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Supreme Court to rule on eyesight standards
Twin sisters who work as commuter airline pilots and a blind-in-one-eye truck driver have convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to consider their claims that prospective employers violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when they were refused jobs. The cases, along with that of a mechanic with high blood pressure, will afford the justices the opportunity to clarify the scope of ADA coverage. Public safety agencies have been particularly affected by varying interpretations of the ADA regarding the validity of uncorrected eyesight standards as well as criteria barring medically controllable conditions such as diabetes and high blood pressure. 

The ADA prohibits public and private sector employers from discriminating against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. A disability is defined as a condition that affects a major life activity, such as seeing. A point of contention since the law's enactment in 1990 has been the level of vision deficiency required before an individual is considered disabled and thereby protected under the ADA. If an individual enjoys ADA protection, an employer has the burden to show that the selection criterion relates to essential functions of the job. 

Prior cases have created a circumstance wherein a public safety agency might lawfully

 enforce a 20/50 uncorrected vision requirement against an applicant with 20/80 vision but would be required to justify the standard if the applicant were 20/200. The former would not be considered sufficiently handicapped to fit within the ADA definition. Complicating the issue is the question of whether protection under the ADA is to be determined with or without the use of remedial aids such as eyeglasses or medication. The federal courts have split on this question.

Karen Sutton and sister Kimberly Hinton unsuccessfully applied for pilot jobs with United Airlines. Each sister has 20/200 vision in her right eye and 20/400 in her left. Glasses or contact lens fully correct their vision. United requires pilots to possess 20/100 uncorrected vision. Lower federal courts ruled against the women in their efforts to assert ADA protection.

Truck driver Hallie Kirkingburg was unable to return to his job with Albertson's grocery chain following a non-driving injury because a doctor refused to certify that he met the company's vision standard. Kirkingburg is virtually blind in one eye but has twice been certified as in compliance with Department of Transportation vision standards.

A decision in the cases is expected by the end of the court's term in July.

President announces proposed COPS funding expansion
In his budget proposal for 2000, President Clinton will ask Congress for $1.3 billion to extend and expand the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. The President made the announcement January 14 at a ceremony held at the Alexandria, Virginia, police station. Various law enforcement and police labor officials were present for the announcement.

The President will request $600 million to hire and deploy between 30,000 and 50,000 more officers over the next five years, with a focus on crime "hot spots." A portion of the funds will also be used to help economically distressed communities absorb the long-term costs of hiring
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and training officers. The proposal will also seek $350 million to help local agencies acquire new crime-fighting technology such as improved communications systems, crime analysis programs, and high end technology such as DNA analysis. Clinton promised that these technical advancements will be available to even the smallest police departments. Other funds are earmarked for schools, community groups, and faith-based groups to use in crime prevention.

In his speech the President noted that crime rates were at a generational low level. According to

 the President much of the credit for the drop goes to various pieces of anti-crime legislation, such as the Brady Bill, and deployment of 92,000 of the 100,000 new police officers scheduled under the COPS initiative.

Among those attending the ceremony were Attorney General Janet Reno, Ron Neubauer, president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gil Gallegos, president of the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police, and Sam Cabral, president of the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO.

Police deaths remain high despite crime dip
The number of law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty in 1998 did not receive a reprieve from the reported drop in the crime rate. According to preliminary data released by the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 155 federal, state, and local law enforcement fatalities occurred compared to 160 in 1997.

Crime statistics reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) show a steady decline in crime since 1992. There was a nearly 7 percent decrease in serious crime from 1996 to 1997, but a 20 percent increase in law enforcement deaths over the same time frame. Recently, the FBI reported a 5 percent crime drop for the first half of 1998.

For the fifth straight year, California was the deadliest state for the law enforcement profession, reporting 17 fatalities. Florida reported 13 line of

 duty deaths while Texas suffered 8. During the year 18 federal law enforcement personnel were killed.

Gunshot deaths (63) were the most common cause, followed by automobile accidents (44). Another 15 officers died as a result of being struck by vehicles. Ten officers drowned and nine succumbed to job-related illnesses. 

