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Hearing promised on police due process legislation

For the last several sessions of Congress legislation establishing a police officer's bill of rights has been introduced, promptly referred to a committee, and never heard from again. That pattern seems destined to change in the 106th Congress. Last month, the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) announced that House of Representatives Crime Subcommittee Chairman Bill McCollum (R-FL) has agreed to hold hearings on legislation protecting the rights of officers during disciplinary proceedings. 

In response to the promise, National FOP President Gilbert Gallegos said, "Bill McCollum has long been a friend of law enforcement and the FOP in particular. We are enormously pleased that he has once again demonstrated his commitment to the men and women in law enforcement by agreeing to have a hearing on legislation protecting the due process rights of police officers." Gallegos also noted that the FOP had been working closely with the National Association of Police Organization (NAPO) on the proposed legislation.

Previously the FOP and other police labor groups have pushed a "bill of rights" for local police officers. Proponents believe that in the past such legislation was misunderstood to provide extra or special rights to law enforcement personnel. The new legislation, which is still being drafted, will be titled "State and Local Law Enforcement Discipline, Accountability and Due Process Act." According to FOP officials the proposed law would clarify existing judicially-created rights and establish minimum procedural protections for state and local police officers subject to serious disciplinary action. Political rights of officers would also be protected.

While a hearing on a proposed piece of legislation does not guarantee Congressional floor

action, such a proceeding is generally the first step toward enactment of a law. No date for the committee hearing will likely be set until the actual bill is introduced.

In a related matter, the FOP, NAPO, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, and the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, last month announced the introduction of a public safety bargaining bill in the 106th Congress. The bill, H.R. 1093, sponsored by Representatives Dale Kildee (D-MI) and Bob Ney (R-OH), tracks the language of legislation proposed in the previous session but not enacted.

The "Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 1999," if passed, would grant state and local police officers, fire fighters, and emergency medical service personnel the right to reach and maintain agreements with management on pay, hours, and working conditions through the collective bargaining process. While strikes would be prohibited, the proposed legislation does not require binding interest arbitration. 

Collective bargaining for law enforcement officers has been a top legislative priority for all of the national police groups for many years. Under current federal law, private sector employees enjoy the right to engage in collective bargaining. However, public sector labor rights are largely regulated by state law. Passage of H.R. 1093 would mandate public sector meet and confer rights in those jurisdictions not already covered by a comparable state statute.

The bill was introduced with 128 co-sponsors and referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. Prospects of passage are unknown at this time.


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Police officer rates 197th in best jobs ranking

Working as a waiter, a file clerk, or a janitor is preferable to being employed as a police officer, at least that is the opinion of one man _ Les Krantz, author of the updated Jobs Rated Almanac. In fact, Krantz ranks police officers 197th out of the 250 occupations he considered in his recently released book. Highway patrol officer ranked 170th.

Krantz compiled the rankings based upon several variables including income, stress, physical demands, potential growth, job security, and work environment. He drew data from the census, Department of Labor Statistics, professional organizations and telephone surveys.

Overall, the best job, according to Krantz, is that of web site manager. The worst job? Oil field laborer. Police officer was sandwiched in the rankings between photojournalist and air traffic controller. Fire fighter was rated 216th, largely

because Krantz placed the profession next to the top in the stress category. Police officer did not finish in the top five stressful occupations despite the widely held view that the job is highly stressful.

If there is good news about occupying the 197th slot, it is that being President of the United States is rated 32 positions lower! President was rated as the job with the highest stress and worst working environment. Other unusual rankings include major league baseball player at 202 and NBA basketball player at 205. The low ratings for these occupations were due largely to lack of job security. 

The fourth edition of the Jobs Rated Almanac is published by the National Business Employment Weekly/Wall Street Journal and is available at most bookstores and through on-line booksellers.

NYCPBA issues first no confidence vote on commissioner

For the first time in its 105-year history the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) issued a "no confidence" vote for the city's police commissioner. On April 13, about 400 delegates of the 27,000 member union called for the immediate suspension of Commissioner Howard Safir because of "lack of leadership, lack of integrity," and his alleged use of police officers for personal matters.

