Los Angeles has become the third city to reach a settlement with DOJ under a 1994 law that permits DOJ to sue communities that permit a pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior within their police departments. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Steubenville, Ohio, previously agreed to federal monitoring of their police agencies, as has the New Jersey State Police. Litigation is still underway in Columbus, Ohio, where the Fraternal Order of Police is actively resisting the federal efforts. Meanwhile, DOJ is reportedly examining the New York Police Department in light of allegations of widespread racial profiling, brutality, and corruption.

Under the LAPD agreement, the sides will together select an independent monitor who will report to the federal court. The monitor will publish quarterly reports detailing the city's compliance with the consent decree. LAPD will remain under federal monitoring for five years.

As a result of the agreement, the city will implement a computerized warning system for tracking the activities of all officers to identify and address "at-risk" conduct. A new LAPD unit will

All officers will be trained in community policing and the use of techniques for de-escalating potentially violent situations. Newly promoted officers must be trained prior to being deployed in a supervisory position.

"This is a historic and comprehensive agreement which provides for meaningful and necessary reform of the LAPD in a fair and reasonable way," said Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Attorney General Janet Reno issued a statement calling the accord "an extraordinary challenge and an opportunity" to ensure high standards of policing in Los Angeles.

A few days prior to approval of the agreement, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL), the union representing officers through the rank of lieutenant, unsuccessfully sought a state court order to halt the city from signing the consent decree. Union officials claimed that the negotiations between the city and the DOJ had not adequately addressed concerns of working police officers and violated their labor agreement. The union had suggested over a dozen remedial actions but the consent decree proposal contains only one of the suggestions.

Following the state court rejection, the

Mayor Richard Riordan somewhat reluctantly supported the agreement, reportedly insisting that primary responsibility for investigating the police department falls to the monitor, not DOJ. "As mayor of the City of Los Angeles, I have often had tough days," Riordan said, "but I can think of none tougher than today." The mayor was joined at his news conference by several council members, but not by Chief Bernard Parks. Parks, who had fought against the signing of a consent decree, later issued a statement expressing support of LAPD personnel.

For decades, the LAPD served as the

Governor George Pataki last month ordered members of the New York State Police to guard all Jewish temples in Onondaga County after an arson fire destroyed one such structure. At least one trooper is stationed at each of the county's seven temples and at the Jewish Community Center. 

"This embarrasses us," said Jeff Piedmonte, president of the Syracuse Police Benevolent Association (SPBA). "It looks like we can't protect our own city, and it's costing us overtime jobs." The SPBA has filed an improper labor practice complaint against the State Police. 

Syracuse Mayor Roy Bernardi replied that the only embarrassment was "that the president of the PBA would turn a tragedy where people want and need help into a union issue." Noting that the arson of a religious building was a serious matter,

Since the Wisconsin case, the IUPA has gained a settlement on the issue in Defiance, Ohio, and has filed suits in eight other states. Lawyers are currently awaiting a court decision from a recent case in Brookline, Massachusetts. 

Sam Cabral, International President of IUPA, said the problem arises from an insufficient number of police officers and explained the union's motive for the suits. "We hope that the realization of the unsettling long hours police officers work will prompt law enforcement agencies to hire sufficient officers to eliminate any need for police to work long hours without a chance to schedule some time off when they need it."

Supreme Court update

Cases of interest 

HELD: The court assumes for the sake of discussion that the lateral transfers accompanied by negative statements constituted an adverse employment action sufficient to give rise to a wrongful retaliation claim under federal civil rights law. Public employees enjoy a Constitutional right to speak on matters of public concern. Whether a public employee's speech involves a matter of public concern depends upon the content, form, and context of the statement. A public employee's speech deals with a matter of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Speech that deals with complaints over internal office affairs is not protected when it is not relevant to the public's evaluation of a governmental agency's performance. Although focused on one employee and not addressed directly to the public, the speech here did concern matters that are relevant to the public's evaluation of the police department. In determining a public employee's right to free speech, however, courts must strike a balance between the interest of the employee as a citizen and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public service. The employer's interest outweighs the employee's interest in speaking if the employee's speech impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the speaker's duties, or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Here, the nature of the sergeants' speech was conducive to racial and gender tension. Several witnesses testified to the development of camps of people within the division, often based on race or gender. This disharmony seems particularly troubling in a police station. Evidence also suggested that Cochran disliked Lieutenant Age from the beginning of the relationship. The speech, while touching on racial and gender equality issues, largely involved internal office matters. In a police department, a quasi-

HELD: To establish liability on the part of the city, Blair must show that he had a Constitutional right; that he was deprived of that right by an adverse employment action; that the city had a custom created by those who are policymakers; that that custom amounted to deliberate indifference to Blair's Constitutional rights; and that the custom was the moving force behind the Constitutional violation. Certainly, Blair enjoyed a First Amendment right to inform his superiors of misconduct in the police department. The other factors, however, must be determined by a jury if there are disputed facts in regard to them. In reviewing the motion for summary judgment the court considers the evidence as it favors the movant. In this case, the evidence, if believed by a jury, would be sufficient to establish that the department had a custom of chastising whistle blowers. It would also be sufficient to establish that the police department had failed to train its members not to retaliate against them. Certainly a reasonable fact finder could infer that the acts against Blair, although he could not identify the individual perpetrators, were committed by fellow police officers. It would be up to the city

HELD: McCraven asserts that the CPD unlawfully used information in the expungement order to deny him employment. The expungement order, however, does not operate to erase the memories of officers who arrested McCraven nor to erase the information found in the two previous applications for employment. The CPD learned of his extensive criminal background through sources independent of the expunged arrest record. As to the claim of race discrimination, McCraven alleges both disparate treatment as well as disparate impact of the CPD policies. He fails to establish by evidence, however, that the department intentionally discriminated against him by refusing to hire him. There is no direct evidence that the CPD refused to hire McCraven because of his race. As to the disparate impact claim, federal law is violated if facially neutral policies have a disparate impact upon protected classes unjustified by the employer's legitimate business needs. Here, McCraven offers statistics that African-Americans are arrested at a