The on-duty death rate averages nearly 21 deaths per 100,000 officers. By comparison, the nation's murder rate has fallen below 7 per 100,000 residents. 

On average, the officers who died during 1998 were 39 years old with 12 years of experience. Twelve of the officers killed were women, the most ever recorded in a single year. The last ten years has seen 1,588 law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty. 

Boston to issue officers gun locks
Boston's 2,247 police officers will receive personalized combination gun locks to render safe their service weapons when not in use. The department will be the first major jurisdiction to utilize the devices that are designed to prevent children from accidentally discharging the firearm.

The locks, which have metal buttons under the fingers of the officers' firing hands, can be unlocked in seconds when the right combination of buttons are pushed. Officers will be required to

 learn how to operate the devices during firearms training although they would likely not keep the firearm locked while on duty. The locks, manufactured by SafTLok of Tequesta, Florida, cost about $80 each.

Boston officials reportedly have been considering joining other communities in a lawsuit against firearms manufacturers accusing them of refusing to place better safety devices on their products.
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Litigation depending upon the nature of the injuries. In each of the three officers' cases, the restrictions generally relieved them from duties involving confrontation. Colwell and Abrams had suffered injuries to their lower backs making it difficult for them to stand and walk for extended periods of time. Ellinger had suffered a brain hemorrhage and was barred by his doctor from doing heavy lifting. He likewise was to avoid stress. When the three were passed over for promotion, they filed a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) asserting that the county police department had unlawfully discriminated against them. A jury awarded a monetary judgment in the officers' favor. County appeals.

HELD: The ADA prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability. A "disability" is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. Clearly, the officers in this case suffer from physical impairments. The question becomes whether that impairment affects major life activities. The Supreme Court has explained that the word "major" denotes comparative importance and suggests that the statute means to distinguish between life activities of greater and lesser significance. Federal regulations interpret the term "major life activities" to include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Case law has added other factors such as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. Each of the three officers' conditions affect major life activities. The lower back problems affect the ability to stand, sit, and lift objects at work, while the cerebral hemorrhage affects Ellinger's ability to work. The third question, however, is whether there is a substantial limitation on the officers' abilities. Once again, the federal regulations establish that the ability to work is substantially limited if the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable

Supreme Court update
The Supreme Court justices have opted not to consider Town of Newburgh, New York v. Holzapfel, No. 98-629, thereby leaving in place a lower court's ruling that canine officers are entitled to receive overtime compensation for the hours actually spent in caring for their dogs, irrespective of whether the time could be considered "reasonably necessary." 

Seeking court review recently are Martin v. Baugh, No. 98-761, and Fort Bend County, Texas v. Brady, No. 98-820. In Martin, a police communications technician, who was disciplined for taking his concerns over a new radio system to city council members and the local police association, sued his supervisor. A federal appeals court held the supervisor had qualified immunity because at the time of his actions, law was not clearly established that he would be violating Martin's First Amendment right of free speech. The technician seeks reversal of that determination and reinstatement of his lawsuit. 

The Texas case is contesting the liability of county government for a newly elected sheriff's failure to reappoint certain deputies because of their political support for his opponent. The case, which has dragged on for many years, has at its core the question of whether the county treasury must pay for the unconstitutional acts of an elected sheriff over whom other governing officials lack control.

