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Where are the 100,000 new police officers?

Five years ago President Clinton unveiled his plan to place 100,000 new community-oriented police officers on the street. As of last month the goal has apparently been exceeded with the Office of Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) reporting an additional 101,000 officers in America thanks to the federally funded program. But wait, a recently released federal audit of the program has confirmed what several newspaper investigations had previously revealed _ the 100,000 number fails to live up to close scrutiny. 

According to an audit by the Justice Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG), more than 40,000 officers could be considered "virtual officers." This total is based on written estimates of time-savings due to the purchase of high-tech equipment and the hiring of civilian employees, thereby freeing sworn personnel to return to the street. This strategy is permissible under the COPS MORE program _ Making Officer Redeployment Effective. In applying for the grants, agencies estimate the number of officer-hours saved. That figure is then converted into the equivalent number of human officers. But, the audit found 52 instances in which the department could not show how newly acquired technology actually led to more officers on the street. 

The study also found evidence that 60 agencies used their federal funds to pay officers already on the force or to otherwise replace local funds. Eighty-three of 144 grantees reviewed either did not develop a good faith plan to retain officer positions or said that they would not retain the officers at the conclusion of the grant. The report from the OIG noted that, "If COPS positions are not retained beyond the conclusion of the grant, then

COPS will have been a short-lived phenomena, rather than helping to launch a lasting change in policing."

The audit also noted that 23 percent of the grantees examined had weaknesses in their community policing programs or were unable to adequately distinguish COPS activities from their pre-grant mode of operations. Over three-quarters of the grantees reviewed had not kept up with the program's required paperwork.

Since the program's inception in 1994, 11,300 law enforcement agencies have received $5 billion in aid. The audit identified $71 million in grants that "could be better used." The OIG cautioned that the study may not be representative of all grant recipients because the COPS office referred its "riskiest" grantees.

In one of the audits, Nassau County, New York, investigators found that the agency had received COPS grants to add 327 officers. Police staffing had actually decreased by 218 officers during the grant period. The drop was attributed to a department budget crisis and a lost lease at the department's training facility.

A study conducted by the Chicago Tribune newspaper last month suggested that COPS funding had produced only 40,680 additional sworn personnel. A COPS office administrator stated that it is a "challenge" for Clinton administration officials to erase the misperception that the 100,000 number reflects only new hires. 

Another COPS office spokesman noted that the agency had always maintained separate tallies: one for officers hired and another for officers funded. "The mission of this office is to fund 100,000 officers," the spokesman said. 


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New Mexico bargaining law lapsing amid litigation

New Mexico's public employee bargaining law will be no more July 1, unless judicial intervention saves it. A lawsuit by the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, and a host of other public sector unions is asking for court help to revive the seven-year-old statute. The unions are seeking to convince the New Mexico Supreme Court that Republican Governor Gary Johnson unconstitutionally used his line item veto power to allow the law to lapse.

Passed in 1992, the law requires public employers to negotiate contracts with workers who are legally unionized. The statute contains a sunset provision of July 1, 1999. The recent session of the legislature twice voted to extend the law until 2005 but Governor Johnson vetoed the proposals. When the legislature met in special session, the lawmakers once again included the extension in the proposed state budget. Johnson vetoed the extension.

The lawsuit is based on a claim by state employees that they were at impasse in negotiations

when the legislative session ended. The bargaining law requires impasses to be resolved by the appropriations process. Thus, the lawsuit argues, the Governor exceeded his authority by striking the matter from the appropriations bill. Attorneys for the unions contend that the legislature, not the Governor, holds the power to resolve impasses in negotiations and that the Governor should not be allowed to unilaterally resolve a contract dispute by failing to renew the law. A court ruling adverse to the Governor's position would likely reinstate the law for both state and local government workers.

Prior to the law's enactment, New Mexico operated under a system of permissive bargaining. Labor contracts existed in a half-dozen cities and a few counties. Other local governmental entities simply refused to bargain with employee unions. If the litigation fails, presumably contracts currently in force would remain valid but state and local governments would no longer be obligated to negotiate future contracts.