HELD: At the time of his arrest there existed a clearly established right that a mental health patient has a general right to be free from seizure unless probable cause exists. Probable cause in this context is the equivalent to some demonstration of overtly dangerous behavior. Ransom argues that the police lacked probable cause in his case because they failed to corroborate the wife's story before initiating action. The record demonstrates, however, that the police psychologist did in fact consult with several other persons before recommending that Ransom be held for observation. Likewise, the behavior Mrs. Ransom described was undeniably threatening to herself and to her husband. It could constitute a basis of a charge of assault as well as probable cause to confine the officer. In addition, as to the investigating and arresting officers, qualified immunity protects them. Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law and it protects police officers from bad guesses in gray areas. Even if the police made a bad guess in this case, they are still protected by qualified immunity. The false arrest claim also fails because under Maryland law an arrest made under a warrant, which appears on its face to be legal, is lawfully permitted even if unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper. Finally, Ransom claims he was defamed. Maryland law recognizes a common law privilege for a defamatory statement if publication of the utterance advances social policies of greater importance than the vindication of the plaintiff's reputation. Here, the alleged defamatory statements made by the officers and Mrs. Ransom all fall under the blanket of qualified privilege. Protecting the safety of Ransom and his spouse, as well as investigating a crime, are of greater importance than Ransom's reputational

HELD: Testimony at the worker's compensation hearing revealed that the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the officers considered officers to be on duty while at lunch. They are paid for their lunch time. The city allows officers to take a half-hour lunch during their shift but they are subject to call when their lunch is interrupted. When on duty, officers are required to carry their identification, radio, and weapons. Klyse's radio was on at the time of the accident and he was in possession of his badge and gun. The Florida statute in question provides that a full-time law enforcement officer who is discharging his primary responsibility in a place and under circumstances reasonably consistent with that primary responsibility is acting within the course of employment for purposes of worker's compensation. This law does not apply to off-duty officers. Under Florida law a police officer is not considered to be on-duty outside his regular work hours. In the instant case, however, Klyse was involved in an activity that his employer specifically designated as part of his employment. He was considered to be on-duty while at lunch and was paid for that time. The half-hour for lunch was contained within his normal working hours and he

HELD: Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Such evidence is inadmissible in administrative proceedings unless it falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the rule. For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the excited utterance exception, there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to cause a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, an absence of trying to fabricate, and a relationship between the statement and the circumstance of the occurrence. Weinmann's statement to the responding officer should not have been admitted at the hearing. She apparently was intoxicated at the time and a significant amount of time had elapsed between the alleged events and her declaration. The utterance was also likely tainted by her own self-interest. Nonetheless, the hearsay statement alone does not warrant a reversal of the termination decision as there was adequate other evidence at the time. The trial court did err, however, in failing to remand the case for consideration of new evidence. Illinois law permits admission of newly discovered evidence into administrative hearings if the evidence is material to the issue and could not have been discovered by a reasonable diligence prior to the initial proceedings. Here, the administrative charges against Morelli were based on Weinmann's grand jury testimony, which she now maintains was fabricated. She has retracted her written complaint that was substantive evidence presented to the commission. It would be unjust to deny Morelli the opportunity to present the new evidence to the commission given the recantation of the primary witness's complaint. Reversed and remanded for additional hearing. [Morelli v. Ward, 734 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)]

HELD: The Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) governs public sector labor law and its provisions have been held to take precedence over other conflicting laws to ensure consistency and predictability in the public sector labor field. The Michigan Employee Relations Commission (MERC) is the agency charged with interpreting and enforcing this highly specialized and politically sensitive field of law. In the labor law arena unions frequently seek information materials from management that the union asserts are necessary to bargain collectively. Unless the information is protected from disclosure, an employer's failure to comply with the union request for information constitutes an unfair labor practice. Michigan law also holds that an employer's failure to release non-protected information constitutes an unfair labor practice. Questions of what information is vital to bargaining and what information is proprietary and confidential goes to the heart of collective bargaining and grievance arbitration law. The MERC has previously determined that a law

HELD: In reviewing disciplinary actions against police officers, a civil service commission must determine whether the charges brought against the officer are supported by the evidence, whether the penalty imposed is not otherwise prohibited, and whether the penalty is not arbitrary, discretionary, or an abuse of discretion. A police officer's off-duty conduct may be the basis for a charge of conduct unbecoming an officer. In the instant case, all of the testimony established that, at a minimum, Feliciano engaged in disorderly conduct. Disorderly conduct constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer, which has been defined to include conduct that adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the police force, or tends to destroy public respect for, and confidence in, the police force. It is undisputed that Feliciano drove the wrong way on a street while armed with his weapon, shouted at his wife and at least one neighbor, and repeatedly tried to force his way into the home. He then refused to get control of himself. This behavior constitutes disorderly conduct. Likewise rejected is his claim that violation

HELD: A review of the transcript of the merit board reveals that the board's decision to terminate Gross was supported by material evidence. The evidence indicated that his primary duty was to transport prisoners. His entry into the club later had been discouraged by senior officers. The board could justifiably question Gross' motives for reentering the club. Gross admitted that he watched the dancer undress but insisted he did so to identify what items or weapons she might remove from her locker as he was concerned for his safety. The merit board could justifiably have rejected Gross' explanation. Gross suggests that the department should not have been permitted to consider the adverse publicity when making its decision to terminate him. However, prior case law in other