Cases of interest

Handicap discrimination
Colwell, Abrams, and Ellinger were veteran police officers. As a result of injuries, each was assigned to light duty for a substantial portion of their careers. The light duty assignments meant that the officers were unable to perform the regular duties of a police officer, but nonetheless able to perform some duties subject to specific restrictions
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training, skills, and abilities. The regulations make clear that the inability to perform in a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. A review of the evidence indicates that the three officers' claims as to the significance of their impairments are a bit vague and nebulous. Colwell, for example, testified he has difficulty standing for long periods of time, but the difficulty is overcome if he is able to move around. Abrams testified that he cannot lift anything heavy or bend over for long periods, but that information merely shows him disqualified from a very narrow range of jobs (those involving physical confrontation). Thus, his impairment is not a substantial limitation. The same is true of Ellinger, whose evidence consisted primarily of general restrictions imposed by his physician. Thus, while each of the officers has established that he suffers from a physical impairment, a jury could not have reasonably concluded that the impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Thus, they are not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Reversed for county. [Colwell v. Suffolk County, New York, Police Department. 158 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir. 1998)] signs belonged to the wives, that if the troopers did not remove the signs quickly, they could be subject to discipline. The two troopers explained to their wives that their jobs would be in jeopardy if the signs were not removed. When the wives heard of the possible threat to their livelihood, the signs were removed. The two troopers and their wives subsequently filed suit against the department and their supervisors claiming infringement of their First Amendment right of free speech. Trial court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to the two troopers because the signs belonged to the wives, not the troopers. Hence, the troopers had not engaged in any protected speech. The court further ruled that the wives had engaged in protected political speech and had standing to challenge the department's order to remove the signs. Finally, the court ruled, however, that the individual defendants had qualified immunity as to the claims. Troopers and wives appeal.

HELD: When the government is acting as an employer, rather than as a sovereign, the First Amendment does not apply with full force. The government employer may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large. To determine whether a public employer has infringed the employee's freedom of expression, the Pickering balancing test is used. The first part of the test focuses upon whether the matter is of public concern. The second portion of the test balances the employee's speech against the government employer's interest in regulating it. Prior case law has upheld various regulations on electioneering by public employees. In the case at hand, even assuming that the two troopers can show that their expression of political support touched on a matter of public concern, the interest of the highway patrol outweighs the employees' interest. The OHP policy prohibiting troopers from displaying political yard signs serves at least three strong government interests. First, the policy assures that persons aspiring to careers in law enforcement will not be obligated to engage in

Political rights
The wives of two Oklahoma State Troopers asked a candidate for sheriff to place campaign signs in their yards. One of the properties was titled jointly to the trooper and his spouse while the other property was titled in the name of the trooper only. Several days after the signs were placed in the yards, the troopers' supervisor ordered a check of homes of all troopers to see whether any campaign signs were visible. The order was pursuant to a department policy that prohibited members of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) from publicly displaying any partisan political signs at their residences. After the supervisor learned that there were signs at the two troopers' residence, he ordered them to remove the signs. The two troopers objected to the demand, stating that the signs belonged to their wives. The supervisor responded that it did not matter that the
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partisan political affiliation in order to guarantee retention and promotion. Second, the policy promotes efficiency and harmony among law enforcement personnel by eliminating controversy that can distract from the operation of the department. Third, the policy proclaims that police protection will be available to the public free from political overtones or other partiality. This is particularly true in rural communities such as in this case. Thus, the interests of the government employer in prohibiting the political signs outweigh whatever First Amendment interest the troopers may have in displaying the signs. The OHP policy is constitutional as applied to troopers. However, a more difficult question arises when the troopers' spouses erect the signs. The trial court focused upon the question of to whom the sign belonged. It should have further focused, however, on to whom the property upon which the sign was erected belongs. If the trooper has sole ownership of the residential property, then by legal definition he has the lawful right to remove political signs from his property, whether placed there by himself or by others, including his spouse. By refusing to exercise this legal authority, the trooper would seem to be adopting the sign as his own. In such situations the department could appropriately sanction him. On the other hand, in property held jointly, the trooper clearly does not have the singular right to remove signs from the yard. Applying this principle to the case at hand, one of the troopers held the property solely in his own name while the other property was held by both the trooper and his wife. Thus, the trooper who has sole title to the property may be required to remove the signs, while the trooper whose property is jointly titled with his spouse cannot be sanctioned for his wife's failure to remove the political sign. The wives, however, have no clear claim against the defendants. The individual defendants escape liability through the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a doctrine which shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Prior case law shows that the question of display of political signs by a spouse of a law enforcement officer was not clearly established at the time of the individual defendants' actions. Similarly, since the wives are not themselves members of the OHP, they have no standing to assert a First Amendment challenge against the OHP policy regarding political signs. Affirmed for highway patrol. [Horstkoetter v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)]

