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AFL finds union violated constitution with web posting
A union umpire last month ruled that the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), through its affiliate the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO), violated the AFL-CIO constitution when the IBPO posted on its website a letter containing disparaging remarks about the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA), another AFL-member union. Impartial umpire Howard Lesnick found that SEIU had violated Article XX, Section 5 of the federation's constitution which prohibits circulating reports designed to bring another affiliate union into public disrepute or adversely affect its reputation "in connection with an organizational campaign." 

IUPA filed a complaint after IBPO in February posted on its website a letter that IBPO President Kenneth T. Lyons had written to SEIU President John J. Sweeney. In the letter, Lyons called IUPA a "phony" organization, "not a genuine police organization", and accused the union of "selling its charters cheaply." The letter was apparently initiated by IBPO displeasure with the IUPA joining with a local lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to defeat the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, also an AFL-CIO union, in a representation election in Anne Arundel County,

 Maryland, this past January. The FOP lodge subsequently entered into an affiliation with the IUPA.

Although the posting of the letter occurred after the representation election in Anne Arundel County, the umpire found that IBPO and IUPA are currently contending for members in various venues around the country. The umpire reversed his interpretation in a prior case and concluded that the phrase in "connection with an organizational campaign" should not be narrowly applied. Thus, SEIU had violated that section of the union constitution with its comments. Under AFL procedures, SEIU may either appeal the decision or inform the umpire of steps it will take to comply with the ruling. 

Prior to the umpire's ruling, Sweeney had written a letter to Lyons stating, ". . . I reject as unfounded the critical statements in your letter about IUPA. IUPA is in fact a highly respected international union that successfully represents law enforcement officers throughout the country . . . ." In his letter Sweeney said that ". . . it is important that I set the record straight with respect to the assertions you made so my position and that of the AFL-CIO concerning the stature of IUPA are clear."

Requiring supervisor to be peace officer violates ADA
A federal judge in Texas has ruled that requiring a communications supervisor to be a licensed peace officer serves only to "reserve the best jobs for members of the guild," apparently referring to sworn law enforcement officers. Consequently, denying a civilian dispatcher - who lacks peace officer certification due to a partially-formed hand - the opportunity to be considered for the promotion violates the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Judge Lynn Hughes last month ordered Harris County, Texas, to waive the peace officer requirement or commission Brad Alan Mathes as a deputy sheriff, if he the passes the state qualification examination, and consider him for promotion.

Mathes, who has a congenitally malformed left hand, has worked as a civilian dispatcher in the Harris County Sheriff's Department for eight years.
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Two years ago he decided to seek a supervisory position in the division. Department policy requires all supervisors, even those overseeing civilians, to be certified deputy sheriffs. In 1998, Mathes attended a police academy but was dismissed after 16 weeks because he could not pass firearms qualification with his left hand nor subdue suspects. On his behalf, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed an ADA claim contending that the county had a legal duty to accommodate Mathes because being a peace officer and firing a handgun were not essential elements of the position of communications supervisor.

Judge Hughes agreed and found that holding

 a peace officer license was wholly unrelated to the proper operation of the communications division. The position involves essentially the same tasks that Mathes had been performing successfully for the previous eight years. The judge stated that while the sheriff's department "may classify jobs to serve the self-interest of the managers and only be responsible politically," the classification system must meet "minimum rationality and adhere to the federal policy of accommodating disabled workers."

Harris County officials have not indicated whether it will appeal the ruling, waive the peace officer requirement for the position, or commission Mathes.

Police unions preparing for political convention
Various national and local police unions have filed applications to demonstrate at the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, August 14-17. Unions representing police officers in the host city as well as New York, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco have reportedly filed applications for demonstrations. Also seeking demonstration permits are the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, the National Association of Police Organizations, and the Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas.

"Our common concerns have reached a critical mass of frustration," said Ted Hunt, President of the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL), which represents LAPD officers through the rank of lieutenant. "As long as the federal government tries to impose consent decrees which disproportionately trample on the rights of officers while city leaders and command staff escape

 accountability, we will escalate our campaign to reveal the hypocrisy of leadership." 

