March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

President calls for improved police integrity

In his weekly radio address March 13, President Bill Clinton announced steps to strengthen the integrity and ethics of police officers and to prevent police misconduct. The President announced that he will soon send to Congress his "21st Century Policing Initiative." 

The proposal will include $20 million to expand police integrity and ethics training. The training will be conducted through the 30 regional community policing institutes. In addition, another $20 million will be earmarked for college scholarships for current police officers. Details of the latter program were not disclosed. The initiative will also include $2 million for improved minority recruitment. Last year, the Office of Community-Oriented Policing awarded $1 million to community organizations to develop targeted police recruitment efforts among racial minorities.

For the first time, $5 million will be available to establish citizen police academies where members of the community can learn about police procedures

and the police can learn about community concerns.

In his address the President condemned abusive and corrupt police officers and announced that the Department of Justice's budget will be increased by $1 million to assist the investigation and prosecution of police officers who violate civil rights laws. The President expressed particular concern about recent reports of alleged racial profiling in law enforcement, saying the tactic has "shaken some communities' faith in the police."

In response to the President's comments, Robert T. Scully, executive director of the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO), agreed that one act of police misconduct is one too many. He called for re-evaluation of police hiring practices and the institution of better training and education programs. Scully told Police Labor Monthly, "For the police to maintain its strong stance against corruption, it is up to municipalities to raise the officers' salaries and hiring standards so that the more qualified find the job appealing." 

State bargaining proposals gain mixed results

State legislators have sent mixed signals to public employees on the right to collectively bargain. The New Mexico Senate last month voted to renew its public sector bargaining law, but in Missouri lawmakers buried the proposal. Virginia lawmakers have approved the right of employee groups to meet and confer with public employers. Meanwhile, Texas legislators have yet to act on such a bill.

In New Mexico, state legislators voted to continue public sector bargaining. The current law is due to expire July 1. Public sector unions had agreed to a sunset provision to win approval of the original law in 1992. The new legislation would

extend the life of the Public Employee Relations Board to July 1, 2006. Supporters of the extension grafted the proposal onto two different bills in an effort to avoid a gubernatorial veto. Republican Governor Gary Johnson has publicly vowed to veto the bill even though one version is included in a charter school bill that the Governor supports. It is unknown whether enough votes exist to override a gubernatorial veto.

An estimated 150 public employee labor contracts, including police officer and fire fighter pacts, are in force in New Mexico. If the bargaining statute is not renewed, the state would revert to


March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

permissive bargaining whereby a public employer could, but would not be required by law to, bargain with employee groups. The current statute bans strikes and other work stoppage. If the law lapses, such job actions would no longer be unlawful in New Mexico.

The news in Missouri was less encouraging for public sector labor groups. By a vote of 73 to 88 the Missouri House of Representatives effectively killed a bill that would have given police officers, fire fighters, and other public workers bargaining rights on salaries and working conditions. Similar legislation has been rejected over the last 20 years but backers thought this year's effort had a chance of success. Governor Mel Carnahan supported the proposal along with a variety of labor organizations. The Missouri Municipal League and most Republican members of the legislature opposed the measure. 

The Virginia General Assembly has modified

state statute to permit public employee associations to discuss their interests with their employing agency whenever the agency agrees. The bill has been forwarded to Republican Governor Jim Gilmore for approval or veto. While authorizing limited meet and confer power, the bill does not repeal the Virginia prohibition of public sector bargaining contracts.

In Texas, a general public safety bargaining bill has not been introduced in this session of the legislature. However, an alteration of the current law that generally prohibits public sector bargaining without voter approval has been introduced. This bill, if passed, would allow permissive bargaining. Prospects of passage are unknown at this time. Similarly, a bill has been proposed allowing meet-and-confer status for Dallas police officers. Police officers in Houston and Austin already enjoy meet-and-confer status while officers in San Antonio and about two dozen other cities work under voter-authorized collective bargaining contracts. 

Facial hair litigation hits the courts

Thirty years ago the U.S. Supreme Court settled the question of the right of police to wear facial hair, ruling that departments could constitutionally enforce reasonable grooming standards. Apparently, several individuals have decided to reopen the issue in 1999, this time posing new arguments. And courts appear willing to listen.

Earlier this month, a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit ruled that Newark, New Jersey, police officials must permit officers to wear beards for religious reasons because the department already makes exceptions for officers who cannot shave for medical reasons. Meanwhile, a Los Angeles officer has sued his department claiming discrimination in promotion because of his beard.

In Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge 12 v. City of Newark, two Sunni Muslim police officers claimed that the city threatened to discipline them for violating the department's 25-year old "no beard rule." The officers claim that the Quran, the

Muslim holy scripture, commands the wearing of a beard by male believers. Police officials instituted disciplinary action against the two officers for refusal to comply with the policy. Meanwhile, department policy permitted a medical exemption to the "no beard rule." 

The appeals court found that the city acted inconsistently in accommodating a medical-based disability but refusing to accommodate a religious claim. The court noted that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires an employer to make a "reasonable accommodation" for individuals with disabilities and that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes an identical obligation to accommodate religious practices. 

The court also rejected the department's claim that safety concerns warranted standardization of appearance of officers. The court noted that uniformed officers, with or without beards, would be clearly identified as police officers. Likewise, plainclothes officers are not supposed to stand out



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

to the same degree as uniformed personnel. Judge Samuel Alito in his opinion observed, "The Department does not contend that these medical exemptions pose a serious threat to the safety of members of the force or to the general public, and there is no apparent reason why permitting officers to wear beards for religious reasons should create any greater difficulties in this regard."

Meanwhile, Kevin Williams, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) lieutenant, has sued claiming that the department refused to promote him because he wears a beard. LAPD also enforces a no beard policy but Williams requested an exemption because he suffers from pseudo folliculitis barbae (PFB). PFB is a skin condition among some African-

American males that produces lesions after shaving. Williams' suit contends the PFB requires accommodation under the ADA. Despite finishing eighth out of 64 candidates for promotion to captain, Williams claims he has been passed over several times. The suit asserts that the stated reasons for being skipped are a subterfuge _ the real reason being his beard.

A third beard suit may not bode well for Williams' claim. The Supreme Court last month refused to overturn a lower court ruling that PFB does not require accommodation under the ADA. This matter, Seaborn v. Florida Department of Corrections, No. 98-998, also involved promotion of an individual suffering from PFB. 

Feds investigating missing NJ union funds

Federal authorities are investigating a former president of the New Jersey Policemen's Benevolent Association (NJPBA) and his aide in the disappearance of $500,000 in union funds, according to published reports earlier this month.

On March 9, federal agents searched the homes of Frank Ginesi, former NJPBA president, and William Saksinsky, a former vice president of the union, a spokesperson for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said. Agents of the FBI and Postal Inspectors reportedly seized various financial documents. 

The investigation began in 1997 when current NJPBA president Michael Madonna reported that

$250,000 in union funds was missing. Investigators later determined that the total was twice that amount. 

Authorities are reportedly investigating charges that someone took NJPBA funds out of union accounts and placed them in bank accounts earmarked for the union but which funds the union never received. The funds included proceeds from the sale of PBA insignias and payments for several Caribbean cruises organized by the union, sources said. To date, no charges have been filed.

The NJPBA is the state's largest police union with more than 30,000 members. Ginesi headed the group for 20 years, until 1997. 

Lottery award for safe drivers

"Fleets" as they are known in some police circles _ damage to police vehicles _ are a constant problem in many agencies. Frequently, damage occurs not as a result of high-speed pursuits or from suspects ramming a patrol car but rather from mundane events such as the backing of the vehicle into a lamppost or rear-ending a citizen's car. Seemingly, no police agency is immune from the rather costly, and arguably preventable, fender benders. Many agencies provide supplemental training in police vehicle operation and most discipline officers who negligently damage their vehicle. Additionally, requiring the officer to pay for the damage is not an uncommon sanction. 

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, Police Department recently launched an incentive program to encourage safe driving. Besides driver training and award pins, cash bonuses will be available for accident-free driving. Yearly lotteries of $1,000 and $500 will be held for



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

employees who remain accident-free for one year. Those who crash in preventable incidents will be assigned the least desirable patrol vehicles.

Traffic records show that Charlotte-Mecklenburg police are three times more likely to be involved in wrecks than civilian drivers. In 1997-98, police cruisers were involved in 17 accidents per million miles driven compared to five accidents per million miles for the general public. The department experienced 284 vehicle accidents in 1998, about 44 percent being characterized as

preventable. In 1997, the city paid out over $300,000 in claims arising from alleged negligent police vehicle operations. Cost of repairs to police vehicles were not reported.

