DOJ sued the City of Columbus on October 21, alleging that its police division has exhibited a pattern of using excessive force, conducting illegal searches, and filing false charges. The suit is the third filed under a 1994 federal law that permits DOJ to sue entire agencies, not just individual officers, for patterns of unconstitutional conduct. Previously Steubenville, Ohio, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, entered into consent decrees after they were sued. Columbus, however, has disputed the federal claims of improper police behavior. If Columbus loses the suit a court-appointed monitor would oversee the police division.

To aid the city and the FOP in fighting the suit, Columbus officers have agreed to a $25 per month assessment while deputy sheriffs and officers in suburban communities will pay $10 per month, all for the next four years. Additionally, the Executive Committee of the national FOP has authorized its attorneys to become involved in litigation against the DOJ. 

FOP officials have argued that the federal lawsuit represents a threat of federal takeovers of municipal police departments. "They didn't do a very good job at Ruby Ridge or Waco," Bill Capretta, Lodge No. 9 president, said, referring to deadly federal standoffs in Idaho and Texas in 1992 and 1993. 

Michigan lawmakers agreed earlier this month to Senate Bill No. 198 that prohibits a public employer from requiring as a condition of employment or promotion residency within a specific geographic area or within a specified distance or travel time. The bill also bars such a

The proposal does permit local governments to mandate that employees reside near the jurisdictional boundary but this requirement cannot be established closer than 20 miles. Additionally, the bill exempts married couples who work in different cities from having to comply with both cities' residency requirements.

Police and fire fighter unions support the measure, arguing that they have a legal right to live where they wish. Other supporters of residency abolition claim that lack of a domicile requirement will expand the pool of applicants for municipal jobs, thereby improving the overall quality of public service personnel.

The "Crown Vic," the standard FHP vehicle and the choice of 90 percent of Florida sheriffs' departments, was the subject of a yearlong FHP investigation after two vehicles erupted into flames following being struck from behind. One trooper died while another trooper, driving a Chevrolet Caprice, was severely burned. A Florida deputy sheriff died earlier this year in a similar accident when his Crown Victoria was struck from behind.

"We don't consider the car to be defective," Major Ken Howes of the FHP told the St. Petersburg Times newspaper. "We're just asking them to consider moving the gas tank ahead of the rear axle or up to the middle of the axle and strengthen the seat." FHP owns about 1,600 of the automobiles.

A Ford spokesman said half of the 120,000 Crown Victorias sold last year were purchased by

In a study conducted by the FHP and forwarded to Ford, the agency found 29 rear-end accidents over an 11-year period in which fires injured or killed motorists in vehicles commonly driven by police departments. Compared to the Ford Taurus and the Chevrolet Lumina, the Crown Victoria and the Caprice are four times likelier to result in a fatal fire when struck from behind. The Taurus and Lumina, both front-wheel drive, have their fuel tanks positioned forward of the rear axle. The Caprice is no longer sold with a police package. According to the National Highway Traffic Administration an estimated 310 people die each year in car fires, about half from rear-end collisions.

Major Howes stated, "Our troopers make about 1.8 million stops a year and they're sitting on the side of the road where motorists are whizzing along at 70 mile per hour. . . . It's not a defect. It's just when you're parked on the side of the road, you're vulnerable." Howes noted that in addition to the fatality several other FHP troopers had been involved in similar life-threatening incidents. 

The dispute began November 9, when

One officer complained to a lieutenant who ordered Mammano to button his vest to cover the shirt. Later in the day, however, a superior officer

According to the lawsuit, Mammano wants the shirt returned, an end to the investigation, and

In one of the first reported efforts invoking the pardon process, two Reno, Nevada, officers have obtained mixed results. The Nevada Pardons Board, chaired by Governor Kenny Guinn, earlier this month voted in favor of officer Lynn Drake but

The two officers have been on restricted duty for two years. The Reno Civil Service Commission has twice denied city efforts to furlough the officers. The city has sued the commission in an attempt to force their layoffs. 

Drake, an 18-year veteran, pleaded guilty four years ago to disturbing the peace after his ex-wife claimed that his discipline of their daughter was excessive. Markiewicz, an 11-year veteran, was convicted of domestic battery in 1997 after wresting a knife from his ex-wife, thinking she was suicidal. The two had been arguing and he had been drinking. 

Rage Against the Machine, a popular alternative rock group, has reportedly generated thousands of dollars for the defense fund of Mumia

Delegates to the last National Conference of the FOP voted to boycott supporters of Abu-Jamal. Additionally, the Law Enforcement Steering Committee, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and many local police groups have joined the protest.

The protest has not been unanimous, however. Thirty off-duty San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) officers reportedly provided security at the band's concert at the Alamodome December 14, despite a request from their union not to work the event. 

