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Volume 18, Number 9

Police groups calling for boycotts

As part of its efforts to organize a boycott of businesses with ties to death row inmate Mumia Abu-Jamal, the Philadelphia lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) has asked the Republican Party to move its national nominating convention to an arena other than the First Union Center. The arena was used last year for a concert by Rage Against the Machine. This rock band has expressed support of Abu-Jamal, the convicted killer of Danny Faulkner, a Philadelphia police officer.

"The Republican Party has publicly supported the law enforcement officers of this nation. We now need to know whether this support is sincere or merely eloquent but empty rhetoric," Richard Costello, FOP Lodge 5 president said. Costello suggested the group consider using the Pennsylvania Convention Center. 

Republican Party officials responded negatively to the request saying the party had no responsibility for other groups that had used the facility. Additionally, a $2.5 million contract for construction of a temporary press facility at the site has already been signed.

Upon hearing the response, Costello stopped short of threatening any action against the convention but stated, "We'll get the word out not to take too seriously what the Republicans say when they tell you they support you." He added, "The

use of the First Union Center will send a subtle but disturbingly clear message to law enforcement officers throughout the nation regarding the Republican Party's true platform position on law enforcement."

Meanwhile, the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA), AFL-CIO, has called for a boycott of the Italian clothier Benetton. The union is protesting Benetton's proposed global advertising campaign "We, on death row." The company, known for its provocative and controversial advertisements, has announced plans to use in magazine ads and on billboards the photographs of 26 convicted murderers who are awaiting execution. 

In a message to IUPA local unions this month, international president Sam Cabral said, "Benetton's actions are unconscionable. At a time when we are finally making progress in reducing violent crime, they glorify wanton criminals just to peddle some clothes."

Cabral called on law enforcement personnel and their family and friends to refuse to patronize Benetton stores and products. "You can't humanize these inhuman monsters," Cabral added.

A leading American retailer, Sears, announced this month that it would drop the Benetton line due to consumer complaints.

Union membership continues rise as do wages

In 1999, government workers were four times as likely to be union members as were their private sector counterparts and local government workers, a group that includes police officers and fire fighters, had the highest unionization rate in the public sector. This is according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) annual survey of union membership released last month.

The protective service category, which includes police officers, correctional officers, and fire fighters, reported the highest unionization rate among occupational groups, at 41.3 percent. Across all occupational categories, 42.9 percent of local government workers are unionized.


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The high unionization rate may be partially attributable to another BLS finding: unionized public sector workers, on average, earned a weekly wage 30 percent higher than their non-union counterparts. In the protective service, the wage differential was reported as 23 percent.

BLS estimates that 991,000 protective service personnel are members of unions. 

Bargaining on horizon for Florida sheriff's deputies?

A recent Florida Supreme Court decision apparently opens the way for that state's deputy sheriffs to engage in collective bargaining. The decision last month seems to topple a longtime bargaining ban on sheriff's deputies. And various law enforcement labor groups are already queuing up to represent the officers.

The decision came in a case that raised the question of whether a deputy court clerk was eligible to engage in union activities. In a unanimous decision, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the state constitution guarantees all "public employees" the right to bargain collectively. Historically, the law distinguished between "public employees" and "public officials" (and their deputies who were also considered public officials). "Public officials" could not bargain. In 1978, the court ruled that deputy sheriffs were "public officials," prohibited from engaging in collective negotiations. "Times change," the anonymous author of the opinion wrote. Such a distinction is no longer relevant as

the term "deputy" often is simply a job title applied to numerous individuals who work in support of the public official. The only differentiation that Florida labor statutes make is between managerial and non-managerial employees, the former do not enjoy bargaining rights. Thus, the court concluded, as long as the "deputy" is a non-managerial employee, the individual is covered by the state bargaining law. 

Curiously, the court did not expressly overrule its 1978 decision denying bargaining rights to deputy sheriffs but noted that the court then "exalted form over substance in contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the [Florida bargaining statute]." A group of Flagler County deputies recently filed suit for a specific declaration that deputy sheriffs are entitled to bargain. 