NYCPBA selects new leadership team

In its first contested election in 19 years, the nation's largest police union, the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (NYCPBA) has selected a new leader. Patrick Lynch, 35, a 15-year veteran received 40 percent of the votes, besting incumbent James "Doc" Savage and two other candidates. Lynch will lead the 29,000-member union beginning July 1.

Lynch and his slate of delegates, called the Voice of the Blue Line, won all six of the union's top posts in a highly acrimonious election. Officers ousted a leadership that has been racked with scandal and had negotiated a contract that provided no pay hikes in its first two years. The latter issue became particularly contentious as crime declined and officers in suburban departments enjoyed substantial wage gains. The wage pass gave rise to a rally cry of "Zeros for Heroes."

In recent years the NYCPBA has seen

several of its top lawyers and advisers, including its chief labor negotiator, convicted of federal racketeering charges for their activities with the now defunct Transit Police Benevolent Association. A recent examination of the NYCPBA financial records by a retired judge concluded that union officials had made excessive expenditures for their services but that no evidence existed to believe members had been cheated. In addition, Savage had taken an increasingly hard line with Police Commissioner Howard Safir and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani over allegations of police misconduct. 

Despite convincing the state legislature to transfer interest arbitration to the state labor board and away from the New York City labor office, the membership chose a different direction. Officers cast 6,458 votes for Lynch. Savage, who became acting president last year upon the resignation of Lou Matarazzo, garnered 4,528 votes.



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Cleveland officers rally against city hall

More than 300 off duty Cleveland police officers rallied outside city hall June 2 protesting against Mayor Michael White. The officers carried signs claiming that the Mayor's accomplishments were "poor equipment, low pay, low morale."

Officials of the Cleveland Police Patrolman's Association (CPPA), the bargaining agent for officers under the rank of sergeant, claimed that 80 percent of the city's 1,850 officers who were not working attended the rally. Protestors cheered when CPPA president Robert Beck addressed the crowd asking, "Are you tired of driving beat-up cars? Are you tired of being paid less? Do you believe you deserve more than Columbus? Cincinnati? Dayton? Toledo? How about Shaker Heights?"

The protest coincided with the filing of an appeal of an arbitration award denying officers a base pay increase of $500. Beck asserted that Cleveland has a lower base pay than any other major city in Ohio. Ralliers also claimed that half of the city's patrol vehicles were unsafe and that the police department's new computerized record system was inadequate. 

Last month 35 officers filed a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit arguing that the city violated federal law by neglecting to include longevity and shift differentials in calculating overtime pay. The suit seeks back wages for the last three years and punitive damages from the city. The CPPA expects most of its 1,650 members to join the suit.

Litigation

Supreme Court update

The appellate life of two cases of interest came to an end last month when the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to review them. The decision leaves in place a lower court determination that the Americans with Disabilities Act was not violated when a city denied employment as a police officer to an individual who was an insulin-dependent diabetic. The case focused upon whether the burden of proof in establishing whether a job applicant poses a direct threat to the safety of others should be allocated to the aggrieved plaintiff or the defendant employer. Upheld was a judgment for the city in Faria v. City of Palm Beach, Florida, No. 98-1497.

Also rejected was Wagner v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida, No. 98-1535, raising the question of whether a public employee's complaints to his employer about workplace safety are protected by the First Amendment. Lower courts refused legal relief to a police officer who claimed a department building was contaminated by asbestos. The officer subsequently lost his job. He sued, contending that his termination was in retaliation for his workplace

safety complaint. The high court's inaction leaves intact a lower court's rejection of his contention that the termination was in retaliation for his workplace safety complaint.

A recently filed matter seeking review is Baltimore City Police Department v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 3, No. 98-1802, requesting the court's guidance on the question of overtime compensation eligibility for police sergeants and lieutenants.

Cases of interest

Free speech

The New York City Police Department (NYPD) had a policy that restricted officers from making public statements regarding department matters. The policy required officers to provide notice to the police department in advance of any speaking engagement, to obtain approval before speaking, and to provide a written summary of the speech the next business day after the engagement.