The LAPPL labor contract expired in June. Additionally, the union has also been demanding a seat at the negotiating table with the U.S. Department of Justice, which has threatened to sue the police department for an alleged pattern and practice of unconstitutional behavior in conducting arrests, searches, and seizures. 

Hunt said, "The Department of Justice promised police unions that their involvement in police reform is critical. Yet they refuse to allow direct negotiations. Politicians use cops as backdrops to show law enforcement support, yet their policies continue to harm working class police officers."

  • No word as yet on which unions plan to protest at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia. 

Justice Department and Denver settle ADA claim
Under a consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the City and County of Denver will modify their employment policies to allow police officers with disabilities to be reassigned to civilian jobs when their disabilities make them unable to continue working as an officer. Denver will also pay $1.5 million to eleven police officers who were forced to retire as a result of the prior policy prohibiting reassignment. The amount is the largest obtained by DOJ to date under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).

The consent decree, approved earlier this
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month by the U.S. District Court in Denver, resolves a lawsuit brought by DOJ in 1996. DOJ alleged that Denver's refusal to reassign police officers with disabilities to other city and county jobs violated the ADA. The lawsuit was filed after DOJ learned that Denver officers who became disabled, many as a result of line of duty injuries, were forced to retire upon determination that they could no longer perform the essential functions of police officers.

"The ADA's protections are essential for police officers who sacrifice their health and their ability to continue their police careers to protect us and keep our neighborhoods safe," said Acting Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann Lee. "It would

 be cruel irony indeed if, as a result of devotion to duty, we allowed employers to discard them."

In addition to requiring Denver to discontinue discriminatory employment practices, the settlement also requires implementation of a written reassignment policy requiring reassigning police officers with disabilities, who can no longer perform essential functions of their jobs, to vacant civilian positions for which they may be qualified.

The settlement stemmed from a 1999 ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that Denver's refusal to reassign officers violated the ADA. The case had been remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings.

Black cops gain $1.2 million over racial transfers
A federal court jury last month awarded $1.2 million in damages to 22 New York Police Department (NYPD) officers and two sergeants who were transferred to a Brooklyn precinct to maintain peace following revelation of the Abner Louima torture case. The two-dozen officers, all African-Americans, brought the civil rights suit claiming the transfers were based solely on their race. A jury awarded each officer $50,000 for emotional distress.

NYPD Police Commissioner Howard Safir testified that he decided to send black employees to the 70th precinct following community outrage over a white police officer sodomizing Louima with a broken broomstick. At trial, Safir admitted that he transferred the officers because of their skin color, justifying the action because of a "compelling

 governmental interest" and because community leaders had asked for more black officers.

Some of the transferred officers claimed that they were ostracized by officers at their new precinct and were unfairly deprived of specialized assignments.

"I hope this sends a clear message to the NYPD that this union will not tolerate discrimination of any kind against our officers, including any type of discriminatory assignments or transfers. The jury agreed with us that there is no difference between one cop and another based on the color of his or her skin. We are all blue," commented Patrick Lynch, President of the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association upon hearing the verdict. 
LITIGATION

Supreme Court update
As the high court's term came to a close, the justices declined review of several police-labor related matters. Rejected were Buckley v. City of Portage, Michigan, No. 99-1743, and Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal Order of Police, Penn _ Jersey Lodge 30, No. 99-1758.  In Buckley, a lower appeals court held no violation of the First Amendment when a police officer who published a newsletter critical of the department was suspended for 20 days. Supreme Court inaction leaves intact this determination. 

By rejecting review of the Delaware River
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Port Authority appeal, the justices leave in place a New Jersey court decision that the authority, a bi-state agency, must adhere to New Jersey labor laws requiring mediation and interest arbitration when negotiating with its police officers' union.

Recently filed cases, which likely will not receive a review decision for several months, include Schenectady County, New York v. Jeffes, No. 99-1798, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 20 v. United States, No. 99-1858, and Breaux v. City of Garland, Texas, No. 99-1863. 

