The quote is contained in a letter written last month by Kenneth T. Lyons, President of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO), to John J. Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO. In the letter Lyons expresses his displeasure with the IUPA joining with the Fraternal Order of Police to defeat the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, another AFL-CIO affiliate, in a representation election in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, this past January.

Lyons accused the IUPA and FOP of "playing a cute game" and urged Sweeney to "do something about it." Lyons cited an "anti-AFL-CIO" publication that IUPA had placed on the Internet. In the publication the IUPA states it helped the FOP in order "to preserve representation of

In the initial representation election, the Teamsters outpaced Lodge 70 of the FOP by 82 votes but fell short of a majority. IUPA finished third. In the runoff election, the FOP prevailed 226 to 192, with all but four of the IUPA supporters switching to the FOP. According to the IUPA, Lodge 70 has become an IUPA local unit. 

The IBPO is affiliated with the AFL-CIO through its parent organization the National Association of Government Employees. Lyons' letter is posted on the IBPO website at www.ibpo.org. No public response to the letter has been released by IUPA or the AFL-CIO.

Meanwhile, the IUPA announced it will now be representing Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) troopers. In a hotly contested campaign earlier this month, the IUPA ousted 27-year incumbent, the Florida Police Benevolent Association. IUPA, through Local 6009, will bargain for about 1,200 FHP personnel. 

The decline in arrests comes on the heels of Mayor Dave Armstrong dismissing Sherrard after

According to jail records, officers made 178 arrests in the four days following the chief's

The FOP, previously one of Armstrong's most vocal supporters, has called on the mayor to resign and for Sherrard to be reinstated but the group denies that a work slowdown has been organized.

The new rules came about after intense negotiations by public safety union leaders and local governmental officials. Fire fighters also must pass similar fitness and medical testing. A compromise resulted in the fitness standards applying only to persons hired after November 1, 1996. The law covers about 30 percent of police officers in 189 Massachusetts communities. Another 162 communities are not participating in the program but set their own standards.

Individuals who fail the fitness test will have 16 weeks to train and try again. If they fail a second time, termination proceedings may be instituted.

Police officers and fire fighters agreed to the fitness law in 1987 as part of a pension reform bill

To pass the fitness test, police officers must complete an obstacle course culminating in a handcuffing simulation, a trigger-pull test, a separation event simulating a crowd control situation, and a dummy drag. These tests will be conducted under job simulation conditions. In addition, every four years a standard medical examination with cholesterol screening and body fat measurements must be passed.

Union officials suggested that the new rules will put the burden on local departments to keep their officers healthy by providing fitness equipment and time to exercise. 

Municipal officials noted that state statute, the so-called heart _ lung law, provides that cardiovascular diseases in police officers and fire fighters is presumed to be job related for workers compensation purposes. Thus, it is only fair that public safety personnel maintain an appropriate level of physical fitness.

After talks of possible merger of the two groups collapsed, the HPOA in 1996 changed its name to the Houston Police Officer's Union (HPOU). By this time many of the original founders of the HPPU had returned to the HPOU fold. In 1998, the HPOU, the larger of the two groups, was selected as bargaining agent for the department's first labor contract. Last year, in a highly unusual move, the IUPA recalled HPPU's charter and granted a new charter to HPOU. This move left HPPU independent

Despite being the largest police labor organization in the country, the FOP has not maintained a major presence in Texas generally. The new affiliation may signal an effort by the group to become more aggressive, at least in Houston. Ironically, the FOP constitution specifically prohibits affiliation with organized labor. Apparently, there is no corresponding prohibition against former AFL-CIO unions becoming FOP lodges. 

Wearing T-shirts that read "Our contract is with the community" and "Pay competitive wages", officers picketed for an hour amid sympathetic sirens sounding from passing fire trucks and horn honking from supportive motorists. The informational picket followed the officers' rejection of a one-year contract

Officers say that low pay has created an attrition problem. A force of 928 officers is authorized but the department currently employs about 850 officers. 

A major sticking point in contract negotiations is the city's resistance to lowering officer retirement contributions from 16.3 percent of salary. By contrast, local sheriff's deputies contribute about 4 percent to their program.

The Albuquerque Police Officers' Association organized the protest. 

Supreme Court update

In other action, the justices recently declined to consider New York Police Department v. Latino Officers Association, No. 99-1068. Court inaction leaves in place an appeals court ruling that the police department may not selectively permit only some employee organizations to wear police uniforms while marching in parades. The department failed to show that permitting the Latino Officers Association to parade in uniform would disrupt

Petitions seeking review that have been recently filed with the court are Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, No. 99-1247, and Motley v. New Jersey State Police, No. 99-1395. Stimpson involves the appeal of a female former police officer who claims her termination was based on illegal sex discrimination. She was dismissed from the force after establishing a troubled disciplinary record. She sued claiming illegal sex discrimination factored into the termination decision. A federal appeals court ultimately found that any link between her termination and unlawful discriminatory behavior was broken by the independent dismissal decision of the civil service board.

The Motley matter involves a state trooper who was seriously injured on the job. He continued to work as a detective for several years but was denied promotion because he was unable to pass the physical examination. Following taking a voluntary disability retirement, Motley sued the state police claiming that the refusal to promote him violated the ADA. Lower courts rejected the claim on the basis that his prior admission of disability for retirement purposes was inconsistent with his ADA assertion that he was an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.

