HUD's Officer Next Door/Teacher Next Door (OND/TND) property disposition program allows police officers and teachers to purchase one HUD-owned single family dwelling in an urban revitalization area for one-half its fair market value. The officer or teacher must utilize the property as their sole residence for three years. The audit found several homes were vacant while others were being used as rental property. OIG estimated that 25 percent of all buyers were violating the occupancy requirement. Under the OND/TND program, 3,824 homes have been sold as of July of last year. HUD discounted about $152 million off the list price of these homes. 

According to a report issued last month, "The OND/TND program appears to be at high risk for noncompliance and abuse by homebuyers." The study found that internal HUD procedures were inadequate to ensure compliance with regulations on use of the properties and that closing agents did not execute the required second mortgage in over half the cases examined. To qualify for the 50 percent discount participants must execute a second mortgage for the other half of the purchase price. The second mortgage prevents resale of the property during the three year qualifying period. The requirement may also discourage renting of the property. 

The OIG observed that as a result of the 

During the three-year study the OIG examined procedures in the Atlanta program office and also audited 29 properties in Dade County, Florida. OIG recommended HUD institute several management controls to oversee program compliance. 

Ironically, at the same time OIG was issuing its report, Congress was considering another public employee housing subsidy program and California was examining its own version of the concept. 

In Congress this month, Representative John LaFalce (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, introduced a bill that would permit police officers, fire fighters, and teachers to finance home purchases with a one percent down payment. A similar bill passed the House of Representatives last session but stalled in the Senate. If enacted, the Homeownership Opportunities for Uniformed Services and Educators Act (H.R. 674) is expected to result in 125,000 new home loans over a five year period. The proposal has already garnered 29 cosponsors. 

Meanwhile, a bill has been introduced in the California General Assembly that would loan police officers and fire fighters up to $7,500 in order to buy and live in a home in the communities that they serve. Under the proposal, the loan would be forgiven after five years of residence. The bill would apply only to employees in Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Francisco, San Jose, and San Diego. 

"Every other profession in the world gets to live where they want to live, but we have to live in the city, which is bordering on slavery," PBPA official Jeff Wilson told the Chicago Sun-Times newspaper. Arguing that city life is costly, Wilson added, "If we're going to have to live in Chicago, we should have a benefits package that compensates us for the downside of living in the city." 

FOP officials claim the PBPA is "grasping at straws" in an attempt to discredit the group which has represented line officers for over 20 years. But, 

Disgruntled officers unhappy with the level of proposed pay hikes and increased prescription drug costs have been circulating the decertification petitions. About 4,000 officers would have to sign decertification cards in order to force a vote. A PBPA spokesman claimed that the drive is "about halfway there." 

The FOP has responded to the PBPA effort by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Illinois public employee labor board. The FOP is charging that Chicago supervisors, who are served by the PBPA, are "intimidating" officers at rollcalls into signing the decertification petitions. 

The independent PBPA, founded in 1936, consists of over 170 locals, mostly located in downstate Illinois. 

The protest apparently worked as the next day City Council granted a $2,000 pay raise to all municipal employees. The City Council had originally penciled in a $1,600 raise for blue collar personnel but on the day of the protest about 200 sanitation workers did not report for work. Council responded by granting all workers the same raise. 

During the demonstration a police union official indicated that unlike the sanitation workers police officers had no plans to engage in a work stoppage. "They [police officers] aren't threatening to strike, they aren't threatening to blue flu, they're not going to be led by a corrupt administration into doing something corrupt. Whether they get what they want or not, they are going to be out there tomorrow protecting the public," said Chip Warren, vice president of the local unit of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, one of several police labor groups in Atlanta. 

Atlanta public safety personnel do not work under a labor contract. 

HELD: Bogren asserts that she was the victim of intentional discrimination based on her race and gender as well as the victim of a hostile work environment. To survive summary judgment on a claim of discriminatory discharge under federal fair employment law a plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie showing creates a legal presumption of unlawful discrimination and shifts the burden of proof to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. If the employer presents a nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption of discrimination drops and the burden of proof reverts to the former employee to show that the reason for the termination was a pretext. Here, Bogren set forth evidence to support a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. The state, however, responded that the real reason for her termination was a combination of her conduct during the dispute with the former boyfriend, her 

Supreme Court update 

Cases of interest 

HELD: The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability. A "disability" is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual. "Major life" activities are defined as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. To show that the ability to work is substantially limited, a plaintiff must establish that he would be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Here, Gasser claims that the department regards him as disabled because of the protein deficiency and the taking of medication to alleviate the disease that has the side effect of blood thinning. The department contends he is not disabled because while taking the medication he has experienced no difficulty whatsoever. The Supreme Court has held that determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impairment. However, in this case it is not the protein deficiency but the medication that exposes Gasser to danger. In other words, it is the Coumadin, not the protein deficiency, which causes Gasser's 