In the first case, the question is raised regarding the liability of a county for the actions of a sheriff who allegedly fostered a "code of silence" among his employees in violation of their First Amendment rights. 

The FOP appeal contests a lower court's determination that white Miami, Florida, officers who were the victims of "reverse discrimination" in the promotion process should share only a pro-rata piece of the wage difference between the ranks in dispute. At trial, the dozens of aggrieved officers each had originally been awarded the full pay differential. 

In the Breaux case, two officers who reported corruption in the police department are seeking reinstatement of a multi-million dollar jury award for retaliation. A federal appeals court overturned the award, finding that despite being subjected to an internal affairs investigation, the officers suffered no adverse employment action in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment right. The appeal seeks a review of that determination and a reinstatement of the monetary award. 

 building. These recordings were made for the purposes of security, safety, and quality control. Every conversation that took place on a particular telephone was recorded regardless of which line was being used. The sole exception was a telephone in the kitchen. The kitchen telephone was reserved for the making of private calls. In 1992, the DPS moved into a new building. The new building utilized a recording device that recorded incoming and outgoing telephone calls. However, unlike the old building, all telephone calls were recorded, including the private kitchen line. In early 1995, Kistler drove his police vehicle through a supermarket window. An investigation was conducted but he was not formally charged with administrative violations until some six months later. A week following the filing of charges against Kistler, he and Sexton discovered that the kitchen telephone line was being recorded. Two days later they and their attorney went to city hall to disclose to the public that the private line in the building was being recorded illegally. Missouri statute declares it a crime to conduct an illegal intercept of a wire communication. Kistler was subsequently terminated a few days later, allegedly because of the vehicle crash earlier in the year. Six weeks later Sexton was also terminated for failing to account for his activities on the day of the discovery of the wiretap. The terminations were affirmed by city officials. Subsequently, the two former officers filed suit against the city and the chief alleging, among other things, a violation of their First Amendment rights. The chief moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. Trial court denied the motion and police chief appeals.

HELD: Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials are protected from civil liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The question raised on this appeal is whether the chief should have known that the termination of the two officers violated their constitutional right to the exercise of free speech. Whether or not a public

Cases of interest

Dismissal grounds
Sexton and Kistler were public safety officers. The city department of public safety (DPS) provided police, fire, and ambulance services to its residents. In 1974, the DPS began recording telephone conversations that took place in its
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employee enjoys a First Amendment free speech right must be examined under the Pickering balancing test. The Pickering test involves balancing the employee's right to free speech against the interest of the public employer. The first step in this inquiry is to determine whether it was clearly established that the two officers' speech was a matter of public concern at the time they were terminated. Prior case law holds that speech that discloses allegations of criminal activity committed by public officials occupies the highest rung of hierarchy of First Amendment values. Such speech is of inherent public concern. The chief argues that no specific prior case law holds that announcing a city official's potentially illegal recording of private telephone conversations is a matter of public concern. The Pickering test, however, does not require such specificity. At the time of the terminations the law was clearly established that disclosure of potential illegal conduct of public officials was a matter of public concern. The second step of the Pickering test requires a balancing of the governmental employer's interest against that of the employee. For the employer to prevail in this step the employer must produce sufficient evidence that the speech had an adverse effect on the efficiency of the employer's operations. Here, the chief asserts that the reporting of the alleged misconduct violated department rules, made various supervisors angry, and created a significant political problem within the DPS. The chief has simply failed, however, to provide evidence of this assertion. A government employer must make a substantial showing that speech is in fact disruptive before that speech may be punished. The chief has failed to present evidence as to how many persons were upset about the news or any specific instance where the speech had disrupted department operations. Alternatively the chief argues that there were sufficient independent reasons for terminating the two officers' employment - the automobile wreck and the violation of various department rules. Thus, he asserts that the termination was based on legitimate unrelated conduct. While this may be the case, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Sexton and Kistler were discharged for the disclosure of the wiretap, not for the reasons stated by the chief. The timing of the terminations was suspiciously close to the protected speech activity. Kistler was discharged six days after the disclosure for an accident that occurred some six months earlier. Three days after the disclosure of the wiretap the administrative investigation was launched against Sexton. These two terminations took place in a department where terminations were rare. A jury must consider these matters. Denial for motion of summary judgment based on qualified immunity affirmed. Matter to proceed. [Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2000)]