Geoffrey Alpert, a University of South Carolina professor who has studied police vehicle operations, characterized the problem as a "pay-attention issue" not a "training issue." He said most police vehicle accidents are preventable and often stem from the officer simply not being alert to the surroundings. 

Norfolk police officers qualify for welfare

Several members of the Norfolk, Virginia, Police Department qualify for food stamps, while one lives in government-subsidized housing. Last month three officials of Local 412 of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO) presented the claim before a meeting of the Norfolk city council. 

"That's a very troubling situation if it is true," said Vice Mayor Herbert Collins. "I told the city manager to look into that… We're going to get to the bottom of this."

Union officials told the Roanoke Times that

the officers they know who qualify for public assistance are those whose spouses do not work or who are single parents. One officer said a high-risk pregnancy forced his wife to quit her job and plunged the family into financial crisis. He earns $25,587 and is eligible for assistance under the federal WIC program. He said he had only $30 left after paying his mortgage, utility bills, groceries, and loan payment on a 5-year old mini-van. 

Last spring, the union lobbied for a 10 percent pay hike but council granted only 2.47 percent.

NYPD merit pay deemed unfair labor practice

Upholding a complaint by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA), a New York City labor relations panel this month ruled that city efforts to give incentive pay to select groups of police officers is an unfair labor practice. The decision by the Board of Collective Bargaining halted payment of the annual $1,400 special assignment differential pay to about 2,000 police officers.

Even though the plan meant more money for some members of the PBA, the union had filed an improper practice petition against the city, arguing that any pay changes had to be negotiated through the collective bargaining process.

The city had argued that it had the authority to grant the pay differentials as a form of special assignment pay. The Board of Collective Bargaining

disagreed saying, "Merely disguising the incentive/merit pay increase as an assignment does not suffice."

The pay differential was originally established to reward exemplary patrol officers in each precinct. Precinct commanders were given authority to choose who would receive the money.

A spokesperson for Mayor Rudy Giuliani told the New York Times, "It's really a shame that the PBA is stopping police officers and their families from receiving hard-earned incentive pay, which is in essence what this is."

PBA acting president James Savage responded that the union would "gladly negotiate with the city to make sure that such pay is distributed in a fair and equitable manner."



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

Litigation
dismissed the suit. 

Benningfield v. Nuchia, No. 98-1266, concerns alleged retaliatory discipline against some current and former employees of the identification division of the Houston Police Department. Appeals court ruled that the employees' speech, which was protected by the First Amendment, was not connected to any adverse employment actions.

Supreme Court update

Justices declined to consider two police labor-related cases last month. As noted elsewhere, in Seaborn v. Florida Department of Corrections, No. 98-998, the court refused to overturn a decision that pseudo folliculitis barbae, a skin condition suffered by some African-Americans that produces lesions when shaving, does not qualify as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thus, the employer could lawfully deny promotions because of non-compliance with its facial hair policy.

Also rejected was Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, Illinois, No. 98-1005, involving a police officer's religious freedom claim. The inaction leaves in place a lower court ruling that the city sufficiently accommodated a Catholic police officer who objected to being assigned to provide security at an abortion clinic. The transfer policy under the labor agreement was sufficient to protect the officer's religious objections to the assignment, the lower court ruled.

Recently filed cases seeking Supreme Court review include Huffman v. Los Angeles County, California, No. 98-1159, wherein a lower court absolved the county of liability for a shooting death by an intoxicated off-duty deputy sheriff. The court refused to impose liability despite the department's mandate that deputies be armed at all times, even when off-duty. Plaintiffs are seeking high court review of the ruling.

In Fournier v. Reardon, No. 98-1264, lower courts refused relief to a corrections officer who claimed he was placed under "house arrest" at the training academy. He asserts that he was handcuffed for failing to follow academy protocol by entering an instructor's office without first requesting permission. Subsequently, he was injured as he attempted to sit in a chair while still handcuffed. Lower federal courts ruled that the injury did not rise to the level of a constitutional claim and

Cases of interest

Handicap discrimination

Burroughs was hired by the city as a police cadet. At the time of his employment he notified the city that he had a diabetic condition but assured the employer that his condition was under control. Burroughs underwent a pre-employment physical examination and the physician reported that Burroughs was able to work with no limitations. However, while serving as a police recruit, Burroughs suffered two diabetic hypoglycemic episodes while on duty, causing him to become disoriented and dysfunctional, and necessitating emergency medical care. Following those episodes the city required Burroughs to take another medical examination. This time the physician concluded that it was inappropriate for Burroughs to maintain a position requiring him to carry a firearm because he could conceivably endanger the public. The physician noted that it was possible for Burroughs to learn to control the episodes by careful timing of meals and suggested that the case be reviewed after a period of time. The city removed Burroughs from active duty and offered him a choice of a voluntary demotion or resignation. Burroughs chose to resign. He then brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claiming that the city had discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. Trial court dismissed the case and former police cadet appeals.