HELD: The FLSA requires that police officers receive time and one-half their regular rates of pay in wages or compensatory time for hours worked over 171 during a 28-day period. "Regular rate" is defined as all remuneration for employment paid to or on behalf of the employee subject to a few exceptions. Here, the city concedes that the duty availability allowance does not fall within one of the exceptions and should have been included in the calculation of the FLSA regular rate. However, the city argues that it should receive credit for overtime it paid under the collective bargaining agreement in circumstances where no overtime was required by the FLSA. Federal statute allows extra compensation paid at a premium rate by the employer to be credited towards overtime payments. This is precisely the type of compensation the officers received under the collective bargaining agreement for hours worked in excess of eight or the normal 40-hour week. Thus, the payments for duty availability as well as the premium time for 

HELD: As to Phelan's claim that he was discharged without due process from his ward superintendent position, he has failed to show a property interest in employment. For Fourteenth Amendment due process to be available an individual must show that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the position. Phelan has failed to show that he is a member of the career civil service 

HELD: Lower courts erred in permitting Turner to proceed with his suit and enjoin the merit commission. To challenge the authority of the chief of police Turner must exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, his challenge should be heard by the merit commission initially. As to the more important question of residency of chiefs of police in Indiana, a more full discussion is needed. The several state constitutions in existence over the history of the State of Indiana have imposed residency requirements on various state and local officers. The bulk of these officers are elected individuals. In addition, the legislature has imposed residency requirements on various other officers who are not elected. The sole law enforcement official specifically named on the list of individuals for whom residency is required is the elected sheriff of a county. It would appear that the legislature intended that residency be a requirement for officers who are directly subject to political accountability, not every public employee. Since an appointed city chief of police is himself accountable to a layer of constitutional officers, such as mayors and city council members, it would appear that the constitutional requirement of residency should not apply in this circumstance. An appointed chief of police is not obligated under the Indiana constitution to live within the city limits of his employing city. [Turner v. City of Evansville, 740 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. 2001)] 

HELD: An employee with permanent status in the civil service may only be disciplined for cause expressed in writing. Cause exists whenever the employee's conduct impairs the efficiency of the public service in which the employee is engaged. Disciplinary action against a civil service employee shall be deemed arbitrary and capricious unless there is a real and substantial relationship between the improper conduct and the efficient operation of the public service. In this case, there was simply no evidence presented to establish that Guggenheim had a substance abuse problem. His four witnesses testified that he had never exhibited signs of being under the influence of drugs. The only contrary evidence was the drug test results but because of chain of custody problems, these were never formally introduced as evidence. The technician who conducted the test never appeared and other questions were raised about the actual chain of custody. The department was obligated to prove that Guggenheim tested positive for marijuana. It never did so because its expert never testified despite the fact the hearing went on for five months. Officer ordered reinstated with all back pay. [Guggenheim v. New Orleans Police Department, 773 So.2d 752 (La. App. 2000)] 

HELD: When statutory language is clear, a court must invoke its terms in substance rather than interpret the statute in a way contrary to its plain meaning. Second, when it is necessary to reconcile different provisions of a law, a court must arrive at a conclusion which gives effect to both provisions. The plain language of the statute in question provides that beyond the probationary period of employment an employer may not discharge an employee without good cause. The statute states that the probationary period of a police officer cannot exceed one year but also provides for permanent appointment by the city council within 30 days following the probationary period. The only manner in which the plain language of both statutes can be reconciled is to create a rule that police officers in Montana may serve a probationary period not to exceed one year. During that probationary period they may be terminated without cause. However, following satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a police officer cannot be terminated without cause. The officer is still subject to confirmation by the city council and does not become a member of the police force subject to other protections afforded police officers without such 

HELD: Prior Pennsylvania case law holds that probationary state troopers do not have a property right in continued employment with the state. Thus, a dismissal of a trooper does not implicate due process protections or the right to a judicial review of the dismissal. While the collective bargaining agreement between the troopers' union and the state includes probationary troopers, state statute grants the police commissioner discretion to dismiss a probationary trooper. Since probationary troopers have no right to a hearing, the dropping of the review panel was not a change in the terms or conditions of their employment that required bargaining. Implicit in the term "probationary" is that the employee is being tested for the job and the relationship is strictly at-will between the employer and the employee. Even though there was a sporadic past pattern and practice of holding hearings on probationary trooper dismissals, the state retained the right to unilaterally cease the practice and did so. Reversed for state. [Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 764 A.2d 92 (Pa. Cmmw. 2000)] 

HELD: The city argues it has a contractual right to proceed to arbitration on the merits of the termination of the officer. Pennsylvania law, however, limits the authority of appellate courts to review arbitration decisions. The court can only consider the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, an excess of the arbitrator's powers, and deprivations of constitutional rights. An error of law alone is not sufficient to support reversal of an arbitrator's award. Arbitrators act within the scope of their authority in determining their own jurisdiction. In concluding that they did not have jurisdiction the arbitrators interpreted the collective bargaining agreement to provide for a hearing within 45 calendar days. The arbitrators' conclusion on this issue is a reasonable interpretation of the contractual language and a reasonable analysis of the contract's distinction between "working days" and "days". A court may not disregard the arbitrators' interpretation of the labor agreement despite the unpalatable result of putting back to work an officer who admitted stealing. Reversal of dismissal affirmed. [City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 2, 764 A.2d 101 (Pa. Cmmw. 2000)]