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Volume 18, Number 3

Police officers at three times the normal risk of death

Police officers are nearly three times as likely to die on the job as the average American worker a study issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports. From 1992 to1997, police officers died at a rate of 14.2 per 100,000 employed. This compares to 4.7 per 100,000 employed for all workers. The fire fighter death rate also exceeded that of police officers during the same period. Fire fighters average 16.5 deaths per 100,000 employed.

The highest occupational death rates are found among timber cutters, fishermen, seamen, and aircraft pilots. Unlike police officers and fire fighters, however, these occupations are not broadly dispersed throughout society.

BLS researchers found, not surprisingly, that assaults and violent acts were the fatal factor in 51 percent of the deaths but transportation incidents

such as highway crashes or being struck by a vehicle accounted for 43 percent of all police officer fatalities. "Quick response often requires traveling at high rates of speed in police cruisers to get to the scene of the crime or emergency. Over half of the highway incidents involved collisions between two vehicles, mostly moving in opposite directions or through intersections. One-third of the highway incidents involved vehicles that ran off the road or overturned without colliding with another vehicle," the report notes. 

The report entitled "Fatalities to Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters, 1992-97" is published in the Summer 1999 issue of the BLS magazine Compensation and Working Conditions. The publication is also available on the Internet at www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cwchome.htm.

Police labor groups hold national conventions

Two of the nation's largest police labor organizations used this month to hold their national gatherings. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) conducted its 54th biennial conference in Mobile, Alabama. More than 3,000 delegates re-elected Gilbert Gallegos to a third term as Grand Lodge President. Gallegos is a retired Albuquerque deputy chief of police. 

Gallegos wasted no time in outlining his next two years. "As we enter into the next millennium, I vow to redouble my efforts and those of the Fraternal Order of Police to ensure basic due process rights for every law enforcement officer in the country."

FOP delegates passed a resolution calling for a nationwide boycott against businesses and individuals that support Mumia Abu-Jamal. Abu-Jamal was sentenced to death for the 1981 murder

of Philadelphia police officer Danny Faulkner. Abu-Jamal, who maintains his innocence, has gained support from death penalty foes as well as various show business personalities. The FOP plans to maintain a list of firms and individuals that lend assistance to the cause of freeing Abu-Jamal. "This is about right and wrong," Gallegos said. "And we will not rest until Abu-Jamal burns in Hell."

In other business, the FOP delegates chose Providence, Rhode Island, as the site for their 2003 convention, nudging out Las Vegas. 

Meanwhile, roughly 300 delegates met in Denver representing the 4,000 member organizations of the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO). Participants heard a variety of speakers discuss Supreme Court cases and federal legislation affecting police officers. 


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Volume 18, Number 3

"Blue flu" strikes New England

Twenty-eight Pawtucket, Rhode Island, police officers called in sick at the end of July in apparent protest of the city's refusal to pay their annual clothing allowance. City officials labeled the `blue flu" outbreak a walkout and have docked the participating officers a day's pay.

Officials of Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Lodge 4 denied that the sickout was orchestrated by the lodge. FOP attorneys claim that the summary docking of pay violates federal and state labor laws and will file unfair labor practice charges against the city. Rhode Island law bars police officers from engaging in work stoppages and strikes.

The job action appears to be the result of the city's refusal to pay officers a $1,000 clothing allowance which officers claim was due July 31.

Officers are also upset at the city's refusal to deduct from their checks medical insurance co-payments on a weekly, rather than monthly, basis. The labor agreement between the city and the FOP has expired and new negotiations have yet to begin. In the absence of a contract, the city administration's position is that it is not required to pay the clothing allowance or alter the method of salary deductions. 

Police officials had to holdover some officers and recall others from days off and vacation to cover the absent personnel. The sickout reportedly cost more than $2,000 in overtime per shift. Ironically, the local FOP president, Steven McElroy, was required to work consecutive shifts.

New bargaining sessions are expected to begin at the end of this month. 

