October 2000
Volume 19, Number 5

Supreme Court opens term and rejects police labor cases

Faced with a large docket, the Supreme Court jumped ahead of its traditional first Monday in October opening and began issuing case review decisions in late September. Among the many pending cases that the justices declined to consider were several police-labor related matters. The court said no to three cases left over from last term: Schenectady County, New York v. Jeffes, No. 99-1798, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 20 v. United States, No. 99-1858, and Breaux v. City of Garland, Texas, No. 99-1863.

The review refusal in Jeffes leaves in place a lower court ruling that the county may be liable for the actions of a sheriff who allegedly fostered a "code of silence" among his deputies in violation of the First Amendment. The FOP matter leaves alone a lower court determination that white Miami, Florida, police officers who were victims of reverse discrimination are entitled to only a pro rata share of the wage differential between the ranks in dispute. The officers had sought a larger measure of monetary damages. Likewise, the Breaux inaction costs two Texas peace officers a multi-million dollar judgment in their favor. A jury had awarded the money for retaliation against the officers who had reported corruption in the department. An appeals court overturned the award finding that the officers had not suffered any direct adverse employment action. The appellate court ruling remains in place.

Also denied consideration was Bryant v. City of Chicago, Illinois, No. 99-1985. The rejection of the Bryant case rebuffs efforts to challenge on race discrimination grounds the Chicago Police

Department lieutenant promotion examination.

One case from the new term, Loudon County, Tennessee v. Sowards, No. 00-77, was also rejected by the court. Justices passed on the opportunity to revisit the question of the extent to which sheriff's department employees are policymakers and thus subject to dismissal on political affiliation grounds. In the Sowards case, a female jailer was discharged allegedly in retaliation for her husband running for sheriff against the incumbent. Following dismissal of the matter at the trial level, a federal appeals court ruled that Tennessee law protects jailers in small counties from political retaliation and the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit. High court inaction leaves this ruling in place and the matter is remanded for trial.

Coincidentally, a somewhat similar issue is raised in Tehama County, California v. DiRuzza, No. 00-398. Here, a deputy alleges she lost her job for supporting the incumbent sheriff who was defeated in his re-election bid. After the trial court's dismissal of the matter, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that California deputy sheriffs are not policymakers and thus are protected from political retaliation. This circuit joins the Third and Sixth in so holding. Federal appeals courts for the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that deputy sheriffs are subject to political retaliation while the Fifth Circuit applies a balancing test on the question. The Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether it will use this opportunity to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeal. 

Vice President Gore gains IUPA endorsement

The International Union of Police Associations (IUPA) announced this month its endorsement of Vice President Al Gore's candidacy for President. The IUPA is the last of the major

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national police labor groups to issue a formal statement of support. The IUPA approval was expected since the group is an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, which previously endorsed the Democratic nominee.

In making the announcement, Sam Cabral, IUPA International President, said, "When we looked past the hype, symbolism and packaging of the candidates and focused on the record, we felt the choice was clear." Cabral cited Gore's record of supporting important law enforcement issues such as purchase of protective vests and collective bargaining for all police officers as well as federal funding of community policing officers

Cabral praised Gore and criticized the Republican candidate George W. Bush on the issue of the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to police officers. The IUPA leader accused Republicans, including Bush, of seeking changes in the FLSA that would hurt rank and file officers. 

The IUPA joins the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) in supporting the Vice President. The nation's largest police labor group, the Fraternal Order of Police, has endorsed the Texas governor's election bid. Several state labor organizations, as well as a few major municipal unions, have not announced an endorsement in the race.

. . . but gets caught in local political squabble

Vice President Al Gore last month was "uninvited" to speak to a convention of 1,500 Chicago police sergeants and lieutenants. Republican nominee George W. Bush received the invitation instead. The reason? Good ol' Chicago politics!