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The policy further prohibited an officer from speaking at a public hearing unless a superior officer was present. The leadership of the Latino Officers Association (LOA) sought NYPD permission to appear before a city council committee to discuss department issues. The request was denied. On a second occasion the leadership requested permission to speak at a press conference regarding NYPD statistics suggesting that minority officers were disproportionately charged with disciplinary offenses. Once again permission was denied. The leadership subsequently alleged that they had turned down invitations to appear on radio and television programs because of the department policy. The LOA subsequently filed suit against the department alleging that the policy on making public statements violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Trial court agreed with the association and enjoined the city from enforcing the regulation. City appeals. On appeal, the city chose not to challenge the trial court's determination that the approval requirement and the requirement that a supervisor be present violated the First Amendment. Rather the appeal focused only on the requirement that officers provide notice to the department in advance of speaking and that officers provide a written summary of the speech the next business day.

HELD: In order to justify the awarding of a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief and that it is likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The trial court found that the department policy was sufficient to give rise to a finding of irreparable harm. However, in view of the fact that the department is not challenging part of the policy, a different conclusion must be reached. The notice and summary requirements do not appear to have the same chilling effect upon First Amendment rights as the initial policy. When confronted with a regulation that restricts the speech of government employees, a court must apply the Pickering balancing test. That test balances the interests of the employee as a citizen commenting upon matters of public concern against the interests

of the employer in promoting the efficiency of the public service. Certainly, the LOA leadership as police officers has an interest to speak out on the matter in which department activities occur. The Supreme Court has noted that government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agency for which they work. Public debate may gain much from their informed opinions. On the other hand, the city has a strong interest in being informed regarding police officers' public statements. This is particularly true given the sensitive nature of police work. On the basis of the information provided, the notice and reporting procedures strike a reasonable balance between these competing interests. With the pre-approval requirement no longer at issue, there is no opportunity for the city to suppress or delay speech that might express a dissenting view. While there might be a concern that employees would be reluctant to speak because of the post-speech reporting requirement, such concern is speculative at this moment. The NYPD procedure is a reasonable restriction on employee activities that in another context might be protected by the First Amendment and is reasonably necessary to protect the efficiency of the service provided by the police department. Reversed for city vacating preliminary injunction. [Latino Officers' Association v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167 (2nd Cir. 1999)]

Dismissal procedures

Heinen was a police lieutenant, a 16-year veteran of the department. He engaged Brewer, the chief of police, in a conversation about the purchase of new police badges. Heinen became upset and used profanity during the discussion. As a result of his confrontational conduct, Heinen was given a written reprimand and advised that any further violations of a similar nature would result in more severe discipline. The following month, Heinen received notice of a pre-disciplinary hearing. The notice accused him of violating department rules and regulations relating to loyalty, insubordination, and inappropriate conduct. At the hearing Heinen


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was shown an anonymous letter that was highly critical of the chief of police. Heinen denied any involvement with the letter. Three days later the chief confronted Heinen about the letter and once again he denied having any knowledge of it, although he later admitted knowing that his wife was responsible for the letter. The chief decided to discipline Heinen by demoting him to the rank of sergeant. Under the proposed disciplinary plan, Heinen would be eligible for reinstatement after six months. Heinen refused to accept the proposed discipline. As a result, the chief told him to surrender his badge, identification card and weapon, and to leave the job for two days. During the morning of October 4, the chief called Heinen and advised him that a meeting would take place that afternoon regarding Heinen's employment. During the meeting the chief provided Heinen with three documents. The first notified Heinen that no disciplinary action was being taken relative to the previous hearing. The second document stated that the city regarded Heinen as an at-will employee but that Heinen would have an opportunity to present his side of the case at the meeting. The chief then gave Heinen a third document stating he was being terminated. Heinen was then handed his final paycheck. Heinen inquired about the right to a pre-termination hearing and the chief advised him that he had a right to talk about his termination "right now." When Heinen again inquired about a hearing, he was told, "You're in it." Heinen subsequently filed suit against the city claiming he had been deprived of due process in connection with his termination. A few days later the termination was rescinded and he was immediately reinstated. However, shortly after returning to work he was again provided notice of proposed disciplinary action, subjected to a pre-termination hearing, and subsequently terminated. The police personnel board upheld his termination and the former officer appeals. After receiving no legal relief in state court, Heinen brought a suit in federal court claiming a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Trial court dismissed the suit and former officer appeals.