Transfer
Allison and Henry were ten-year veteran sheriff's deputies. Both were assigned to the warrant division. In 1996, Allison publicly sought the nomination for the Democratic Party for the job of sheriff. He lost the primary election. However, he and Henry then publicly supported the Democratic candidate against the Republican incumbent. Henry and Allison agreed to allow their names to be published in the local newspaper on a list of supporters of the Democratic challenger. The incumbent sheriff was reelected. Eleven days later, Allison and Henry were informed by memo that they were being reassigned outside the warrant division. Allison was assigned to a jail position and Henry was reassigned to a court security position operating an X-ray machine. Two other deputies whose names appeared in the newspaper advertisement were also transferred. Allison and Henry filed suit alleging that the reassignments to less prestigious and less desirable positions were the result of unlawful retaliation in response to their participation in activities protected by the First Amendment. While they originally named both the county and the sheriff as defendants, the court rejected their claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity. The county moved for summary judgment alleging that it is not liable for the employment actions of the sheriff.
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HELD: A municipal government is generally immune from constitutional tort liability unless such liability arises out of the execution of an official policy or custom of a municipality. A single action by a municipal official possessing final policymaking authority regarding the action in question constitutes the official policy of the municipality. The determination of whether a municipal official welds final policymaking authority regarding a particular action constitutes a question of state law. Prior cases hold that Texas law unequivocally vests the sheriff with final policymaking authority with respect to filling available vacancies in the sheriff's department. However, the instant case is somewhat different because this sheriff's department operates under a statutory civil service system. County civil service rules regulate employment decisions regarding transfers, reassignments and demotions. Under the rules, the sheriff has the authority to reassign employees to positions in the same grade in salary in order to maintain the efficiency and productivity of the department. The rules further state that reassignments are not subject to the same rules as transfers. Similarly, reassignments are not subject to appellate review by the civil service commission. The county asserts that the reassignments involve no reduction in rank or decrease in salary and thus cannot be the basis for a federal civil rights claim. However, the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled that such lateral transfers may be viewed as demotions when the new jobs in the jail are not as interesting or prestigious as jobs in the law enforcement section. A jury might reasonably find that the transfers of the plaintiffs to their new positions after having worked at least ten years in the warrant division were sufficiently adverse to construe these employment actions as demotions for the purposes of finding liability. The plaintiff who claims a public employer retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment right to free expression bears the burden of proving his conduct was constitutionally protected and a motivating factor in the employer's adverse employment action. There is no question that campaigning for a political candidate relates to a matter of public concern. The two deputies' actions were clearly protected by the First Amendment. The plaintiffs have also presented a presumptive case that the reassignments were politically motivated. They had worked in the previous positions for over ten years, they had consistently received above average evaluations, and the reassignments occurred merely eleven days after the reelection of the sheriff. Likewise, two other deputies who supported the sheriff's opponent were transferred from the warrant division the same day. The county's motion for summary judgment is denied because of factual questions a jury must consider. [Allison v. Tarrant County, Texas, 92 F. Supp.2d 601 (N.D. Tex. 2000)]