The Police Benevolent and Protective Association (PBPA), which represents Chicago police supervisors, had invited the Vice President to speak to its convention. However, prior to the convention, Mayor Richard Daley announced plans to reinstate mandatory retirement for public safety employees at age 63, without making concessions for personnel who do not possess 20 years of service. This service factor is a major point of contention between the city and the union. With 20 years on the job, pension benefits amount to about $2,000 a month. Without the 20 years of service, benefits drop to 25 percent of that amount, $500. More than

300 police officers and fire fighters are over 63 but lack the 20 years of tenure, according to union leaders. Union officials want an accommodation for those individuals.

"Al Gore made it perfectly clear that he's an organized labor kind of guy," stated Jeffrey Wilson, president of the Chicago Police Lieutenants Association. "He (Gore) also said, `You know the quality of a person by the friends they keep.' Well, his friends are Mayor Daley and his brother Bill."

Why the anger at Gore? William Daley, brother of the mayor, is Gore's campaign chairman. The PBPA anger also stems from a promise that the Vice President allegedly made to mediate the retirement dispute. 

A Gore campaign spokesperson expressed surprise at the flap, saying that the Vice President had been endorsed by "every key law enforcement organization" around the country.

LAPPL sues to block consent decree

The union representing rank and file Los Angeles police officers filed suit earlier this month against the city council seeking to block implementation of a federal consent decree reforming the department. The Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) filed the suit in state court asking for an injunction barring city officials from reaching a deal with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 

The DOJ has alleged that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has engaged in a broad pattern of misconduct that has resulted in numerous



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violations of citizens' constitutional rights. DOJ has threatened to sue the city if certain reforms in the LAPD are not implemented and made subject to monitoring by DOJ. The DOJ investigation was prompted by a scandal a few years ago in the LAPD Rampart Division. Several officers have since been criminally prosecuted for planting evidence on narcotics suspects.

LAPPL officials claim that police officers have not had sufficient input in the drafting of the proposed consent decree. The union has accused the city of moving too hastily in agreeing to DOJ oversight. Additionally, the union, which hired its own consultant to recommend methods of improving

the department, has itself called for more civilian oversight of the police disciplinary process.

The efforts of the DOJ are based on a 1996 federal statute that authorizes suits against law enforcement agencies that engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior. To date, only a half dozen such suits have been initiated nationwide. Critics of the statute assert that the efforts place municipal police under federal oversight contrary to the traditional American notion of local control of law enforcement. Proponents of the law say such suits are necessary to deal with egregious and pervasive incidents of police misconduct.

Litigation

Cases of interest

and that the raises were denied because of the city's financial situation. The white officers appeal.

HELD: Prior case law holds that stray remarks of a derogatory character are not evidence of actionable discrimination. This rule applies when someone who is not involved in an employment decision makes those remarks. However, when an individual who is a decision-maker utters such derogatory remarks around the time of, or in reference to, the adverse employment action, then it may be possible to infer that the decision-maker was influenced by those remarks. While there is evidence that the city could not afford to give pay raises to the supervisors, the conflicting evidence raises the right of the plaintiffs to a judicial determination. The question is also raised whether the denial of a raise is an "adverse employment action" necessary to serve as the basis for a suit. The idea behind requiring proof of adverse employment action is simply that the federal statute that forbids employment discrimination is not intended to reach every bigoted act or gesture that a worker might encounter in the workplace. Prior case law holds that pay bonuses are not an adverse employment action because they are sporadic, irregular, and wholly discretionary on the part of

Race discrimination

In the early 1990s the City of Markham saw its political landscape change. The majority of the local population as well as the bulk of public officials were African Americans. The mayor and a majority of the city council as well as the members of the board of fire and police commissioners were black. Allegedly, during this time the mayor and other black officials made repeated statements to white police officers that were racist in nature. Allegedly such statements as the city needed "to get rid of all old white police officers" and "it's the blacks turn to self-govern in Markham, and if you're a white, get out." Once the mayor told the city council that the white officers who held supervisory positions in the police department were not worth anything. When asked if the mayor was making that statement because they were white, the mayor replied, "Maybe I am." Subsequently, four white officers filed suit claiming they were denied raises on account of their race. One of the officers claimed he was denied a temporary promotion to sergeant because of his race. Trial court rejected the claims on the basis that none of the derogatory comments were contemporaneous with the action of the city council denying the raises


