Delegates to the Association's Washington, D.C. convention heard the Vice President speak during a gathering to honor NAPO's TOP COPS award recipients. In his remarks at the ceremony, Gore stated that he supported collective bargaining for police officers as well as the addition of 50,000 more federally-funded community police officers. The Vice President also called for a constitutional amendment to ensure crime victims' rights and mandatory child safety locks on firearms. He called

Thomas J. Scotto, President of NAPO, said that the group endorsed Gore because he earned it. "This endorsement is based on his past performance and his unwavering support of the law enforcement community," Scotto stated.

About 300 delegates representing 4,000 law enforcement organizations attended the convention. Through its affiliates, NAPO claims representation of over 220,000 law enforcement personnel.

In May, the Executive Board of the Fraternal Order of Police endorsed the Vice President's bid for higher office. Support for Gore is also expected from the International Union of Police Associations and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, both affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

In opening the hearing before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Senator Mike DeWine (R.-Ohio) stated that public safety officers should have the basic rights of most U.S. citizens, including the right to form unions and bargain collectively. Currently,

The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (S. 1016) would authorize the Federal Labor Relations Authority to oversee collective bargaining by police officers and fire fighters in those states that do not have bargaining laws in place. A hearing on the House version of the bill (H.R. 1093) was held in May.

Appearing in support of the measure were Gerald Flynn, National Vice President of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and Gilbert Gallegos, Grand Lodge President of the Fraternal Order of Police. Testimony was also

Opposing the bill was Chicago attorney R. Theodore Clark, Jr., of the law firm Seyfarth Shaw. Clark testified on behalf of the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties, and several other municipal management organizations.

The public safety labor leaders called the legislation "crucial" and said it would not require federal intervention in local affairs, only that states

The summer hearing marked the first time both houses of Congress have taken any action on a public safety bargaining law. While the House version enjoys fairly wide bipartisan support, far fewer Senate sponsors have come forward. The measure has an uncertain future. 

Earlier this summer, twenty Defiance, Ohio, police officers sued their employer contending that the police department is violating federal law by not granting them time off for working overtime. The Defiance officers join police personnel in other cities who have filed similar lawsuits, accusing their employers of breaking promises by forcing them to take money instead of days off.

In 1994, the U.S. Department of Labor ruled that a department may not use pre-set minimum staffing levels to refuse requests for time off without first offering to pay other officers time and one-half to work in place of the requesting officer.

"Excessive overtime fatigues an officer. And if there was a profession that you need to be sharp at, it's police work," said Rich Roberts of the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA), AFL-CIO, which is assisting its locals' lawsuits in

Defiance City Attorney David Williams said the department is willing to compensate the officers for their work but is unable to give time off because of staffing problems. Resignations and retirements have outpaced the city's ability to hire and train new officers. A tight labor market appears to be compounding the problem of attracting new officers.

Ironically, Defiance is the former employer of IUPA National President Sam Cabral. He retired from the agency as a sergeant of detectives before becoming the leader of the union.

To date, the courts have not ruled on the extent to which an employee can choose compensatory time in lieu of cash for overtime. Likewise, the courts have yet to fully consider the relationship between the FLSA and disciplining of a police officer who might refuse to work in excess of 40 hours per week. 

One of the plaintiffs in the Defiance suit, Steve Gebhart, claims to average 12 hours of overtime a week. Gebhart, a canine officer, said, "I spend more time with the dog than I do with my wife. When you're young, that overtime is nice. When you get old, you want that time off." 

Last month, Naum L. Ware, 41, was terminated from the force because he authored a thinly veiled book about the police department that included tales of sexual impropriety, theft, and spousal abuse. The book, "The Rose Garden," was published by a vanity press and uses fictitious names for Ware's colleagues. Ware, a 23-year veteran of the department, said he wrote the book to highlight unethical behavior and cronyism in the department.