Sex discrimination
On June 16, 1997, Sumner was hired as a police officer for the sheriff's department. Under the collective bargaining agreement she was considered to be on a probationary status for her first year of employment. She satisfactorily performed her duties as a probationary police officer and after eleven months of probation was evaluated as "above average" by her supervisor. In August 1997, Sumner became pregnant. She approached her commander to discuss possible accommodation in her probationary period on account of her pregnancy. Sumner told the commander of her need to take time off to give birth and requested that her probationary period be extended so that she could return to work and complete the remainder of her probation without being required to start a new one-year probationary period. Citing the collective bargaining agreement the commander told Sumner that only employees with more than one year of service were allowed to take a leave of absence without pay. Thus, if she left without attaining such status, she would have to resign, reapply, and, if accepted, complete another full year of probation. Sumner continued to work at the sheriff's department until May 6, 1998, when she began labor pains. She used sick leave for eight days, exhausting
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her available leave on May 19. She returned her uniform on May 20 and gave birth to her baby on May 21. She did not return to work after May 20. The county completed a separation report on May 28 and on June 1 informed her that she was terminated. Sumner filed sex discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She alleged discrimination based on her pregnancy as well as being treated differently than a male officer whose probationary period was also interrupted by injury. In response to a conciliation agreement negotiated by the EEOC, the county offered to reinstate Sumner to her position at an increased salary and offered to extend her probation two months and two days. Sumner rejected the offer and filed suit. The county moves for summary judgment on the matter. 

HELD: Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex. In 1978, the law was amended to provide that "because of sex" included pregnancy. Here, the county argues that although Sumner was clearly a member of a protected class - a pregnant individual - her claim fails because she did not suffer an adverse employment action because she voluntarily turned in her uniform prior to termination. The county also argues she was not qualified for her position because she did not report to work and that the non-protected person that she compares herself to is not a similarly situated employee. These arguments are without merit. Sumner clearly suffered an adverse employment action; she was discharged from her job for failing to report to work after experiencing labor pains, i.e., was affected by pregnancy. Likewise, she was qualified for her position. She had been performing her position at a satisfactory level. Finally, the male officer to whom she compares herself is similarly situated for the purposes of establishing a discrimination case. He was an officer in his ninth month of his probationary year when he suffered an on-the-job injury. As a result of the injury he was unable to work for ten

 weeks and was separated from employment from the sheriff's department. After his injury he was permitted to return to work and complete the remaining portion of his probationary period without restarting a new period. The fact that the male officer's temporary disability was the result of an on-the-job injury whereas Sumner's was the result of a pregnancy is not material. The county also wishes to introduce into evidence the conciliation offer made through EEOC prior to the filing of the suit. Federal law, however, prohibits the use of such offers without the written consent of all parties involved. Here, Sumner has not consented to the introduction of the letter at trial and therefore it must be excluded. Summary judgment for county denied. Case to proceed to trial. [Sumner v. Wayne County, Michigan, 94 F.Supp.2d 822 (E.D. Mich.2000)]

Disciplinary procedures
Sullivan was a two-year veteran officer. He and another officer stopped a car and questioned the passenger, a 17-year-old female, about underage smoking. When the 17-year-old passenger was asked to produce identification, she showed the officers her older sister's driver's license. Sullivan apparently determined that the license was not the 17-year-old's and told her he could take her to jail and write her tickets for underage smoking and using false identification. Sullivan then asked for and received the female's phone number and told her he would not return her billfold unless she gave him a kiss. After the female kissed Sullivan on the cheek he returned the billfold and asked her to meet him at the high school parking lot after he had finished his shift. She did not do so. Subsequently, the girl's mother contacted the police department and told them of Sullivan's alleged conduct. Following an investigation the chief of police suspended Sullivan for five days without pay. The officer requested a hearing before the police merit commission. The three-member commission subsequently conducted the hearing. It agreed with the chief of police's findings but suspended Sullivan without pay for one year and ordered him to serve a two-year
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probationary period. Additionally, the commission ordered him to submit to a mental health evaluation. Sullivan appealed the ruling to a trial court. He filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that neither of the three commissioners nor the chief of police had authority to discipline him because all four resided outside the city limits in violation of the Indiana constitution. He also alleged that he had been denied due process at the disciplinary hearing and that his punishment was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court granted summary judgment for the city and officer appeals.