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the employer. However, pay raises appear to be the norm for workers who perform satisfactorily. Given continuing rises in inflation, denying a raise to an employee effectively means cutting his wage in real terms. Raises have become the norm quite apart from inflation. They reward the increased productivity that comes with the experience of the job, satisfy expectations for a rising standard of living, and provide an incentive to discourage workers from slacking off as they approach retirement. Thus, the denial of a raise is more likely to reflect invidious motivation than is a denial of a bonus. Consequently, denying a raise can be viewed as an adverse employment action. One of the plaintiffs claims that he was denied a temporary promotion to sergeant because of his race. He admits he flunked the test for sergeant three times but is not seeking permanent promotion. Apparently, the city has made temporary promotions that have lasted as long as five years. In one case a black officer after being released from jail for having violated a resident's civil rights was temporarily promoted. The complaining white officer is entitled to a trial on whether his failure to be temporarily promoted to sergeant was motivated by racial discrimination. Reversed for white officers ordering trial on issues. [Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000)] Chadwick became acting chief of police. Soon thereafter he transferred Stanley from the narcotics unit to the third shift of the uniformed patrol division. He denied Stanley's request to remain in criminal investigation. During the same time frame Chadwick passed over Stanley for promotion. In 1994, Chadwick began an investigation of the narcotics unit buy fund that Stanley had supervised prior to his transfer. The fund accounting records contained inconsistencies. Ultimately, the city auditor determined that proper paperwork had not been completed. Stanley was reprimanded over the matter despite his assertion that the paperwork had been completed properly. In 1997, Stanley had an altercation with a lieutenant. During the altercation he cursed the lieutenant and physically touched him. As a result of this incident Stanley was ordered to serve a six-day suspension and undergo a fitness for duty psychological examination. Later the same year Stanley lost his temper and used profanity during a conversation with a subordinate officer. As part of the internal investigation into the matter Stanley took a polygraph. The polygraph exam indicated deception regarding his version of the incident. Chadwick charged Stanley with unprofessional conduct and providing false statements in the internal investigation. He terminated Stanley from his job. The city public safety commission upheld the termination. Stanley subsequently filed suit claiming that he had been terminated in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights during the 1993 GBI interview. He sued both the city and Chief Chadwick. Chadwick moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Trial court denied the motion and Chadwick appeals.

HELD: Pursuant to the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. For a law to be clearly established, the law must have earlier been

Dismissal grounds

In 1993, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) launched an investigation of suspected theft of money from the police department evidence room. The GBI interviewed a variety of officers including Stanley. Stanley told the GBI his theory that he suspected that Chadwick, the deputy chief in charge of the evidence room, might have committed the theft because he was one of two people with keys to the room. Stanley knew that Chadwick wanted to become chief and speculated that Chadwick might have staged the theft to damage the incumbent chief's credibility. Despite further investigation, the GBI never identified anyone responsible for the theft. Later the same year


