The number of officers killed in 1999 totaled 130, down from 156 fatalities in 1998, and less than half the record-high 271 who were killed in 1974. Fewer officers died in 1999 than in any year since 1965.

NLEOMF Chairman Craig Floyd credited a combination of factors for making life safe for officers. Floyd cited "better training, improved equipment, the increased use of bullet-resistant vests, and the overall drop in crime" as affecting the total. Other observers noted that increased

The 45 officers who were shot to death in 1999 represented the fewest number of officers killed by firearms in a single year since 1962. There were 63 firearms-related deaths in 1998.

Of the 130 deceased officers, 47 died in automobile accidents while 45 were shot to death. Fifteen succumbed to job-related illnesses, eight were struck by vehicles, seven died in motorcycle accidents, four were killed in aircraft crashes, two were stabbed, one died in a fall, and one was struck by a train. Texas was the deadliest state, losing ten officers. Georgia lost nine officers while North Carolina and Tennessee saw eight die. California and Florida lost seven officers each.

The NLEOMF estimates that more than 14,000 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty during the past century.

In a five to four decision, the justices ruled that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it authorized state workers over 40 years old to sue their employers for age bias. In a two-part ruling, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, said that the Constitution bars states from being sued for money damages unless

The opinion, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, No. 98-791, marks the latest in a string of rulings in which the justices have struck down federal laws giving individuals the right to sue the states. Last term, the court ruled that probation officers could not maintain personal suits against the state for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Such suits are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the court has ruled. The court noted, however, that aggrieved parties are not without a remedy because almost every state has its own statute prohibiting age

In her opinion, Justice O'Connor observed that old age is different than other worker classifications because all workers will experience it. She noted that it was constitutionally permissible for a state employer to discriminate on the basis of age if the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. It is not unconstitutional for a state to rely on age as a proxy for other characteristics and set cut-off ages for hiring or forced retirement.

While the opinion is unlikely to have a major impact on public safety personnel due to a 1996 change in the ADEA that generally exempts police officers and fire fighters, the decision is important in a broader constitutional sense. Unclear from the decision is whether the same constitutional reasoning applies to local governmental entities. For many years the Supreme Court has held that

The court's intentions may become clearer next month when it hears oral arguments in Christensen v. Harris County, Texas, No. 98-1167, a case challenging the county's method of implementation of the compensatory time provisions of the FLSA. Although the issue is supposed to be limited to interpreting a section of the FLSA, the justices might choose to broaden their inquiry to whether the Eleventh Amendment bars an individual from pursuing a suit against a government employer.

The matter came to light when former trooper Darron Anderson released a photograph of himself sitting with a birthday cake on his lap and a smile on his face surrounded by hooded colleagues

Anderson claims he was traumatized by the experience but waited eleven years to come forward because as a rookie he feared for his job. However, one of Anderson's former supervisors claimed that Anderson himself requested the party after seeing photographs of a similar affair thrown for another black trooper four years earlier.

Texas troopers are not covered by a labor contract and state law places no time limit on the filing of administrative charges for misconduct. 

A group of 100 active and former officers, with the backing of the LOA, filed a lawsuit last month seeking compensation for the time they are required to remain home after their normal eight-hour shifts. Robert Goodstein, attorney for the group, said, "We are not asking the court to overturn the

The LOA is seeking $100 million in lost wages and damages for a three-year period beginning in 1996. New York City correctional officers filed a similar suit in 1995. A federal judge refused to grant them relief and the matter is now on appeal. 

Until the change, Berkeley officers had used two protective seals on the pepper spray cans: the factory-installed protective lip to prevent accidental releases and a department-added plastic tab affixed

Berkeley officers raised objections to the multiple seals saying the seals made the devices difficult to use, especially with one hand. One officer alleged he was severely bitten by a suspect when he could not activate the canister quickly enough to subdue the man.

Supreme Court update

Justices also refused to consider Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. 99-634, wherein a lower court rejected a claim that racial discrimination was involved in the termination of an off-duty police officer who threatened a citizen with his service weapon. In rejecting Mills v. Meadows, No. 99-703, the court declined to grant relief to a 23-year veteran sheriff's deputy who was not reappointed upon the election of a new sheriff apparently because the deputy campaigned for the new sheriff's election opponent. Lower court found no First Amendment violation. 