HELD: The parties agreed that Heinen's status as a merit employee created a property interest in his job that entitled him to due process as a condition precedent to any deprivation of that interest. The question then is what process Heinen was due. The essential requirements of procedural due process are notice and the opportunity to respond before being discharged. Before a tenured public employee may be terminated, a pre-termination hearing must be provided. The pre-termination hearing serves as an initial check against mistake in termination. The employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the employer's evidence and an opportunity to present his side of the case. Although the October 4 proceeding constituted what might best be characterized as a bare-bones approach to a pre-deprivation hearing, the court concludes that it satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements. Such pre-termination hearings need not be formal or adversarial. In any event, however, Heinen's reinstatement coupled with the second set of hearings constituted an adequate remedy for any initial pre-hearing deprivation that may have occurred. Affirmed for city dismissing suit. [Heinen v. Brewer, 171 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1999)]

Dismissal grounds

Maniccia was employed as a deputy sheriff in a Florida sheriff's department. She filed a sexual harassment complaint against her supervisor and a co-worker. About the same time she filed the complaint, she was transferred to work in the jail as a correctional officer. Although her pay was unaffected, she considered the transfer as a demotion. A new sheriff took over the department a year later. Maniccia subsequently complained to him about her assignment and he reassigned her back to patrol under her original sergeant's supervision. After working only three shifts, the sergeant filed administrative charges against her for failing to follow operating policies. An internal investigation was launched. As a result, Maniccia was terminated. She challenged her termination before the civil


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service board. The board determined that she had improperly obtained confidential drivers license information for a private purpose, had lied about why she needed the information, had transported an unauthorized passenger without advising the dispatcher, and had lied when she denied transporting the passenger. The board also determined that she lied during the course of the internal affairs investigation. As a result of these findings, her termination was upheld. The trial court refused to overturn the dismissal despite Maniccia's claim that she had been treated more severely than similarly situated males and that the termination was in retaliation for her original sexual harassment complaint. Finding no relief in state court, she turned to the federal judicial system. The federal district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff holding that Maniccia had failed to establish that she was treated differently than male employees. Likewise, the court rejected her retaliation complaint. She appeals.

HELD: The former deputy asserts that the trial court erred by finding that she was estopped from arguing that she did not commit the violations that led to her termination. In particular, she contends she did not violate the policy against untruthfulness. The civil service board determined that she had lied on several occasions. A Florida court reviewed this determination. Under federal law, a state court's upholding of an administrative finding has preclusive effect if the courts of the state are bound by the decision and the proceedings that produced the decision met the requirements of due process. Such is the case here. Federal court may not second-guess the previously determined factual decision of the state court. As to Maniccia's claim that she was treated differently because she was a woman, she must show that she was a member of a protected class, was subject to an adverse employment action, that her employer treated similarly situated male employees more favorably, and that she was qualified to do the job. The sheriff concedes all points except as to the question of whether she was treated less favorably than male

employees. When reviewing such cases, the court focuses upon the most important factors in the disciplinary context: the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. The court requires that the quantity and quality of the misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing "apples with oranges." Exact correlation is not likely, nor necessary, but the cases must be fair comparisons. Here, Maniccia identified several instances where male officers had lied but were not terminated. The misconduct of these male officers, however, is easily distinguishable from the conduct engaged in by Maniccia. Each of the males was involved in a single incident of alleged misconduct, while she was found to have committed multiple incidents of misconduct. Likewise, none of the cases involved the use of confidential information that is accessible only to police officers. Such confidentiality goes to the very heart of law enforcement. It is quite reasonable for an employer to respond to such a breach of trust with the most serious punishment available. Maniccia simply failed to carry the burden of proof to establish that male employees engaged in similar misconduct and were treated differently. Her retaliation claim also fails. She was assigned to the jail in November of 1992, and terminated in April of 1993. The record reflects that her transfer and her subsequent termination occurred 15 and 21 months respectively after she had filed the grievance against the supervisor. These employment actions were isolated events that had no relationship to Maniccia's protected activities. The more than 15-month period that elapsed between her initial sexual harassment grievance and the transfer to the jail negates her assertion that the former caused the latter. Summary judgment for sheriff affirmed. [Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999)]

