The report charges that the low percentage of female police officers, up only 5.3 percent since 1990, is the product of a variety of factors. Employment barriers include entry tests that overemphasize physical prowess, particularly upper body strength; recruitment at male dominated institutions such as military bases and sporting events; continued use of outmoded policing strategies that emphasize aggressive behavior; and

Of particular concern to the NCWP is the low proportion of female command-level personnel. According to survey results, only 5.6 percent of top law enforcement positions nationwide are staffed by women. Philadelphia reported the highest percentage of female command officers, 24.2 percent, followed by Chicago at 21.9 percent. Of the agencies surveyed, a dozen state police reported no female command-level officers. Only Florida and Massachusetts reported that at least 10 percent of their total trooper force was women. 

The data was derived from 126 responses to a survey initially sent to a sample of 180 law enforcement agencies that employ 100 or more officers. A representative sample of state, county, and municipal departments were all surveyed. Results of the study may be accessed at www.feminist.org/police/ncwp.html.

The ruling, City of Midland v. O'Bryant, involved five Midland police officers who were notified that their positions were being reclassified as civilian slots. The officers were given the opportunity to apply for an intra-department transfer or remain in their jobs but as non-sworn personnel. If the latter option was taken, pay would be reduced. The officers sued the city and the chief of police

Like most Texas peace officers, Midland officers are not protected by a labor agreement. Rather, they are considered at-will; subject to limited exceptions, they can be terminated for any reason or no reason. Texas law has traditionally treated at-will employment as a form of contractual relationship.

State Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen, writing for the court, agreed with the city's position. She noted that some states had extended the concept to employer-employee relationships. But, prior

However, a police officer who perceives that he has been treated unfairly or has been demoted, transferred, or discharged may seek alternative employment. Thus, as at-will employees, the officers have no enforceable claim against the city on this issue. 

County Executive Thomas Gulotta is considering the furloughs after the Nassau County Police Benevolent Association (PBA) failed to agree to millions of dollars worth of concessions. Gulotta had asked the PBA and other unions to let the county temporarily withhold two weeks' salary. The procedure would accumulate an extra $20 million. The money would be repaid when the employees

A recent study of the police department's finances found that each officer cost the county $114,877 annually in pay and benefits. In comparison, New York City officers cost $79,209. Police staffing levels are 314.6 per 100,000 residents compared to the national average of 243.2. 

Possible furloughs are particularly ironic with a booming national economy and a shortage of police applicants in most communities, including New York City. The long tradition of NYPD officers jumping to better paying suburban departments, such as Nassau County, may soon reverse itself.

Apparently, the ARC has decided to enforce its rule that blood donors are not to receive compensation for their donation. The ban on inducements is to prevent donors from hiding

Three out of every five Buffalo police officers participated in the program in 1999 and, per their labor agreement, received days off. Donate twice, receive two days off. Deputy sheriffs in surrounding Erie County enjoy a similar program.

The city tried to end the practice in the 1980s after discovering that some officers were donating every eight weeks and receiving a day off.

A city labor relations official noted that the

Under prior law, a fact-finder's determinations were advisory and could be ignored

To ensure that the arbitrators are accountable to Delaware taxpayers, only members of the state labor board may serve in that capacity. The law contains a four-year sunset provision.

Supreme Court update

HELD: In order to establish retaliation for engaging in a constitutionally protected activity, a plaintiff must prove that she engaged in protected conduct, an adverse action was taken against her that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct, and the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the protected conduct. As to the first element, Sowards

Cases of interest

HELD: In order to make out a claim under the ADA, an individual must show he is a qualified individual with a disability. In this case, Krocka at all times has been able to perform the duties of a police officer and thus is a qualified individual. He argues, however, that the department considered him as either actually disabled or simply regarded him as disabled, both violations of the ADA. To be

HELD: The federal Fair Labors Standard Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime to employees who are employed more than 40 hours per week. If an employer knows, or has reason to believe, that an employee is working overtime, those hours count for the purposes of the FLSA. In order for Gaylord to recover for uncompensated overtime, he must show that he worked the overtime without compensation and his employer had knowledge or should have known of his work. Prior case law holds that an employer does not have knowledge of uncompensated overtime if an employee submits time sheets showing such overtime did not occur. Here, Gaylord has simply failed to demonstrate that he worked the 4,000 uncompensated hours. The enormous amount claimed for overtime is so substantial as to make it implausible that, Gaylord could have reasonably relied on a supervisors alleged directive that he supervise the transit squad at all times. With only 168 hours in a week, for a period of 20 months Gaylord would have had less than six hours a day for eating, sleeping, or other time outside of work. A large portion of the unpaid overtime claimed by Gaylord was for monitoring the police radio. Prior decisions hold that merely monitoring a police radio does not constitute compensable work

HELD: Ziskend alleges that he was dismissed from the auxiliary police force in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right to bring suit against a governmental official. O'Leary responds that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Qualified immunity is available to government officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known. Ziskend's claimed right was not clearly established at the time of O'Leary's actions. Neither the Supreme Court nor federal appeal courts have ever held that the rule forbidding denial of valuable