Commissioner Safir dismissed the PBA action as a ploy of interim president James Savage who is a candidate in the group's first seriously contested election in 18 years. "This action is not about me but about a hotly contested union election and the inability of the current PBA to fulfill the expectations of its members," Safir said.

The Police Commissioner has come under fire for allegedly taking a trip to the Oscars at the expense of a cosmetics manufacturer, sending officers to investigate a woman who ran into his wife's car, and having detectives chauffeur his daughter's wedding party. While city officials are

investigating the charges, many officers accused the department of using a double standard. One officer told the New York Daily News, "If we took a trip to the Oscars on the arm, we would be fired."

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who has the sole authority to remove the Police Commissioner, expressed support for Safir. 

The no confidence vote is the latest action in an increasingly complex situation at the NYPD. Giuliani and Safir have been under political attack from a cross-section of community leaders for their handling of the death of Amadou Diallo. Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant, was hit with 19 of 41 gunshots fired by four white officers last February. The officers, who have been suspended without pay for the maximum allowable period of 30 days, have pled not guilty to indictments for second-degree murder and reckless endangerment. The action outraged many politicians and civil rights leaders, resulting in sit-ins and other protests at police headquarters. A former mayor and a member of Congress were arrested during peaceful sit-ins. 



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Police officers generally viewed the indictments and suspensions as unjust and political in nature. Meanwhile, many NYPD officers have not forgiven the Giuliani administration or the PBA for agreeing to a five-year labor contract in 1997 that provided no pay increases the first two years. As the city gained recognition for dramatic reductions in crime, the officers found the wage freeze all the more galling. Many police officers have apparently grown unhappy with either the NYPD leadership, the PBA leadership, or both.

Safir was named Police Commissioner following a career as assistant director of the U.S. Marshal's Service (USMS). He is widely credited with making major improvements in the Marshal's Service. 

NAPO announces bargaining law survey

The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) announced last month the release of its 1999 National Survey of State Collective Bargaining Laws Applicable to State and Local Law Enforcement Officers. The report provides detailed information about each state's laws (or lack thereof) indicating: (1) the existence and scope of any collective bargaining statutes for law enforcement officers; (2) the labor rights of law enforcement officers, such as the right to organize, be represented by employee organizations, and to bring grievances; (3) the rights of and prohibitions on employing agencies; and (4) the nature and extent of collective bargaining, including the method of selecting the employees' bargaining representative and the resolution of impasses or other disputes with management. "We decided to take on this project of compiling a national survey of state collective bargaining laws applicable to law enforcement officers because it is in the best interest of citizens in those states which do not have collective bargaining laws to encourage legislators to consider and enact such legislation. We hope our survey will serve as a useful tool for lobbying efforts across the country," said Robert T. Scully, NAPO's executive director.

NAPO conducted the survey under the auspices of its National Law Enforcement Officers' Rights Center. The report is believed to be the only current national compilation of law enforcement labor laws available. Copies of the survey are available for $19.95 from NAPO by calling (202) 842-4420. 

Y2K problem bars vacation time

The Y2K problem _ the real or perceived computer crisis at year's end _ has for some months had police departments scrabbling to determine whether or not their computer systems will function properly after the new year. Out of concern for possible disruptions that may occur not only in the department but throughout society, the New York State Police announced that no troopers will be permitted to take vacations during the last week of this year or the first week of January 2000.

"It's a precautionary thing. There are so many unknowns and supervisors in Albany want to make sure everything is OK," Major Michael McManus told the Buffalo News newspaper last

month. "Hopefully, there won't be any problems, but if there are, we'll be able to respond if needed," McManus added. The New York State Police employs more than 4,000 people. 

The Y2K problem arises because most computers read only the last two digits in dates. Some computers may read the year 2000 as 00 and treat it as the year 1900, causing malfunctions. Since computers are involved in everything from financial accounting records to airplane navigation systems, some experts have predicted a social crisis with the arrival of the new year. Other experts have been more temperate, suggesting the problem will prove to be a minor annoyance at worst. 



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Litigation allegedly owed for the 15 minutes they spent each day attending mandatory roll call at police headquarters. Trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment and police officers appeal.