HELD: The police officers argue that they are being denied their constitutional right to equal protection of the law because they are treated differently than other employees in the same pay grade. They argue that the city cannot lawfully require them to work more hours at a lower hourly rate than other grade 14 employees. To prove an equal protection claim the officers are required to demonstrate they are treated differently from others similarly situated to them. In this case, the only relevant similarity between the officers and other city employees to whom they wish to be compared is the fact the jobs performed by the officers and the jobs performed by other grade 14 employees all fall within the same pay classification. The officers have not alleged that they are paid below the minimum annual salary or minimum hourly wage assigned to the pay grade. Thus they and other grade 14 employees are not treated differently with respect to this established similarity. Likewise, calculating their rate at 42.5 hours as compared to using a 40-hour work week for other grade 14 employees is not improper. The evidence established that officers must sometimes be called upon to work during their lunch break while no comparable need exists for other types of city employees. In respect to the lunch break question, they are actually dissimilarly situated with respect to other grade 14 employees. Prior case law holds that to defeat an equal protection claim economic legislation must simply be based upon a plausible reason existing for the classification in question. The city's purpose in adopting a new pay schedule was to establish a systematic method of paying its employees. The officers are compensated on the basis of an annual rate of pay that corresponds to other grade 14 employees. Because of the

Cases of interest

In 1990, the city hired a consultant to make recommendations regarding the pay structure of all city employees. The consultant ultimately created 36 pay grades and every city position was assigned to one of those pay grades. The city adopted the proposal by ordinance. Police officers, as well as some other municipal employees were assigned to pay grade 14. However, the hourly wages of police officers were calculated by dividing their weekly pay by 42.5 while the hourly wages for other grade 14 employees was calculated by dividing the respective weekly pay by 40. The weekly pay was calculated based upon a set annual rate of pay. The

HELD: In order to establish a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally protected and the conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination. The parties agree that Thomsen's request for investigation of the handling of drug seizure money and the behavior of the narcotics detectives was a matter of public concern that is constitutionally protected. However, to prevail on his First Amendment claim he must establish that the city and the chief would not have terminated him "but for" his constitutionally protected conduct. Thomsen simply fails to establish that the termination would not have occurred anyway. While the timing of the three reprimands does appear suspicious to the court, it is difficult to see how these reprimands adversely affected his employment. None of them resulted in discipline and each of them Thomsen admitted he had done. The former officer suggests that the incidences might have led to future discipline but the court will not speculate as to that matter. The same holds true as to his termination. Thomsen cannot prevail on his retaliatory discharge claim if the decision to terminate him would have been reasonable even in the absence of the protected conduct. The evidence establishes that he was unable to perform the essential functions of the job and was seeking a disability retirement. There is no evidence to suggest that the city would have attempted to accommodate his request for light duty had he not filed the original request for investigation. While the chief may have been angry at Thomsen,

HELD: Governmental classifications based on race are inherently suspect under the equal protection clause and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. To satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis, a race-

HELD: To establish a claim under the ADA an individual must show that they are a qualified individual with a disability and had been discriminated against as a result of the disability. The city concedes that Pickering is disabled and was terminated because of her disability. Thus, the focus of this litigation is whether she meets the definition of a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the ADA. A "qualified individual" is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position. Pickering argues that inmate supervision and its inherent risk of physical trauma is not an essential part of the position of corrections officer. When determining what functions of a job are essential, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgement and particularly to written job descriptions. Here, the city's job description indicates that guarding, escorting, and restraining inmates are essential functions. Even if the risk that a corrections officer will be exposed to physical trauma is minimal, it may still be an essential part of the job. If a physical altercation between an officer and a prisoner is rare, nonetheless it is essential that an officer assume that risk may occur. Pickering argues there are positions in the department that do not involve inmate interaction. The ADA imposes upon an employer the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for known disabilities unless doing so would result in undue hardship to the employer. But an accommodation is reasonable only if it enables the employer to perform the essential functions of the job. Eliminating interaction with inmates would eliminate an essential function of the job; thus, the city is not required to make that accommodation. There is no reasonable accommodation that would allow Pickering to patrol the detention center and

HELD: Liff argues that the supplemental letter from the city manager stating he was entitled to all rights of a police officer fundamentally changed the nature of his employment status. Specifically, it placed him under the collective bargaining agreement and the city must have cause to remove him as well as provide certain due process. To reach this conclusion, however, the court would have to find that the letter modified the nature of

HELD: The FOP argues that the city was bound to continue the operation of its pension plan consistent with state statute. However, under Missouri law once the city became a charter form of government statutory provisions applicable to it were automatically superceded. As a constitutionally chartered city, the home rule provisions of the state constitution permit the city to enact or repeal ordinances governing its police pension plan. Thus, the state statutes on the matter are not applicable to this case. Likewise, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which bars unfair or inconsistent treatment of individuals, is not applicable in this case. Equitable estoppel is normally not applicable against a governmental entity. In those rare occasions where the law does apply the doctrine to government, it must be shown that the government has acted inconsistently with a claim. Here, the FOP has failed to meet its burden of proving any misconduct on the part of the pension board. Therefore, the board cannot be equitably estopped from changing the method of calculating pension amounts. Additionally, the officers have no contractual right to the former method of pension calculation. The general rule of law is that a pension granted by a public authority is not a contractual obligation but a gratuitous allowance, in the continuance of which the pensioner has no vested right, and the pension is accordingly terminable at the will of the grantor. Since there is no contract on the part of the state to continue the payment of a benefit or annuity, a change in the law affecting such a benefit does not impair the obligation of a contract or deprive a pensioner of property within the constitutional meaning. The extent of the rights that vest in employees is governed by the controlling law in effect at the time their rights vest. In this case, the officers' rights in the pension fund are determined by the city ordinance and pension board regulations. Nothing in the ordinance or the pension

HELD: A drug test of a police officer is a search subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. While probable cause is the general