LA officers fighting back on complaints

With misconduct complaints against Los Angeles police officers soaring, an unprecedented number of officers are fighting back by suing over what they claim are unfounded and malicious accusations. Last year Chief Bernard Parks instituted a tougher discipline policy that requires all complaints against officers be logged and investigated regardless of their plausibility. Complaints have jumped about 300 percent.

With the backing of their union the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL), officers have filed 23 lawsuits against citizens in the past 2

years and won 20 of them. "We are very careful with the cases we choose to pursue because this could have a chilling effect on people who make complaints against police," said Gary Fullerton of the LAPPL.

The lawsuits are filed under Section 47.5 of the California Civil Code that permits peace officers to sue persons for defamation who file false complaints alleging misconduct if the complaints are made with "spite, hatred, or ill will." The American Civil Liberties Union says the law is unconstitutional and has called for it to be changed.

Chicago pondering mandatory retirement

Chicago Mayor Richard Daley is exploring the possibility of reinstating a mandatory retirement age for the city's police officers and fire fighters. Establishment of a retirement age of 63 is directed at improving morale and enhancing a youth movement in both agencies. If established, the requirement would force out 67 police officers and 40 fire fighters.

The city repealed mandatory retirement in

1993 following a string of court cases. 

William Nolan, President of Lodge 7 of the Fraternal Order of Police, labeled the plan unfair and unwise. However, Bill Kugleman, president of Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local 2, stated that "63 and out" is the only way to rid the department of "dinosaurs" standing in the way of change.

In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act



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(ADEA) applied to local government. The statute prohibits age-based discrimination against anyone 40 or older unless the employer can prove that age is a bona fide occupational qualification. Mandatory retirement policies for public safety personnel fell victim to the law because it became virtually impossible for agencies to establish that every fire fighter or police officer who reached a particular age was automatically incapable of performing the essential functions of the job. 

In 1996, Congress amended the ADEA to allow re-establishment of a mandatory retirement age of 55 for public safety officers. To date, however, there has not been widespread reinstatement of hiring age limits or age-based mandatory retirement. 

Litigation

Cases of interest

Overtime

The city police officers worked four 12-hour shifts every eight days. The city required the officers to attend 10-minute briefings before each of these shifts. The briefings covered new policies and procedures, events that had occurred on recent shifts, job assignments, and similar matters. The officers were paid a set salary by the city. The terms of the salary were defined in the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided that overtime was due whenever an officer was required to work more than seven minutes beyond the normal workday and specified that overtime was payable in seven minute increments. In 1992, the police union sought compensation for attending the briefings arguing that the officers' salaries did not compensate for their attendance. When the city refused, the officers filed a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Trial court granted summary judgment for the city finding that while the 10-minute briefings were compensable work time, they were compensated through the officers' salaries. Court also found that the city had qualified for the 7(k) exemption of the FLSA. Officers appeal.

HELD: The FLSA was enacted to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours. The officers argue that the pre-shift briefing is overtime under the FLSA for which they were not properly compensated. The

overtime limit is normally 40 hours per week, but a limited exemption is offered for law enforcement personnel and fire fighters. This so-called 7(k) exemption increases the overtime limit slightly and gives the employer greater flexibility to select the work period over which the overtime limit will be calculated. The officers argue that the city never actually established the 7(k) exemption. The evidence reveals, however, that the collective bargaining agreement provides that for purposes of complying with the FLSA, the patrol division work period is eight days and the detective division seven days. This language is sufficient to establish the exemption. Where an employer affirmatively adopts a work period and follows the period in practice, the employer has effectively established a 7(k) exemption. While the labor contract provides that overtime is payable for work in excess of the "normal workday," it does not define the term "normal workday." Instead, the contract refers to shifts as lasting for 12 hours. The language in the contract is ambiguous as to whether the briefings are considered part of the "normal workday." Thus, the matter must be returned to the trial court on the issue of whether the labor agreement compensates the officers for the briefings. Reversed for officers. [Adair v. City of Kirkland, Washington, 175 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1999)]