Both the Florida Police Benevolent Association and the Fraternal Order of Police reportedly have launched efforts to organize deputy sheriffs. Florida counties employ several thousand deputy sheriffs. 

FOP turns back Teamster challenge in Maryland

Last month, Anne Arundel County, Maryland police officers voted to keep Lodge 70 of the Fraternal Order of Police as their bargaining representative. By a vote of 226 to 192, the FOP was chosen over the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

The election was a run-off between the two top vote-getting unions from an election last December. In that contest, the Teamsters outpaced the FOP by 82 votes but did not garner a majority of the officers' support. 

Following the first round of voting, the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA),

AFL-CIO, which finished third, combined forces. The FOP contracted with the IUPA to assist with contract negotiations. IUPA supporters apparently switched their votes to provide the FOP a majority. The Teamsters gained only four votes in the second election. A new representation election cannot be held for another two years.

The FOP reportedly will pay the IUPA $2.51 per member each month for its services. Contract negotiations are expected to begin immediately.

In 1997, the FOP defeated the Teamsters by three votes. The FOP has represented the rank and file county police officers for 30 years. 



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"O forty-five hundred _ BINGO!"

Since 1985 when the Supreme Court held that federal law requires public employees be paid overtime for hours worked in excess of the normal workday, police officers have received premium pay for a wide variety of activities ranging from dog grooming to testifying in court. Last month, Lockport, New York, detectives settled a back pay claim for bingo inspections.

Four Lockport detectives will receive about $4,500 each in back wages for five years of after-hours inspection of bingo halls. State law requires

monthly police inspections of all bingo halls. At the time, six bingo halls operated in the city and the detectives rotated quarterly who handled the inspections.

The city had been paying the detectives a flat $540 per year for conducting the inspections after their regular shifts. The officers' union, the Hickory Club Police Benevolent Association, subsequently sued, claiming that under the Fair Labor Standards Act the detectives were entitled to time and one-half their regular rate of pay.

Litigation

Supreme Court update

Justices declined to review several police
articulated.

In Blake v. Wright, No. 99-848, the court refused to consider a lower court ruling that a police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from suit when he recorded officers' personal calls from police station phones. The decision leaves intact the lower court determination that at the time the chief recorded the calls, the fact that his conduct might violate federal law was not clearly established.

The justices last month did agree to review Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, Arkansas, No. 99-423. A police applicant who was unable to meet state training board eyesight standards brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). An appeals court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred an ADA suit against the State of Arkansas. The Supreme Court will consider the matter as another in a recent series of cases wherein the court is defining the scope of Congress' constitutional authority to regulate state and local government. The case has been consolidated with Florida Department of Corrections v. Dickson, No.98-829 which challenges a different section of the ADA.

labor cases within the last month. Rejected was Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority v. Lanning, No. 99-557. In this matter the court refused to reinstate a fitness test requiring transit police officers to be able to run 1.5 miles in under 12 minutes. A federal appeals court had ruled that a job standard could not be used unless it measures the minimum qualifications for the job. This "minimum qualifications" standard is stricter than the "business necessity" standard used in other federal circuits. Several unsuccessful female candidates, with assistance from the Justice Department, had sued claiming that the running test was discriminatory. The case goes back to the trial court for reconsideration.

Also rejected was Sheppard v. Cook, No. 99-589, wherein a female state trooper had alleged her First Amendment rights were violated when she was not selected as a Texas Ranger. The Ranger Captain allegedly manipulated her promotion scores because he believed she was a "woman's libber." His views were apparently his interpretation of the way she behaved. Lower courts rejected her constitutional claim, finding that she never "spoke" about her beliefs. Consequently, the First Amendment did not cover a freedom of belief that is not otherwise



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Cases of interest

the essential functions of a state trooper, with or without reasonable accommodation. His assertion of total disability as well as the award of the disability benefits is certainly evidence inconsistent with the argument that he is a qualified individual under the ADA. The evidence established that Motley was incapable of performing the essential functions of a state trooper. As such, trial court correctly granted summary judgement for the state police. [Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160 (3rd Cir. 1999)]