Sex discrimination

Klein was employed as a communications technician with the county sheriff's department. He worked in that position for 16 years. His


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responsibilities included servicing and installing the communications equipment in the offices and department vehicles. The division was staffed almost exclusively by males except for one or two female secretaries. During the term of his employment, Klein claims he was harassed by his co-workers and supervisors. The alleged harassment ranged from supervisors saying, "If I ever find out you're a queer, I'll fire you," to co-workers calling him a "homo," making fun of the car he drove, and expelling gas in his work space. Allegedly a bell was installed over his work space and the ringing of the bell upset Klein. During his 16 years of work, however, he never filed a formal grievance about the alleged harassment. Nonetheless, Klein quit his employment and subsequently sued his former employer alleging both sexual harassment and constructive discharge. Employer moves for summary judgment.

HELD: To succeed on a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or a privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action. Federal law also requires that a complaint be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of one of the acts of harassment. In this case the record reflects that the only alleged harassing act that occurred within the 300-day period was a dispute over Klein using his foot to flush a toilet. He received a written reprimand for the behavior but that reprimand was not included in his permanent personnel file nor did it result in any reduction in salary. Klein contends this was an act of harassment, but the evidence simply does not support the claim. Thus, Klein has failed to meet the requirements of the law regarding filing with the EEOC. Even if his claims were timely, however, he failed to prove that the actions were so severe and pervasive as to create an abusive

working environment, or that the alleged harassment was based on his sex. Simple teasing, off-hand comments, and similar isolated incidents would normally not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Admittedly, the conduct in this case went beyond mere teasing or offensive comments. However, the fact that it was cultural intolerance, a lack of decency and civility, and even outright offensive conduct is insufficient to implicate fair employment laws. Federal law prohibits harassment that is based on sex. While male-on-male sexual harassment is actionable, the harassment must still be based on the victim's sex. When making a determination of whether the alleged harassment is based on the victim's sex, a court must examine whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. The workplace at issue here was almost entirely male, and there is no allegation that anyone other than Klein was subjected to the alleged harassing conduct. Thus, he does not meet the burden of showing that one sex was treated differently than another sex in this case. The implication of his suit is that he was harassed because he was perceived as being a homosexual. But prior case law has consistently held that federal fair employment law does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Finally, Klein argues that he was constructively discharged. To prove one is constructively discharged, a plaintiff must establish that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing him to quit his job. It must be shown that a reasonable person would have found the conditions of employment intolerable. Even if Klein could show that the circumstances were intolerable, he cannot succeed on a claim of constructive discharge. To establish a constructive discharge, the employee must show that the employer was given a reasonable opportunity to work out the problems. An employee has an obligation not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too quickly. An employee who quits


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without giving his employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem has not been constructively discharged. Motion to dismiss granted to employer. [Klein v. McGowan, 36 F.Supp.2d 885 (D. Minn. 1999)] reimburse a claimant for the difference between the purchase price of a van and the purchase price of a regular automobile. To make the determination in this case, the court must consider the purpose of worker's compensation laws. Worker's compensation laws arose as a result of a sharp increase in industrial accidents and a simultaneous decrease in the employee's common law remedies for his/her injuries. In an effort to meet changing societal needs, the legislature sought to create a balance between the interests of the employee and the interests of the employer. Under worker's compensation laws, an employee receives a modest but assured benefit and in exchange gives up the common law right to sue an employer for damages. The Alabama legislature incorporated this balancing concept into the state's worker's compensation statute. To accept the argument that the van is an appropriate expense would upset the balance of interests at the heart of the worker's compensation system. The purpose of the van is to transport the wheelchair and restore Bishop's mobility to the highest level possible. It has no other medical purpose. But worker's compensation law also provides for payment of expenses associated with transportation to and from medical offices. It cannot be argued that the legislature intended to both require payment of transportation expenses under one statute and at the same time include motor vehicles within the meaning of "other apparatus." A motor vehicle is not a device that, in and of itself, can serve to improve a disabled employee's condition. Its only use is to improve the employee's independent functioning. While human concern would cause one to wish that a disabled person would reach the maximum possible level of independent functioning, the court believes that allowing reimbursement for vehicle costs would stretch the worker's compensation law beyond its intended meaning. Thus, a motor vehicle is not within the meaning of "other apparatus" as the term is used in the Alabama worker's compenstaion statute. Reversed for city. [City of Guntersville v. Bishop, 728 So.2d 611 (Ala. 1998)]