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Dismissal grounds

irrational reason. Notwithstanding this broad grant to employers of the power to terminate at-will employees, Missouri law does afford a discharged at-will employee the ability to seek judicial redress under limited circumstances. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. This clause has two components: the procedural due process and the substantive due process components. The question presented in this case is whether Singleton was deprived of a liberty protected by the substantive due process clause. The substantive component of the due process clause especially protects fundamental rights and liberties, which are deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. For this reason judicial protection of substantive due process has for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. There is no suggestion that a right to continued employment with a particular governmental employer is anywhere equivalent to the individual's freedom of choice with respect to basic matters of life. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has suggested that a public employee's interest in continued employment is not so fundamental as to be protected by the substantive due process clause. Several other federal circuits have refused to allow discharged public employees to proceed with a substantive due process claim against their former employers, holding that employment rights are not fundamental rights created by the Constitution. This Court agrees with the holding that occupational liberty is not protected by substantive due process. Singleton was not deprived of any constitutionally protected right. Dismissal of claim affirmed. [Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 1999)]
Singleton and his wife moved to a town in Missouri where he took a job as a police officer. Singleton's daughter also moved to the community. In 1994, a private investigator, using a radio scanner, happened to pick up a telephone conversation between Singleton's wife and daughter. The conversation suggested that the wife intended to entrap the chief of police by hiring someone to bribe him. The investigator recorded the conversation, subsequently contacted the chief and mayor, and played the recording for them. The recording was also played for various members of the city council. A few days later a special meeting of the city council was called to discuss the matter. The city attorney advised the council members that since Singleton was an at-will employee, he could be discharged without cause and without a hearing. All members of the council subsequently voted to terminate Singleton's employment because they apparently feared he was part of the supposed plot against the chief of police. They possessed no direct evidence of any connection to the officer, however. Singleton filed suit against the city alleging that his termination violated his constitutional rights to freedom of association, privacy, and due process. Trial court granted summary judgment for the city and the officer appealed. A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the decision. Singleton petitioned for a re-hearing and the panel reconsidered the matter. This time it affirmed most of the trial court's judgment, but reversed on the sole ground that it believed that the city had deprived Singleton of his occupational liberty, which was protected by substantive due process. Employer seeks review by entire appeals court.

HELD: In this case neither state law, municipal law, collective bargaining agreement, nor an employment contract afforded Singleton any property interest in his job. Thus, as an at-will employee in Missouri, he could be discharged for cause or without cause. Indeed, he could even be discharged for no reason or for an arbitrary or

Handicap discrimination

Gonzales was hired as a city police officer in 1982. Approximately two years later he was diagnosed with insulin dependent diabetes. Despite this diagnosis, Gonzales remained with the force


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for the next ten years, successfully performing all the duties of his job. In 1996, however, he failed the routine firearms qualification test and the driving qualification test. The police chief initiated a disability investigation, which required Gonzales to undergo a physical examination. Based on the doctor's examination, it was determined that Gonzales suffered from severe diabetic neuropathy. This condition caused the officer to experience poor dexterity in his hands and numbness in his feet, thereby limiting his ability to handle firearms and to drive vehicles safely. After being placed on sick leave for some months, Gonzales was required to take an early medical retirement. He subsequently filed suit alleging that his forced retirement violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Trial court found for the city, holding that Gonzales was either not disabled or not qualified to perform the essential functions of a police officer. Former officer appeals.