HELD: The FLSA generally requires employers to pay employees at overtime rates for work in excess of 40 hours per work week. However, the law contains a special exemption for public employers who employ police officers and fire fighters for established work periods up to 28 days. Regulations permit a public employer who establishes a 28-day work period not to pay overtime rates to employees who work 171 hours or less in the particular work period. Here, the officers claim that the city never officially established the 28-day work period because the 1985 memorandum was never made public and is allegedly ambiguous. In addition, the officers argue that the 28-day work period was not established because the city continued to pay them overtime on a daily basis, not on the 28-day work cycle basis. Trial court properly found, however, that the city does not forfeit its right to the FLSA exemption by paying overtime more generously than federal regulations require. In addition, regulations do not require that the establishment of the 28-day work period be done by some form of public declaration. The memorandum from the city manager in this case was sufficient to establish the 28-day work schedule. Affirmed for city denying overtime. [Milner v. City of Hazelwood, Missouri, 165 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1999)]

Pension rights

Supreme Court update

Review was denied by the Supreme Court
in Huffman v. Los Angeles County, California, No. 98-1159, and Colwell v. Suffolk County, New York, No. 98-1164. The justices also rejected Stahulak v. City of Chicago, Illinois, No. 98-1383. 

The Huffman decision leaves in place a lower court determination that even though the county had a policy of requiring officers to be armed 24 hours per day, it is not liable for the actions of a drunken off-duty officer in shooting and killing another bar patron. 

In Colwell, three police officers with bad backs failed to establish that they were protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or that requiring two of the officers to pass a physical examination prior to being promoted violated the ADA.

Finally, in Stahulak, the court rejected a Chicago fire fighter's efforts to challenge an arbitration decision regarding his compliance with the city's residency requirement. The inaction leaves in place a lower court determination that under Illinois law only the union or a public employer may appeal arbitrator's rulings to the courts. The probationary fire fighter lacked legal standing to bring his claim.

Cases of interest


Overtime

In 1985, the city manager sent an interoffice Kilbourn was a veteran police officer. In
memorandum to his staff announcing the establishment of a 28-day work schedule for police officers. This action was taken in an apparent effort to reduce overtime liability under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). However, the city continued its previous practice of paying overtime compensation on a daily basis, not on a work cycle basis. Subsequently, a group of police officers sued the city to recover unpaid overtime compensation 1980, he was awarded an occupational disability pension by the city police department. Six years later he began employment as a detention officer for the county sheriff's department. Subsequently, his job title was changed to that of deputy sheriff. He continued to receive his occupational disability pension. In 1995, however, the pension board, following a hearing, concluded that Kilbourn's occupational disability had ceased to exist because


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he had resumed full-time employment in police protection. Based on the Colorado statutes in force at the time and subsequent amendments, the board ordered the disability pension discontinued. On appeal the matter was upheld by the trial court. Police officer appeals.

HELD: One of the claims raised by Kilbourn is that the revocation of his occupational disability pension affects a vested right. Kilbourn's pension is the result of a Colorado statute. Although statutes are not presumed to create private contractual rights, they may constitute a contract subject to the protection of the contract clause of the Constitution if the statutory language manifests a legislative intent to create an enforceable contractual right. Only vested contractual rights are constitutionally protected from statutory impairment. However, there are no bright line tests to determine what constitutes a vested right or when that right accrues. Certainly, under certain circumstances, an individual may have a vested right to his disability pension. In this case, Kilbourn knew that his continued eligibility for occupational disability benefits was contingent upon his inability to perform the duties of a police officer. He could not reasonably have expected such benefits to be permanent, particularly after his re-employment in a position having duties directly involved with the provisions of police protection. The relevant statute defines "occupational disability" as an "incapacity to perform assigned duties." "Assigned duties" are specific tasks designated by the employer for a specific position. The statutory scheme indicates a legislative intent to revoke occupational disability benefits for individuals who return to employment in such positions. Trial court was correct in holding that occupational disability benefits, unlike pension benefits based upon age and service requirements, are not vested, but subject to divestment in the event the occupational disability ceases to exist. Affirmed for pension board revoking disability pension. [Kilbourn v. Fire and Police Pension Association, 971 P.2d 284 (Colo. App. 1999)]