Handicap discrimination

Since 1988 the New Jersey State Police has required that its officers participate in an annual physical fitness examination. The examination requires the officers to satisfactorily perform in various physical activities such as running, sit-ups, and push-ups. The department rules provide that any officer who does not satisfactorily complete the examination is not eligible for promotion. Motley was a detective who was seriously injured during a drug buy/bust. He sustained injuries to his knees, back, neck, shoulder and left eye when he was dragged by an automobile. Subsequently, Motley did not participate in the annual physical fitness examination. Consequently, he was not recommended for promotion to the next detective pay grade. In 1993, Motley applied for an accidental disability pension claiming that he was permanently and totally incapacitated as a result of the injuries sustained during the drug investigation. The pension board granted the retirement pension. Motley then filed suit claiming that denying him promotion violated New Jersey law as well as the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The trial court ruled that Motley's prior assertion that he was totally and permanently disabled prevented him from bringing suit under the ADA. Former trooper appeals.

HELD: Prior case law holds that a claim for a disability pension does not necessarily bar an individual from pursuing an ADA discrimination claim. Rather, each case must be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances while recognizing that in many instances a disability claim may be inconsistent with an ADA claim. On the other hand, a situation may exist in which a person is disabled enough to qualify for certain benefits and yet not be able to bring an ADA claim because of the differences in legal definitions. Under the ADA, Motley would be required to establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability. He must be able to demonstrate that he could perform

Free speech

About 1500 New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers of Hispanic origin were members of the Latino Officer's Association (LOA). The group was a fraternal organization that sought to promote the interests of Hispanic officers. It was founded by a dissident faction of the Hispanic Society, another fraternal organization of the NYPD. The NYPD recognizes over two dozen organizations based on ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. Among the groups is the Hispanic Society. Recognized organizations were allowed to use NYPD facilities for meetings, post notices on NYPD bulletin boards and march in parades in uniform behind the organizations' banners. NYPD regulations give the police commissioner the sole discretion to grant recognition and further provide that multiple organizations serving the same goals were to be discouraged. The LOA applied for official recognition by the NYPD, but the police commissioner denied the application on the grounds that the Hispanic Society was already recognized by the NYPD. The LOA then sued the NYPD seeking an injunction with respect to the prohibition on member officers wearing uniforms while parading behind the LOA banner. Trial court granted the injunction, finding that the LOA had a First Amendment interest in the wearing of NYPD uniforms in public parades and that the city had failed to show that the LOA's interest was outweighed by the impact the wearing of uniforms would have upon department operations. City


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appeals.

HELD: It is well established that individuals do not relinquish their First Amendment rights by accepting employment with the government. Nevertheless, the state does have an interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. Accordingly, the government may impose restraints on the job related speech of public employees. Those restrictions must be balanced against the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern. The LOA argues that it should be permitted to wear uniforms because it is concerned about discrimination and police misconduct, topics of broad public interest, and because other organizations' members are permitted to wear their uniforms in parades. The city argues that the LOA's interest in wearing police uniforms is not protected under the First Amendment because members of the public are unlikely to understand their anti-discrimination message. Secondly, the city argues that the police officers ethnic pride is not a matter of public concern worthy of protection by the First Amendment. Finally, the city contends that wearing police uniforms while marching is a weak method of communicating as the same message could be easily presented with a banner or by handing out pamphlets. In response, however, members of the public are much more likely to understand the LOA's message about discrimination and police misconduct if the officers are wearing their uniforms at the time of communicating the message. Secondly, the various ethnic-based parades within the city show that ethnic pride is a matter of public concern. The NYPD already authorized other groups such as the Hispanic Society to march in uniform to celebrate their ethnic participation in the police force. Finally, marching in uniform as a means of communicating a public message is a unique expressive quality that would be lost by merely handing out flyers or carrying a banner. Certainly the city has an interest in prohibiting the

