On appeal, the full Eleventh Circuit court reversed, finding that the supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment and, thus, liability could not be placed on their employer. 

Justice David Souter, writing for the Supreme Court majority, noted that supervisors have special authority enhancing their ability to harass, and an employer has greater capacity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than by common workers. Thus, the supervisor's misconduct can reasonably be imputed to the employer. 

A 1986 Supreme Court decision held, 

The court reinstated the original judgment, finding that the record supported the conclusion that the employer had not taken the steps necessary to qualify for the affirmative defense. 

The decision appears to put public and private employers on notice that sexual harassment by a supervisor attaches liability to the employer unless proactive measures have been taken. To avail itself of the defense developed by the Supreme Court, personnel experts suggest an employer adopt a formal written policy prohibiting sexual harassment, the policy be distributed to all employees, and a meaningful procedure be in place for the reporting of workplace misconduct. In addition, the cautious employer will remind personnel of the policy on a periodic basis and permit the reporting of sexual harassment outside of the 

In the signing ceremony at the White House the President said, "The line of fire will always be a dangerous place. But today, we're making it less dangerous for those who are brave enough to walk that line. Every day, all of you in uniform protect us. It's good to know that every once in a while there's something those of us on this end of the line can do to help protect you." 

Representatives of various police labor groups were present at the ceremony. A spokesman for one union noted that the bill was a mixed blessing. Arthur J. Reddy, Vice President of the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA), AFL-CIO, stated that his group objected to the possibility that protective vests might be constructed by prison labor. His criticism was directed primarily toward U.S. Representative Bill McCollum (R._FL.), chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Reddy charged that Congressman 

IUPA officials stated that they intend to instruct their local unions to monitor their agency's purchasing of vests to determine made using prison labor. As companies that produce these items with prison labor are identified, their names will be publicized to the law enforcement community. 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) will administer the vest program. Preference will be given to jurisdictions with the greatest percentage of officers without vests, that have a higher than average violent crime rate and that mandate the wearing of vests on duty. One half of the funds are allocated to departments serving communities with less than 100,000 population. 

At the same ceremony the President signed legislation requiring at least $150,000 be spent by the BJA to enhance peer support and counseling services for families of officers killed in the line of duty. 

The city argued that Officer Jensen could not have had any of his rights violated because he was injured while performing his duties as a police officer. The Supreme Court has previously ruled that no constitutional right to a safe workplace exists. The appeals court rejected that argument noting that this case is different because it involves the allegedly intentional or reckless acts of a government employee directed against another government employee. "Officer Jensen did not forfeit all constitutional rights when he became a member of the police force. Rather, like all individual police officers, Officer Jensen maintained some constitutional rights (including Fourth Amendment 

The court also found Jensen's heirs had appropriately alleged "deliberate indifference" on the part of the city in the selection and training of SWAT members. In addition, the heirs claim that a senior police official assigned the sergeant to SWAT while "knowing that he was using mind-altering drugs, including phenobarbital and other substances." This conduct, if found to be true, could constitute the required "deliberate indifference" on the part of the city needed to establish liability. 

Also, rejected was the supervisors assertion of the defense of qualified immunity. As to this issue, the court found that the deceased officer had a "clearly established right" to be free from unreasonable seizure at the time of his death. 

The appellate ruling in Jensen v. City of Oxnard, California, No. 97-55936, came after a trial court rejected the city's effort to gain summary judgment. The matter now returns for a trial on the merits. 

A team of researchers surveyed over 200 retired law enforcement officers or their widows and 

The researchers noted that it was unclear what aspects of the law enforcement profession contributed to the increased cardiovascular problems. Survey respondents perceived that their job had increased their risk of cardiovascular disease. They most commonly cited stress, poor eating 

The article entitled "Cardiovascular Disease 

Supreme Court update 

Cases of interest 

Review was also refused for Childress v. City of Richmond, Virginia, No. 97-1723, wherein a lower federal court rejected the assertion of several white male police officers that a supervisor's disparaging remarks about female and black officers created a hostile work environment. The officers claimed that the harassment of their peers was destructive of the concept of team work. Left in place is a split appeals court determination that the white males lacked standing to pursue the claim under federal fair employment law. Also rejected was their claim of retaliation for complaining to their precinct captain. 

Similarly, the lower court's decision in Vingi v. State of Rhode Island, No. 97-1887, was left intact. No sex discrimination was found in regard to Vingi's admission to the police academy. 

Requests for Supreme Court review will continue to be filed over the summer months. The Court reconvenes on October 5. 

HELD: The county contends that the judge's instruction to the jury misallocated the burden of proof. The judge instructed the jury, "The county is liable unless it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it took prompt and effective remedial measures that were reasonably calculated to end the hostile workplace." The county is correct on this point. The proper allocation of burden of proof to show employer liability for a hostile workplace environment is placed on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must show that the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment and took no effective action to correct the situation. A review of the record reveals, however, that Mockler did indeed carry this burden of proof. Although the sheriff told deputy Fitz to cease his interference with Mockler, the sheriff did not discipline Fitz for his continued conduct after the one-day suspension. Indeed the sheriff permitted Fitz to work overtime to make up his lost wages. Neither Fitz nor any other deputies were ever disciplined for retaliating against Mockler by subjecting her to increased disciplinary action or by denying her appointment to various positions. The evidence presented by Mockler overwhelmingly demonstrates that the county failed to take effective remedial action to end the sexual harassment. The misallocation of burden of proof at trial did not matter in this case. Judgment affirmed for former deputy. [Mockler v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 140 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1998)] 

