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Volume 19, Number 4

FOP rejects Board recommendation; endorse Bush

Rejecting the recommendation of its Executive Board to back Vice President Al Gore, the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) endorsed Governor George W. Bush as its presidential candidate. The endorsement came when National Trustees convened in Oklahoma City earlier this month. No vote tabulation was announced but FOP rules require a two-thirds majority for endorsement.

The Bush candidacy was lobbied heavily by Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Governor Keating told the FOP representatives that law enforcement issues demanded a conservative like Bush and "they would rue the day" they endorsed Gore.

Various FOP delegates expressed support of Bush as the candidate who would appoint conservative federal judges and maintain a zero tolerance position on terrorism. The latter concern apparently stems from President Bill Clinton's pardon of several Puerto Rican separatists who were responsible for a wave of bombings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

Other issues swaying the delegates reportedly included Gore's failure to support White House uniformed Secret Service employees in their try to gain bargaining rights, as well as the recent actions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in bringing "pattern and practice" police misconduct suits against local departments. The FOP is the bargaining agent in at least two of the jurisdictions that have been sued - Pittsburgh and Columbus. The Columbus FOP lodge has joined with the city in aggressively fighting the DOJ suit in that community. 

In siding with the Texas governor, the group

picked the candidate that opposes federal legislation granting police officers the right to bargain collectively, a cornerstone of the FOP's national legislative agenda. According to FOP National President Gilbert Gallegos, Bush has agreed to listen to the group's views on collective bargaining and due process rights for police officers.

In making the announcement Gallegos said, "The FOP believes that Governor Bush will be a President who will do what he says and will do right by the cop on the beat." He added, "The Fraternal Order of Police strongly believes that Governor Bush's genuine commitment to law enforcement and his crime-fighting record in Texas make him the best candidate for America's police officers." Gallegos noted that during the governor's tenure violent crime in Texas has decreased by 20 percent.

The trustees' rejection of the Executive Board's recommendation placed Gallegos in a peculiar position. In June, when announcing the recommendation of the Executive Board, Gallegos had said, "An objective review of the candidates' responses, follow-up interviews and analysis of their records clearly demonstrate that the election of Vice President Gore would best serve to further the legislative goals of the Fraternal Order of Police." However, true to the FOP's advertised assertion of being member controlled, the National President followed the majority will. 

In 1992 and 1996, the FOP, the nation's largest police labor group, sided with the Clinton-Gore ticket. The FOP endorsement of Bush carries political value but no economic reward. The national FOP does not make contributions to candidates. 

Gore has received the endorsement of the other major police labor organizations.


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Binding arbitration awaits California governor's signature

California lawmakers last month approved a bill granting binding arbitration to police and fire fighter unions in wage disputes. The bill now awaits the signature of Governor Gray Davis before becoming law. The governor, who has taken no public position on the measure, has until the end of the month to sign it into law.

The bill, that has been several years working its way through the legislative process, mandates establishment of an arbitration panel in cases of impasse over police or fire fighter wages and benefits. The parties would submit last-best offers on each contested issue. The panel would then select the submissions that best comply with specified statutory factors, such as the employer's ability to pay, the rate of inflation, wages in comparable jurisdictions, and the peculiarities of the job. Any panel decision could be amended by the parties prior to it being made public.

The proposed law does not provide for arbitration of non-economic items, such as working condition disputes nor discipline and grievance actions.

Under the bill, each party to the negotiations will appoint a member of the arbitration panel and the two panel members will select a third person to serve as chair. If the two appointed members cannot

decide on a chair, the bill specifies a procedure that involves striking names from a seven-person list established by the American Arbitration Association. The panel is granted subpoena power and authority to examine the records of the employer and the employee organization.

Passage of the measure brought an immediate retort from the League of California Cities: a threatened lawsuit. League officials claim the measure violates the state constitution because it removes control of 60 percent of a city's budget (e.g., personnel costs) and places it in the hands of non-elected arbitrators. Another critic, state Senator Ray Haynes, a Republican, said the measure "represents the destruction of representative democracy" because it removes the issue of expenditure of public funds from the hands of elected officials. 