Worker's compensation

Bishop was a city police officer who was shot in the back while he was on duty. As a result he was rendered a paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He sued for worker's compensation benefits. Trial court awarded him a weekly lifetime monetary benefit. However, before the trial court entered its judgment, Bishop purchased a van for approximately $24,500. The van was outfitted with a wheelchair lift. Bishop sought to have the city reimburse him for the full price of the van. The city refused but agreed to pay the cost of installing the wheelchair lift. Litigation followed regarding whether Alabama worker's compensation law required the city to reimburse Bishop for the purchase price of the van. Trial court entered a judgment declaring that the city was responsible for the full price of the van. Appeals court affirmed that determination. City appeals.

HELD: The Alabama worker's compensation statute requires an employer to pay those amounts reasonably necessary for medical and surgical treatment and attention as well as crutches, artificial members, and "other apparatus as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The question presented in this case is whether a motor vehicle comes within the term "other apparatus." A review of case law from around the country reveals that courts in Pennsylvania, Colorado, South Carolina, Maryland, New York, and North Carolina have determined that the purchase price of a motor vehicle is not a reimbursable expense under their state's worker's compensation laws. Courts in Arizona, Iowa, Florida, Maine, and Mississippi have held that an employer may be required to pay the price of a motor vehicle under certain circumstances. Meanwhile, North Dakota and West Virginia have ruled that an employer must



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Bargaining unit

officers for operational police duties is a management prerogative and not subject to the bargaining process. The primary question presented in this case, however, is whether state statute requires exclusion of the clerical workers from the police unit and, hence, their representation by the civil service association. Police officers are clearly in a separate and special category of police employees, implicating quite distinct and unique terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, in view of the nature of their policing function, there is a clear potential for a variety of conflicts of interest if sworn police officers were in the same unit as other department employees. While New Jersey statute authorizes the inclusion of non-sworn personnel in the same bargaining unit as police officers under a "special circumstance," the current situation does not fit the intent of the legislation. The transfer of civilians to clerical positions under the COPS MORE program is not the kind of "special circumstance" envisioned by the legislature when it authorized non-officers to be in the same unit as police officers. Likewise, the unit work rule, relied upon by the arbitrator, has no relevance here. The unit work rule requires collective bargaining for workers in the bargaining unit who are replaced by non-unit workers. The objective of this rule is to provide the union with at least an opportunity to negotiate an acceptable alternative. Its purpose is to afford reasonable protection to the unit from loss of jobs within the unit and the resultant reduction in union membership. Here, the FOP, the group that would be adversely affected by the application of the unit work rule, takes the position that the clerical workers do not belong in their unit. The FOP specifically rejects the protection that the unit work rule would provide. A review of public employment arbitration law requires the court to consider the consistency of the award both with the law and the public interest. New Jersey public interest is that police officers not be members of mixed bargaining units. Arbitration award reversed. [City of Newark v. Newark Council 21, New Jersey Civil Service Association, 726 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1999)]
The City of Newark obtained a COPS MORE grant from the federal government to increase the number of police officers on the street. Newark's grant was based on its plan of returning police officers performing clerical duties to active, operational police work by hiring and transferring non-police employees to perform the clerical functions. The implementation of the plan resulted in the transfer of a variety of clerical duties to civilian employees, thereby returning sworn officers to field duties. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed a grievance with the acting police director asserting that the department's action of transferring the duties of four overtime clerks, who were sworn police officers, to civilian personnel constituted a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance was not resolved and the matter went to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the transfer of clerical duties to civilians did not violate the bargaining contract since the displaced officers would continue to function as police officers and the civilians would not be doing police work. The arbitrator ruled, however, that under the unit work rule, the clerical positions had to remain within the FOP bargaining unit. Accordingly, the award required the new civilian clerks to be represented by the FOP. Both the city and the FOP requested a clarification from the arbitrator on the matter. The arbitrator responded by saying that the COPS MORE program constituted a "special circumstance" within the law that justified placing non-police personnel in the same bargaining unit as sworn officers. A variety of litigation erupted from this ruling. The FOP asserted that the clerical employees could not be represented by it, and the civil service employee's union sought a ruling that it was the appropriate bargaining agent for the new employees. Ultimately, the director of the state labor board ruled that none of the clerical employees belonged to the FOP. City appeals.

