The 64 officers who died as a result of criminal activity is 8 higher than the 1996 annual count of 56. Firearms continue to be the weapon most frequently used in the slaying of officers. During 1997, handguns were used in 43 of the murders, rifles in 12 and shotguns in 6. Two officers were stabbed, and one was slain with personal weapons (e.g., hands, fists or feet). Three officers were slain with their own weapons. 

By region, 31 officers were slain in the Southern states, 15 in the Western states, 11 in the Midwestern states, and seven in the Northeastern states. Seventeen officers were slain during arrest situations: 6 were attempting to prevent robberies or apprehend robbery suspects; 5 were serving arrest warrants; 5 were attempting to apprehend burglary suspects; and one was investigating a drug-related situation. Fourteen officers were slain while answering disturbance calls, 12 in ambush situations, 9 while investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, 7 were enforcing traffic laws, and 4 while handling prisoners. Additionally, one was slain while handling a mentally deranged person. Arrest or exceptional means has cleared 63 of the 64 killings. One suspect remains at large. 

Preliminary statistics also indicate an additional 60 officers were accidentally killed in 1997 during the performance of their duties. Traffic accidents were the primary reason for these deaths. This total reflects an increase of 13 when compared with the 47 accidental deaths that occurred in 1996. 

The FBI will publish final statistics and complete details later this fall. Earlier in the year the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund and the Concerns of Police Survivors had announced that 159 officers had been killed in duty-related activity (see, January 1998, Police Labor Monthly). The differences in totals are the result of differing definitions. 
 

Elections produce mixed results for national union

Until the 1997 session of the Texas Legislature, 

The news for IUPA was much better in South Florida. Earlier this month the IUPA won a representation election in North Miami over the Dade County Police Benevolent Association, garnering 96 percent of the vote. In winning the 

Currently, regulations surrounding the use of federal funds to construct highways do not require a uniformed police officer to be present near road construction sites but do require an approved safety plan be utilized. Officers typically direct traffic 

NAPO argues, "Officers provide the professional training and access to communications needed to deal with an emergency situation. Motorist are more apt to slow down when in sight of a uniformed officer (in or out of a police cruiser) that a civilian flagger." 

The legislation, along with the House of Representatives version, was earlier this month referred to a conference committee for drafting of a final version. If passed, the Secretary would report back to Congress within two years with any legislative or administrative recommendations. 

For one officer, a year's accumulation of the additional time totals 61 hours and 15 minutes, based upon a five-day work week and subtracting three weeks of vacation. Calculated at time and one-half, the typical patrol officer could receive about $3,000 

Attorneys for the city and the ELPOA had assumed that the FLSA provided an exception for "show-up" time. Union lawyers researched the matter and concluded that the time is compensable under FLSA and could not be waived in the bargaining contract. City officials are apparently similarly convinced that the practice constitutes "work" under the FLSA. 

Many cities handle briefing time as part of the beginning or ending of each 8-hour shift. Others handle the matter by providing a paid 30-minute lunch period. This technique essentially compensates officers for 8.5 hours, thereby covering the 15-minute briefing period. 

Supreme Court update 

Cases recently filed seeking review include 

Additionally, in Yinger v. City of Dearborn, Michigan, No. 97-1658, a police officer wants review of his disability claim on the grounds of unlawful discrimination. 

Cases of interest 

HELD: Claims by public employees of retaliation in violation of their First Amendment right to free speech require that the speech must first constitute a matter of public concern. This case raises the question of whether the public concern requirement also attaches to assertions of First Amendment right to petition the government. Several federal Courts of Appeal have considered this issue and the majority have concluded that the public concern requirement applies to retaliation claims based on the right to petition. One circuit, however, has held there is no public concern requirement. Grigley does not contest the trial court's finding that testifying against the female officer did not involve a matter of public concern. 

HELD: Prior to accepting employment with the city, the officers were assured that their personal information would be maintained in strict confidence. Despite this earlier promise, the city subsequently decided that the Ohio Public Records Act required it to release the officers' files upon request from any member of the public. Federal law imposes civil liability on a local governmental entity that deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution. The threshold question here is whether the city deprived the officers of a right protected under the Constitution. The officers claim that in releasing personal information they were denied their Fourteenth Amendment due process right, specifically, the right to privacy. While the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs procedures by which the state may deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the clause also bars certain governmental actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures. This is the substantive component of the due process clause and includes not only the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but also rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Supreme Court over the last 30 years has recognized a limited right to privacy. This right involves intimate matters, such as family relationships and child rearing, but also an individual's interest in avoiding divulgence of highly personal information. Here, the officers' privacy interests do indeed implicate a fundamental liberty interest, specifically, their interest in preserving their lives and the lives of their family members as well as preserving their personal security and bodily integrity. By disclosing personal information to individuals likely to seek revenge upon the officers, the city created a very real threat to the officers and their families' personal security, bodily integrity, and 