Currently under California law police officers and fire fighters possess the right to join unions, present grievances, and bargain collectively. Public employers are required to bargain in good faith but mediation is the current remedy for impasse. However, twenty-three local jurisdictions already have binding arbitration under local procedures. These jurisdictions would not be affected by the proposal. 

Police deaths on the rise in first half of year

The number of police deaths nationwide rose sharply during the first six months of 2000, according to preliminary figures released by the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). Seventy-six officers were killed in the line of duty from January through July, a 13 percent jump over the 67 officers who lost their lives during the same period last year.

Of the 76 officers who were killed during the first half of the year, 26 were shot to death while 24 died in automobile accidents. Six were struck by cars while outside their vehicles, five were killed in aircraft accidents, and four succumbed to job-

related illnesses. Two officers died in motorcycle mishaps while one was killed in an accident involving a horse.

"These numbers are very troubling, especially at a time when the nation's overall crime rate has been on a steady decline," said NLEOMF Chairman Craig W. Floyd. "This is stark proof that no matter how great the danger, our police officers always put the safety of others above their own."

California and Georgia have experienced seven police deaths each, followed by Louisiana and NewYork with five deaths each. Maryland and Tennessee each have seen four officers killed.



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Court denies claim of "too smart" police applicant 

The saga of the man too smart to be a police officer has apparently come to an end. Last month, the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a Connecticut community violated no rights of Robert Jordan when it refused to process his application as a police officer after he scored too high on an intelligence test. A panel of judges ruled that the City of New London presented a rational basis for its decision not to consider Jordan for the job. Jordan said he would not pursue the matter further. "I'm just so burned out."

The 49-year-old Jordan, a college graduate and former prison guard, gained national publicity in 1997 when New London officials rejected his application after he scored a 33 on the Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level Exam, the equivalent of an IQ of 125. The score was well above the median of 21 suggested for police officers. The

city refused to process his application further on the grounds that he was overqualified and would become bored on the job.

Newspapers and television stations across the country carried the story. The incident earned Jordan an appearance on the Tonight Show with Jay Leno where the comedian suggested he take the test again but not study this time.

The federal appeals court noted that no constitutional right to be a police officer exists. Consequently, the municipality need only show a rational basis for its policy of exclusion. The city's policy passes this test because it has an interest in reducing employee turnover and lessening the cost of hiring and training police officers. "[I]t matters not whether the city's decision was correct so long as it was rational," the judicial panel said in a unanimous unsigned opinion.

Forced to work suit settled

Defiance, Ohio, officials agreed to hire more police officers to settle a lawsuit claiming that the city's police department broke federal labor law by forcing officers to work excessive hours without time off. As reported in last month's Police Labor Monthly, the Defiance Police Officer's Association had sued the city claiming that officers were not allowed to take days off for accumulated overtime but were required to take cash instead. Staffing shortages were blamed for the excessive work hours. As part of an agreement reached August 29, city officials agreed to hire four more police officers within the next year and pay $25,000 to the department's current 24 officers and to the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, lawyers who represented the officers. 

"We said from the beginning of the suit that we were simply seeking fairness," said Steve Gebhart, president of the union local.

Similar suits are pending in other cities.

Some San Francisco cops earning big bucks

Across the nation police officer pay ranges widely. Despite a perception of depressed police wages generally, some officers do quite well economically. If a list of the highest paid officers were compiled, some San Francisco officers would certainly be near the top, according to The San Francisco Chronicle newspaper. 

The newspaper reported last month that officer Dominic Yin was on a pace to earn nearly

$165,000 this year while motorcycle officer James Petrie is zooming toward $150,000. In fact, city projections indicate that 318 police officers ranging from patrol officers to deputy chiefs are expected to earn anywhere from $100,000 to $167,000 this year. 

How can this happen? Overtime, what else. In the case of officer Yin, he will earn $97,000 in city paid overtime. Yin had spent his time



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researching police disciplinary cases. Petrie, on the other hand, will earn his overtime pay from privately paid "second duty" work such as providing funeral escorts and working with movie film crews.

