The BLS also reported that median weekly

According to the report, 991,000 workers in the protective services were members of unions. This is a 94,000-worker increase over 1997. For the first time, the number of protective service workers represented by unions topped 1,000,000, equaling 43.7 percent of all employees in this category.

The suit alleges that Woods, who was convicted of misdemeanor assault of his girlfriend three years ago, was erroneously terminated from the police force. Specifically, the suit alleges that in response to a request from the city, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) conducted an investigation to determine if Woods' conduct was covered by the firearm disability law. BATF responded that Woods' conviction did not fall within the scope of the statute because he and the girlfriend were not domiciled together at the time of the incident. NAPO alleges that BATF reopened the

In August, 1998, during the inquiry, a federal appeals court in the District of Columbia ruled that the public interest exception to the law was unconstitutional insofar as it barred police officers convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms. 

NAPO Executive Director Robert T. Scully said, "This case presents one of the more egregious cases of a federal agency, the BATF, being overruled in its reasonable interpretation of a criminal law by senior Treasury Department officials, in response to blatant political pressures from a U.S. Senator and a Congresswoman."

In past years, Flammia, regarded as one of the most influential police union officials in Texas, had led the SAPOA to lucrative bargaining contracts

The kickback scheme unraveled when one of the lawyers hired a government informant to kill his ex-wife. During the investigation, federal agents found that the attorney was laundering the kickback money through his law firm, falsely claiming it to be consulting fees for legitimate work by Flammia. Flammia, 54, will begin his sentence in April.

Chief Kim Tierney, who plans to stay on the job, has been assured that the others feel the same way. "They've guaranteed me they're not going to quit," the chief said. Commander Michael Oh, one

The six officers had played the lottery for only two weeks, each time paying just $2 apiece. They pooled their money to buy a dozen tickets at a convenience store. Florida lottery officials announced that more than 53 million tickets were sold for the highest jackpot in nearly four years. The officers must decide whether to take their money in a lump sum or spread the full amount over 30 years.

Lighthouse Point, population 11,000, employs 32 sworn officers and is located on the Atlantic coast, north of Fort Lauderdale.

Kevin Knussman claimed that he was illegally denied 12 weeks of leave guaranteed by the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Additionally, Maryland law permits state employees with primary responsibility for newborns to take up to 30 days leave.

The case is believed to be the first sex discrimination claim brought under the provisions of the FMLA. 

In Colwell v. Suffolk County, New York, Police Department, No. 98-1167, an officer assigned to light duty was bypassed for promotion. He sued alleging a violation of the ADA. Lower courts found that Colwell was not handicapped within the meaning of the statute.

Finally, Christensen v. Harris County, Texas, No. 98-1167, raises the question of whether a public employer can control when a deputy sheriff must use his accumulated compensatory time that was earned under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected another appellate court's decision on the issue and ruled that the employer could require a deputy to use his accrued compensatory time.

Supreme Court update

In Hoyos, a lower court denied the immunity claim of police psychiatrists who certified an officer as fit for duty despite a long history of violent acts on the job. Subsequently, the officer wrongly arrested and assaulted a security guard. The injured guard sued the psychiatrists. With the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case, the matter now proceeds to trial under Title 42 U.S. Code Section 1983. 

The other matter leaves in place a federal Court of Appeals ruling that a Texas county is liable for the actions of the elected sheriff who failed to reappoint certain deputies because of their support for his political opponent. The county must pay the monetary judgment even though the sheriff is an independently elected official answerable only to the electorate.

Several interesting matters have been filed in recent weeks hoping to gain Supreme Court review. In Seaborn v. Florida Department of Corrections, No. 98-998, two African American males who suffer from a skin condition that causes lesions if they shave claim they were denied promotions because of their beards. Lower courts ruled that the condition, pseudo folliculitis barbae, did not constitute a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). They seek high court review of that determination.

Cases of interest

HELD: In order to prevail on their claims, the former officers must establish that they are disabled persons within the meaning of the ADA, and that they are qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job. The evidence reflects that the former officers are not qualified individuals with a disability as defined under the ADA. No accommodation would allow them to have direct inmate contact, an essential function of the corrections officer position. The county has identified inmate contact as a fundamental duty of a corrections officer. The written job description so provides. Although the officers were assigned to a control room and were not expected to have inmate contact on a regular basis, incidental contact was inevitable. Similarly, their ability to restrain inmates during an emergency is critical to jail security. Finally, the collective bargaining agreement between their union and the county provided that corrections officers were expected to rotate among several positions, most of which required inmate contact. Trial court was correct in dismissing claim. [Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998)]

HELD: Review of the PERC order is subject to the substantial evidence rule. A review of the evidence in this case reveals that the hearing officer made findings that relied upon various documents introduced in evidence as well as testimony describing the internal affairs investigation. The documents considered established that an internal affairs investigation was conducted and contained its conclusions. These documents were not hearsay because they were not offered as proof that the officers committed the actions, but rather that the memoranda were written. The hearing officer considered this evidence in determining whether the chief's actions were motivated by anti-union sentiment. Since the evidence in the record was