HELD: To establish a case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the law, that he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability. Ditullio argues that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he is substantially limited in the major life activities of seeing and working. While the medical evidence suggests that the officer is virtually blind in his right eye, his left eye is normal and results in an overall vision of 20/20. There is no evidence indicating that his total vision system is substantially restricted when compared to the average person in the population. Prior case law has held that individuals who are blind in one eye are not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing if the remaining eye functions normally and if they are able to perform the normal daily activities of the average person. Such is the case here. Ditullio also argues that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. This claim also must fail. He is still employed as a peace officer, although not on road patrol. The inability to work as a patrol officer pertains to a single, particular job that is insufficient to constitute a substantial limitation on the broader ability to work. The ADA requires significant restriction on the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Summary judgement for village on these issues. [Ditullio v. Village of Massena, New York, 81 F. Supp.2d 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)]

HELD: To be successful in a suit, Mercure must show that one or more of his federally protected constitutional rights were violated. He first claims that his freedom of association was violated. Freedom of association involves either the right to associate for the purposes of engaging in First Amendment-protected activities or the right of intimate association. This case, if at all, fits in the latter category. The right of intimate association is

HELD: This case presents whether under Maryland law a deputy sheriff is to be treated as a licensee or an invitee when entering upon the premises of another. If the deputy is considered an invitee, the standards for the landlord are more strict than if the deputy was a mere licensee. The State of Maryland has long recognized the common law Fireman's Rule that in some circumstances operates to bar recovery for injuries to a fire fighter or police officer who is injured in the performance of their employment. The rule is based on public policy grounds. This public policy is based on the relationship between public safety officers and the public that calls on these safety officers specifically to confront certain hazards. The public safety officer may not recover for injury by the negligently created risk that was the very reason for his presence on the scene. Officer Rivas' visit to the apartments was to perform the duty of serving a subpoena. The negligence that allegedly caused his injury, however, was unrelated to the situation that required his services. He was injured on account of an allegedly defective condition in the common area of the

HELD: The PERA governs public sector labor law in Michigan and its provisions have been held to take precedent over other conflicting laws. It is well established in Michigan that the MERC's exclusive jurisdiction forecloses actions under other laws where the alleged wrongdoing raises an unfair labor practice issue. Clearly, the PERA is the exclusive remedy for any unfair labor practice charge. A plaintiff cannot obtain another remedy by framing the unfair labor practice as a different species of common law or statutory claim and invoke the jurisdiction of a different tribunal. Here, the association's claim that the defendant must provide the internal affairs files raises a question of an employer's obligation to provide the union with requested information. Because the association's claim, if meritorious, constitutes an unfair labor practice by the county; its resolution falls within the MERC's exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court erred in ordering the documents released to the association. Reversed for county. [Kent County Deputy Sheriffs' Association v. Kent County, 605 N.W.2d 363 (Mich. App. 1999)]

HELD: The principle of estoppel holds that one may by voluntary conduct be precluded from taking action that would work injustice and wrong to another who with good reason and in good faith relied on that conduct. Equitable estoppel is rarely invoked against a governmental entity but it may be applied in appropriate circumstances unless the application would prejudice essential governmental functions. Equitable estoppel cannot apply if the governmental action is utterly beyond the jurisdiction of the governmental entity. Such action would be beyond the power of the government and be void. There is a distinction, however, between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a governmental entity and the irregular exercise of a basic power of the government. The latter may be subject to the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of fairness and justice. During the course of Beaver's career the statute regarding health care coverage for retirees was changed several times. Additionally, the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the town on its face covered retired employees. Beaver himself had purchased

HELD: The town argues that several of the employees should have been excluded from the bargaining unit. Specifically, the part-time officers are ineligible, on-call employees, the lieutenant and sergeant possess supervisory authority, the highway department personnel lack a community of interest with the police department employees, and the police department's secretary is a confidential employee. To succeed on appeal, the town must show that the labor board's decision was unlawful or clearly unreasonable. The labor board found that the part-time officers have much in common with the full-time employees. They found that they trained with the officers and filled in shifts for the full-time employees. State statute provides that a public employee eligible for collective bargaining

HELD: Police officers in Virginia are considered at-will employees. They may be discharged for any reason or no reason, subject to limited exceptions. One exception is where the termination violates the explicit public policy of the state. In these cases, however, the underlying statute has to specifically assert that the matter is public policy. The second exception involves laws that do not explicitly state a public policy but are instead designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety or welfare of the people in general. In this case the trial court found the city had violated public policy by retaliating against an employee who has complied with the laws of the state and for obtaining criminal warrants. These statutes do not implicate explicit public policy of the state, however. To hold otherwise would create a situation where virtually any police officer could argue that a personnel decision obstructed that officer's enforcement of the law. Since the city violated no recognized public policy when terminating Harris, his action for wrongful termination must fail. Reversed for city. [City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 523 S.E.2d 239 (Va. 2000)]