Of course, the cost of living is high in the Bay Area.

Litigation

Cases of interest

argue the board dismissed them without notice and an opportunity to be heard. They base their property claim on the city employee rule stating that employees may be terminated for any just cause. The former officers argue this statement modifies their at-will status by establishing a contractual right to termination only for just cause. Property interests are determined by reference to state law. Tennessee law has long recognized the doctrine of employment at-will with the mutual right of either party to terminate such a relationship with or without cause. Under Tennessee law, what would otherwise be an at-will contract may be modified by specific language which evidences an intent to modify the existing employment contract. Prior Tennessee cases hold that in order to constitute a contract, an employee handbook must contain specific language showing the employer's intent to be bound by the handbook provision. The handbook in this case does manifest such a specific intent to be bound. A Tennessee case last year held that while a handbook could modify the employment agreement, there must be unequivocal language demonstrating the employer's intent to be bound by the handbook. That court even suggested that employers express that intent by stating that the document represented the parties' "entire agreement of employment." Using this high standard as the test, the plaintiffs in this case have not met the standard. In addition, the handbook states that the board "may" fire an employee for any just cause. The term "may" is permissive and suggests there are other permissible means for terminating a city employee. Under Tennessee law, the language of the employee handbook did not evidence a clear intent to create a property interest in continued employment. Even if the board's rule on termination created an

Dismissal procedures

The city personnel manual stated, "A city employee may be terminated for any just cause at the discretion of the board." Brown and Anderson were police officers. At a meeting of the board of commissioners, Brown's continued employment was discussed. Brown had been involved in a shoving incident. After a heated discussion in which the shoving incident was mentioned as the primary reason for dismissal, the town commissioners voted to discharge Brown. His notice of separation stated he was being dismissed for unsatisfactory behavior. The commissioners then voted to dismiss Anderson from the police force because of an alleged conflict of interest. Anderson's wife was one of the board commissioners but Anderson also was employed by both the police and fire departments. One month later Brown and Anderson mailed a letter to the mayor requesting a name clearing hearing arising out of comments made at the board meeting. The letter established a deadline by which the mayor should respond to Brown and Anderson. The two ex-employees stated that if they did not hear from the mayor by the specified date, further action would be taken. However, the mayor did not receive the letter until the day after the deadline. On the same day, Brown and Anderson filed a federal court suit against the town. Consequently, the mayor made no response to their request for a hearing. Trial court granted summary judgment to the city on the issues and former police officers appeal.

HELD: The plaintiffs argue that they were deprived of both a property interest and a liberty interest in continued employment without due process of law. As to the property interest, they



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employment contract between the city and the two former police officers, the ex-officers still cannot establish that they had a property interest in continued employment because the contract did not provide a definite term of employment. Tennessee courts have held that a contract for employment for an indefinite term is a contract at-will and can be terminated by either party at any time without just cause. The former officers also assert a liberty interest violation. A person's reputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A deprivation of any of those interests must be accompanied by notice and an opportunity to be heard or to refute any charges against that person. In this case the city was unable to provide a name clearing hearing. The request for the hearing was received after the deadline set by the former police officers and after a lawsuit had been filed. Thus, as of the date of the filing of the lawsuit, the former officers could not show that they were denied a name-clearing hearing because they could not show that the city was aware of their desire for this hearing. Because the plaintiffs must request a name-clearing hearing and be denied this hearing before they have suffered a deprivation of their liberty interests, the trial court correctly granted the summary judgment for the city. Affirmed for city. [Brown v. City of Niota, Tennessee, 214 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000)] probationary period. A few days later, the police chief told Curby of the council's decision but advised him that he could continue working as an auxiliary officer. Following this conversation, however, Curby was utilized to only a very limited extent. Two months later, Curby advised the police chief that he would be on military leave for two months. When he returned from the military he was restored to his status as an auxiliary officer but again worked very limited hours. When members of the village council found out that Curby was still employed as an auxiliary officer, despite his prior removal as a city marshal, they pressured the police chief to remove him from his position. Thus Curby's employment as an auxiliary officer was terminated. Subsequently, Curby filed suit against the village claiming a denial of due process in violation of federal law protecting the re-employment rights of military veterans. Trial court found for village and former officer appeals.