Cases of interest

HELD: The 1996 exemption to the ADEA provides that it shall not be unlawful for a public employer to fail to hire an individual as a police officer because of the individual's age if the age of hiring was in effect on the date of the 1983 Supreme Court ruling and the action was taken pursuant to a bona fide hiring plan. Kopec argues that since the city dropped its age requirement and never reinstated it after the 1996 law, the city is subject to the ADEA and may not discriminate against him based on his age. This interpretation is in error. While it is true that the statute does not require local governments to impose an age limit, the lack of an age limit does not trigger ADEA protection. The point of the 1996 amendment was to offer safe harbor to all governmental employers that had age limits in place in 1983, not just to those who chose to keep those restrictions in place in later years. In other words, regardless of whether a local government has in practice abandoned its age limit for public safety personnel, as the city has done in this case, the entity is not subject to suit under the ADEA. The current age limit, if any, is not relevant for determining this matter. Since the city had a maximum age limit of 34 in 1983, Kopec was older than that when he sought to become a full time officer in 1994. The unambiguous terms of the 1996 amendment preclude relief under the ADEA. Similarly, the requirement that the city's plan be bona fide does not mean that any age must be a BFOQ. Rather, the statute merely intends that the age requirement not be a subterfuge to avoid compliance with the ADEA. The city need not prove that its age requirement, if any, was a BFOQ for its police officers. The term "bona fide" in the statute is used in reference to the hiring plan as opposed to the hiring age. Similarly, the fact that the 1996 amendment was retroactively applied in Kopec's case does not provide him relief. Kopec had no vested right in the law remaining unaltered and Congress had a rational basis for

HELD: To be covered by the ADA a person must suffer a disability. The law defines "disability" as a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. In this case, the evidence indicates that the injuries to Piascyk's back and leg

HELD: The SDPOA argues that the statute must be interpreted broadly because the criminal portion of the law refers to "every person who files any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer." However, the statutorily required language of the advisory specifically refers to "citizen complaints" of "improper police conduct." Trial court correctly inferred from this language that this statute applied exclusively to complaints from the public regarding on duty police misconduct. Legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to internal police complaints or to off duty behavior. Affirmed for department. [San Diego Police Officers Association v. City of San Diego, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 6 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1999)]

HELD: Illinois statute provides that every county that has a merit commission for sheriff's personnel "shall adopt and implement a merit system" established by state law. This state statute sets forth the disciplinary and promotional procedures to be followed. The sheriff argues that these statutory provisions are mandatory from which he cannot deviate. The union counters that the law does not state that its procedures are the exclusive means of reviewing employee-related issues. The union cites state labor law that mandates bargaining over "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment." A review of prior case law finds that in many instances the legislature did not intend to make the broad duties imposed by the labor law hostage to the myriad of state statutes pertaining to matters of public employment. But those cases did not involve mandated statutory language. The disciplinary and promotional procedures set forth in the merit law are not optional. The use of the word "shall" manifests the legislature's intent to require the county to adopt and implement the particular merit system provided. The county is not a home rule unit of government and does not have the ability to modify the law. By mandating the legislative language, the legislature expressed its desire to limit the county's ability to bargain over the merit law procedures. Sheriff was correct in his

HELD: Labor relations commission decisions must be reviewed under the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the commission, even on the basis of evidence that might have warranted a contrary conclusion. It is well established under Massachusetts' law that pay differential affects salary and is, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. Likewise a unilateral change in past practice, if it bears on terms and conditions of employment, violates the duty to bargain collectively. Prior case law holds that a collective bargaining agreement is not necessarily limited to the terms of the written document. There are too many people, too many problems and too many

HELD: It is well-settled law in Ohio that a valid contract cannot be made if its purpose or performance is contrary to statute. Similarly, a contract may be void if it violates public policy, the legal principle that declares that one may not lawfully do that which has the tendency to injure the public welfare. Assuming a contract existed between Lampert and Marsh, the purpose of the contract was to ensure promotion of a subordinate by inducing the early retirement of a superior. This is clearly contrary to Ohio law and public policy. Ohio civil service statutes provide that no applicant for promotion may pay or promise to pay any consideration for obtaining the promotion. Similarly, ethics laws prohibit any public employee from accepting anything of value as an incentive to retire in order that a subordinate may be promoted. The law similarly forbids the subordinate from paying such incentive. The alleged contract was illegal and void and, therefore, unenforceable. Affirmed for officer. [Marsh v. Lampert, 718 N.E.2d 997 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1998)]