In dismissing Ware, Chief of Police Bernard Melekian said the book did not touch upon matters of public concern and that some of the content reflected bias against women, homosexuals, and

Many of the events recounted in the book are derived from documented court cases and police reports. These are supplemented with unsubstantiated tales such as that of a sergeant who repeatedly rapes a cadet and an officer who tears up traffic citations in exchange for sexual favors. The discharge notice reveals the identities of officers who are given pseudonyms in the book.

In reaction to his loss of job, Ware, a lay Baptist minister, stated, "Whatever happened to the First Amendment?" The former officer says he plans to seek arbitration over the firing and will sue to get his job back, if necessary.

The book is Ware's second effort. In 1994, publication of "Roses Have Thorns," about discrimination within the department also caused controversy.

In recent weeks, police groups in Louisville, Kentucky, and Albany, New York, have either sued or threatened suit to limit the citizen panels in investigating police misconduct allegations. 

In Louisville, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) local lodge instituted suit to block granting of subpoena power to the panel. Currently, a temporary injunction has stayed the board's authority. The review board was created in June when city aldermen overrode a mayoral veto. The

"We want to nip it in the bud. We would rather try to get it declared illegal now before it gets started," said local FOP lodge president Rick McCubbin.

In Albany, the Police Officers Union is contending that the newly created review board threatens officers' right to privacy and violates their labor agreement. Specifically, the union objects giving the panel access to department personnel files as well as the use of an independent monitor to oversee police internal affairs inquiries into use of force complaints. The union has threatened suit over the board's authority.

"Unfettered access to personnel records without an officer's permission, particularly by an outside observer, is against the law," said union attorney Christopher Gardner.

Cases of interest

HELD: The city contends that during the times the officers worked their extra jobs, they were independent contractors. Thus, the city argues, it is not under the FLSA requirement of prompt payment of wages. The FLSA defines "employee" and "employer." These definitions, however, are notoriously circular and provide little clarity. Consequently, the courts have adopted an economic realities test to determine if individuals are "employees" under the FLSA. The focus of the test is whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, in fact, in business for himself. Here, the city argues it has no say in the length of employment, the location of employment, nor the number of hours required for the assignment. Rather, it merely provides the personnel needed. However, the facts

HELD: The plaintiffs contend they possess liberty and property interest in police academy positions and the concomitant opportunity to become police officers. They assert that their loss of these interests is due to the city's lack of a coherent drug testing policy. In essence, they blame the city for its dispute with the FOP over the applicable drug use standards. The city responds that the would-be cadets possess no property interest in employment with the city and have been deprived of no liberty interest. When considering a procedural due process claim, the court must first determine whether the interest at stake is a protected property interest. Property interests are not created by the Constitution but rather by state law. A review of Ohio law reveals that a police cadet has no property interest in becoming a police officer. An individual who enters an academy as a police recruit encounters a probationary period and a permanent appointment is not complete until after that period. Ohio law provides that probationary employees do not possess a property interest in government employment. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot prevail on this claim. As to the liberty interest claim, a person has a protected liberty interest in his reputation, good name, honor, and integrity, as well as in being free to move about, live, and practice his profession without the burden of an unjustified label of infamy. To establish a liberty interest, an individual must demonstrate a false statement, that is stigmatizing in nature, relating to government employment, and that is made public by the government employer

HELD: If a public employee's speech addresses a matter of personal concern, discipline of the employee does not violate the First Amendment. If his speech addresses a matter of political, social or other concern to the community,

HELD: The FLSA states that employers may not employ an employee for longer than 40 hours per week unless such employee receives overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times the employee's regular rate of pay. An exception exists to this rule for employees who work under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement. In determining the number of hours for which the employee is employed, the regulations provide that there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes when such time is excluded from measured working time by the express terms of a labor agreement or by a custom or practice under a collective bargaining agreement. The city argues that in this case it has no liability for the time spent changing clothes because exclusion of that time is part of the work custom of the job. Neither the FLSA nor its implementing regulations define the terms "custom" and "practice." The term "custom" suggests an ongoing understanding with some continuity or an ongoing course of conduct. Here, for some 30 years, with union acquiescence, the city has not compensated correctional officers for change time. This clearly constitutes a custom and practice. The officers argue, however, that to constitute a custom or practice under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement the issue must have been raised in formal collective bargaining negotiations. No court, however, has held that absence of formal negotiations precludes the existence of the required custom or practice. In this case, the parties' employment relationship is governed by the labor agreement. Uniform change time is the type of activity that ordinarily would be discussed during negotiating sessions if the union were inclined to