HELD: To prevail on his due process claim Curby must first establish that he enjoyed a property interest in his position as a law enforcement officer. Property interests are established by state law. Government employment amounts to a protected property interest when the employee has a legitimate expectation of continued employment. A review of Ohio statutes reveals that a person must satisfactorily complete a six-month probationary period before being finally appointed to a permanent position as a deputy marshal. Curby finished his probationary period but the village did not appoint him as a deputy marshal. Thus, he had no reasonable expectation of continued employment. Curby argues that the completion of the probationary period vested him as a permanent employee. This misreads the Ohio statute, however, and prior case law holds that a probationary employee who completes a probationary term but is not finally appointed has no reasonable expectation of continued employment. The statute merely requires that the appointment be made after the six-month probationary period ends, not within the six-month period. Curby also has no claim under federal law protecting the re-

Dismissal procedures

In 1995, the village appointed Curby as an auxiliary police officer. In that capacity he worked approximately 84 hours per month on a part time basis. In late 1996 he was appointed a deputy marshal. Deputy marshals, who were full-time police officers, served a six-month probationary period before being considered for permanent appointment. While working as a deputy marshal, Curby apparently did not always act appropriately. Consequently, the village council voted to remove Curby from his position as deputy marshal, finding that he had failed to satisfactorily complete his


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employment rights of military veterans. Prior Supreme Court decisions hold that federal statutes on military veteran re-employment were enacted for the limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion motivated solely by reserve status. Congress later amended the law to provide that a violation occurs when a person's membership in uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employment decision. In either case, the employee has to show that the employer's adverse employment decision was related to the service in the armed forces. Curby has simply failed to do that. He had the burden of showing that military service was a motivating factor in the village's decision not to re-employ him at the same level of work he enjoyed when he left for military service. Affirmed for village. [Curby v. Archon, 216 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2000)] police officer and ordered Baker to drop the gun. Baker whirled around and immediately started firing at Peterson. Peterson returned two shots at Baker in an attempt to defend himself and Neal. Baker continued firing and fled the scene. Peterson then noticed that Neal was injured. Additional police officers and an ambulance were summoned to the scene. Neal subsequently died from a gunshot wound. The medical examiner determined that the bullet that struck and killed Neal had been fired from Peterson's gun. Peterson stated that at the time he did not realize that he had shot Neal, believing Neal would not be endangered by shots because he was lying on the ground. Subsequently, Neal's family brought suit under federal civil rights laws alleging that Peterson violated the deceased officer's Fourteenth Amendment rights by not following department policy concerning undercover operations. The police department was also sued for failing to train or supervise Peterson properly. Trial court dismissed the case and the family of the deceased officer appeals.

HELD: The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees more than simply fair process. It also bars certain governmental actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. The deceased officer's family argues that Peterson's actions in causing Neal's death were an abuse of executive powers so clearly unjustified as to be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The test of whether Peterson's actions were such an abuse of power is whether Peterson's actions towards Neal shocked the conscience in such a way as to violate the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Normally, where a government employee is afforded an opportunity to deliberate various alternatives prior to electing a course of action, the chosen action shall be deemed "conscience shocking" if the action was taken with deliberate indifference. However, in a rapidly evolving dangerous situation that precludes the luxury of calm and reflective deliberation, a government employee's actions shall shock the conscience only if the actor intended to cause harm.