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest

HELD: The former deputies and the jailer contend that the sheriff violated two of their First Amendment rights, political association and free speech. The First Amendment protects public employees from discrimination based upon their political beliefs and political affiliation or non-affiliation, unless their work requires political allegiance. The record reflects no dispute as to whether political affiliation or beliefs were a substantial factor in the firing of Haugland. Haugland was terminated because he was a

HELD: Milwaukee requires officers on sick or injury leave to remain at home unless they obtain permission which is readily granted for purposes such as attending a doctor's appointment. The police union argues that the time at home is like "on call time," for which employees must be compensated if personal activities are severely restricted. Union argues that a sick day does not produce simply a day's pay but four days' pay—regular pay for eight hours plus overtime pay for the other 16 hours at time and a half. This produces 32 hours pay per sick day, which incidentally goes up to double time rates for weekends. Trial court rejected this contention because the officers failed to prove that their activities were severely restricted by the remain at home limitation. While the FLSA does not mention sick leave, it does not follow that an employer can attach any conditions that it wants to the use of sick leave. However in this case, trial court was correct for a simple reason: sick and

HELD: McQuirk argues that trial court misinterpreted California law. Specifically, he

HELD: Prior case law holds that an examination, even though partially subjective, may comply with the charter requirements if it conforms to measures or standards that are sufficiently objective to be challenged and reviewed by a court. Here, there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that there was any objectivity in the commission's scoring decisions. Apparently similar candidates were subject to different and random standards. This was particularly noticeable in the area of evaluation of previous discipline imposed on candidates. In some cases individuals who had received no or minor discipline received lower scores than candidates who had received serious discipline. This lack of objective standard violates the Denver City Charter. Reversed for officers. [Basefsky v. Civil Service Commission of Denver, 985 P.2d 81 (Colo. App. 1999)]

HELD: Trial judge's resolution of the issue is persuasive, particularly as applied in cases such as this in which promotion out of the bargaining unit would normally bring the officer involved under the aegis of a different labor contract negotiated by a different bargaining unit. But the court is not required to decide that issue in this case. The reason being: a Massachusetts statute by its very terms requires that municipal residency provisions adopted through a collective bargaining agreement apply only to newly appointed officers. A fair reading of the statute is that it exempts from a collectively bargained residency requirement those members of a police department already on the force at the time the agreement takes affect. It would stretch the statutory language to argue, as the city does, that a police officer would be considered newly appointed to the department upon promotion to another rank. State law forbids application of the collectively bargained residency requirement to any incumbent member of a police department at the time of its adoption, regardless of rank or bargaining unit. Affirmed for police union. [City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, 717 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)]

HELD: Michigan courts adopted the Fireman's Rule in 1987. While the rule varies slightly from state to state, its most basic formulation is that a police officer or fire fighter may not recover damages from a private party for negligence in the creation of the reason for the safety officer's presence. In adopting the rule, Michigan courts did so on the basis of public policy. Since 1987, Michigan appellate courts have considered the application of the Fireman's Rule to a variety of circumstances. The courts have carved out exceptions and clarifications to the rule. A review of the scope of the rule reveals that it bars recovery in cases where one's negligent conduct brought the injured official to the scene. This, however, is not the situation here. The officer's death was the result of subsequent negligence on the part of Syze. The officer had stopped one motorist and was injured by the alleged negligence of a second motorist. Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this factual situation have found that the Fireman's Rule does not bar a suit. Therefore, in Michigan the Fireman's Rule does not prevent suit where the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant did not result in the officer's presence at the scene of the injury. In 1998, the Michigan legislature enacted a partial abolition of the Fireman's Rule. The result in this case is consistent with that statute as well. Reversed for trooper's estate. [Harris-Fields v. Syze, 600 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1999)]

HELD: Bobash presented evidence to the trial court that on prior occasions when the police chief chose a captain, the chief always chose the highest scoring of the three officers on the availability list. The only variation from that pattern had occurred when a high-ranking candidate had declined promotion. Thus, she argued that a custom and practice had been established whereby promotion would occur in rank order. To the extent that a collective bargaining agreement must be interpreted, reference to past practice may be appropriate. However it is a well-established principle of law that when terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation or construction is necessary. Here, the labor agreement clearly and unambiguously vests the chief of police with the authority to choose any of the top three ranked command officers for promotion. Additionally Bobash argues that she was the victim of sex discrimination when the chief jumped over her. To establish a case of intentional discrimination Bobash must show that she was a member of a protected class, she applied for and was qualified for promotion, she was not promoted, and a comparable non-protected employee was promoted. She certainly meets the first three criteria but not the fourth. The evidence presented at trial established that African-Americans were underutilized at the rank of captain and females were

HELD: Many jobs by their very nature are highly stressful, including the job of police officer. For a high stress work environment to constitute a legally sufficient abnormal working condition, however, there must be a finding that the worker's work performance was unusually stressful for that kind of job or a finding that an unusual event occurred making the job more stressful than it had been. Prior case law holds that involvement in a shooting is not itself an abnormal working condition for a police officer. Certain stressful and even life threatening events are expected and anticipated due to the nature of the employment, regardless of where the officer is employed or how long the officer has been employed. The fact that Young had never had such an experience in his long career merely makes the experience subjectively abnormal for him but not abnormal for the job as a whole. Accordingly, the workers' compensation board was correct in ruling that Young is not eligible for benefits in this situation. [Young v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 737 A.2d 317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)

HELD: Texas civil service law defines "police officer" as a member of the police department who has been appointed in "substantial compliance" with civil service law. The statute also requires that the selection process involve open, competitive, and free examinations to establish an eligibility list. Finally, an officer who has been appointed in substantial compliance with the law and who serves a one-year probationary period becomes a full-fledged civil service employee. A fundamental principle of civil service is that appointments be made according to merit and fitness as ascertained by competitive examination. The city argues that Spivey's appointment was not in "substantial compliance" with state civil service law because of his possession of the test. This case requires the court to interpret the Texas civil service statute. In interpreting a statute, the court must diligently attempt to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. To ascertain legislative intent, the court must first look to the statute's plain and common meaning. The "substantial compliance" requirement does not mean literal and exact compliance but simply compliance with the essential requirements of the law. Use of a competitive examination is one of those essential requirements and to be in substantial compliance with the law a police applicant must take a