HELD: The ADA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he has a "disability" as defined by the law, that he is qualified to perform the essential



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

functions of the job, and that because of his disability, he suffered an adverse employment action. The city does not dispute the fact that Burroughs is a qualified individual with a disability. Rather, the city argues he was not terminated "because of" his disability. The undisputed evidence showed that the two on-duty episodes rendered Burroughs unable to function on the job. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that nothing more than poor timing of Burroughs' meals and activities caused the episodes. It is legitimate for a public employer to expect and require that police officers keep themselves functional and alert at all times while on duty. Burroughs failed to meet this legitimate expectation on two occasions. The ADA does not require the city to provide him with another chance to try to improve his diabetes monitoring techniques while on duty as a patrol officer. Burroughs' eating schedule is a matter within his own control. The inherent and substantial risk of serious harm arising from diabetic episodes, given the nature of police work, is self-evident. The city's decision to remove Burroughs from duty was appropriately based on objective evidence and reasonable medical judgment. When an employee knows that he is afflicted with a disability and needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet the employer's legitimate job expectations, due to failure to control a controllable disability, he cannot state a claim under the ADA. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Burroughs v. City of Springfield, Missouri, 163 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 1998)] statute. In early 1998, a city council candidate contacted the Police Association of the City of Kenner (PACK) about endorsing his election bid. The executive board of PACK polled the membership about the possible endorsement. Meanwhile, the chief of police allegedly told PACK members that they should be wary of supporting a political candidate because of state law. Nonetheless, PACK voted to support the candidate after receiving legal advice that to do so would have no adverse legal consequences. PACK also provided the candidate with a monetary contribution. The letter endorsing the candidate was distributed to city employees and PACK publicly announced the endorsement during the campaign. The chief of police subsequently launched an internal affairs investigation that resulted in the termination of five police officers, the executive board members of PACK. The officers sued contending that they had been wrongfully terminated. Specifically, the officers contended that their actions were as the executive board of the association and not as individuals. Thus, they argued, the chief violated their constitutional rights. Chief and city move for summary judgment.

HELD: The law is well established that states and the federal government may legitimately regulate certain political activities of civil servants. The Supreme Court has ruled that a law that forbids activities such as organizing a political party, actively participating in fund-raising activities for partisan candidates, becoming a candidate for office, campaigning for office, actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate, circulating a nominating position, soliciting votes for candidates, or serving as a delegate to a political party would be constitutional. The rights to associate and participate in politics are not absolute. The former officers in this case, however, argue they were merely executive board members of the association and that the association, and not they individually, endorsed and contributed to the candidate for city council. Thus, they claim this activity does not fall under the statutory prohibition. Louisiana law, however,

Dismissal grounds

Louisiana law prohibits a wide range of political activities by police officers and other civil service employees. The statute prohibits any employee from directly or indirectly making political contributions, serving as a member of a campaign committee, being a candidate for public office, making a political speech in behalf of any candidate, or taking part in the management of a political campaign. The law further requires termination of any employee who violates the


March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

prohibits both direct and indirect political activity by public employees. The endorsement of, and subsequent monetary contribution to, a candidate by PACK, an association of police officers, which was controlled by the five officers in this case, amounted to at least an indirect political activity. The chief appropriately applied the statute to the five former officers. Summary judgment for city. [West v. Congemi, 28 F.Supp.2d 385 (E.D. La. 1998)] security work, for which a question might exist as to whether an off-duty officer is acting as a police officer or as a private individual while performing the task. Because Cannon was directing traffic and the activity is necessarily a police function, it follows that he was acting in his capacity as a police officer at the time of the incident. Thus, under Georgia law, he is entitled to assert official immunity as a defense to any claim of negligence. The relationship of the officer and the insurance company determines whether the insurance company can be held liable as the officer's employer. Certainly, the insurance company was compensating the officer, but prior case law holds that if the police officer, while working for the private employer, was performing public duties not at the direction of the private employer, the employer will not be held liable. Although the insurance company determined the hours it required police assistance and the pay rate, there is no evidence that the insurance company controlled the manner or method in which Cannon directed traffic. On the contrary, the officer used his police training and expertise to guide his traffic direction. Because he was performing a clear public duty for the insurance company, any negligence on the part of Cannon is not attributable to the insurance company. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Sommerfield v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. App. 1998)]