Civil liability

Neal, a police officer, asked Peterson, another police officer, to accompany him later that day on an undercover assignment that Neal had arranged. Peterson agreed subject to the approval of his supervisor. After learning of the planned operation, the supervisor asked Neal if he wanted additional backup officers to participate in the operation. Neal refused the offer. Later that afternoon Neal and Peterson drove in separate vehicles to a liquor store. Within a few minutes of their arrival a person later identified as Baker approached the car. Neal exited his vehicle and approached Baker, shook his hand, and began engaging him in conversation. They subsequently walked somewhat out of view of Peterson who had remained in his vehicle. A few moments later Peterson saw Neal raise his left hand in what he recognized as a sign of trouble. Since he could no longer see Neal, Peterson exited his car and moved to a better position. What he observed was Baker pointing a pistol directly at Neal's head and jabbing the weapon in a hostile and threatening manner. At that moment Peterson announced that he was a


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In this case, an allegation of deliberate indifference is insufficient to state a cause of action. Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the law enforcement objectives will shock the conscience in cases requiring officers to exercise quick judgment. Trial court found that Peterson did not have time to deliberate about his actions but responded quickly and decisively to protect Neal from the criminal suspect who was pointing a gun at his head. Accordingly, Peterson violated Neal's constitutional rights only if he maliciously and sadistically intended to cause harm. The plaintiffs admit that Peterson accidentally shot Neal in an attempt to protect him. Even if the actions were to rise to the level of deliberate indifference they are insufficient to establish a claim. Since Peterson did not violate Neal's Fourteenth Amendment rights, county officials cannot be held liable for failure to train or supervise Peterson. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Neal v. St. Louis County, Missouri, Board of Police Commissioners, 217 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2000)] First Amendment right to intimate association as well as his right to privacy. Both sides move for a declaratory judgment.

HELD: The United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to intimate association. The court declares that the First Amendment protects certain kinds of highly personal relationships from unjustified interference by the state. The court, however, recognized that there exists a continuum of human relationships potentially protected by the freedom of intimate association. Extremely close relationships, such as family relationships and marriage, are generally afforded greater protection from government interference than are merely social ones. Similarly, there is a zone of privacy that creates a penumbra protected from governmental intrusion. In this case, while any sanctioned marital relationship between Wieland and Yochum would be constitutionally protected, their amorphous social relationship, although apparently intimate to some degree, is not entitled to the full scope of constitutional protection. The relationship may be entitled to some level of protection against unreasonable government interference but not at the same level as marriage. The issue in this case may be resolved by making an analogy to the First Amendment speech cases. In those cases, the court, upon finding existence of constitutionally protected speech, uses a balancing test to determine whether the public employee may be disciplined for his or her speech. A balancing test would appear appropriate here as well. Wieland has an associational interest in continuing his dating relationship with Yochum. On the other hand, the city's interest in maintaining the strict order and efficiency of its police department is high. Because the police department's function as a paramilitary organization is charged with maintaining public safety and order, they may be given more latitude in their decisions regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary government employer. Here, the city's determination of both the potential for disruption as a result of a forbidden activity as well as the employer's response to the perceived

Dismissal grounds

Wieland was a veteran police lieutenant. He maintained an ongoing off-duty relationship with Yochum. At the time Yochum was on probation for the felony offense of receiving stolen property. The acting chief of police issued a written order to Wieland directing him to immediately terminate his relationship with Yochum. The chief cited a department general order that prohibited knowingly associating, on or off-duty, with convicted criminals under circumstances that would bring discredit to the department. The acting chief referred to an incident in which Wieland, while off duty, attended a city ribbon cutting ceremony with Yochum. A photograph of the two was published in the local newspaper. The acting chief believed the public appearance embarrassed the city. His written order threatened Wieland with demotion or termination if he did not sever his relationship with Yochum. Wieland filed suit claiming that the general order as well as the active chief's mandate violated his


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disruption are entitled to consideration judicial deference. The mere fact that Wieland's relationship with Yochum has not as yet directly interfered with the performance of his job does not make it unreasonable to assume a likelihood that it could affect the chain of command as well as the public image of the department. When Wieland appears at public functions in the company of a known felon, that behavior potentially undermines his authority as a police officer. Furthermore, when junior officers observe Wieland appearing publicly with Yochum in direct violation of the general order, it further undermines his ability to serve as a police lieutenant. The court in this case upholds the city's exercise of discretion in regulating its police department. Declaratory judgment for city. [Wieland v. City of Arnold, Missouri, 100 F.Supp.2d 984 (E.D. Mo. 2000)] charges for which he was subsequently acquitted. So long as the defendant is convicted on one or more counts of a multi-count indictment simultaneously disposed of by trial or plea, he is not entitled to reimbursement under the New Jersey statute. Since the statute applies only to acts directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties, such determination can only be made after disposition of the underlying litigation. Acquittal alone is not sufficient to require reimbursement. A complete disposition of charges allows an officer to apply for reimbursement of attorney's fees and to demonstrate that his conduct was directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers and in the furtherance of his official duties as the statute requires. Since the plaintiff was convicted on some counts he is not eligible for reimbursement of attorney's fees. [Johnstone v. Town of Kearny, 754 A.2d 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)]