HELD: The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee who is a qualified individual with a disability because of that individual's disability. The qualified individual with a disability is a disabled person who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job related requirements for the position. Under current law a driver with insulin dependent diabetes poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. Driving is an essential function of the job of police officer. Gonzales is not qualified for the position because of his inability to safely drive. Similarly, the city is under no obligation to assign Gonzales to the position of evidence technician. The evidence technician job in the police department is a certified position, meaning the individual must be a commissioned officer. To be a commissioned officer one must be able to use firearms and drive an automobile. Since Gonzales is not qualified to be a commissioned officer, he is likewise not qualified for the position of evidence technician. Neither retesting Gonzales nor reassigning him to the position of evidence technician is a viable alternative. Gonzales may be disabled for the

purposes of the ADA, but he is not qualified for the job of police officer. Affirmed for city. [Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, Texas, 176 F.3d 834 (5th Cir. 1999)]

Handicap discrimination

Kapche was an insulin dependent diabetic who applied for a position with the police department. Despite successful completion of the written test and the background, the department removed his name from the eligibility list due to his diabetes. As provided by Texas law, he appealed the decision and a panel of physicians reviewed his physical capabilities. The physicians concluded that because of his diabetes he did not meet the requirements of the job. Kapche brought suit claiming the police department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that Kapche was not qualified to be a police officer due to his diabetic condition. Kapche appeals.

HELD: The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of that individual's disability. A qualified individual with a disability is one who can perform the essential functions of the position sought. Essential functions are those duties that are fundamental to the job at issue. In holding Kapche unqualified for the position of police officer, the trial court assumed that he would be required to drive a vehicle as an essential function of the job. Prior case law holds that an individual afflicted with diabetes who operates a motor vehicle poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. Federal regulations provide, however, the determination that a person poses a direct threat shall be based on an individual assessment of the person's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. The prior case ruling that insulin dependent diabetics automatically pose a direct threat within the meaning of the law was wrongly decided. Such determinations should be made on an individualized



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basis. This case presents a genuine dispute of fact regarding the safety risk posed by insulin dependent drivers. The case is remanded for determination of whether today there exists new and improved technology that could permit insulin dependent diabetic drivers to operate a vehicle safely. If the trial court determines that insulin dependent diabetic drivers continue to pose a direct threat as a matter of law, summary judgment in favor of the city should be reinstated. Reversed for further proceedings. [Kapche v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 176 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 1999)] appeals.

HELD: Federal law prohibits employers from requiring a medical examination unless such examination is shown to be job related and consistent with a business necessity. In the case of police officers, fitness for duty and tuberculosis examinations are job related and consistent with business necessity. In any case where a police department reasonably perceives an officer to be even mildly paranoid, hostile, or oppositional, a fitness for duty examination is job related. Police departments place armed officers in positions where they can do tremendous harm if they act irrationally. Contrary to Watson's contention, the ADA does not require a police department to forego a fitness for duty examination and wait until a perceived threat becomes real or questionable behavior results in injuries. The evidence showed the city had good cause for concern as to whether Watson was fit to be a police officer. As to the tuberculosis examination, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations provide that periodic medical examinations for public safety positions may be conducted if they are narrowly tailored to specific job related concerns. The evidence presented showed that the tuberculosis examination addressed unrefuted health concerns regarding officer safety. The evidence also showed that disclosing one's HIV/AIDS status was necessary to properly diagnose and treat an individual with tuberculosis. Accordingly, no jury could find that the city acted improperly in requiring the test and the disclosure of HIV/AIDS status. Affirmed for city. [Watson v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, 177 F.3d 932 (11th Cir. 1999)]

Handicap discrimination

Watson was a veteran police officer. In 1995, a superior officer became increasingly concerned about what he perceived to be Watson's display of unusually defensive and arrogant behavior toward coworkers and supervisors. An investigation revealed that Watson had been the recipient of nearly a dozen complaints, some of which resulted in disciplinary action. The following month a department-wide tuberculosis screening was being conducted. As a part of the examination, the individual was required to disclose his or her HIV status because diagnoses and treatment of tuberculosis differ for those individuals with HIV/AIDS. Watson went to the hospital for the screening but refused to take the examination because it required him to disclose his HIV/AIDS status. The supervising nurse found his behavior unreasonable and reported it to superiors. Based on the pattern of conduct and the confrontation with the nurse, the city ordered Watson to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation. The doctor concluded that Watson was experiencing symptoms typically associated with stress and recommended he return to work with appropriate stress management counseling. Watson returned to work eight days later and continued as a police officer. Nonetheless, he filed suit against the city claiming that relieving him from duty pending a fitness examination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Trial court granted summary judgment for city and police officer