HELD: The 1984 sick leave policy vested in all city employees who would thereafter retire immediate right to receive payment for up to 90 days of unused sick leave. The city's obligation to pay for the unused sick leave would have arisen effective upon the date of the policy's enactment. However, the exact amount of payment would be calculated at the time of the particular employee's retirement. The employees were given this benefit gratuitously. The unused sick leave policy was part of the city's overall sick leave plan and not part of its separate and distinct retirement policy. The record reflects that Bates made no form of contribution to the sick leave benefit plan. Under Georgia law, contract actions arise at the time of the breach of contract, not at the time the actual damage results. Thus, although the city's 1988 policy phased out the 1984 policy over an extended period of time, any breach of contract occurred when the 1988 policy was

HELD: The issue is whether the incentive pay ordinance applies to employees who acquired their educational degrees prior to the ordinance's effective date. In construing statutes, courts should follow the plain meaning of the statutory language. The ordinance states that effective July 1, 1996, existing employees shall progress to the next pay grade "upon the attainment" of a degree. The preposition "upon" means "on the occasion of: at the time of." The verb "attain" means to "gain, achieve, accomplish" or "to come into possession." Based upon these definitions, the court interprets the critical term "upon the attainment" to mean on the occasion of the employee gaining a degree. Nothing in the ordinance suggests that the city intended for the pay incentive to apply to individuals who had attained degrees prior to the ordinance's effective date. Reversed for city. [Columbus Consolidated Government v. Schmidt, 507 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. 1998)]

HELD: Judicial review of administrative decisions is very limited. Deference is to be given by the reviewing court to the expertise of the administrative body. Such a review is limited to determining whether the administrative body adhered to proper legal procedure and made a finding based upon substantial evidence in accordance with appropriate constitutional and statutory provisions. The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body or modify a penalty imposed by that body without it showing that such action was arbitrary and capricious. An arbitrary and capricious decision is one that is patently unreasonable. It is made without consideration of the facts and in total disregard of the circumstances and lacks any basis that might lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence is not to be re-weighed by a reviewing court. Here, the city argues that the trial court re-weighed the evidence and improperly allowed Woods to supplement the administrative record by introducing the disciplinary history of the other officer. No specific Indiana statute speaks to the acceptance of newly discovered evidence by a court upon review of a police merit board's decision to terminate an officer. The court must then turn to the general principles of trial procedure for guidance. The general rule is that granting of new trials based on newly discovered evidence is a matter that rests within the discretion of the court. Such a decision will be disturbed only for a manifested abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court abused that discretion in admitting the disciplinary record of the other officer. Newly discovered evidence is admissible only if the party can show that he had exercised due diligence prior to the discovery of the evidence. Woods failed to demonstrate that he exercised such due diligence in pursuing the disciplinary record of the other officers at the time of his administrative hearing. The trial

HELD: A writ of mandamus lies to compel performance of prescribed duties that are purely ministerial. A ministerial duty is one that is performed without requiring the exercise of

HELD: Ross contends that the MHRA and the GCFP impliedly repealed the maximum age limitation for police officers. A statute may be repealed by a legislative enactment that expressly provides the earlier statute is repealed. Alternatively, a statute may be impliedly repealed where a subsequent legislative enactment is clearly inconsistent with the earlier law. Neither the MHRA nor the GCFP expressly repealed the maximum age restriction for police officers. Prior case law reveals that Montana courts have not favored repeal of statute by implication. The Montana Legislature is presumed to act with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the subject. A later statute that is general in its terms does not expressly repeal a prior special statute unless there is an intention to affect repeal or there is an unavoidable irreconcilability of the two laws. An implied repeal will result only where the terms and necessary operation of the later statute cannot be harmonized with the terms and effect of the earlier statute. A review of the MHRA and GCFP reveal that they both have the object of prohibiting age discrimination in employment. However, they do

HELD: Under New York law, a public employer is statutorily obligated to negotiate in good

HELD: The FPAA was enacted in 1971 to give permanent members of any paid fire or police department in any municipality all rights of labor except the right to strike. The FPAA provides bargaining rights to police officers. "Police officers" are defined as permanent paid members of any police department in any municipality in the state. The term "officer" is further defined as any duly appointed and sworn full time officer of the regular police department of a municipality whose duties are to preserve the public peace, protect life and property, prevent crime, serve warrants, enforce all laws and ordinances, and who is authorized to bear arms in the execution of such duties. The city contends that the ASOs do not fit within these qualifying definitions. First, the city argues that a police department does not employ ASOs, and secondly, that only a portion of their duties can be defined as law enforcement and, hence, are not full-time officers. A review of the evidence reveals, however, that the ASOs are certified by the state as police officers with full police powers. Much of their work involves law enforcement related activities. However, the FPAA requires that officers be employed by the "police department in any municipality." The airport authority employs the ASOs. The phrase "regular police department of a municipality" is a plain and unambiguous reference to the department in municipal government that has been given the responsibility to carry out the normal law enforcement functions within the municipality. In this case, that phrase refers to the Tulsa Police