The unanimous decision came after the high court reviewed cases involving misconduct by six federal employees who were sanctioned both for their misconduct and for willful falsehoods during internal investigations. The lead case concerned Lester Erickson, a police officer for the U.S. Bureau of Printing and Engraving, who denied any knowledge of a series of harassing telephone calls made at the agency. Subsequent investigation determined that Erickson had encouraged another employee to make the "mad laughter" calls. The bureau sought to fire him for his part in the incident and for lying about it, but the federal Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) disallowed the double punishment and reduced the discipline to a 15-day suspension. A federal appeals court upheld the MSPB, ruling that due process grants an accused person a meaningful opportunity to be heard and

Not so, said the Supreme Court. The opportunity to be heard does not include the opportunity to lie, making the analogy that a criminal defendant's right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury.

While the decision, La Chance v. Erickson, No. 96-1395, was rendered in a case involving a federal employee, nothing in the unanimous opinion of the court would appear to limit its application solely to federal employees.

The Supreme Court also said, "If answering an agency's investigatory question could expose an employee to criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." There is nothing inherently irrational about the investigating agency drawing an adverse inference from the assertion of the right to silence. 

In a friend of the court brief, the International Association of Chiefs of Police had told the justices that its ruling would have a far-reaching effect on state and local law enforcement agencies, which require truthfulness from officers during internal affairs investigations. 

BLS believes its new calculations will more accurately reflect contemporary American purchasing patterns through expansion of data collection on such items as food away from home purchases and motor vehicle expenses.

Frequency of publication of detailed regional indexes will also be altered, being published at different times of the year than in the past.

BLS also announced abandonment of its plan to change the CPI base year from 1982-84=100 to 1993-95=100. The agency concluded that such a shift would largely be a mathematical exercise that

Because of the changes, the BLS is delaying release of January's CPI numbers until later this month. Accordingly, the Police Labor Monthly Salary Tracker, presenting police lieutenant and sergeant wages, will be mailed to subscribers separately in approximately 10 days. The next Salary Tracker is scheduled to accompany the May issue as delay in reporting of CPI data is expected only during this two month transition period. 

Individuals using CPI data in wage negotiations should become familiar with the changes. The technical information on the alterations can be accessed through the link on the Police Labor Monthly home page at www.justex.com.

Public sector unions lost about 107,000 members in 1997. A breakdown on the number of unionized protective services workers gained or lost was not provided in the data that BLS released.

BLS did report that overall, unionized workers earn a median wage about 33 percent higher than comparable non-union workers. Once again, BLS does not report differences in wages of union and non-union police officers and fire fighters, although some differential would be expected.

NAPO was founded in 1978 by former

Currently, NAPO claims to represent over

The bulk of the charges stemmed from a 1993 campaign by Reale in which he unsuccessfully

The defendants chose not to call any defense witnesses at their trial. Sentencing of the four men is tentatively scheduled for May. All four individuals face up to 20 years in prison with several of the defendants potentially looking at even longer possible terms.

Supreme Court update

Also rejected for review was Wagner v. Devine, No. 97-754, involving a decision holding that a chief of police was not protected from politically motivated dismissal.

HELD: In order to succeed in an action brought under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, a claimant must possess two elements: the conduct complained of must have been under color of law and it must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The thrust of the Larsens' claim is that the city council's decision to discontinue its practice of paying the medical bills deprived the couple of a constitutionally protected property interest without affording them due process of law. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather arise from an independent source such as state law. The Larsens contend the city ordinance, which was subsequently repealed, granted them a property interest protected by the Constitution. The city ordinance can create a protected property interest if it established substantive criteria that, if met, entitle an individual to the property. Wisconsin law, however, distinguishes between ordinances, which are of a general permanent nature, and resolutions, which are informal enactments of a temporary nature. A review of the evidence in this case reveals that the actions of the city council must be considered resolutions rather than ordinances. Even if the resolutions were ordinances, they did not give rise to protected property interests. The resolutions did not create any substantive entitlement to payment of medical expenses. That right already existed under the state worker's compensation law. Because Officer Larsen was injured in the exercise of his duties, state law required the city worker's compensation carrier to pay his reasonable and necessary medical expenses. The council's resolution merely established a method of payment whereby the city would prepay some bills in order to minimize the inconvenience to Larsen. Larsen