Dismissal procedures

In 1996, the city council, at their regular meeting, adopted a personnel manual. The manual was signed by the mayor and the four members of the council. The city's seal was affixed to the document. The manual contained procedures allowing the council, after notification with reasons, to suspend or dismiss employees for cause. It also


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allowed an employee to appeal to the council for a hearing. The caption on the manual purported to make the personnel policies part of the town charter. Subsequently, two police officers were disciplined for misconduct. One, Rugg, was terminated for professional misconduct and possible criminal violations, while another was suspended for five days for ethics violations. Pursuant to the city personnel manual, both men filed for a review hearing. At the hearing, no evidence was taken nor was a record made. The town council upheld the actions against both officers. The two officers sought judicial review of the rulings under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). Such review is permitted if the matter is a "contested case." Under the MAPA, a contested case is one where a statute, municipal charter, ordinance, or a constitutional provision for a hearing exists. The trial court ruled that the officers were due hearings pursuant to MAPA. City appeals.

HELD: The city asserts the trial court erred in determining that the personnel manual afforded the right to continued employment to the two police officers. Rather, it argues that the manual could not be considered law since it was not part of the city charter and not adopted by ordinance. The point raised by the town is indeed novel. The town essentially argues that since the personnel manual was not formally adopted as an ordinance nor was there a change to the city charter, the manual does not have the force of law to bring it within the scope of the MAPA requirement for a contested case hearing. Nothing in the record, however, justifies allowing the town to escape taking consequences for what it wrote and presented to all city employees. The town adopted the personnel manual; now years later it attempts to cast doubt on its legitimacy, which it originally stated was part of the city charter. The court will not allow a city to rescind a right to a contested hearing that it created and promised its employees. Affirmed for officers ordering full hearing. [Rugg v. City of Carrollton, 990 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)]

Arbitration procedures

In 1993, the borough hired a special law enforcement officer to perform patrol and desk work. The police union claimed that the replacement of a regular officer as a special officer violated the collective bargaining agreement and state statute. The borough claimed that it was entitled to hire the special officer because of an emergency circumstance. A grievance clause in the labor agreement specified that the submission of disputes to arbitration be conducted in accordance with the rules laid down by the state Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC). The union filed a grievance and the matter went to arbitration. The arbitrator entered an award for the union. Under New Jersey statute either party may commence a summary action for confirmation or vacation of the award within three months of its delivery. Rather than immediately file for confirmation of the award, the union waited for four months and then instituted an action seeking to have the award confirmed. The borough argued that the confirmation was time barred because of the three-month limit. Lower courts held that the union was bound by the statutory time limits. Union appeals.

HELD: With increasing frequency parties to commercial disagreements, labor disputes, and other controversies resort to arbitration and mediation for dispute resolution. The speed, efficiency, and economy of arbitration appeal to many as an alternative to judicial proceedings. In 1794, the New Jersey legislature first adopted a statute recognizing arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. Over time, parties turned increasingly to common law arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. Under common law, arbitration parties could agree on their own initiative to submit a matter to an arbitrator of their choice. In 1923, the legislature created a modern statutory form of arbitration that established streamline procedures as an alternative to court action. The question presented in this case is whether common law