HELD: The disciplining of police officers in Indiana is within the province of the government's executive, rather than judicial, branch. A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body when no compelling circumstances are present. Judicial review of administrative decisions is very limited. Deference is to be given to the expertise of the administrative body. Discretionary decisions of administrative bodies are entitled to deference absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Review is limited to determining whether the administrative body adhered to proper legal procedure and made a finding based upon substantial evidence in accordance with appropriate legal provisions. Sullivan's first contention is that members of the board lacked authority to discipline him because they were not in compliance with the state residency requirements. The evidence suggests that all three members of the board as well as the chief live outside of the city limits of Evansville. However, Indiana law holds that when a judge is called to try a case and no objection is made, all objections are deemed waived on appeal. In the present case the commission was acting under color of authority pursuant to their appointment and, as such, were de facto judges. Any challenge of authority should have been made at the time the irregularities occurred and may not be raised on appeal for the first time. One who holds office under color of an appointment and discharges the

 purported duties of office in full view of the public without being an intruder is at least a de facto official. The authority of a de facto official cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of a de facto officer's acts may only be challenged directly against the individual who purports to hold the office. Sullivan argues, however, that he did not learn of the constitutional violations until long after the hearing and could not have raised the issue at the hearing. Nonetheless, the law required him to make any objection prior to the hearing. The officer further argues he was denied due process of law because he was not given direct notice of the charges to be considered by the commission and because he was punished for uncharged prior bad acts. Indiana statute sets forth the procedures to be followed in the case of a police discipline hearing. Once again, by continuing to participate in the hearing without raising objection, Sullivan has waived any subsequent claim of irregularity. For example, he cannot complain that he lacked proper notice of the hearing when he in fact appeared and participated in the hearing. Police merit board hearings are administrative actions that allow for less formality than civil proceedings before a court. The decision of the board will not be disturbed as long as the hearing was full and fair before an impartial body and conducted in good faith. Finally, the officer argues that the commission did not have the authority to place him on two years' probation and require him to undergo a mental examination and the commission's ultimate sanction was arbitrary and capricious. In Indiana, administrative bodies may impose only those disciplinary measures sanctioned by the enabling statute. Nowhere in the law does it authorize the imposition of either a probationary period or mental health evaluation as a form of discipline for a police officer. That portion of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions to the commission to vacate the probationary period and mental health evaluation portion of the discipline. While Sullivan argues that the one-year suspension and the subsequent loss of $47,000 in salary was a
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stiff fine for violating three department regulations, it is not the job of the court to second guess the administrative body when no compelling circumstances are present. The court will not modify a penalty imposed by a disciplinary body unless the action is shown to be arbitrary and capricious. An arbitrary and capricious decision is one that is patently unreasonable. It is made without consideration of facts and total disregard of the circumstances and lacks any basis that might lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. The commission's decision in this case, while harsh, does not rise to the level of patently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. [Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.W.2d 182 (Ind. App.2000)] was ordered evaluated by a psychologist as to his fitness for duty. As a result of that evaluation and the prior investigation Cecil was notified in October that he was being terminated as a Boston police officer. On appeal to the police commission, the hearing officer found that the department's use of administrative leave to extend Cecil's probationary period of employment was inconsistent with basic merit principles of civil service because it was intended, at least in part, to block his attainment of job tenure. The hearing officer ruled that such an administrative leave would have no effect on the probationary period. The full police commission subsequently adopted the hearing officer's recommendation that Cecil be recognized as having attained tenure status during the time he was on paid leave. Department appeals. Trial court upheld the police commission's interpretation of the law and department appeals.