Defamation
Zappola was a police sergeant who was accused of sexual impropriety while on duty. Disciplinary action was instituted against him. Zappola subsequently admitted the behavior and agreed to a 60-day suspension. According to Zappola, the chief of police indicated that would be the only discipline given out. The officer subsequently served the suspension and returned to work. Hennig, a city council member, began exerting pressure on other public officials to terminate Zappola for his sexual improprieties. Hennig was quoted in the local newspaper stating he thought Zappola should have been fired and that the city should not fear a lawsuit from him. Hennig also issued a campaign advertisement asserting that Hennig alone had insisted that action be taken to remove from the police force a policeman who had admitted to having sex in a police cruiser while on duty. Zappola was not mentioned by name in the advertisement. Ultimately, the city gave Zappola the choice to resign from the police force or have criminal charges filed against him. Zappola chose to take a disability retirement. He then filed suit against Hennig and the city claiming that defamatory statements were made that resulted in his loss of employment. Defendants move for summary judgment.

HELD: In order for a person's procedural due process rights to be violated, the person must have a constitutionally protected property or liberty
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interest, and the person must be deprived of that interest without adequate process. A defamation claim cannot, standing alone, constitute a deprivation of liberty or property under the Constitution. Defamation occurring during the course of employment termination by a public employer may be enough to invoke a public employee's procedural due process rights, however. Zappola claims the statements made by Hennig and others during the course of his termination were defamatory. Defamation consists of false publication causing injury to a person's reputation or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame, or disgrace. The record in this case fails to disclose any defamatory statements. Hennig's quote in the newspaper is merely an opinion of the council member. Defamation must consist of assertions of fact, not opinion. Similarly, Hennig's campaign advertisement is not defamatory because Zappola admitted to participating in the referenced sexual encounter. Because the assertion of fact regarding Zappola is true, it cannot be defamatory. Zappola has failed to produce evidence to show he was deprived of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Summary judgment for municipal defendants. [Zappola v. Hennig, 20 F. Supp.2d 1150 (N.D. Ohio 1998)] proposal. The city filed suit to vacate the arbitration award claiming that the disciplinary provision violated Illinois law because the city lacked the authority to implement the provision. Trial court confirmed the arbitrator's award and city appeals.

HELD: The city in this case is a non-home rule entity. Under Illinois law, a non-home rule entity possesses no inherent governmental power not specifically provided to it by the legislature. Non-home rule municipalities must adhere to the provisions of the Illinois code. The code includes specific statutory procedures that a municipality must follow in disciplining and terminating its employees. This procedure is known as the BFPC procedure. Since non-home rule municipalities lack the power to abolish or amend any statutory mandate without the permission of the legislature, a non-home rule municipality, such as the city in this case, cannot modify its statutory obligations by contracting with a labor union. Thus, not only is the state-created BFPC binding upon the city, but the Illinois bargaining laws permits bargaining over conditions of employment "not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law." Because the discipline of police officers is specifically provided for in the Illinois code, it is not a proper subject of bargaining, and thus an arbitrator lacks authority to force the city to violate the express mandates of state statute. Reversed for city. [City of Markham v. State and Municipal Teamsters, Local 726, 701 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1998)]

Bargaining subject
The city and its police officers engaged in negotiations for a first ever labor contract. The parties reached impasse over the question of grievance and disciplinary procedures. The city proposed that the contract not modify the authority of the board of fire and police commissioners (BFPC), which would retain authority to resolve disputes over disciplinary suspensions of five days or more or discharge. The union proposed that the officers have the option of appealing their discipline to the BFPC or to an arbitrator. The impasse went to interest arbitration. The city objected claiming that Illinois law exempted it from any duty to bargain over the discipline issue. The arbitrator overruled the objection and subsequently adopted the union's