Attorney's fees

Under New Jersey law, whenever a police officer is a defendant in any legal proceeding arising out of and directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of his official duty, the municipality shall provide him with the necessary means for defense of such action. The municipality will not provide a defense in disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings. If, however, such criminal proceedings are dismissed and finally determined in favor of the officer, he shall be reimbursed for the expense of his defense. Johnstone, a police officer of the town, was indicted on various federal criminal charges regarding excessive use of force. He was convicted on some of the counts but acquitted on other counts. He subsequently filed suit seeking pro rata attorney's fees for the charges that were rendered in his favor. Trial court found for the town on the claim and former officer appeals.

HELD: Johnstone argues that he is entitled to reimbursement for the charges for which he was not convicted. Prior case law rejects the argument that an individual is entitled to a proportionate share of attorney's fees based on the percentage of the

Management rights

The sheriff's department and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The contract covered 220 employees, including 21 detectives. One provision of the pact stated that detectives would "normally not be scheduled to work on a designated holiday." During negotiations for a successor contract, the sheriff proposed removing Columbus Day as a holiday and substituting the day after Thanksgiving. The FOP counterproposed that both days be counted as holidays. Twenty days after the counterproposal, a division commander issued an order that detectives would normally not be scheduled to work holidays. The directive changed a policy that had been in effect since 1985. That policy had allowed detectives to schedule themselves to work holidays and thereby draw extra pay. The new policy had an adverse financial effect on the detectives. In response, the FOP filed an unfair labor practice charge with the state labor board. Following a hearing at which evidence was presented that command staff members made statements indicating that the action


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was retaliatory, the labor board ruled that the directive was issued because of the FOP's failure to agree to the holiday change. The sheriff had committed an unfair labor practice. Sheriff appeals the ruling. Trial court upheld the determination and sheriff appeals.

HELD: The sheriff argues that the directive was merely a management decision enacted for budgetary reasons. He claims the order was lawful because it merely conformed to the plain language of the labor contract. The labor board found this argument irrelevant. Under Ohio law, acts that normally could be done validly may result in a finding of unlawful behavior when the acts interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their lawful collective bargaining rights. The order and the accompanying statements were threatening in nature. The right to bargain collectively includes refusing to concede to proposals, to make counter-proposals, and to negotiate without being coerced when doing so. The labor board did not abuse its discretion when it found that the directive was enacted to punish the FOP if it did not agree to the holiday proposal. Unfair labor practice determination affirmed. [Hamilton County Sheriff v. State Employment Relations Board, 731 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio App. 1999)]

careless driving and was repeatedly disciplined. Under Pennsylvania law, an officer can be dismissed for neglect or violation of any official duty or for inefficiency, neglect, intemperance, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an officer. At the civil service commission hearing on Brooks' dismissal the police chief and the township manager detailed his history of automobile accidents as well as testified personally witnessing Brooks' erratic driving. The town manager also testified as to the township's concern about liability and public safety in connection with Brooks' driving skills. The civil service commission concluded that Brooks' history of on-duty automobile accidents, along with his most recent out-of-state accident, demonstrated a pattern of poor judgment that rose to the level of a violation of official duty, inefficiency, neglect, and conduct unbecoming an officer. The commission concluded that the town had a legitimate interest in avoiding uninsurable liability, protecting its insurability, and protecting the public. On appeal, the trial court affirmed the dismissal. The former officer appeals.