HELD: Employees with permanent status in civil service may be disciplined only for cause expressed in writing. Legal cause for disciplinary action exists whenever the employee's conduct impairs the efficiency of the public service in which the employee is engaged and the appointing authority has the obligation to prove the impairment.

HELD: Massachusetts statute imposes upon a public employer the obligation to negotiate in good faith with the union that the members of the collective bargaining unit have chosen as the unit's exclusive representative. This duty necessarily entails the duty to refrain from circumventing the union by dealing directly with bargaining unit employees as to mandatory subjects in negotiations. So-called direct dealing is impermissible for two reasons. First, direct dealing violates the union statutory right to speak exclusively for the employees who have elected it to serve as their sole representative. Second, direct dealing undermines the employees' belief that the union actually possesses the power of exclusive representation to which the statute entitles it. While an employer does not violate the law by merely communicating its bargaining positions to its employees; surveys of employees as to mandatory subjects of bargaining are a different matter. This is particularly true if bargaining discussions have already begun. Exchanging information about employees' views on these subjects is a crucial element of any negotiation between an employer and a union. Employers who

HELD: Sadowsky argues that the jury should have been instructed that Rotkiewicz was a public official and as such was required to prove actual malice in order to recover damages for defamation. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that a public official could not recover for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proved that the statement was made with actual malice. This rule was based on the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. The Constitution protects such debate even when it includes vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The question presented in this matter is whether a patrol level police officer qualifies as a public official for the purposes of this actual malice rule. One of the major factors in determining whether a government employee is a public official for purposes of defamation law is whether the employee's position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it. Law enforcement officials, from a chief of police to a patrol officer, necessarily exercise state power in the performance of their duties. All police officers are empowered to further the preservation

HELD: The MTCA states that a governmental entity and its employees acting within the scope of their employment shall not be liable to any claimant who is an employee of a governmental entity and whose injury is covered by the worker's compensation law of the state. The question presented in this case is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the statute. The trial court found that at the time of the injury Leslie was employed by a governmental entity, the county, and was in the performance of his duties as deputy sheriff. The judge found that the city is a governmental entity and that Campbell was working in the scope of his employment. The court further found that Leslie's injuries were covered by worker's compensation law and he had received such benefits. Applying the facts to the statute the court ruled that a subsequent civil suit is barred by the MTCA. This is a correct interpretation of the statute. The injured deputy cannot bring a civil suit against the governmental entity or its employee that precipitated the deputy's injuries. Affirmed for city. [Leslie v. City of Biloxi, 758 So.2d 430 (Miss. 2000)]

HELD: Worker's compensation benefits are

HELD: Under Wyoming worker's compensation statute an "injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging. In interpreting this phrase a court must look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must follow the plain meaning of that language. An exposure to a potential illness or communicable disease does not fit within the meaning of "any harmful change in the human organism." Coming into contact with unidentified blood in the course of employment is not a covered injury under Wyoming worker's compensation law. The cost of a blood test as a precautionary diagnostic measure need not be awarded as a benefit under the statute. While the wounds and scrapes incurred by Williams and the subsequent testing of his blood might well fit within the statutory definition of "compensable injury," he failed to thus describe his injury. Rather, his claim stated only that he came in contact with blood while arresting a suspect. Williams did not describe his open wounds or scrapes as constituting even part of his injuries. Thus, because of his failure to properly prepare the paperwork, he is not entitled to payment for the cost of the blood test. [Williams v. State of Wyoming, 2 P.3d 543 (Wyo. 2000)]