worker's compensation benefits are available to those who are injured in the course of their employment. This rationale applies to the suits in this case. Stott was injured and Dickerson was

HELD: Under Virginia law, benefits are available if the disease is an "occupational" disease as opposed to "an ordinary disease of life." An "occupational disease" is a disease arising out of and in the course of employment but not an ordinary

HELD: State patrol contends that the contract provisions addressing wage-related matters are illegal and, therefore, unenforceable. The association asserts that the law prohibits mandatory or obligatory bargaining on these issues but allows for bargaining on a voluntary or permissive basis. The Washington Public Employee's Collective Bargaining Act requires public employers to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representatives of their employees. The law serves the remedial purpose of implementing the right of public employees to join and be represented by labor organizations. Therefore, courts must construe the law liberally. Generally, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining. In contrast, the parties may negotiate over permissive subjects, but are not obligated to do so. Finally, illegal issues are those that a statute or the Constitution prohibits and the parties may not consider during collective bargaining procedures. In interpreting the statute in question, a court construes the law according to its plain language and gives effect to the legislative intent. State patrol correctly argues that the words "shall not" are prohibitory, not permissive. The meaning of "shall not" does not decide the question, however. Scrutiny of the statute reveals that the prohibition as to wage-related matters is not a total bar on negotiation but rather simply excludes them from the statutory definition of "collective bargaining." The legislature intended to exclude wage-related matters from the definition of "collective bargaining," not from the process of bargaining. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that wage-related matters are a permissive subject for bargaining under Washington statute. Consequently, the state patrol and its employees acted in accordance with the statute when they bargained and agreed to those sections. Contract is enforceable. Affirmed for trooper's association. [Washington State Patrol Lieutenant's Association v. Sandberg, 946 P.2d 404 (Wash. App. 1997)]