HELD: Brooks argues that the civil service commission abused its discretion in terminating him based solely on his off-duty accident that occurred in Arizona. He argues that over his 23-year career he had already been disciplined for the prior driving infractions and that his professional record had been incident free for the last three years. Under Pennsylvania law an appellate court in reviewing a disciplinary action against a police officer must determine whether the charges brought against the officer are supported by the evidence, whether the penalty imposed is not otherwise prohibited by law, and whether the penalty is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or an abuse of discretion. Nothing in the record supports Brooks' contention that the termination was based solely on the off-duty accident. The commission specifically stated that it considered the accident but did not make that the basis for its decision. Rather, it considered the town's ongoing concerns as well as Brooks' past history. Brooks was terminated not for a single lapse of judgment but rather for a history of accidents that

Dismissal grounds

Brooks was a 23-year veteran patrol officer with the township. In 1997, the township filed administrative charges against him recommending termination of his employment. At the time of the charges, Brooks had just returned from work after recovering from injuries sustained in an automobile accident that had occurred one year earlier while he was on vacation. The administrative charges detailed Brooks' history of 13 on-duty automobile accidents over an 18 year period, including one incidence of striking a pedestrian and the pedestrian's dog and failing to report the incident promptly. Over the course of his career Brooks had been warned of the eventual consequences of his


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resulted from following too close, his inability to anticipate obstacles, and his consistent failure to exercise good judgment. Brooks' failure to improve his driving and his inability to respond in emergencies without endangering himself and others at the very least constitutes neglect, inefficiency, and conduct unbecoming an officer. Conduct unbecoming an officer has been defined to include conduct that adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the police force or tends to destroy public respect for and confidence in the police force. Likewise, the township had legitimate concerns about liability and public safety as well as the public perception of the police department. Dismissal of officer affirmed. [Brooks v. Civil Service Commission of Shaler Township, 755 A.2d 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)]

Hanover Park, Illinois

police officers
The Village of Hanover Park and the Metropolitan Police Alliance have ratified a new three-year labor deal for patrol officers that includes an immediate 3 percent pay boost. The contract is retroactive to November 1, 1999, and moves base pay for a first year officer to $39,042. Top of scale now goes to $53,872. In the last year of the pact, 2002, the pay range increases from $41,829 to $57,720. In addition to the economic gains, officers may now live up to 25 miles from village hall. The previous agreement limited the range to 20 miles. Binding grievance arbitration was also approved. 

Los Altos, California

police officers
Settlements The city and its police officer association have reached an agreement on a contract that will give officers a hefty pay raise to combat the high cost of living in Silicon Valley. The three year deal grants a 13 percent wage boost this year and a 2 percent increase plus a cost of living allowance in years two and three. Pay for an officer with at least three and one-half years experience goes to $68,000. The department currently has nine vacancies, blamed on officers leaving for higher paying private sector jobs.

Baltimore, Maryland

police officers
The highest pay raises in department history have been approved by the City of Baltimore in a new contract with Lodge 3 of the Fraternal Order of Police. Under the three-year deal veteran officers will see a 33 percent pay boost. The pact raises starting pay to $35,784 by July 2002. A 7 percent wage increase will be awarded the first year followed by an 8 percent the second year. The final year of the agreement awards a 9 percent pay boost. Officers with more than six years of service gain an extra one percent each year. By the end of the contract term, the base wage for veteran lieutenants will move from $56,851 to $76,788 annually. In exchange for the pay hikes, which will cost the city $30 million, the officers agreed to forfeit five unexcused absence days and pay 10 percent of health insurance premiums. The parties agreed to the large boosts after a salary survey showed Baltimore officers' pay ranked 13 out of 17 Maryland jurisdictions and 262 out of 305 cities nationwide.

Paducah, Kentucky

police officers
After a year of working under an expired contract, Paducah police officers and the city reached an agreement last month. The new three-year pact provides 3 percent pay hikes in 2001 and 2002 along with increased health insurance benefits. The agreement, which covers about 50 officers, expires June 30, 2003. Lodge 15 of the Fraternal Order of Police represents the officers.