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developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors that what he is doing violates federal law. In this case, the first determination that must be made is whether a violation of a constitutional right actually occurred. Stanley claims that he was dismissed in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right of free speech in talking to the GBI investigators. A state employer cannot retaliate against a state employee for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. However, the speech must be on a matter of public concern and the employee's interest in engaging in the speech must outweigh the employer's interest in maintaining the efficiency of the public service. Stanley's speech - the theory that Chadwick may have stolen the money - relates to a matter of public concern. Even though the speech was in a theoretical form it still touched upon a matter of interest to the public, possible theft by a public official. In weighing the relative interests of Stanley and the police department the evidence reflects that the speech did not cause disruption within the department or that it was stated in an inappropriate manner. However making an accusation as serious as theft against a deputy chief based solely on his role as a manager undoubtedly could be considered disruptive and potentially undermining to the mutual respect and confidence needed for fellow officers. The balance in this case tips ever so slightly in Stanley's favor. Even if Stanley's constitutional rights were violated, he must still demonstrate that a reasonable police chief would have known that terminating a subordinate officer under these factual circumstances violated clearly established law. Chadwick is shielded from suit even though he in fact committed constitutional violations, provided that a police chief reasonably, all be it mistakenly, could have believed that his conduct was lawful. In other words, a police chief can guess wrong about the constitutionality of his conduct, provided the mistake is a reasonable one. Here, there appears to be both constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible grounds for terminating Stanley. The former has to do with his insubordinate behavior while the latter touches upon his right of free speech. Under prior case law a public employer is entitled to qualified immunity where the record establishes that he was motivated at least in part by lawful considerations. Stanley admits that he used profanity and placed his hands on the lieutenant. He also lost his temper and used profanity in other incidents. This behavior shows a lawful basis for terminating Stanley from the police force. Similarly, the indication of deception following the polygraph examination was also a lawful basis for his termination. Four years passed between the time of Stanley's protected speech and his subsequent termination. While the four year gap does not preclude Stanley from showing Chadwick acted in substantial part because of the protected speech, the time gap and the other facts show that Chadwick predominantly acted on lawful grounds. Based upon the circumstances a reasonable police chief could have lawfully terminated Stanley for his misconduct and thus could have considered Chadwick's termination proper, even if motivated in part by unlawful motive. The chief's termination of Stanley was objectively reasonable for the purposes of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity from suit granted for police chief. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. [Stanley v. City of Dalton, Georgia, 219 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2000)]

Transfer

Kuchenreuther was a Milwaukee police officer who served as the union steward on the midnight patrol shift. She filed suit against the city alleging four separate violations of her First Amendment rights. The first instance involved her placement of a note on the department bulletin board. The note, which was unsigned and written on department stationery, was in response to a chief's memo urging officers to support the United Performing Arts Fund (UPAF). Kuchenreuther's note stated, "When you donate to the UPAF you make the chief and the administration look good. Do you want to help that cause?" The note was


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removed from the board by a superior officer on the basis that it was disrespectful and violated department policy regarding use of department stationery. Kuchenreuther was subsequently suspended for two days without pay over the matter. The following month the chief of police addressed an in-service training session at the police academy. Following his statements he invited questions. Kuchenreuther asked several questions about the chief's policy of authorizing officers to carry only one set of handcuffs. At some point the chief stated he had heard enough and was not going to answer any more question from her on the issue. Believing that Kuchenreuther had been inappropriately argumentative at the meeting, the chief directed a lieutenant to review Kuchenreuther's notes of the discussion. Initially she refused to allow the lieutenant to view her notes but subsequently provided them. They were photocopied and returned to her. No further action was taken on the matter. In a third incident, Kuchenreuther posted a variety of notes on the union bulletin board. In each instance the note was removed, date stamped, and initialed by a supervisor before being placed back on the board. In at least one instance the note was removed because it was viewed as being disrespectful. Kuchenreuther was advised that department policy required such postings be reviewed by a supervisor before being placed on the bulletin board. In the final instance Kuchenreuther alleged that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was transferred from the patrol division to the property control division. She had filed a request for transfer to the day shift but left blank the section where she was supposed to indicate her assignment preference. A command officer reviewing the request failed to note any preferred assignment and knew that the property control division needed additional officers. Consequently, he transferred Kuchenreuther to property control. She subsequently viewed the position as less desirable and thought it punitive for her previous behavior. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the suit finding no violation of the officer's First
Amendment rights. Officer appeals.