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arbitration still exists independent of the statutory form of arbitration. That answer must be in the affirmative. No New Jersey statute abolishes common law arbitration nor do the statutes prevent parties from using PERC arbitrators in common law proceedings. Sound policy considerations also support the continuing availability of common law confirmation. Depriving parties of common law confirmation of awards would consign them to legal limbo. If parties to an arbitration wish to confine themselves to statutory time limits, they may so specify in their agreement. Otherwise, the prevailing party retains the common law right to seek confirmation in a court proceeding within the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts. The losing party may not initiate an action to vacate an award after the three-month expiration, however. The losing party may file answers asserting affirmative defenses. Reversed and remanded for union. [Policeman's Benevolent Association, Local 292 v. Borough of North Haledon, 730 A.2d 320 (N.J. 1999)] HELD: Pennsylvania law authorizes collective bargaining for police officers concerning their terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions, and other benefits. The FOP argues that eligibility for promotion falls within the undefined phrase "terms and conditions of employment." The city argues that the matter is a managerial prerogative not subject to bargaining. Prior case law holds that for an issue to be deemed a managerial prerogative, a managerial policy concern must substantially outweigh any impact an issue will have on the employees. The FOP argues there is a rational relationship between the officers' duties and the use of seniority in the promotion process, and that it substantially outweighs the department's interest in increasing the pool of applicants for promotion. The court disagrees with this observation. A change in the minimum requirements for promotion relates directly to the city's managerial prerogatives in selection and direction of personnel. The determination that in view of their increasing educational backgrounds, police officers with only four years experience would be able to meet the increased responsibilities of the detective and juvenile officer positions is clearly one to be made by the city as employer. The issue is not a mandatory subject of bargaining in Pennsylvania. Affirmed for city. [Rose of Sharon Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 729 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)]

Bargaining subject

The 1984-1985 labor agreement between the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and the city provided that an applicant for promotion have at least five years experience with a law enforcement agency. Subsequent contracts did not retain the minimum service requirement for promotion. In 1990, the city unilaterally implemented requirements that applicants for promotion have five years of service. In 1997, however, the city altered the requirement by one year for posted vacancies in the positions of detective and juvenile officer. The FOP filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the change in minimum service requirement was a mandatory subject of bargaining. An arbitrator subsequently ruled for the FOP, but the full labor board ruled that an employer need not bargain over establishment of job qualifications because such action relates more to the employer's managerial interests than to the employee's interest in wages, hours, and working conditions. FOP appeals.

Worker's compensation

McDowell was employed as a transit police officer. He injured his right knee while jogging through a park. He filed for worker's compensation alleging that the injury occurred because he was running in order to meet his employer's physical fitness standards. At a hearing on the claim the employer's representative acknowledged that the department had physical fitness standards and that an officer was subject to discipline if he did not meet those standards. The representative further testified


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that the transit authority provided gym memberships to assist officers in staying in shape. The worker's compensation judge concluded that McDowell was in the course of his employment at the time of the injury and awarded job-related benefits. Transit authority appeals.

HELD: Under Pennsylvania law, injuries sustained by an employee while actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer are compensable, whether the injuries occurred upon the employer's premises or elsewhere. Determining when an employee is acting in the course of employment is a question of law that must be made upon the findings of fact by the administrative judge. McDowell testified that he was running in order to meet certain physical fitness standards of his employer. The employer argues, however, that it was not necessary for McDowell to run in the park as it provided all police officers with a health club membership where they could exercise. The question before the court, however, is whether McDowell was in the furtherance of his employer's business at the time of this injury, not whether he was doing so in the proper place. The transit authority does not require its officers to use the health club when exercising to meet its standards. The fact that the employer offers such exercise facilities only provides additional evidence that McDowell's fitness was in the interest of the employer. As such, he was furthering his employer's interest at the time of the injury and is due worker's compensation. Affirmed for injured police officer. [Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority v. Worker's Compensation Appeal Board (McDowell), 729 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)]

employment. Davis filed a petition to have his name placed on the ballot for the council election. The city terminated Davis for violating its charter and ordinance. He filed suit alleging that the charter and ordinance violated his First Amendment rights. Trial court granted summary judgment for city and former city employee appeals.

