Acting U.S. Attorney for New Jersey Robert J. Cleary called the incident "an audacious, long-running fraud." According to Cleary, current NJPBA officials have cooperated in the investigation. 

The NJPBA is the largest law enforcement group in the state. About 35,000 public safety personnel are members.

The lawsuit, filed in Jackson, Tennessee, claims that the dispatchers lost their jobs because of the psychological tests even though their job performance was satisfactory. The tests did not reveal a safety hazard or inability to perform the job, merely that the individuals were perceived to have some mental disorder.

According to the USDOJ, the Attorney General of Tennessee has indicated a willingness to work to resolve the matter and identify other

The ADA prohibits persons with disabilities from being excluded from a job based solely on generalized fears about safety unless there is an actual reason to believe the person cannot perform the job safely. "Employers who rely on these [mental disability] stereotypes instead of considering an individual's ability to perform a job are engaging in the very type of discrimination the ADA was intended to prevent," said Acting Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann Lee.

The ADA prohibits persons with disabilities from being excluded from a job based solely on generalized fears about safety unless there is an actual reason to believe that they cannot perform the job safely. However, the ADA does permit an individual to be excluded from a job if they pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. A direct threat is a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged the statute on behalf of Myron Gritchen who had accused a Long Beach police officer of misconduct during a 1998 traffic stop. The department determined that no misconduct had occurred. The officer, Gordon Collier, sent Gritchen a letter threatening a defamation suit. Gritchen and the ACLU brought a federal civil rights suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1982 statute.

Judge Taylor found that Section 47.5 of the California Civil Code is unique as no other state

Additionally, the judge noted, "Significant protections from false complaints are already afforded to police officers by their internal oversight agencies, in addition to the possibility of perjury charges for false complainants." Treating complaints against police officers differently from complaints against other governmental officials is impermissible discrimination against a type of speech.

Like his predecessors, the city's current police chief is protected under civil service rules. The current chief, James G. Jackson, has been in conflict with the city's mayor for some years. The civil service commission previously upheld two administrative charges against Jackson but left him in office. Jackson has served as chief for over nine years. He began his career with the department in 1958.

The limitation on police chief terms is fairly

The Columbus Police Division (CPD) is operating under threat of a U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit that alleges that the agency has a pattern of abusing residents' civil rights. The police chief, city administration, and Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) have been unable to agree on changes in the department's operating procedures to head off further federal litigation. The chief and the FOP have denied that officers violate residents' rights.

A proposed consent decree would require a review of CPD training, extensive documentation of use of force incidents and traffic stops, as well as changes in internal investigation procedures. An "Independent Monitor" would be appointed to oversee compliance with the decree.

The action is one of the first pursued under a 1994 statute that authorizes the attorney general to take action against law enforcement agencies that engage in a pattern of unconstitutional behavior.

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest

Cases seeking review that were recently filed include Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Lanning, No. 99-557, concerning the legally proper method to use in establishing cut-off scores for police pre-employment physical ability tests. In Sheppard v. Cook, No. 99-589, a female state trooper alleges that she was not selected as a Texas Ranger because the agency head disagreed with her feminist views and coerced the selection panel to choose another female applicant. Lower courts found that while the Senior Ranger Captain acted unreasonably in rigging the process, Sheppard never engaged in any activity protected by the First Amendment. Mills v. Meadows, No. 99-703, again affords the high court the opportunity to consider the relationship between political affiliation and employment in a sheriff's department. Mills, a 23-year veteran Maryland sheriff's captain, was not reappointed by the new sheriff who ousted the incumbent. Mills had campaigned for the incumbent sheriff. Lower courts ruled that Mills' First Amendment rights were not violated by the new

HELD: Under Arkansas law, an at-will employee may be discharged at any time without cause. However, the employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge if fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the state. The court need not, however, decide whether the public policy exception constitutes a constitutionally protected property right, because even if it does,