HELD: It is well established that the state may not retaliate against an employee on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in free speech. In making such determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected it must be shown that the speech touches upon a matter of public concern. To involve a matter of public concern the speech must relate to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. If that hurdle is cleared a balancing test is imposed that balances the interest of the employee as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern against the interest of the employer in promoting the efficiency of the public service. In Kuchenreuther's case, none of the matters touched upon topics of public concern. The posting on the bulletin board regarding contribution to the charity was not constitutionally protected speech. The posting was made anonymously and used department letterhead in violation of department policy. Her motive was purely to voice an opinion about the matter, not to raise particular public awareness. Likewise, the questions about the handcuffs related to an internal operations issue. While issues of police protection and public safety are matters of public concern, not every aspect of internal operations fits within that definition. The removal of the postings on the bulletin board is not protected by the First Amendment. They were removed because Kuchenreuther failed to comply with departmental posting requirements of having the matters date stamped and reviewed by a supervisor, not because of the content of the postings. Finally, Kuchenreuther herself initiated the transfer to the property control bureau. On the form she failed to indicate an assignment preference. Thus, the transfer was of her own making because she refused to comply with department rules regarding the proper means to fill out the form. None of these matters are protected by the First Amendment. Summary judgment for city affirmed. [Kuchenreuther v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 221 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2000)]



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Sex discrimination

from the eligibility list. Following that hearing the commission decided to delete her name from the list. Kehrer brought suit claiming that the department had engaged in gender discrimination by removing her name from the list and that it had refused to hire her in retaliation for her filing of the EEOC claim. Department moves for summary judgment.

HELD: Kehrer's first claim alleges sex discrimination. It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire an individual because of their sex. Sex discrimination can be established by demonstrating that there was intentional discrimination or by showing through circumstantial evidence sex discrimination. This circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination may be shown through a mosaic of suspicious timing, comparative evidence showing that employees similar situated received better treatment, or that the individual was qualified for and failed to receive the desired treatment and the employer's stated reason is unworthy of belief. Here, Kehrer presents no evidence of suspicious timing or of differential treatment compared to other similarly situated candidates. The only remaining avenue is for her to show a pretext. Her name, however, was removed from the list because she failed to disclose information about the speeding ticket and the previous disciplinary action as well as unfavorable references. Failure to disclose information is by itself cause for a candidate's disqualification. The city has offered credible reasons for removing Kehrer's name from the eligibility list. She has produced no evidence to cast suspicion on the city's reasons for not hiring her. Accordingly, it is entitled to summary judgment on her gender discrimination claim. Similarly, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. At the time the civil service commission ordered her name removed from the list it was unaware of the filing of the EEOC complaint. In addition, the city has shown legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for removing her name from the eligibility list. Kehrer lied on her application to become a police officer. The city

Kehrer applied to become a police officer. Several months later she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the city's police department alleging sexually discriminating hiring practices. The department and the civil service commission entered into a settlement contract on the claim. In partial consideration for Kehrer releasing her claim, the city agreed to place her name on the list of candidates for police officer positions and hire her under the same terms and conditions as other candidates. As part of the hiring process the city required all applicants complete an initial application. This application asked for a variety of background information, including employment history. It also informed applicants that false statements were sufficient cause for dismissal. In completing her application, Kehrer stated she had never been discharged from a job even though it was subsequently determined she had been fired from a retail establishment for stealing merchandise. On the questionnaire Kehrer had failed to list this previous employer. In the course of conducting a background check the department discovered the theft incident. In addition a social and educational acquaintance of Kehrer was interviewed. This individual had interned with Kehrer at the U.S. Marshal's office. She stated she had concerns about Kehrer becoming a police officer because she was not an honest person. In particular, the individual claimed that Kehrer had falsified time sheets during her marshal internship. A subsequent review of court records showed that Kehrer had indeed plead guilty to retail theft. In addition, there was a record of a guilty plea to a speeding ticket even though on her questionnaire she denied having been convicted of a traffic violation during the previous five years. The civil service commission was apprised of the results of the background investigation and a recommendation was made to remove Kehrer's name from the list of eligible candidates. The commission gave her the opportunity to present evidence as to why her name should not be removed