HELD: With respect to police officers and fire fighters the legislature has recognized the special need of a prolonged probationary period. Courage, good judgment, and the ability to work under stress in the public interest and as part of an organization are qualities that are not quickly perceived. The purpose of the statute is to ensure sufficient time for careful determination of whether these factors are present in a sufficient degree. The statute calls for newly appointed police officers to "actually perform the duties of such position on a full time basis for a probationary period of twelve months." The police commission exceeded its authority when it credited to Cecil nine days he did not serve in his probationary period. The police department has a legitimate interest in placing any officer on administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning the officer's fitness. The police commission concluded that because the department could conduct its investigation against Cecil as a tenured employee just as easily as it could if he were a probationary employee, then he should not be deprived of the basic merit principles of civil service. That reasoning is hollow. The department proceeded judiciously in this case. It did so out of

Disciplinary procedures
Cecil was appointed a Boston police officer on March 22, 1995, and began his one-year statutory probationary period. On March 12 of the following year a protective order was issued against him. Cecil notified his captain of the existence of the order as required by departmental rules and a hearing was scheduled for March 22. He surrendered his service weapon at the time. Cecil was the subject of an ongoing departmental investigation that had begun earlier in March involving his marital circumstances, prior military experience, and a civilian complaint. As a result of the investigation the internal affairs bureau recommended that Cecil was unfit for duty. On March 13, the police commissioner notified the officer that effective the next day he was being placed on paid leave and relieved of his duties as a police officer pending the outcome of the investigation. On March 21, the department exercised its authority under Massachusetts' law and notified Cecil that his probationary period was being extended for two months. No reasons were given for the extension. On March 22, the protective order was vacated. Accordingly, Cecil requested permission to return to his duties. He received no response. Similarly, a request by his lawyer for reinstatement and recession of the extension of the probationary period went unanswered. In July, Cecil
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fairness to Cecil, because it was mindful of its responsibility to the public, and because of the time, training, and money it had invested in Cecil's appointment. The police commissioner certainly could have sent Cecil a termination notice on March 13. The commissioner chose, however, not to act in haste and for that Cecil may not receive a windfall. The legitimacy of the need to promptly take a probationary officer out of service pending an investigation as to his fitness justifies the need for tolling his 12-month probationary period. The paid administrative leave imposed on Cecil pending the outcome of the investigation as to specific matters that affected his fitness served to toll his probationary period. Judgment of trial court vacated and termination of officer reinstated. [Police Commissioner of Boston v. Cecil, 727 N.E.2d 846 (Mass. 2000)] $38,274 to $55,298. Top of scale pay in the final year will be $57,233. The contract, retroactive to May 1, was negotiated by the Metropolitan Alliance of Police.

Farmington, New Mexico

police officers
After a year of negotiations a one-year contract has been approved by the Farmington City Council and the police officers' union. The contract grants a six percent wage boost. This is the first pay hike for officers in two years. Local 7911 of the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, represents the 51 police officers covered by the pact.

Simi Valley, California

police officers
A one-year memorandum of understanding granting a two percent raise and improved retirement benefits has been finalized between the City of Simi Valley and the Simi Valley Police Officers Association. Beginning in fiscal year 2000-2001, officers who work until age 55 with 25 years of service will receive 75 percent of their highest year's salary. As part of the agreement, the city will conduct a salary survey of area departments. If the study results show Simi Valley officers are underpaid, the city will make salary adjustments. The contract, which covers 103 officers, is effective July 1. 
SETTLEMENTS

Amarillo, Texas

police officers
A wage referendum has resulted in a 12 percent wage hike for Amarillo police officers. In May, voters approved by a slim margin the pay hike. The election drive was spearheaded by the Amarillo Police Officers Association (APOA). Texas law does not permit the APOA and the city to negotiate wages but does allow the electorate to authorize a pay hike by popular vote.

Tazewell County, Illinois

deputy sheriffs

Bartlett, Illinois

police officers
Tazewell County and its deputy sheriffs represented by the Fraternal Order of Police have agreed to a new multi-year contract. The settlement came last month after the deputies worked more than 18 months without a labor agreement. Under the pact a four percent wage hike is granted the first year, followed by three percent in each of the next two years. The agreement is retroactive to December 1, 1998.
The Village of Bartlett and the local police officers' union have come to terms on a contract that will run through April 30, 2003. Raises of three and one-half to four percent will be awarded each year to all officers below the rank of sergeant. During the first year of the contract a newly hired officer will earn a base of $36,980. In the pact's second year, the pay range for officers will be