unauthorized wearing of police uniforms or the exploitation of the trust that wearing a police uniform is meant to inspire in the public. But those restrictions are not relevant to the circumstances here, marching in a parade behind an organizational banner in an ethnic pride parade. The NYPD already permits at least 25 such organizations to march in their uniforms. Whether the department could constitutionally prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform is not a question before the court that needs to be decided. Even if the NYPD constitutionally could prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform, it does not logically follow that it has the lesser included authority to ban only certain organizations from marching in uniform. In short, the department has failed to carry the burden of showing that the LOA's expression specifically would have an impact on the actual operation of the government. The NYPD, allowing the Hispanic Society to march in uniform, cannot now contend that allowing the LOA to do the same would have a detrimental effect on its operations. Judgment affirmed for LOA. [Latino Officers Association v. City of New York, New York, 196 F.3d 458 (2nd Cir. 1999)]

Compensation

For a three year period five police officers served in the department's Neighborhood Recovery Unit (NRU). Their duties included investigating homicides, shootings, prostitution and drug offenses as well as working with confidential informants. The officers alleged that although they performed functions identical to those executed by individuals designated as detectives, they were not granted the title of detective nor the attendant salary increase. Consequently, the five officers filed suit against the city and the mayor alleging a violation of their First Amendment right to petition government and to freedom of association as well as a violation of their due process rights. City moves to dismiss the suit.

HELD: New York statute provides that any person who is temporarily assigned to perform the duties of a detective for more than 18 months shall



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be permanently designated as a detective and receive the appropriate compensation. The officers in this case claim that state law grants them a property interest in the designation of detective and its salary increase, as does the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the police union relative to out of title pay. The officers argue that the city has deprived them of that property without due process of law. This claim must fail because the officers have adequate state remedies to pursue. Due process has two indispensable components, notice and a post-deprivation opportunity to be heard. The officers have three post-deprivation remedies available to them: (1) grievance and arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement; (2) a petition under state labor law; and (3) an appeal under state civil service law. Because this case involves an alleged unauthorized arbitrary act by city officials, state labor law proceedings would provide an adequate forum for the officers to pursue their claims. Where a property right is lost because of a random and unauthorized act by a state actor, rather than through an established state procedure, the existence of an adequate post-deprivation state remedy for the loss sufficiently affords due process. As to the First Amendment claims, the Constitution affords protection to two different types of association: intimate association and expressive association. Expressive association protects the rights of individuals to associate for purposes of engaging in the activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech, assembly, or petitioning for a redress of grievances. The officers in this case assert that their rights were infringed because their membership in the NRU resulted in their being denied detective designation and pay. They further allege that the police union and the chief of police entered into an unlawful agreement that NRU members would not receive the rank of detective. This allegation is sufficient to state a claim under the First Amendment. Whether or not the officers were in fact retaliated against involves examining the city's motives and intent which is difficult to do from the written pleadings in a suit. Consequently the motion to reject the First Amendment claim is denied and the officers may continue legal process with that claim. [Fernandez v. City of Poughkeepsie, New York, 67 F. Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)]

Handicap discrimination

Treglia was a police sergeant assigned to road patrol. In 1996 he experienced an epileptic seizure. His wife called for an ambulance but two of the town police officers came to assist before the ambulance arrived. En route to the hospital he suffered a second seizure. After that time he has experienced no further seizures. He returned to work several days later with a note from his physician stating that he could resume work on light duty. Upon his return to work he allegedly was not permitted to take part in training classes and received fewer occasions to work overtime. He also was not permitted to conduct investigations by himself. The following year two other officers were promoted even though Treglia had a higher score on the promotion exam. Feeling he was being discriminated against, Treglia filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Shortly thereafter, he was given an unsatisfactory performance evaluation, that was inconsistent with his prior evaluations. Similarly, he was required to work different shifts and was removed from serving as a hostage negotiator. The next year he was once again passed over for promotion. Ultimately, Treglia filed suit against the town claiming that its actions violated the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that he had been retaliated against for filing the EEOC claim. The town moves to dismiss the complaint.