HELD: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike. The complaining officers in this case assert that family and political influence are impermissible motives for promotion. Prior case law does hold that nepotism in government hiring requires some measure of justification before it can pass constitutional muster. Certainly, in this case family and political influence may have played some role in the promotion process, but such influence was only one of many factors considered by the police board members. The record reflects that four of the six officers promoted were on the chief's recommendation. Board members testified they felt it important to meet with candidates for promotion to learn more about them. Family members, friends, or the candidates themselves may have prompted those contacts, but that in itself does not permit the automatic assumption that the contacts resulted in the decision to promote. All officers, including the six plaintiffs, were considered equal within their promotion cluster. The police board's gleaning of personal information to help distinguish among the candidates was directly related to a determination of the officers' fitness and merit and was consistent with state law. The complaining officers were not treated differently because they also had the opportunity to talk to the board members. Their equal protection claim, therefore, must fail. 

HELD: The determination of whether on-call restrictions are so restrictive as to require compensation under the FLSA is a question of fact to be resolved by the court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes the "predominant benefit" test for determining compensability of on-call time of law enforcement officers. Here, the officers allege that they must be readily accessible at all times when on call, must be available by telephone or pager or radio, must remain constantly rested and alert, must notify the dispatcher of their movements and whereabouts, must be able to respond to call-out within 30 minutes properly equipped and dressed, and must remain in a geographical area that would allow the officer to maintain radio, pager, or telephone contact and the required response time. The officers further assert the restrictions are such that they are prevented from working second jobs and from traveling great distances outside the city. The officers presented information showing the average number of call-outs when they were on a standby status. The city disputes the officers' assertions as either being erroneous or being merely conclusionary. The 11th Circuit rule in this regard is that an employee's free time must be severely restricted in order to be construed as work time for the purposes of the FLSA. A review of the factual allegations fail to show that the officers' free time is 

HELD: The FLSA exempts bona fide executive, administrative, or professional employees from the act's overtime pay provisions. One requirement for exempt status is that an employee earns a specified minimum amount on a salary basis. An employee is paid on a salary basis if he regularly receives each pay period a pre-determined amount that is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the Secretary of Labor's formulation of the salary basis test. Under the test, employees subject as a practical matter to reductions in pay through disciplinary suspensions are not exempt under the FLSA. In order to be subject to disciplinary reductions as a practical matter, there must be either an actual practice of making deductions or an employment policy that creates a significant likelihood of such deductions. The mere existence of a policy providing for deductions, without more, will not defeat the salary 

HELD: The general rule in Alabama is that a person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts of a third party. There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) the special relationship exception, and (2) the special circumstances exception. The relationship between Patterson and Marquette was that of grandmother and adult grandson. This relationship imposes no duty on the elderly Patterson to control Marquette. The relationship between Patterson and Finley was that of citizen and police officer. This relationship is insufficient to create a right in Finley, the police officer, to require Ms. Patterson, the citizen, to protect him. Finley was an armed, trained law enforcement officer with years of experience in dealing with domestic disputes and violent criminals. It cannot be maintained that Finley was dependent on the elderly Ms. Patterson for protection. The special circumstances exception arises only in rare cases where the person knows, or has reason to know, that acts are occurring on the premises that pose an imminent probability of harm to another. Finley argues that special circumstances are established by evidence that Ms. Patterson knew that Marquette had the shotgun and knew that he had made a statement about shooting the police. Thus, the officer argues that Patterson had a duty to warn him that harm was imminent. However, for one to have a duty to warn, one must have a reasonable opportunity to warn. Ms. Patterson was 80 years old. Despite Finley's argument that she could have felt safe in warning him, there is no 

HELD: The police merit board, not a reviewing court, is in the best position to assess how an officer's conduct affects the department's operations. A reviewing court may not simply re-weigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of the board. Here, the board's determination that Merrifield's association with Houston, and his lies about it, tended to discredit the department and impair its operations was not unreasonable. He maintained a regular and continuous relationship with an individual he knew was a convicted criminal. This relationship may foster several problems with law enforcement agencies, such as creating conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety. In addition, an officer's untruthfulness clearly discredits his integrity and it thwarts the efficiency of the department. Likewise, the board is in the best position to determine "cause" for police discipline. "Cause" has been defined as some substantial shortcoming, which renders the employee's continuance in office in someway detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service in which the law and sound public opinion recognizes good cause for his no longer holding the position. A reviewing court will not decide whether a less stringent punishment is appropriate and will overturn the board's decision only if it is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service. Here, the board found sufficient 

HELD: The police department argues that the civil service commission simply substituted its judgment as to the appropriate sanction in violation of Louisiana law. Under state statute, the civil service commission must find there was insufficient legal cause for the action taken by the department in order to modify the disciplinary action. Legal