HELD: Prior case law holds that the transfer of clerical duties to civilians in order to free police



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Settlements

Indiana

state troopers
Members of the Indiana State Police received good news this month when Governor Frank O'Bannon announced extensive raises for the force. No trooper will see a raise of less than $3,700. Under the Governor's plan, salary for newly hired troopers will jump from the current $22,438 to $28,804, a 28 percent hike. First-year troopers will see their base go to $30,100, a 20 percent raise. Veteran troopers will gain a 9.5 percent pay boost, jumping a 10-year veteran to $42,708. The Indiana State Police Alliance, which represents over 90 percent of the 1,200-member force, had waged a concerted public campaign for higher pay in recent months. Funding for the hikes will come from a $22 million pool that the legislature set aside for salaries for state law enforcement personnel.

Albuquerque, New Mexico

police officers
A four percent step raise for officers on their anniversary hire dates is the economic cornerstone of a new pact between the city and the Albuquerque Police Officers' Association (APOA). Officers with up to eight years of service, about half of the force, will receive the boost. In addition, members with 10 or more years on the job will receive a one percent longevity hike. Newly hired officers will not see a wage increase. A sticking point in the agreement was resolved when the mayor agreed to sign off on a provision that would restrict dissemination of compelled statements made by officers during internal affairs investigations. The statements may not be provided to the Police Oversight Commission, a seven-member citizens review board, but the independent review officer may provide summaries of conclusions drawn from reviewing the statements. The APOA represents about 900 officers from the rank of captain down.

Palisades Park, New Jersey

police officers
An arbitrator has awarded a new three-year contract to the two dozen officers in Palisades Park. A 3.75 percent hike is retroactive to 1998, with a 3.87 percent boost granted for this year. The year 2000 will see officers receive another 4 percent. Borough officials had argued that its officers were well paid since a five-year veteran drew nearly $63,000 under the old pact. Some officers hit $90,000 annually with longevity and overtime. Local 45 of the Policemen's Benevolent Association countered that a reduction in the number of officers and a streamlining of the command staff required officers to work harder and eliminated promotion opportunities. The arbitrator generally sided with the officers, settling on an award that he said maintains the force's relative ranking within Bergen County. Under the new contract the borough is given the option of extending the average workweek from 32.5 hours to 36 hours but must pay an additional one percent to the base wage. The union also won an increase in clothing allowance to $625 this year with an additional $50 next year. 

Anchorage, Alaska

police officers
A five-year labor agreement with little in pay raises has been agreed to by the Municipality of Anchorage and its officers' union, the Anchorage Police Department Employees Association. Economic pressures resulted in a contract that provides a cost of living adjustment (COLA) of 1.1 percent this year and another COLA in 2001 but no other wage increases. The contract does give officers the option of joining a better supplemental retirement plan as well as choice of taking compensatory time instead of pay for overtime. Overtime will now be recorded in 15-minute increments instead of the current 30-minute segments. According to city officials, the force's top-paid officer last year earned $73,446 in base pay plus $48,234 in overtime.