HELD: The town argues that Treglia is not an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. While he does have epilepsy, which is designated as a physical impairment under ADA, he controls the impairment with medication and thus, a major life activity is not substantially limited. To prevail on an ADA claim, Treglia must show that the town perceived he was substantially limited



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in the exercise of a major life activity. Prior case law holds that "working" is a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. However, to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be precluded from more than one type of job or a particular job of choice. The fact that Treglia was perceived as unable to fully perform all the functions of the police officers does not show he was precluded from a broad class of jobs. Being declared unsuitable for the particular position of police officer is not a substantial limitation on a major life activity. The fact that the duties of his position were not to his liking or did not permit the utilization of any of his unique talents does not mean that he is precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Thus, his initial ADA claim fails. However, the ADA also forbids retaliation against any person who asserts rights under the ADA. Here, Treglia has alleged significant changes in his job duties, statements made to him by department superiors, an alleged unfair and inaccurate evaluation, removal as a hostage negotiator, and being passed over for promotion. All of these assertions could be viewed as retaliatory for his filing of the ADA claim. Thus this claim must go to trial to determine the truth of the allegations. ADA claim dismissed but retaliation claim to proceed to trial. [Treglia v. Town of Manlius, New York, 68 F. Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)] a self report of a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder from several years earlier. Smith filed suit against the city claiming that his home address and the results of the psychological exam were personal and should not have been released. He claimed such a release violated his constitutional rights. City moves for summary judgement.

HELD: Federal law provides a cause of action on behalf of any person deprived of a constitutional right by someone acting under color of state law. The purpose of the federal statute is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights. Smith has not sued any individuals but rather has sued the city. For a city to be liable under federal law it must be acting pursuant to an unconstitutional policy. Smith contends that the unconstitutional policy was the city's following of the Ohio public records law. Indeed, at the time of the incident the city followed the law as it best understood it. Under the law, any record kept by a governmental unit must be available for public inspection unless it is specifically exempted by statute. At the time the information was released only one case decision had been rendered interpreting the law and that case established a privacy right to one's Social Security number. In fact, Smith's Social Security number was not released in the records produced. However, since the time of the incident the law has changed substantially. A second federal suit has resulted in a court substantially limiting in the name of privacy the amount of information a government entity may release under the Ohio statute and establishing a right of an officer to notice and a hearing before any information is released in the future. Thus, at the time the city released the information in Smith's case it was carrying out an unconstitutional state law and as such acting with an unconstitutional policy. The city inappropriately released Smith's address and phone number. Smith did not receive notice of this release. On the other hand Smith's privacy interests were not violated with the release of the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Right to privacy

Smith was a police officer who was dispatched to a scene of a suicidal individual. The person had attempted suicide on two prior occasions. When Smith arrived the individual deliberately attacked him in such a way that Smith's only response was to shoot and kill the individual. The shooting became a matter of public knowledge. A reporter for the local newspaper requested to review the personnel file of Smith. Acting pursuant to the Ohio public records law, a portion of the file was made available to the reporter, with Smith's Social Security number blacked out. Among the materials in the file were the various home addresses of Smith, including his current address, as well as records of