Cases of interest

HELD: To qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the law, and that he is otherwise qualified, with or without accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job, and that the employer terminated him because of his disability. Here, the record positively establishes that Houck would have maintained his employment as a police officer in spite of his mental illness if he had not violated the law. The department was aware of his mental illness and had accommodated him up to the domestic violence incident. At that incident, his misconduct violated not only state criminal law, but also the regulations of the police department. Houck claims his firing was discrimination because his alleged misconduct was caused by his disability. This claim must be rejected. A person who commits a criminal act as a result of a disabling condition is not excused from the employment consequences of his criminal act because of the disability. Likewise, his case does not compare to earlier instances where other police officers were accused of domestic violence. Thus, there is no ADA discrimination. Similarly, there is no denial of procedural due process in the discharge proceedings. The procedures employed by the city to discharge him satisfy the commands of the Constitution. Pre-termination due process requires oral or written notice of charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present the employee's side of the story. The record clearly indicates that the elements of pre-termination due process were satisfied in this instance. Neither is the city liable for alleged deliberate indifference in providing him medical care. Specifically, Houck asserts the city should have trained its police officers to immediately hospitalize persons in his condition

HELD: To establish a violation of procedural due process, Jefferies must show that he had a property interest in his job. An interest in property arises only when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but arise from independent sources such as state statute. In the absence of an express or implied contract to the contrary, Kansas law presumes employment to be at will. An at will employee has no property interest in his employment. However, Kansas has recognized implied in fact employment contracts to be an exception to the at will doctrine. Here, Jefferies admits that he neither signed an actual employment contract nor bargained for the terms of his employment. His property interest claim must therefore be based on a theory of implied contract. A mutual intent to form a contract is necessary to show that an implied in fact contract exists. Jefferies initially points to the county personnel guide that specifies the reasons individuals may be terminated. This claim fails, however, because the guide specifically states that it shall not be construed to create a contract between the county and the employee. Jefferies also contends that the county had a continuing policy of requiring just cause for terminations. The initial evidence presented by Jefferies is sufficient to present a jury question as to whether or not an implied contract existed based on the custom of showing cause in prior terminations. But even assuming Jefferies had a property interest in his position, the procedural due process he received was adequate. Due process is satisfied if at the pre-termination hearing itself, the employee is informed of the purpose of the pre-termination hearing and given a chance to respond. That was the case with Jefferies when he met with the acting sheriff and jail administrator. He was made aware of the official reason for his discharge at that meeting. The meeting was a sufficient pre-termination meeting even if, as Jefferies asserts, the acting sheriff was unaware of the necessary procedures to follow, and therefore, could not have

HELD: The officers cannot maintain a suit against the board members because these individuals enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity from lawsuits. It is well established that local officials acting in a judicial capacity enjoy the same immunity as more traditional judges. This immunity springs not from the notion that judges are above reproach, but rather that an appellate process exists for righting judicial wrongs. If aggrieved litigants were permitted to end run the appellate process, judicial actors would be hard pressed to carry out their functions. Similarly, the city attorneys enjoy

HELD: Edwards has been unable to point to a clearly established right that the city violated by barring him from engaging in secondary employment or by suspending him. To maintain a federal civil rights suit, he must prove that some underlying act complained of violates his constitutional rights. First, the officer alleges a violation of his right to free association. The right of free association correlates to an individual's right to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for redress. While Edwards obviously has a right to engage in speech and activities with respect to firearms safety education, he does not have a constitutional right to engage in employment in that regard. The city did not take adverse action against him for expressing his views or joining an association, but merely prohibited him from engaging in secondary employment. The officer also claims a violation of procedural due process rights. In North Carolina, an enforceable expectation of continued public employment can exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted some form of guarantee. Here, the officer fails to allege that he has an employment contract with the city. Similarly, he points to no statute or ordinance creating such an interest. Even if he could establish a property interest in his employment, he received the necessary due process. At a minimum, the officer

HELD: In Georgia, the appropriate standard of review for a civil service appeal is by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is effectively the same as any evidence. The appellate court's role is to determine whether the record supports the initial decision of the administrative agency. The city argues that the entrapment claim is not a valid defense in a proceeding before a civil service board. A prior Georgia case has held that entrapment is generally limited to a defense in a criminal proceeding but is available in an administrative hearing where a professional license is subject to revocation. Here, however, Smith was not deprived of a license to engage in a given profession but rather was terminated from a particular job. While an individual terminated from a job for wrongful conduct may, as a practical matter, find it difficult to obtain other employment in the same line of work, he is not, in fact, deprived by the government of the right to engage in such work. This case thus falls under the general rule that entrapment is not available in a civil proceeding. The civil service board correctly so held, and the case is reversed ordering dismissal of police officer. [City of Atlanta Government v. Smith, 493 S.E.2d 51 (Ga. App. 1997)]

HELD: The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly addressed the relationship between government employees and the First Amendment, holding that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. However, the state's interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulating the speech of the citizenry in general. The threshold question in determining whether the First Amendment applies to a governmental employee's statement is whether it constitutes speech on a matter of public concern. If the statement at issue is a matter of public concern, the court must balance the employee's interest in making the statement against the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service. If, however, the statement does not involve a matter of public concern, then the First Amendment does not apply. Whether the statement