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is entitled to summary judgment on her retaliation claim. [Kehrer v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 104 F. Supp.2d 1001 (C.D. Ill. 2000)] not qualified for his position if he is unable to come to work. There can be no reasonable accommodation for attendance because it is an essential function of employment. A claim of disability discrimination based on failure to accommodate an employee does not arise out of the ADA unless the employee requests a reasonable accommodation and the request has been denied by the employer. Here, a review of the facts demonstrates that Mazza failed to request an accommodation. In fact, the testimony reveals that Mazza rejected the police surgeon's suggestion that he return to work at a desk job. The police department maintained the former officer on sick leave for almost 10 months with no request that he return to work in any capacity. Since there was no evidence that his condition would improve or that he requested an accommodation, the department did not engage in unlawful discrimination when it discharged him. Summary judgment for police department. [Mazza v. Bratton, 108 F. Supp.2d 167 (E.D. N.Y. 2000)]

Handicap discrimination

Mazza was employed as a probationary police officer in 1990. He graduated from the police academy some six months later and entered upon duty as a police officer. Approximately one year later Mazza began experiencing difficulties with his intestinal system. He ultimately was diagnosed and treated for severe ulcerative colitis. This condition caused Mazza to suffer from bloody bowel movements, cramps, severe abdominal pain, and occasional urgency to relieve himself. He remained in the hospital for this condition for six weeks. The police department physician reviewed Mazza's condition and medical records. As a result, the decision was made to terminate him on the grounds that he was unable to perform the duties of a police officer. The former officer filed suit claiming that although he had been off the job sick for almost 10 months, his termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The city moves for summary judgment. 

HELD: To establish a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he suffers from a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA, that he can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and was terminated because of the disability. The ADA defines "disability" as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual. Mazza's impairment fits the definition of a disability. Any physiological disorder or condition affecting the digestive system is considered to be a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA. Likewise, his condition affects major life activities. In particular, his medical condition affects Mazza's ability to care for himself and to work. He has failed, however, to establish that he is able to perform the essential functions of the position of police officer, with or without accommodation. An individual is

Bargaining contract

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and the city entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement. The agreement was approved by the city council. Subsequently, the mayor, allegedly on behalf of the city, agreed to a side letter to the bargaining agreement that stated that it was the understanding of the parties that $1 per hour for 125 days of unused sick leave benefit at retirement and five weeks of vacation during the final work year had been negotiated away in favor of a 20-year longevity pay step. The agreement further stated that if for some reason in the future the longevity step were excluded from the bargaining contract, then the original benefits would be reinstated. The mayor signed this addendum eight days after he was defeated for reelection and 20 days before his last day in office. He neglected to submit it to city council for approval. Additionally, no appropriation of funds to cover the city's increased financial burden under the addendum had been enacted.


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Shortly thereafter the city treasurer discovered the addendum and obtained a legal opinion that the addendum was unlawful under the state pension code. The city treasurer notified the FOP that the city was not going to honor the addendum. The city then filed suit against the FOP seeking a declaratory judgment as to the legality of the addendum. Trial court ruled in favor of the city and FOP appeals.

HELD: Under Illinois law only corporate authorities have the power to bind the city in a contract unless that power is delegated to another. The general rule is that when an employee of a municipal corporation purports to bind the corporation by contract without prior approval, in violation of an applicable statute, such a contract is utterly void. Illinois statute provides that no contract that creates liability for a city for expenditure of money is valid unless approved by a majority of the city council. Additionally, statute provides that no contract made by a city is valid unless an appropriation has previously been made concerning that contract. Any such contract is null and void. The record in this case shows the addendum was entered into without prior appropriation of funds to cover its obligation. It further shows that it was not approved by the city council. Thus, it is clear that the addendum is void and unenforceable. Affirmed for city. [City of Belleville v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 732 N.E.2d 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)]

removed air from the van's tires and the sergeant broke the passenger side window. At that point the driver drove away. A pursuit ensued. The sergeant's vehicle was in the lead and the vehicle containing Bickl and the other officer followed. The van subsequently made a U-turn on a bridge. The incident ended when the van stopped and the driver was shot and killed. Following an investigation Bickl was charged with violating department policy that provides that once a pursuit has been started the primary unit (vehicle nearest to the pursued vehicle) shall notify the dispatcher of the pursuit. The police board found that Bickl violated this pursuit policy in that he was in the primary unit when the van was originally stopped and failed to report the pursuit to the dispatcher. He was suspended for ten days without pay. Bickl appealed and the trial court reversed the finding holding there was no evidence that Bickl was in the "primary pursuit unit." The city appealed.