Dismissal procedures
In 1985, Sheldon was hired as a police officer. Shortly thereafter, he became chief of police. In 1987, he arrested Hays for drunk driving. At the time of the arrest Hays was an ordinary citizen. The following year Hays was elected to city council and a few years later was appointed to fill the unexpired term of the resigning mayor. He was eventually elected mayor in his own right. The day after his election as mayor, Hays called a special meeting of the city council and summarily fired Sheldon, giving no reason for his dismissal. Sheldon filed suit
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claiming the firing violated the Kentucky Police Officer's Bill of Rights. He alleged his dismissal amounted to a retaliation discharge for his prior drunk driving arrest of Hays. During the course of the lawsuit, a witness testified that he had complained to Hays about the manner in which Sheldon had investigated a robbery. The mayor had requested the citizen to file a written complaint about Sheldon's actions in the investigation. The mayor admitted that the written complaint was in his possession at the meeting in which Sheldon was fire. The mayor testified that the decision to fire Sheldon was based on this complaint. Trial court found that the chief had been improperly terminated and that the mayor's failure to provide written reasons for the termination voided the termination. The Court of Appeals essentially affirmed the finding. City appeals.

HELD: Under Kentucky law the chief of police is an at-will employee subject to discharge by the mayor. The statute specifically permits a mayor to terminate the employment of a police officer only if there is no statute which provides otherwise. However, the Kentucky Police Officer's Bill of Rights provides that an officer is entitled to a hearing prior to his dismissal if he is charged with some violation of department rules and regulation. Given that the mayor's own testimony established that Sheldon was terminated due to the citizen's complaint, a hearing should have been held. Sheldon was clearly fired for cause and was thus entitled to due process rights. Under Kentucky law, a mayor's power to discharge a police officer at will is qualified. While it may be absurd to require the mayor to afford due process rights to someone he has already decided to fire, the Police Officer's Bill of Rights at least gives officers the opportunity to be heard in a public forum and the opportunity to defend and protect their professional and personal reputations from permanent damage. Nothing in the law prohibits a mayor from discharging an officer at his discretion so long as the reason behind the discharge does not trigger the hearing requirement of the Police Officer's Bill of Rights or fall within

 one of the exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. Reinstatement of police chief affirmed. [City of Munfordville v. Sheldon, 977 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1998)]

Disciplinary grounds
Disciplinary action was imposed on Macelli, a New Orleans police officer, because of two separate instances. In the first incident, Macelli responded to a disturbance where a citizen was accusing an employee of an establishment of stealing $1,000 in cash. The citizen was subsequently arrested when she refused to leave the establishment. Macelli failed to prepare a report on the alleged theft. The facts later showed that the citizen had merely misplaced the money as opposed to losing it to theft. In the second incident, Macelli learned of the videotaping of a burglary by a hotel surveillance camera. Upon reviewing the tape he concluded it had no evidentiary value and did not confiscate it. Another officer retrieved the tape from the hotel the following day. The superintendent of police subsequently suspended Macelli for ten days for failing to write the report and 30 days for failing to confiscate the videotape. Macelli appealed the decision. Following a hearing, the civil service commission reversed the 30-day suspension and reduced the ten-day suspension to a strong reprimand. Department appeals.

HELD: Under Louisiana law an employee who has gained permanent status in civil service cannot be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing. That employee may appeal to the civil service commission any disciplinary action taken against him. The civil service commission has a duty to decide if the appointing authority had good or lawful cause for taking the disciplinary action and, if so, whether the punishment is commensurate with the offense. Legal cause for the disciplinary action exists if the facts found by the commission disclose that the conduct of the employee impaired the efficiency of the public service. Prior case law holds that the civil service commission may not substitute its
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judgment for that of the superintendent of police. The superintendent is charged with the operation of his department, and it is within his discretion to discipline an employee for sufficient cause. Although the civil service commission has authority to modify a penalty imposed, the modification may only be exercised where there is insufficient cause for imposing the penalty. Under the facts of this case, the civil service commission's alteration of the suspensions was arbitrary and capricious. The department met its burden of showing sufficient cause for the imposition of the penalty. Having done so, the civil service commission's substitution of its judgment for that of the superintendent of police was unwarranted. The penalty was based on a penalty schedule established by the police department and was commensurate with the infraction. Reversed, reimposing 10 and 30-day suspensions on police officer. [Macelli v. New Orleans Department of Police, 718 So.2d 1021 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998)] the repair, Muller filed for accidental disability retirement. The retirement board rejected his claim of a duty-related disability, finding that the injury did not result from a traumatic event as required by New Jersey statute. He was awarded an ordinary disability pension. Retired officer appeals.

