Of particular note is the extension of the law to include jurisdictions under 100,000 population. Previously, federal funds were used to match local funds up to 50 percent of the cost of the armor. Under the newly inked statute, the matching requirement for small and rural agencies is waived beginning in 2002. 

Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Col.), himself a former deputy sheriff, was a leading proponent of expansion of the program. "Police officers risk their lives every day to keep our communities safe," Campbell said. "Too many of them go without protective vests simply because 

Echoing those sentiments was Gilbert Gallegos, National President of the Fraternal Order of Police. "This program has helped provide law enforcement officers with one of the most important pieces of equipment they can have out on the streets _ body armor," Gallegos said. "It can literally mean the difference between life and death. Every man and woman in law enforcement who puts their life on the line should always put on a vest." 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) at the U.S. Department of Justice administers the vest partnership program. BJA will begin taking applications for funding over a 90-day period beginning January 15, 2001. All vests must meet National Institute of Justice specifications. Further information may be found at http://vests.ojp.gov/. 

The case began when 44-year-old Eugene Quinn applied to become a LAPD officer despite 

Quinn sued the department alleging handicap discrimination in violation of the 

In reviewing the case, the California Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District found that Quinn was required to prove as part of his case of disability discrimination that he was qualified to be a police officer. This Quinn could not do. Qualification was a matter for the LAPD to determine through its selection criteria, the court ruled. "Simply stated, there was no discharge based upon a disability. Instead, there was a discharge 

Officers were reallocated from 10-hour shifts to 8-hour shifts, adding an extra day of work per week. An arbitrator ruled later that the city 

The settlement will provide 40,000 hours of compensatory time off worth $1.2 million. Additionally, one-time cash payments and contributions to deferred compensation plans will range from a few hundred dollars to over $19,000, depending on the officer's pay grade and work schedule. The average value of the settlement is about $10,000. 

The Teamsters Union, which represents the deputies, claims in the suit that the legal effect of the law is to create improperly a subclass of employees. The union also claims that the law violates their collective bargaining contract because the retired county officers could not become part of the bargaining unit because their compensation is not the same as other members. 

A union official, J. William Mowery, said, "The reason it's a bad idea is because you fracture the integrity of the union. This is a case where basic benefits are going to be different." He also expressed concern that retirees might receive preferential promotions because it would be less expensive for the department. 

The suit follows a grievance that the Teamsters had filed last month requesting that the sheriff refrain from hiring retired officers. To date no retired officers have applied. 

No court action has been taken as yet. 

"I fully expected to spend the last of my working days as a Chicago police officer," said Misch, who had served as a military police officer 40 years earlier. He began his work career as a printer but sold his company in 1992 and joined a real estate firm. He reportedly became one of the top-producing real estate agents in the country. 

While standing in line at a library, Misch spied a police application. "I did not see an upper 

Chicago, like most communities, dropped maximum age requirements some years ago following court rulings that such standards violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Congress amended the law a few years ago to permit age-based retirements in public safety positions. Chicago, following the lead of Los Angeles and other major cities, reinstated an age bar. 

Cases of interest 

Supreme Court update 

The West case leaves in place a lower federal court's view that Louisiana's "Little Hatch Act," which bans direct and indirect political activities by public employees, is not contrary to the First Amendment. The high court's inaction leaves two terminated Kenner police officers without jobs. The two, both police union officials, had been fired for communicating the union's support of political candidates. 

Refusal to consider the DiRuzza matter leaves in place a Ninth Circuit determination that sheriff's deputies are not policymakers and are thus protected against political retaliation. DiRuzza, a deputy sheriff, had lost her job for supporting the incumbent sheriff who was defeated for re-election. The appeals court found that her termination by the new sheriff violated the First Amendment. 

HELD: The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. A qualified individual with a disability is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position." The trial court based its decision on the grounds that Hoskins had not established that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The statute defines "disability" as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, it is uncontested that Hoskins' musculoskeletal and respiratory systems have been affected. These impairments affect major life activities such as breathing, moving, and performing manual tasks as well as working. She has to be careful in the manner in which she moves and even if she coughs or sneezes in the wrong way. Thus, it can be said that Hoskins has raised a genuine issue of fact regarding whether her impairments substantially limit major life activities. However, even if she is disabled, the question still remains as to whether Hoskins is otherwise qualified for the position of deputy. Hoskins argues that physical restraint of inmates is not an essential function of the deputy position. The term "essential functions" means the fundamental job duties of the position. In determining whether a particular function is essential, federal regulations instruct courts to consider the following factors: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared for advertising or interviewing applicants; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of collective 