Civil liability

Cannon was a municipal police officer. His sergeant arranged for Cannon to work an off-duty job directing traffic in front of the office of an insurance company. The insurance company paid him for his work. While directing traffic on the public roadway, Cannon motioned for Sommerfield's automobile to exit the insurance company premises. As she did, her car was struck by another vehicle traveling westbound at a high rate of speed. Sommerfield was injured in the collision. She brought suit against the insurance company and the police officer alleging he was negligent and caused the car wreck. She also alleged that the officer was working as an employee of the insurance company at the time of the accident. Trial court granted summary judgment for the officer and insurance company and injured motorist appeal.

HELD: Under Georgia law, whether a police officer can be held liable for negligent conduct while working for a private entity depends on whether the officer was acting within the scope of his official authority at the time of the conduct. In this case, the officer was directing traffic on a public street while being paid by a private employer. Thus, the question becomes whether he was performing a public or private function. Prior case law holds that directing traffic upon a public thoroughfare is a police function. It is always a police function regardless of who is assisted in the process. Georgia statute limits direction of traffic to police officers, fire fighters, and school crossing guards. As such, the activity of directing traffic is distinct from other activities engaged in by police officers, such as

Fireman's rule

Whitten and her husband had to leave town to attend a funeral. She decided to leave her 17-year old son alone at home as he was scheduled to work that week. One evening while the Whittens were gone, the son had someone else purchase beer for him at the end of his work shift. He then invited several teenagers to his house, including Brown who he did not know very well. That evening, the teenagers drank beer and listened to music. Ultimately, a disturbance erupted and Brown and another teenager ended up in the yard preparing to fight. A neighbor called the sheriff's department to report the incident. As the first deputies arrived at


March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

the scene, the two individuals fled to the next street. One of the deputies went to the next street and located Brown. About that time Bell, also a deputy, arrived to assist the first deputy in subduing Brown. In the course of trying to handcuff Brown, Bell was knocked down, breaking his ankle. The other deputy managed to get Brown under control. Following medical treatment Deputy Bell filed suit against Brown, his father, Whitten's mother, and her homeowner's insurance carrier. Trial court found that Brown was 100 percent at fault for causing the injuries to Bell and rendered a monetary judgment. Whitten's mother and the insurance carrier were absolved from liability. Deputy appeals on the grounds that the jury was clearly wrong in absolving Whitten and her insurance company from liability.

HELD: For a negligence action to be pursued, there must be evidence of a breach of duty to the plaintiff. Duty is defined as an obligation to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct towards another. The imposition of a duty depends on a case-by-case analysis. Louisiana law prohibits minors from purchasing or possessing alcohol. Prior case law holds that these statutes do not extend to impose a duty upon one minor not to give alcohol to another. Thus, Whitten had no statutory duty not to share with Brown the alcohol he obtained. Any duty that Whitten might have had towards the deputy also would be limited by the professional rescuer's rule. This rule provides that professional rescuers, such as fire fighters or police officers, injured in the performance of their professional duties assume the risk of such injuries and are not entitled to damages, with certain limited exceptions. A professional rescuer may recover for injuries caused by a risk independent of the emergency that the rescuer assumed the duty to render. Second, where the risk involved arises from the very emergency the rescuer was hired to remedy, the rescuer may only recover for injuries when the risk is so extraordinary that it cannot be said the parties intended the rescuer to assume it, or the conduct of the defendant is so blameworthy that recovery should be imposed for

purposes of punishment or deterrence. Any negligence Whitten had in providing beer to Brown, another minor, does not rise to the level of gross negligence and is so remotely connected to Bell's injury that liability does not exist. The jury correctly determined that Whitten had no duty not to offer alcohol to Brown. With Whitten having no such duty, liability likewise may not attach to his mother or her insurance carrier. Judgment against assailant affirmed. [Bell v. Whitten, 722 So.2d 1087 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1998)]