Disciplinary grounds

Allen and two other police officers were on duty in a park where there had been complaints of drug use and prostitution. They approached a vehicle with two persons in it. Allen observed that the vehicle's steering column was broken. The individuals sitting in the vehicle ignored the officers' orders to get out. The driver of the vehicle started it and drove toward Allen. As the vehicle came at him, Allen fired a shot from his service weapon into the driver's side window. The shot hit the driver and grazed the person sitting in the passenger seat. When the vehicle stopped, the police found cocaine in the care and also determined that the vehicle had been stolen. Allen, however, was charged by the Atlanta Police Department with violating a department work rule that prohibited discharging a firearm if the lives of innocent persons might be in danger. Following a hearing, the department suspended Allen for three days without pay for firing his weapon and wounding the innocent passenger. The civil service commission upheld the suspension and officer appeals.

HELD: Allen asserts that the department's rule is unenforceable because it conflicts with Georgia self-defense and arrests statutes. Georgia's self-defense statute provides that a person is justified in using deadly force if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself. The statute further mandates that any rule or regulation or policy of any municipality that is in conflict with the self-defense statute is null and void. Similarly, the state's arrest statute provides that police officers may use deadly force to apprehend a suspected felon when the officer believes the suspect poses an immediate threat of physical violence to the officer. This law also states that any regulation of a governmental entity that prohibits a peace officer from using the degree of force that is allowed by statutory and case law to apprehend a suspected felon is void. The scrutiny of the self-defense statute and arrest statute reveals that neither automatically prohibits the



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discharge of a firearm if the life of an innocent person is in danger. The police department's regulation, however, creates such a mandatory prohibition. The plain language of the police department regulations states that a firearm "shall" not be discharged if the lives of innocent persons may be in danger. In its ordinary meaning, "shall" is a word of command. Thus, the language of the rule is mandatory and does not permit any exercise of discretion on the part of the officer when faced with a self-defense or arrest situation. Such a mandatory prohibition against an officer's use of a gun in self-defense or in the execution of an arrest, when circumstances would otherwise authorize the use of the firearm, is in conflict with state law. Reversed for officer. [Allen v. City of Atlanta, 510 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. App 1998)] officer holding Fireman's Rule inapplicable. [Gaither v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 510 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. App. 1998)]

Dismissal procedures

Spoon was a six-year veteran deputy marshal. In 1996 he was notified that he was ineligible for continued employment because he had failed to comply with state mandated in-service training requirements. The town had been notified of Spoon's ineligibility for employment by a letter from the Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board (ILETB). The ILETB reported that Spoon had only completed 8 of his 16 hours of required in-service training. Upon receiving notice of the matter, Spoon sought a hearing before the town council. At the hearing, Spoon and his attorney sought to prove that Spoon had, in fact, completed the required 16 annual hours of training. The town, however, ruled that it had no authority to determine whether or not Spoon had completed the in-service training requirement. The town decided that Spoon would have to present his proof to the ILETB in order to seek redress. Spoon did not pursue an appeal to the ILETB but rather filed suit claiming that his due process rights were violated when he was not permitted to have the town review his in-service training requirements. Trial court dismissed the matter because Spoon failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the ILETB. Former deputy marshal appeals.

HELD: Generally, a person must exhaust all administrative remedies before petitioning a court for judicial review. Failure to exhaust such remedies creates a jurisdictional defect and a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim. Spoon's employment with the village was terminated after the ILETB determined that he had not fulfilled his in-service training requirements. Indiana statute permits the ILETB to require minimum in-service training. The statute also sets out a grievance procedure to be followed for challenging an action by the ILETB. Spoon counters, however, that irrespective of the grievance procedure he is entitled to the protections of state

Fireman's rule

A university police officer was in the middle of the street directing traffic when struck by a transit authority bus. The bus mirror struck the officer on the top of the head and knocked him into the back of another car, causing injury. The police officer sued the transit authority, but trial court dismissed the matter on the basis of the Fireman's Rule. Officer appeals.