HELD: The right to become a candidate for public office is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution. That right is not absolute, however. The government has a legitimate interest in regulating the political activities of its employees. In determining the amount of regulation permissible, the government must arrive at a balance between the interests of the employee and the interests of the government in promoting the efficiency of its employees. In striking this balance the government may place limits on candidacy by public employees if the limits substantially serve government interests that are important enough to outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights. The city has an interest in maintaining the loyalty, efficiency, and non-partisanship of its employees. To further that interest the city may prevent its employees from running for positions that would give an employee power over his supervisors. Davis was terminated for becoming a candidate for the city council of the very city that employed him. This is precisely the type of political activity that prior case law holds that a municipal employer can justifiably prohibit. The city's termination of Davis did not violate the Constitution. Affirmed for city. [Davis v. City of Dallas, 992 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App. _ Dallas 1999)]

Disciplinary procedures

Dismissal grounds

Wisconsin statute provides that a police officer who is suspended for a period exceeding five days may appeal the suspension to the board of fire and police commissioners. In 1997, the Milwaukee chief of police suspended three officers for allegedly violating department rules. One was suspended for 17 days arising from a theft investigation, another for 20 days arising from an incident involving loss
Davis was employed as a security officer by the Dallas Police Department. He announced his candidacy for city council. The city notified Davis that his action in becoming a candidate for city council violated provisions of the city charter and city ordinance. The city warned Davis that if he proceeded with his candidacy, he would forfeit his


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of his service revolver, and a third for 7 days arising from his failure to appear in court. In each instance, however, the chief segregated the suspensions into components of five days or less. For example, the officer who was suspended for 17 days actually received suspension orders of 5, 5, 5, and 2 days. By segmenting the suspensions, the chief shut off the statutory right to appellate review of his actions. The officers filed suit seeking an order requiring the chief to aggregate the charges for the purpose of determining appeal rights. Trial court granted summary judgment for the chief and officers appeal.

HELD: When asked to apply a statute whose meaning is in dispute, court efforts are directed at determining the legislative intent. The court begins by looking at the plain meaning of the language of the statute, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, the court concludes its inquiry and applies the language to the facts of the case. If the language used in the statute is capable of more than one meaning, the court will determine the legislative intent from the words of the statute in relation to its context, subject matter, scope, history, and the objective which the legislature intended to accomplish. Here, however, the statute in question is clear and unambiguous. The statute speaks of the chief "suspending" for a period exceeding five days. It does not say suspending "in a single order" for a period exceeding five days. Clearly, the statute focuses on the duration of the suspension not the administrative manner in which the chief joins or segments the charges. No other reading of the statute would be reasonable. A Wisconsin police chief has authority and discretion to delineate disciplinary charges and issue suspension orders specifying violations of and penalties for rule violations. When the violations arise from a single transaction or set of events, the total length of the suspension is the standard for determining appeal rights. Reversed for police officers. [Parker v. Jones, 595 N.W.2d 92 (Wis. App. 1999)]

Settlements

Banning, California

police officers
A new two-year labor deal for Banning police officers awards a 2 percent raise to officers and corporals retroactive to July 1. Sergeants will receive a 2.83 percent boost. The officers and corporals will gain another 1 percent come January 1 and an additional 2 percent July 1, 2000. Over the same time frame sergeants will see wage jumps of 2.83 percent at each change point. The raise differentials are to bring relative salaries more in line with comparable police departments. Current officer pay ranges between $29,808 and $38,052. Corporals earn between $32,052 and $40,908 while the sergeant spread is $36,576 to $46,692. The Banning Police Officers Association represents the 29 officers covered by the memorandum of understanding.

Hamtramck, Michigan

police officers
The good news is that an arbitrator has awarded 45 Hamtramck patrol officers $9,000 each in back pay. The bad news? Mayor Gary J. Zych is saying that layoffs will be necessary to fund the award. The award to members of Lodge 109 of the Fraternal Order of Police consists of $3,000 per officer for each of the last three years. The officers had been the lowest paid in the metro Detroit area. Now a top of scale officer will earn $43,230 annually. The award and collateral cost of benefits could hit the city for over $1.4 million, money the mayor says does not exist. Zych has proposed laying off over a dozen sanitation workers as well as one detective sergeant and one police lieutenant as the first step to covering the fiscal shortfall. Other proposals include furloughing all four of the city's community policing officers and outsourcing to the local sheriff's department enforcement of truck weight and licensing regulations.