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This is not the kind of information that creates a special privacy right on the part of a police officer. If a police officer has a psychiatric diagnosis which makes him a greater risk to the public because he is armed, the public has an interest in knowing about the diagnosis and any treatment and prognosis. Although Smith has shown his constitutional rights were violated in the release of his personal information, he has not shown that he suffered any damage. He claimed his life was threatened indirectly by the brother of the individual he shot but the evidence established that the threat was communicated through another individual and that the brother was unaware that the threat would be passed on to Smith. Likewise, the evidence reflects that the newspaper, while obtaining Smith's home address and other personal information, never did publish it. So he was not harmed by the newspaper obtaining the information. Consequently the city's motion for summary judgment must be granted. [Smith v. City of Dayton, Ohio, 68 F. Supp.2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1999)] HELD: Cleaves argues that his firing involved illegal sex discrimination under federal law because had he been an unmarried woman, rather than an unmarried man, the city would have granted him paid leave due to the death of the father of his female domestic partner. Chicago city ordinance provides that unmarried employees of the same sex who cohabitate and are registered with the city as domestic partners are entitled to certain benefits. Cleaves argues that a woman would not have been terminated for the same behavior in which he engaged. Thus, he claims he was fired because of his sex, that is, because he is a man and not a woman. This creative argument fails to state a claim under federal anti-sex discrimination law. Federal fair employment laws are silent on the issue of marital status discrimination. The ordinance under attack discriminates on the basis of marital status not sex. Federal law prohibits employers from treating married women differently from married men but it does not protect marital status alone. Thus, Cleaves was not treated differently because of his sex but rather because of his marital status, which is not protected under federal law. Similarly, the former officer argues a violation of the federal Equal Pay Act. He argues that sick leave constitutes wages under the Equal Pay Act and as such there was unlawful discrimination as applied to him. This claim will not stand because even if men and women are doing the same work for different pay, if the difference is due to a factor unrelated to sex, there is no violation of the law. In this case Cleaves was denied bereavement leave under city ordinance because of his marital status not because of his sex. Cleaves has stated a claim, however, of unlawful retaliation. Federal statute makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual because he has participated in an investigation of a violation of fair employment law. Thus, Cleaves has stated the retaliatory claim. The remainder of his claims are dismissed. He is entitled to a trial on this issue. [Cleaves v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 68 F. Supp.2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 1999)]

Sex discrimination

Cleaves was a probationary police officer. During his probationary period he made certain statements to internal affairs investigators in connection with a charge of sexual harassment made by someone else against another officer. The statement involved speaking in support of the officer charged with sexual harassment. Cleaves later alleged that he and other officers were warned not to speak about the incident and if someone violated this instruction he would be terminated. Subsequently, Cleaves called in sick, telling the department that he had a death in the family. He identified the decedent as his father-in-law. In fact, it was his fiancée's stepfather who had died. The department subsequently discovered this mistaken assertion and terminated Cleaves for being absent without leave and filing a false report. Cleaves filed suit against the city claiming among other things sex discrimination. City moves to dismiss case.


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Overtime

liability under the FLSA to the deputy. As to the sheriff, however, the matter is different. While the sheriff knew he could have established a 28-day work period, he chose not to do so. The FLSA requires an intent to adopt the 28-day work period exemption. In the alternative the work period is considered adopted if it in fact is implemented with no public announcement. Here, the sheriff did neither. While the refusal of the county administrator to cooperate with the sheriff on the work period issue placed the sheriff between the proverbial rock and hard place, he was not without options. He knew the requirements of the FLSA but did not press the issue with the county or consult a lawyer concerning his legal obligations. Instead, he made a conscious decision to allow his deputies to accumulate overtime on a calendar basis despite budget limitations. The sheriff had the ability to move money from one budget category to another. While the choice between fully funding his deputies' overtime versus providing additional law enforcement services may not have been palatable, the county's decision not to change the work period left the sheriff little choice. By failing to shift the work period he knowingly violated the FLSA. Thus Taylor is entitled to back overtime pay equal to the difference between what he was owed for all hours worked in excess of 171 during a calendar month minus the amount he has already been paid. That differential is $6600. Additionally the sheriff violated the FLSA by not paying his employees on time. His overtime budget was consistently underfunded but he failed to transfer money from other parts of the budget. Federal law requires accrued overtime be paid on the next regular payday after the overtime has been earned or as soon as possible thereafter. The system created by the sheriff allowed too much time to lapse between earning the overtime and it being paid. Because the sheriff knowingly violated the FLSA, Taylor is also entitled to liquidated damages equal to his initial award. A judgment in excess of $13,000 is awarded to the deputy for back pay. [Taylor v. County of Fluvanna, Virginia, 70 F. Supp.2d 655 (W.D. Va. 1999)]
Under Virginia law, sheriffs are independent constitutional officers whose power does not derive from the state or county. As such, the sheriff has sole discretion to hire and fire deputies. Shortly after being elected sheriff, Richardson became aware that the overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) were applicable to his deputies. He attended a training session where he learned the proper way to pay deputies under the FLSA. Up until that point, the county had paid deputies on a calendar month basis. Richardson learned, however, that deputy sheriffs were eligible to be paid on the basis of a 28-day work cycle. Under this approach, overtime liability would not accrue until hours were worked in excess of 171 during the 28-day period. Richardson proposed changing the deputies work cycle but the county administrator declined to do so saying it was too much trouble to treat the deputies differently from other county employees. As a result, the deputies continued to be paid on a calendar month basis. Overtime funds for the deputies were allocated to Richardson as part of the sheriff's department budget. From its inception this plan never provided the sheriff with enough money to pay all of the deputies' accrued overtime for the budget year. Only when the sheriff received the budgetary allowance for the next fiscal year was he able to pay the deputies completely for their accrued overtime from the previous fiscal year. This system progressively left the sheriff with less money to pay for deputies' overtime. Ultimately Taylor, one of the deputy sheriffs, filed suit against the county and the sheriff alleging a violation of the FLSA. Both parties move for summary judgment.