HELD: The Fireman's Rule does not apply in this case. The officer was in the street, not because of any negligence of the bus driver, but because of negligence by a student who the officer was ordering to move her vehicle from a no-parking zone. Neither the presence of the bus nor any act or omission on the bus driver's part prompted the officer to be out in the street fulfilling his duty to direct traffic at the given location. Thus, the basis for application of the Fireman's Rule is missing. In Georgia, public safety employees cannot recover for injuries caused by the very negligence that initially required their presence in an official capacity and subjected them to harm. The bus driver nor his employer instigated the need for police services. Nothing the driver did or failed to do caused the officer to step out in the street. He was already there when the driver's alleged negligence took place. Reversed for injured



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law, which outline the general disciplinary procedures for removing a peace officer. This statute says that an officer may not be disciplined by demotion, dismissal, reprimand, forfeiture, or suspension unless certain formal procedures are followed. However, the plain language of the statute and its procedural protections apply only when an officer is being "disciplined" by dismissal. The procedures cited do not apply unless Spoon was being disciplined by being dismissed from his position. Spoon was not terminated for discipline reasons, but because he was ineligible for continued employment under state rules. Thus, the disciplinary appeals procedure upon which he was relying is inapplicable. The town was without authority to question the ILETB's ruling that Spoon was ineligible for employment. He should have initially filed an objection, not with the town, but with the ILETB. Affirmed for town upholding discharge of officer. [Spoon v. Town of Pittsboro, 706 N.E.2d 254 (Ind. App. 1999)] action except for cause in writing. An employee may appeal a disciplinary action taken against him to the civil service commission. The civil service commission has a duty to decide if the employer has good or lawful cause for taking the disciplinary action and, if so, whether the punishment imposed is commensurate with the offense. In reviewing the decision of the civil service commission, an appellate court should not modify the commission's order unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. "Arbitrary or capricious" means the absence of a rational basis for the actions taken. The previously established rules indicate that a court must determine two factors: (1) whether the appointing authority had good or lawful cause for disciplinary action, and (2) whether the punishment imposed is commensurate with the offense. To prove good cause it must be shown that the complained of conduct occurred and that the conduct impaired the efficiency of the department. A review of the testimony before the civil service commission reveals that the superintendent of police considered Staehle's behavior an embarrassment to the department that brought discredit to the organization. The superintendent noted that off-duty officers were not prohibited from drinking so long as they did not embarrass the organization. The superintendent's testimony is sufficient to carry the burden of proof that the officer's conduct impaired the efficiency of the department. As to the level of punishment appropriate, the superintendent testified that he used a disciplinary chart to determine punishment for officers subject to disciplinary action. The chart is designed to allow the department to consider a number of factors, including the officer's disciplinary history, in imposing the appropriate discipline. Thus, the record is sufficient to establish a rational basis for the punishment imposed on the officer. Because the court record establishes a rational basis for the civil service commission's finding that the department had good or lawful cause for taking the action and the punishment imposed was commensurate with the

Disciplinary grounds

Early one morning Staehle, who was an off-duty police officer, became involved in an altercation with two males while intervening in a situation involving a woman. During a subsequent investigation, Staehle admitted that he had drunk ten beers in the seven hours prior to the incident. At the time of the incident, he was holding an open beer bottle. As a result of the event, Staehle was charged with violating two New Orleans Police Department rules. First, he was charged with violating the rule requiring professional conduct and second, the rule regarding adherence to all laws. As to the latter, Staehle was charged with violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting the carrying of open beverage containers. He was suspended for five days for violation of the professionalism rule and two days for violation of the adherence to law rule. Staehle appealed alleging the seven-day suspension was excessive. 