HELD: The FLSA does not specifically address when overtime compensation must be paid. In 1972, the Department of Labor issued an

HELD: The ability of the governmental employer to sanction an employee for exercising his First Amendment rights is limited. In determining whether a public employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment, a court must consider: (1) whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern, and (2) whether the employee's interest in speaking is outweighed by the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs. Prior case law holds that

HELD: Spades' alleged disability is depression. The evidence supports the allegation that he suffered from depression in the past but that causes no conclusion that he is presently "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. Recently, the United States Supreme Court ruled that determination of a disability must be made with reference to any mitigating measures that might be employed. A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity. The record shows that the former officer took medication and received counseling for his alleged disability of depression. He admitted that the medication allows him to function without limitation. Thus, his depression is corrected and cannot substantially limit a major life activity, a requirement for a finding that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.

HELD: The determination of an appropriate bargaining unit is a question of fact. In designating appropriate bargaining units, the MERC's primary objective is to constitute the largest unit that, under the circumstances of the case, would be most compatible with the effectuation of the purposes of the Michigan labor law and would include in a single unit all common interests. The touchstone of an appropriate bargaining unit is a common interest of all of its members in the terms and conditions of their employment that warrants inclusion in a single bargaining unit and the choosing of a bargaining agent. A community of interest includes, among other considerations, similarities in duties, skills, working conditions, job classifications, employee benefits, and the amount of interchange or transfer of employees. The FOP argues that MERC erred in finding that the sergeants and lieutenants were supervisors. Michigan law does not contain a definition of the word "supervisor." Thus, lacking prior case law, reference is made to federal labor law. Under federal law, the term "supervisor" means any individual having authority to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or other discipline of employees or responsibility to direct them, or adjust their grievances or effectively to recommend such action. Such activity requires the use of independent judgment. In the present case, the sergeants are supervisors within the definition. They regularly assign and correct the work of deputies. While they do not have authority to recommend the discharge or suspension of an employee, they do have the authority to issue lower levels of discipline such as verbal warnings. Sergeants also have the authority to transfer employees from shift to shift and approve or deny leave requests. Similarly, lieutenants have formal supervisory authority over subordinate

HELD: Oklahoma law requires an employer to pay compensation only for "accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment." The term "arise out of employment" contemplates a causal connection between the injury and the risk incident to employment. The term "in the course of employment" relates to the time, place, or circumstances under which the injury is sustained. The two requirements are distinct and not synonymous. Moore's injury arose out of his

HELD: Pennsylvania labor law provides that it's an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed by state law. Statute further lists the rights of employees, such as to form unions and bargain collectively. The stated purposes of the statute are to encourage the practices of collective bargaining and to protect the exercise of freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment. The statute, however, was never intended to protect every work procedure negotiated that might impact the exercise of those rights. Collective bargaining agreements create far more employee rights than the state law. However, these rights are contractual in nature and are protected by grievance arbitration. Similarly, state law does not grant to employees the right to conduct union business on employer's time. The labor board was correct in determining that on-duty grievance processing is not a protected activity under state statute. Similarly the question of on-duty grievance processing is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. A matter is deemed to be subject to mandatory bargaining if it bears a rational relationship with employee's duties. However, where a managerial policy concern substantially outweighs any impact the issue will have on employees, the issue will be deemed a managerial prerogative rendering the issue non-bargainable. The parties' labor contract provides management

HELD: Washington's law does not recognize constructive discharge but does recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Clearly

HELD: Wisconsin statute provides that no subordinate may be reduced in rank based on charges filed by the chief unless the police board determines whether there is just cause to sustain the charges. The statute then further articulates what constitutes just cause. The logic in this case is inescapable. Antisdel is a "subordinate" within the meaning of the law and he was reduced in rank based on "charges" made, but not filed, by the chief. The action would appear to fit squarely within Wisconsin law. The city argues, however, that Antisdel accepted the promotion with the understanding that he would be on probation for one year and that that