Disciplinary grounds

Erickson, the police chief, established a policy that provided that the newest police vehicle would be assigned to him. When a new vehicle was delivered to the department, the chief assigned the vehicle to himself. The town's selectmen directed the chief to deploy the new cruiser to patrol officers. The chief argued that the vehicle would last longer if he had the car, while the selectmen claimed that greater service life would be obtained if the vehicle were assigned to a patrol officer. When the chief refused to assign the vehicle to a patrol officer, the selectmen imposed a one-day suspension without pay on the chief, for failure to obey a lawful order. The chief appealed to the civil service commission, which upheld the suspension. He then appealed to the trial court, which vacated the suspension. Selectmen appeal.

HELD: Erickson serves as chief under the Massachusetts "weak chief" statute. This statute provides that selectmen may make suitable regulations governing the police department and its officers. Also by law, the chief of police is to be in the immediate control of the property used by the department and by the officers. In a prior case, a state court recognized that the general control of the police department rests with the selectmen. In that case the court upheld the authority of the selectmen to set the scheduling and assignments of police officers through collective bargaining, provided such regulations maintained some minimal level of generality to avoid conflict with the statutory



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

reservation of immediate control of the department by the chief. The statute in question makes no distinction between property and personnel of a police department in its allocation of authority. There is no reason to view the authority of the selectmen under the state statute to regulate the use of department property different from their authority to regulate the officers. Thus, the selectmen's directive as to the deployment of new police cars is sufficiently general to fall within their policymaking authority, leaving day-to-day management of the department to the chief. Trial court reversed, reimposing chief's suspension. [Erickson v. East Longmeadow Civil Service Commission, 704 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)] untrained individuals should not apply it mechanically. The specific diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-IV are meant to serve as guidelines to supplement clinical judgment and are not meant to be used in a cookbook fashion. The worker's compensation board erred in holding that the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria must be satisfied in order to establish PTSD. Reversed and remanded for reconsideration. [Rivera v. City of Gresham, 970 P.2d 232 (Or. App. 1998)]

Dismissal procedures

In 1995, Bowling was hired as a part-time officer on a probationary basis. There was no formal contract nor any other written record of the terms of his employment. Nor apparently was there any agreement as to the term of his probationary period. Further, no town ordinance or state statute addressed the probationary period length that a new police officer must serve. Over a year after he was originally hired, the township unilaterally extended Bowling's probationary period, ostensibly to provide additional time to review his work performance. Four months later, the town notified Bowling that his probationary period had concluded and that the township would not hire him as a full-time officer. He was terminated. Bowling notified the town that he wanted arbitration over his termination pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the police force and the town. That bargaining contract stated that dismissals must be for just cause. In response, the town informed Bowling that he was not entitled to arbitration concerning his dismissal since he was not covered by the bargaining agreement because he was only a probationary police officer. Bowling sought to pursue the arbitration by requesting appointment of an arbitrator to hear his grievance. Meanwhile, the town responded by seeking an injunction stopping the arbitration efforts. Trial court determined that Bowling was not entitled to grievance arbitration and granted the town's injunction. Former officer appeals.

HELD: Bowling asserts that the collective

Worker's compensation

Rivera was a police officer who was involved in a shooting in which he killed a suspect. He subsequently filed a worker's compensation claim on the basis that he suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At a hearing the medical evidence on his condition conflicted. Two physicians offered opinions that Rivera suffered from PTSD as a result of the shooting, while two others expressed the opinion that his symptoms did not reflect PTSD. Several of the physicians mentioned the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). The hearing officer denied Rivera's claim reasoning that PTSD cannot be diagnosed unless the criteria contained in DSM-IV are satisfied. Worker's compensation board adopted this finding. Officer appeals.