HELD: Under Louisiana law, a permanent civil servant cannot be subjected to disciplinary



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offense, the seven-day suspension is affirmed. [Staehle v. New Orleans Department of Police, 723 So.2nd 1011 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998)] record is specifically exempt or otherwise privileged by law. Pivero argues that the investigative file became part of his personnel file when the October 30 letter was temporarily placed in it. Normally, police internal investigative files are specifically exempted from disclosure under New Hampshire law. The state statute permitting employee access to personnel files relates to information pertaining to the employee's work history. Since the October 30 letter merely notified Pivero of citizen complaints against him and did not result in any disciplinary action, it did not become a record of his work history. Likewise, internal investigations of police officers are not directly related to employment and do not constitute personnel records for purposes of disclosure. Until an internal investigation produces information that results in the initiation of the disciplinary process, public policy requires that internal investigation files remain confidential. These public policy concerns in protecting the confidentiality of investigative files override an officer's interest in the investigative file, even though the contents had been previously disclosed in a non-disciplinary setting. In other words, until the department initiates the disciplinary process, internal investigations do not affect an officer's work history and a reference in a personnel file to a non-substantiated internal investigation does not entitle the officer to a copy of those files. Reversed for city holding no requirement to disclose internal investigation file of police officer. [Pivero v. Largy, 722 A.2d 461 (N.H. 1998)]

Open records

The police department conducted an internal investigation of Pivero, a police officer, as a result of several citizen complaints of misconduct. After investigation, the department concluded the complaints were not sustained due to the complainants' lack of credibility. After the officer learned that the investigation was closed, he was allowed to review the investigative file in the presence of a lieutenant. He requested a copy of the investigative file, but the chief of police denied the request. Subsequently, a deputy chief requested that Pivero meet with him to discuss some concerns regarding his professional conduct in dealing with the public. The letter stated that the meeting would not result in discipline. On October 30 the deputy chief wrote a letter to Pivero summarizing their meeting and placed a copy of the letter in Pivero's personnel file. Soon thereafter, a grievance was filed on behalf of Pivero alleging that the meeting was a disciplinary action because documentation of the meeting was kept in his file. The department subsequently removed the letter from the personnel file. A few months later Pivero filed suit claiming a right to a copy of his personnel file, including the investigative file. He claimed that the temporary inclusion of the October 30 letter in his personnel file with its implicit reference to the internal investigation entitled him to a copy of the investigative file. Trial court agreed and ordered the chief to provide Pivero with a copy of the investigative file. City appeals.

HELD: Under New Hampshire law, every employer is required to provide a reasonable opportunity for any employee who so requests to inspect the employee's personnel file and provide the employee with a copy of all or part of the file. State statute defines personnel file as any or all personnel records created and maintained by an employer and pertaining to an employee unless the

Bargaining subjects

Pennsylvania statute prohibits a public employer from establishing a ticket quota for police officers. In addition, state law grants police officers the right to bargain collectively with their employer over the terms and conditions of their employment. In 1994, Haverford Township began tracking the activity of its police officers through a weekly recording of officer activities in twelve categories. The categories ranged from arrests made to foot beats walked. Included within the productivity


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measures were traffic citations and parking tickets issued. At the end of 1994, the department compiled the activity reports of all officers and determined the average number of occurrences for each of the activities. A summary report was then produced for each officer's recorded numbers and whether the officer's numbers were above or below the average of all officers. The chief of police used this report in evaluating individual performance. During the evaluation meeting officers were informed of their numbers and their relative status. Officers who were below average in productivity were told they should increase their productivity. Some officers whose reports reflected below average productivity still received good evaluations. Subsequently, two officers were removed from the special response team because of low productivity as well as some issues of getting along with other officers. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge against the township charging that the productivity measures violated the anti-ticket quota statute and also had been implemented without being bargained. The state labor board concluded that the FOP did not establish that the productivity measures involved unlawful traffic citation quotas nor that the performance standards were a mandatory subject of bargaining. Rather, the labor board ruled the standards to be a matter of managerial prerogative. FOP appeals.

HELD: Pennsylvania statute grants police officers the right to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of their employment. The courts have ruled that an issue is presumptively bargainable if it bears a rational relationship to the employee's duties. However, where a managerial policy concern substantially outweighs any impact the issue has on employees, the issue will be deemed a managerial prerogative, rendering the issue non-bargainable. Here, the township's method of tracking police officer performance bears a rational relationship to the officers' duties. The labor board concluded that the township's managerial policy substantially outweighs any impact the tracking method may have on the officers. The board is correct in this