HELD: To make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment under federal civil rights law a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Here, Jones alleges she received disparate treatment because of her gender in that she was a woman who passed the written and agility test, was informed that she was 15 pounds overweight, subsequently lost some of the weight, that similarly situated men were appointed even though they were more overweight than she, and that she was not given a stress test to determine her eligibility as was done with other applicants. While the evidence that several overweight men, including one who was diagnosed with obesity, were hired as police officers raises the suspicion of discrimination, a reasonable suspicion is insufficient to impose liability on an employer. Jones offered no evidence that any other individual was informed of the option to take a stress or fitness test. In fact two civil service commission staffers testified they never told an applicant of the stress test option. There is no 

HELD: Berard alleges that the chief slandered him in his statements to the city council. Slander per se is the publication of a defamatory statement concerning a plaintiff that is false and causes damage to the plaintiff. The chief argues that his description of Berard's conduct as a "mistake" was a statement of opinion that is not actionable as defamatory. Statements of fact may expose authors to liability for defamation but statements of pure opinion are constitutionally protected. Whether an alleged defamatory statement is a fact or an opinion must be determined by the court through looking at the totality of the context of which it was uttered. All of the words used must be examined as well as the circumstances surrounding the statement and the audience to which it was published. Here, the chief's statement that Berard made a "mistake" could be interpreted to imply that Berard failed to follow proper procedures, a factual issue. The chief, however, claimed he was legally privileged in making the alleged defamatory statement because it was made during a meeting of the city council. Under the law, a public official is conditionally privileged to make otherwise 

HELD: Under Louisiana law, a government employee with permanent status may not be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause. Such disciplinary actions may be appealed to a civil service board. Judicial review of the board's determination is also available to an employee. The judicial review is to determine whether the board acted in good faith for cause. Likewise, the employing agency has a right to appeal any action of the civil service board. A close reading of the state law reveals that the statute requires reinstatement when the civil service board finds that the police department's action was not taken in good faith for cause. The statute is clearly designed to protect the employee from political or otherwise arbitrary action by the appointing authority. The law permits the board to modify the order of removal by directing a suspension without pay for a given period. This statute provides flexibility required by the board's authority to determine the reasonableness of the employer's actions. Here, the board decided that punishment was appropriate for Willis but decided to modify it to a 90-day 

HELD: The state labor law provides that any arbitration award ordering reinstatement of a public employee shall comply with public policy requirements as defined in statutes and decisions, including policies regarding egregious use of physical or deadly force. Thus, under state law an award must comply with public policy. Here, however, the question before the arbitrator was 

HELD: The question presented is whether an arbitrator or the trial court has the initial jurisdiction over the issue of arbitrability of this grievance dispute. The Pennsylvania statute, which controls the manner in which grievances between police officers and their public employers are resolved, was passed by the legislature after years of unrest in the fire fighting and police forces. The central goal of the legislature in crafting the law was to return these critical labor forces to a state of stability. To ensure that resolution of labor disputes was both swift and certain, involvement by the judiciary in their resolution was severely limited. While the statute does not specifically state whether issues of arbitrability are first to be determined by an arbitrator or the court, a holding that would give that responsibility to a judge would set itself in opposition to the intrinsic purpose of the law - limiting the judiciary's involvement in the area of labor law. Thus, the rule most consistent with the dictates of state statute would hold that the arbitrator, not the trial court, has the jurisdiction to make the initial determination of arbitrability on grievances. Reversed for former police officer. [Township of Sugarloaf v. Bowling, 759 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2000)] 

HELD: The city asserts that the labor board erred when it found that the city failed to comply with the arbitration award when it reinstated the officers to the DPR and did not issue them weapons, badges, and identification. Though the award does 

HELD: Under Texas law, civil service appeals are reviewed under the substantial evidence rule. A court is to reverse a civil service commission decision if the employee's rights have been prejudiced because of the commission' findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions violate a constitutional or statutory provision. Here, Bustamante contends that the trial court erred because it did not consider that she invoked her constitutional right against self-incrimination when interviewed by the internal affairs investigator. She argues that she was entitled to an attorney and that a government agency may not discharge her for invoking her privilege against self-incrimination. Whatever merits these contentions may have in some other context, they are irrelevant to the grounds for this appeal. A reviewing court looks at whether or not the civil service commission violated a constitutional or statutory right, not whether the former employee's rights were violated or that an