HELD: To be eligible to retire on accidental disability pension in New Jersey an officer must establish that he is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during, and as a result of, the performance of his regular duties. Here, the retirement board does not dispute that Muller is totally and permanently disabled as a direct result of the incident and that the incident occurred during the performance of his regular duties. The retirement board simply disputes whether or not the injury occurred as a result of a traumatic event. Prior case law holds that for an accident to constitute a traumatic event, a worker must demonstrate: (1) that his injuries were not induced by the stress or strain of the normal work effort; (2) that he met involuntarily with the object or matter that was the source of the harm; and (3) that the source of the injury itself was a great rush of force or uncontrollable power. Moreover, this force or power must originate from sources other than the injured party. Other courts have recognized that violent altercations between law enforcement officers and suspects may satisfy these tests. The retirement board concedes that if the suspect had bitten off Muller's finger and caused him to become disabled, the incident would have constituted a traumatic event entitling him to a service-related disability pension. The court can see no reason why there should be a different outcome simply because the disabling injury was not an immediate result of the suspect's actions, but instead resulted from the officer's efforts to extract his finger from her mouth. A violent assault upon a police officer may constitute a traumatic event within the meaning of New Jersey law even though the officer's actions in responding to the assault are part of the overall chain of causation ultimately resulting in the disabling injury. The source of the harm in this case was the suspect's

Disability eligibility
Muller was a detective sergeant who was aiding two other officers in executing a search warrant for drugs. While at the scene a female suspect, who appeared to be under the influence of drugs, became belligerent. The officers attempted to handcuff her as she struggled. Muller reached out to grab the suspect, but she resisted by biting the middle finger on his hand and locking it in her mouth. Muller was unable to extract his finger, and as he was struggling with the suspect twisted his left shoulder. He then grabbed the suspect's hair and pulled himself away from her. As Muller yanked his finger out of the suspect's mouth, he stumbled over debris on the floor and crashed into a nearby wall, severely injuring the same shoulder he had just previously twisted. Ultimately, the other officers subdued the suspect and completed the search. Muller had surgery on the shoulder and continued to work as a police officer for several more years. However, the surgery did not adequately repair the shoulder. When a second surgery failed to complete
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act of violently biting the officer's finger. This act constituted a great rush of force or uncontrollable power to qualify the officer for a duty-related disability pension. Reversed for police officer. [Muller v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 719 A.2d 699 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1998)] the nature of retirement benefits for public employees is that of deferred compensation for services actually rendered in the past. While it is true that providing new benefits to former retirees is unlawful, here the arbitrators awarded future benefits to current employees for present services rendered. Thus, the medical benefits awarded in the future would be deferred compensation for services rendered in the past and permissible under Pennsylvania law. Arbitration award affirmed for officers. [Borough of Elizabethtown v. Elizabethtown's Non-Supervisory Police Negotiating Committee, 719 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)]

Benefits
When the borough and the police union could not reach agreement on a new contract, the matter proceeded to binding arbitration. Ultimately, a three-member arbitration panel issued an award. Included in the award were health care benefits for retired officers. The benefits applied to officers who retired during the life of the contract. The borough filed suit to vacate the award.