conclusion. For good reason the township began tracking productivity to further its managerial interests in evaluating, selecting, and directing its employees. It is within the township's prerogative to establish and utilize a method to aid in selecting and directing personnel and in measuring performance. The ability to formulate policies in these areas is essential for the proper and efficient functioning of a police force. Thus, the interest of the employer substantially outweighs the impact of the policy on the officers and is not bargainable. Similarly, the town did not establish an illegal traffic citation issuance quota. The statute barring ticket quotas is violated only when a political subdivision orders, requires, or suggests that a police officer issue a certain number of traffic citations in a given time period. Here, while several of the officers were informed that the number of citations they had issued the previous year was below department average, there is no indication that the issuance of a certain number of citations was ever ordered. Further, the record reveals that the two officers who were dismissed from the special response team were dismissed because of their productivity levels in a significant number of the twelve categories and not just a deficient number of traffic citations. Rejection of unfair labor practice charge affirmed for township. [Delaware County Lodge No. 27, Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 722 A.2d 1118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)]

Compensation

The city and the police association were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement delineated specific police ranks including that of police alarm operator, personnel primarily assigned to computerized dispatch units. The police alarm operators were to be compensated at a pay grade higher than patrol officers. From 1986 forward the police department did not promote any officers to the rank of police alarm operator, apparently due to expectations that the position would be civilianized. When vacancies in the position occurred, the positions were underfilled by patrol


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officers. Underfilling was a procedure whereby personnel were assigned to carry out duties of a higher ranking officer rather than permanently filling the vacancy at the higher rank. The officers who were placed in the police alarm operator slots did not receive any additional pay. The collective bargaining contract did not address the timeline for promotions or the process for filling of vacancies. Ultimately, 23 police officers who filled police alarm operator slots sued the city for breach of contract. Trial court found in favor of the officers, holding that the city had breached its obligation by failing to pay appropriate compensation for the performance of the police alarm operator duties. City appeals.

HELD: In evaluating a breach of contract claim, a court must determine whether a valid contract exists, whether a party has violated its terms, and whether any such violation is material such that it has resulted in damages. When the contract is unambiguous, determining the meaning presents a question of law. Here, the contract specifies separate positions of "police officer" and "police alarm operator," with different scales of pay. On the other hand, the contract does not define or delineate the scope of underfilling. An examination of the facts reveals the city has circumvented the only reasonable reading of the collective bargaining agreement. The officers have been assigned to work as police alarm operators on a permanent basis, but have been denied the rank and the additional compensation. To allow the city to simply require officers to perform the duties of police alarm operator without compensating them as required under the contract would permit the employer to avoid the consequences of the collective bargaining agreement. Requiring officers to work permanently as police alarm operators without promoting them or paying them violates the bargaining pact. One party may not reclassify employees in an effort to circumvent contractual obligations. Affirmed for officers. [Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 588 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. App. 1998)]

Settlements

Anne Arundel County, Maryland

police officers
The risk of arbitration, a ticket writing slowdown, and unauthorized patrols that resulted in traffic jams have led Lodge 70 of the Fraternal Order of Police and Anne Arundel County officials to reach accord on a new labor deal. Officers overwhelmingly approved a pact granting a 3 percent pay hike and dropping the service requirement for retirement from 25 to 20 years. The county also agreed to make it easier for officers to pursue secondary employment by dropping the requirement that private employers indemnify the county in case of a lawsuit. Officers had engaged in a series of job actions culminating in command officers using the department helicopter to ensure officers were not deliberately impeding the flow of traffic. The new agreement, which covers nearly 500 officers, starts July 1. Starting pay for officers is currently $27,800.

Atlantic City, New Jersey

police officers
An arbitrator has ordered a two-year wage freeze for Atlantic City police officers. The 380 members of the department were awarded a seven-year contract with average wage boosts of 2.78 percent annually. However, no raise was awarded for 1996 and 1997. Starting pay for a police officer is $33,000. The award is believed to be the first rendered in New Jersey since the state amended its labor laws and removed last-best offer arbitration. Previously, an arbitrator had to select either the union or the employer's offer. Under the change, the arbitrator can reject both offers and fashion a compromise. Arbitrator Martin Scheinman rejected the city proposal of 1.5 percent as meager and the union demand of 3.1 percent as excessive. The officers were represented by the Atlantic City Police Benevolent Association.