HELD: Oregon law provides that compensation for a mental disorder is not available unless the worker establishes that there is a diagnosis of a mental or emotional disorder which is generally recognized in the medical or psychological community. No statute or administrative rule adopts the DSM-IV criteria as the specifications for PTSD diagnosis. None of the witnesses testified that those criteria are required for such a diagnosis. Indeed, the DSM-IV itself appears to warn against just such use of its diagnostic criteria. The text cautions that



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

bargaining agreement specifically calls for arbitration between the parties when a police officer claims there is a wrongful dismissal. In addition, Pennsylvania law provides that an arbitrator normally has sole jurisdiction in the first instance to decide whether or not an issue is arbitrable. On the other hand, the town argues that Bowling was never a member of the police force covered by the terms of the bargaining contract since he was serving only as a probationary officer. Thus, he has no right to pursue a claim under the bargaining agreement. Bowling was either a member of the police department covered by the collective bargaining agreement as he contends or was covered by a separate employment agreement as a consequence of his status as a probationary officer, as the town contends. If a member of the police force, then he has arbitration available. If, however, not a member, then the trial court would have jurisdiction to enjoin his attempt to arbitrate the dismissal. Neither side has provided any authority on the issue of whether a probationary officer is considered covered under a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the court holds that absent specific language in a collective bargaining agreement or specific contractual legislative requirements, a probationary officer in Pennsylvania is not subject to the protections of a collective bargaining agreement. The matter is reversed to determine Bowling's status at the time of his termination. [Township of Sugarloaf v. Bowling, 722 A.2d 246 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)] the 180 days had passed. Under state civil service law Lindsey had the option of appealing his suspension to the civil service commission or to an independent hearing examiner. He chose the latter route, claiming that the department had failed to take action within the 180 days required under the state statute. The hearing examiner upheld the suspension, apparently deciding that the police department did "impose" the suspension within 180 days. Lindsey then filed suit contending that the hearing examiner exceeded his authority because he interpreted the state's statute when he determined that the notification of suspension fell within the definition of "impose." City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the hearing examiner correctly interpreted the statute. Trial court granted city's motion and officer appeals. 

HELD: Under state civil service law the initial disciplinary action against a police officer comes from within the department. The officer, at his discretion, may appeal the disciplinary action to either the civil service commission or to the third party hearing examiner. A hearing examiner's decision is final and binding on all parties. By electing a hearing examiner, the officer waived all rights to appeal except when the officer claims the hearing examiner was without jurisdiction, the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction, or the order was procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means. Lindsey seeks to fit his appeal within the assertion that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by interpreting the word "impose." Hearing examiners conducting a hearing have the same duties and powers as a civil service commission. This authority includes applying, interpreting, and enforcing the rules adopted by the commission and the procedural rules the legislature has enacted to govern suspensions. In the case of rules that it has adopted, the commission and the examiner have authority to interpret them. Any other conclusion would stymie and completely hobble civil service commissions and independent hearing examiners. In short, the hearing examiner had the authority to apply the state statute to the case before

Arbitrator's authority

Texas civil service law provides that a public employer has a maximum of 180 days to "impose" a suspension after it learns of an administrative violation. Lindsey, a police officer, was investigated for a possible violation on December 19. Following the investigation, he was issued a letter on June 13 of the next year notifying him that he was suspended for five days, from June 19 until June 23. The notification of suspension was made within 180 days from the time the department learned of the violation, but the suspension did not start until after


March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

him and decide if the police department correctly applied the law to Lindsey's case. Therefore, Lindsey, by choosing to go to a hearing examiner instead of the civil service commission, lost his right to a judicial appeal. Trial court decision dismissing case affirmed. [Lindsey v. Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service Commission of Houston, 980 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998)] good cause. A commission may affirm or modify the terms of the suspension. Likewise, state statute permits unions and cities to enter into a collective bargaining agreement covering most aspects of their employment relationship including grievance procedures. Under the labor contract in this case, the department may not suspend an employee without just cause. Once suspended, the employee may have the matter ultimately reviewed by a neutral arbitrator. The arbitrator's decision is final and binding. The city asserts that the doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of claims that were brought in a prior action. Specifically, the city asserts that the initial decision of the civil service commission precludes a subsequent review of the same matter by the arbitrator. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable in this case, however, because the civil service commission and the arbitrator are concerned with different standards. The role of the civil service commission is to evaluate the officer's suspension under a standard of "good faith and for cause." In contrast, the arbitrator evaluates more expansive rights under a labor contract that allows discipline only for "just cause." These two standards are not the same. The civil service commission found that Stair had violated department policy and several traffic laws. It further found that his suspension was not motivated by political or religious reasons. It, therefore, concluded that suspension was a valid punishment under civil service standards. In contrast the arbitrator found just cause lacking. Whether there is just cause for discipline entails much more than a valid reason. It involves such elements as procedural fairness, the presence of mitigating circumstances, and the appropriateness of the penalty. While the arbitrator agreed with the commission's finding that Stair violated department regulations, the arbitrator also considered Stair's previous record as a police officer and other mitigating factors of the event. The arbitrator ruled that under the collective bargaining agreement just cause for the suspension did not exist. The civil service hearing was based on a statutory right while