HELD: Under Pennsylvania labor law the review of an arbitration award is narrow and is limited to examining the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, the regularity of the proceedings, questions of excess, the arbitrators' exercise of powers, and constitutional questions. The borough argues that the arbitrators exceeded their powers and jurisdiction by requiring it to provide post-retirement medical benefits for retirees in violation of state law. Prior case law holds that an arbitrator acted properly in terminating the post-retirement medical benefit coverage of a police officer on the grounds that retirees were no longer employees of the municipality. In that case, the arbitrator reasoned that a township may not be required to pay a premium for a non-employee because requiring it to do so would be requiring it to perform an illegal act under Pennsylvania law. The union counters, however, that in the instant case the post-retirement benefits are applicable only to officers initially covered by the contract. State law provides that police officers have the right to bargain collectively on terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement pension, and other benefits. The union contends that the benefits at issue easily qualify under this statute. Previous courts have found that
Settlements

Barrington, Rhode Island

police officers
Officers in Barrington, Rhode Island, are operating under a new retroactive labor contract. The agreement grants a 4 percent cost of living boost for 1996, a 3 percent jump for 1997 and 1998. An additional 3 percent will be awarded in the next two fiscal years. Wage hikes for fiscal year 2001-2002 are yet to be determined. To obtain the cost of living adjustments, Local 351 of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the police bargaining unit, agreed to increase the officer's share of pension contribution. Newly hired officers will also be subject to a 20 percent co-pay on medical and dental insurance. 

Bethlehem Township, Pennsylvania police officers
Bethlehem Township, Pennsylvania, police officers will submit to annual random drug screening as part of the terms of a new bargaining agreement. The new three-year pact also provides annual wage boosts of 3 percent. By 2001 a senior patrol officer will draw $43,490. Additionally, officers assigned to evening and night shifts will see additional pay increases. Shift differential pay will reach 70 cents per hour by the last year of the contract. The 21
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officers covered by the contract are represented by the Bethlehem Township Police Association. 

New Jersey

state troopers

Boynton Beach, Florida

police officers
 An arbitrator has awarded a new four-year contract to New Jersey state troopers with a wage pass the first year but pay boosts exceeding three percent for the each of the remaining years. The award, retroactive to July 1, 1996, provides the first pay hike of 3.75 percent as of July 1, 1997, and a similar increase for July 1, 1998. July of the current year will see a wage change of 3.5 percent, with the contract concluding with a 1.5 percent boost on January 1, 2000. The award also calls for establishment of a committee to recommend revisions to the current disciplinary and grievance procedures. With the raises to date, base pay and maintenance allowance places a trooper at $70,302. The troopers are represented by the New Jersey State Troopers Fraternal Association. 
Starting salary for police officers in the southeastern Florida community of Boynton Beach jumps to $31,191 under a tentative agreement reached by that city and the local Police Benevolent Association. The starting pay is increased by 2.5 percent while veteran officers will receive a 3.5 percent pay hike. In addition, the prospect of merit pay is included in the proposed three-year deal. Under the plan, officers could earn up to 4 percent next year and 5 percent the following year depending upon their performance evaluations. The pact also contains some adjustments to inequitable salaries that resulted from intermittent pay raises over the past few years. Consequently, some officers could see their paychecks jump by more than 18 percent. Approximately 125 officers will be covered by the new contract. 

St. Petersburg, Florida

police officers

Indianapolis, Indiana

police officers
 The City of St. Petersburg, Florida, and its police officers have reached accord on a new three-year labor contract. Officers through the rank of lieutenant will receive wage increases of two percent in each of the first two years of the pact and 2.5 percent in the third year. The accrual rate for police pensions will also improve, going to 2.5 percent per year for the first 20 years of service and 3 percent annually after that. To aid in funding the pension boost, officers gave back their $275 annual uniform maintenance allowance. Settlement came a few weeks after the police union declared impasse. The contract is retroactive to October 1, 1998. The Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association represents approximately 500 officers in the bargaining unit.
Eight days before the end of their current contract, members of Lodge 86 of the Fraternal Order of Police voted to accept a new four-year pact with the City of Indianapolis. Two previous versions of the contract had been rejected. The new agreement will raise the average police officer pay about 13 percent, from $38,651 to $43,876 over the contract's life. Additionally, in 2000, the current $400 per month deduction for officers who drive a police vehicle home will be eliminated. Officers will continue to be assigned take-home vehicles. The contract is subject to a wage reopener if the cost of living exceeds 4.75 percent by July, 1999.

ENCLOSED WITH THIS ISSUE IS THE

1998 ANNUAL INDEX!
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