HELD: As a general rule there is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a decision by an administrative tribunal. A court's review is limited to determining whether the decision was in excess of jurisdiction, unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, or was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Due weight must be given to the police board's expertise and its opportunity to observe witnesses. If the evidence supports two contrary findings, the court must uphold the board's factual determination. The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board on matters of fact. In this case, no one disputes that at some point during the incident a pursuit ensued. The issue in contention is where the pursuit began. Did it begin when the driver made the U-turn as Bickl argues or when the officers first stopped the van? Testimony reveals that the van did not have a license plate, that the driver failed to cooperate with the officers, and that he resisted arrest by fleeing. The evidence is clear that the driver would be under arrest once he was apprehended. The police board as finder of fact could determine from the evidence that the driver was evading arrest and that the pursuit

Disciplinary grounds

Bickl was a veteran police officer who was assigned to a walking beat. At the end of his shift another officer in a police car picked him up. As they drove to the police station the other officer observed a suspicious van he had seen earlier in the evening. He turned on the red lights and the van stopped. Both officers approached the van to question the driver. When the driver did not comply with the officers' requests, they called for assistance and a sergeant arrived. The van driver continued to disobey the officers' instructions. As a result, Bickl


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was in process because after the driver drove away from the initial stop, officers followed in their vehicles to apprehend him. Bickl acknowledged that his vehicle was behind the van when it left the point of initial stop and the sergeant did not take over the lead until the van made the U-turn. Based on this evidence the board could reasonably find that Bickl's vehicle was the primary pursuit unit responsible for announcing the chase to the dispatcher. Having failed to do so, he violated department policy. Trial court's decision reversed and matter remanded for entry of an order reinstating the board's suspension of police officer. [Bickl v. Smith, 23 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)] earning at the direction of the municipalities. The same law also contains a provision that pertains specifically to the management of the fund and reiterates that the municipality controls the disposition of excess interest. Thus, the provisions of the law make it clear that the allocation of excess pension interest to the various accounts within the fund is a management question. This management function is performed by the state pension board in conjunction with municipalities. Thus, Pennsylvania law makes allocation of excess pension interest an inherent managerial prerogative. As such, the allocation of excess pension interest is not a bargainable issue. The arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction over this matter. Reversed for borough. [Borough of Morrisville v. Morrisville Borough Police Benevolent Association, 756 A.2d 709 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)]

Pension rights

When the police union and the borough reached impasse in bargaining for a new contract the matter went to arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held and ultimately a panel of arbitrators issued an order and an award. The award included a provision that stated that the borough shall apply all funds received as excess interest from the municipal retirement system to the accounts of active and retired police officers. The borough took exception to this provision and filed suit seeking to have the award vacated on the grounds that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority. Trial court dismissed the borough's petition and an appeal follows.

HELD: In Pennsylvania, a review of an interest arbitration dispute is limited to questions regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, the regularity of the proceedings, an excess of the arbitrators powers, and a deprivation of constitutional rights. Under Pennsylvania law arbitrators are prohibited from making awards that are outside the definition of bargainable issues set forth by state statute. The statute in question specifically states that the subject of pensions is a bargainable issue. However, prior case law has held that the administration of pension funds is not a bargainable issue. The state pension law states that the retirement board shall allocate excess investment

Settlements

Dallas, Texas

police officers
After being bombarded by billboards and letters urging pay boosts, Dallas city council members have agreed to grant police officers a 13 percent wage hike. Final arrangements for the hikes have not been decided but council members are expected to split the increase in two, granting half in October and half in April. If 6.5 percent is initially granted, police recruit pay will go to $33,383. In addition, council members agreed to keep patrol cars on the street for four years instead of three in order to fund an additional 1.51 percent pay increase for officers who work the first and third watches. Dallas is the largest city in the country in which police officers do not operate under a labor contract. Most officers are members of the independent Dallas Police Association.