Disciplinary procedures

Stair was a police officer who was suspended by the department for 2½ days after his negligence during a high-speed chase caused a traffic accident. Pursuant to state law, Stair appealed his suspension to the local civil service commission. On the same day, he also initiated a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the police officers' union and the city. While the grievance under the labor contract proceeded through its necessary steps, the civil service commission moved more rapidly. The civil service commission reviewed the facts and concluded that the 2½-day suspension was insufficient in the light of Stair's conduct and increased the suspension to 10 days. Meanwhile, the arbitrator of the grievance determined that the suspension was not based on just cause and ordered the city to decrease Stair's suspension to a written reprimand. Civil service commission sues seeking a court order to declare its earlier order final and binding on all parties and nullify the arbitration decision. Trial court ruled for suspension and intermediate appellate court agreed, holding that although Stair was entitled to pursue both remedies, the doctrine of res judicata precluded further prosecution after a final judgment was obtained in either proceeding. Officer appeals.

HELD: Washington statute permits cities to establish a civil service commission to review police disciplinary matters. If an employee challenges his suspension, the commission conducts a public hearing to determine whether the discipline was impermissibly imposed for religious or political reasons or was properly made in good faith and for



March 1999
Volume 17, Number 10

the arbitration was based on a more expansive contractual right. Although the two procedures appear to be a duplicate review of disciplinary actions, such inefficiency must be resolved by the parties when they next negotiate their collective bargaining agreement. Often where a state enacts collective bargaining laws against a background of existing civil service laws, the parties will specify that only one avenue of appeal is available. No such specification was made in this instance. Where the two appeal processes are concerned with different substantive rights, the court will not impose an election of remedies clause where none was bargained for by the parties. Res judicata is not implicated by the facts at hand because the causes of action are not identical. Reversed for officer. [Civil Service Commission v. City of Kelso, 969 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1999)] the new two-year pact officers will receive a 2 percent raise the first year and a 4 percent hike the next year. However, six-year veterans, the top of the pay scale, will see increases of 6.5 percent and 5.7 percent in the two years of the contract. On July 1, police officer wages will jump to $29,273. The officers at top of the pay scale will earn $38,948. In the second year of pact, base wages go to $30,444 and $41,187 respectively.

Jackson, Mississippi

police officers
Mayor Harvey Johnson, Jr., of Jackson, Mississippi, recently announced a plan that would place police officers' salaries among the highest in the southeastern region. The new minimum salary for an officer will climb to $26,487, compared to the current $22,177. A five-step plan went into effect last fall to bring all city workers up to the southeastern median. The mayor said he expected the wage hikes to lift morale and improve police services.
Settlements

Baltimore County, Maryland

police officers

West Warwick, Rhode Island

police officers
A generous new wage package for county police officers reportedly has other county unions envious. An agreement reached this month between Baltimore County officials and the Fraternal Order of Police will grant a one-time pay raise of $3,500 and annual raises of 4 to 8 percent in each of the next three years. A wage reopener is available for the third and fourth years of the pact if county officers' wages drop below the average of those paid to Baltimore City, the Maryland State Police, and two surrounding counties. Starting pay under the contract goes to $30,156 on July 1. About 1,650 officers are covered by the new pay rates.
After four years of strife and no labor contract, Local 312 of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and the Town of West Warwick have inked a bargaining contract. The new pact raises the annual base pay for each of the 55 union members by $7,000. The lowest ranking patrol officer's pay will rise from $29,000 to $36,000. On June 30, officers will also receive a $25 per week pay boost for the final year of the agreement. The 18-month contract contains the first pay raise for officers since July, 1994. Officers also won one more paid holiday, Easter. They also gained the right to sell back up to one year's worth of vacation time. Town officials reasoned that the buy-back was cheaper than paying overtime to another officer to cover the shift of the vacationing officer. The police administration gained additional management rights over work assignments.

Council Bluffs, Iowa

police officers
A new labor contract between the City of Council Bluffs and the local police union will provide higher wages for veteran officers. Under