HELD: Under federal statute, federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to a state court judgment. The doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits the federal courts from re-litigating a matter that has previously been resolved in state court. It seems clear in this case that the plaintiffs' discipline was litigated in state court and the chief, who they are trying to sue in his official capacity, and the police board both possessed identical interests, i.e., responsibility for police department discipline and administrative judgment to terminate the plaintiffs. The government can only act through its officials. Since the two police officers could have raised their Equal Protection claim in state court and failed to do so, that claim cannot now be raised in federal court. As police officers, the U.S. Constitution and Wisconsin law guarantees the plaintiffs due process, process by which they may fairly try to prove that they are not guilty of the rule 

HELD: Swanson's First Amendment claim centers around his contention that he was terminated when Van Otterloo learned that he intended to challenge him in the sheriff's election. Swanson 

HELD: Fobar claims that the city's failure to provide an automatic 60 percent surviving spouse benefit to disabled retirees, while providing it to non-disabled retirees, violates the ADA prohibition against discrimination. The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. According to interpretive guidelines, a "qualified individual with a disability" is capable of performing the essential functions of the job. A plain reading of the ADA definitions indicates that Fobar is not a qualified individual with a disability because he cannot perform the essential functions of a police officer. The statute simply does not cover an employee incapable of performing the essential functions of the job. Fobar counters that his employment position is "benefits recipient," not police officer, and should be judged by that standard. The argument is posed that because the ADA prohibits discrimination in fringe benefits and because most long-term disability benefits are reserved for people who are unable to hold substantial employment for which they are qualified, virtually no employee could ever challenge discrimination in the provisions of long-term disability benefits. Prior cases have rejected this argument, however. Whatever Congress may have intended, the clear wording of the ADA does not apply to people who are no longer able to perform the essential functions of their jobs. Fobar lacks standing to sue because he simply does not fit within the statutory definition of a qualified individual with a disability. The provision of lower pension benefits under a disability retirement plan does not violate the ADA. Summary judgment for city. [Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, Michigan, 994 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1998)] 

HELD: The city argues that because the arbitrator's award is based on an error of law that taints his decision and requires enforcement of an illegal parity clause, the court should vacate the award. Under Massachusetts law, a matter submitted to arbitration is subject to a very narrow scope of review by the courts. Absent fraud, errors of law or fact are not sufficient grounds to set aside an award. Even a grossly erroneous decision is binding. Courts inquire into an arbitration award only to determine if the arbitrator has exceeded the scope of his authority or decided the matter based on fraud, arbitrary conduct, or procedural irregularity in the hearings. Arbitration, however, may not award relief of a nature that offends public policy or that requires a result contrary to an express statutory provision. While the arbitrator's interpretation of the police contract may have erroneously swept the police officers into the grandfather provision of this award, the ruling is not contrary to state law. While Massachusetts law frowns upon parity clauses, the 

HELD: Under Louisiana law, jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a proceeding and to grant the relief to which the parties are entitled. The city claims that since there is no language in the collective bargaining agreement that permits judicial review of a grievance, the officer may not appeal. The officer argues that the lack of such language in the contract does not mean that the contractual grievance procedure is the sole available remedy. While parties to a contract are generally bound to follow the stipulated procedures outlined in the agreement, it is against the public policy of the State of Louisiana for such contractual provisions to be so interpreted as to deny access to the courts. The Louisiana Constitution states that a district court shall have original jurisdiction in all civil matters. Accordingly, the trial court should have heard the officer's claim. Reversed for officer. [McGehee v. City of Baton Rouge, 708 So.2d 809 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1998)] 

HELD: The appellate court's review in a matter such as this is to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent, credible evidence. The police department had in place at the time various regulations concerning the use of force against individuals and the reporting of such use of force. Beal denied that he choked the detainee and claimed he used restraining force in self-defense only. Testimony of the other employees at the detention center paints a different picture, however. From a review of the testimony, it is abundantly clear that Beal choked the prisoner. Such action violated the regulations of the police department. The trial court's decision overturning the officer's dismissal was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Case reversed reinstating dismissal of police officer. [Shirey v. Beal, 693 N.E.2d 1146 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1997)] 

HELD: Since the lower court did not have benefit of the statement of the state policy concerning commuting employees, this matter should be remanded. It is appropriate for the lower court to first consider whether trooper Perry had begun her commute at the time she injured herself and, thus, qualifies for worker's compensation benefits. [Perry v. New Jersey Department of Law 

HELD: A trial court may review and vacate an arbitrator's award only in limited circumstances. Texas courts have held that both statutory arbitration and common law arbitration exist side by side in state law. In this case, common law principles resolve the question. Under the common law, a court can vacate an arbitrator's award if the award violates public policy, or the law, or exceeds the scope of the arbitrator's authority. The county argues that the arbitrator's award violates public policy because it is contrary to the Texas Constitution. The relevant portion of the Texas Constitution prohibits any extra compensation to a public officer after service has been rendered. Prior case law holds that a court may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy and that the question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts. The explicit public policy at issue in this case is the use of government funds. The constitutional provision in question was adopted to prevent municipalities from giving away public