HELD: Initially it must be determined whether the deputy is employed by the county or by the sheriff. Using the FLSA test for who is an "employee," it becomes clear that the deputy works for the sheriff, not the county. The county has insufficient control over Taylor, his working conditions, his work place, and his pay to make him its employee. Accordingly, the county has no



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Job action

details, the city exercised its right to compel the officers to work overtime. Accordingly, as the labor board found, the city's ability to perform its essential functions was not frustrated by the union's directive not to volunteer. Because the union did not undertake actions that frustrated the city's ability to perform its functions, its action did not constitute an illegal job action. Similarly, there was no breach of the collective bargaining agreement because union members did not withhold services nor did the union call for the withholding of services. Judgment for police union affirmed. [Appeal of the City of Manchester, 741 A.2d 70 (N.H. 1999)]
The city and the police union were stalled in their negotiations for a new labor agreement. During negotiations an annual city festival was scheduled to be held. In prior years police officers had volunteered for extra duty details but none volunteered for the upcoming festival. The union encouraged its members not to volunteer because it had scheduled an informational picket at the festival. When police supervisors became aware that officers were not signing up for the extra duty, the city sought a temporary junction against the police union. Trial court denied the injunction noting that the collective bargaining agreement allowed the city to compel officers to work overtime as necessary. Following the court's ruling the union issued a memo to its members directing them not to voluntarily work the detail. The union, in the same memo, recognized that the department had the authority to order officers to work and that officers had no choice if so ordered. The city then filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming the union's memo to its members constituted a breach of the collective bargaining contract and an illegal job action under New Hampshire law. Labor board found that since the city was able to get the job done without volunteers by ordering officers to work, the union's actions did not impair the delivery of police services. Thus, the union had not violated state law. City appeals.

HELD: The collective bargaining agreement establishes a procedure whereby the chief of police may require officers to work unscheduled overtime in inverse order of seniority. The contract also prohibits the officers from engaging in any strike, work slowdown, or other job action. Finally, state statutes specifically prohibit strikes and other forms of job actions by public employees. Prior case law defines "job action" as union activities such as strikes or sick outs in which a public employer is unable to perform its essential government functions. Although the union in this case encouraged members not to volunteer for the extra

Settlements

Buffalo, New York

police officers
The city council and the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association have approved a new two-year labor pact. The contract is the first in seven years that was not the product of binding arbitration. Under the agreement, police officers will receive a 3 percent raise each year, retroactive to July 1, 1998. Retroactive to July 1, 1999, annual longevity payments will increase from $75 per year annually to $125 per year of service. About 945 police officers across all ranks are covered by the agreement.

San Bernardino County, California

deputy sheriffs
Early this month members of the San Bernardino County Safety Employees Association approved a new three-year labor accord. The pact provides an immediate pay boost of 6.5 percent followed by a 6 percent jump in June, 2001. A five percent hike follows in June of 2002. Premium pay for on-call deputies moved from $25 a week to $120 weekly. Association officials claim that even with the pay hikes, deputies' pay lags surrounding law enforcement agencies by six percent. The contract ends December 13, 2002.