April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

"COPS AHEAD" may become "COPS NO MORE" 

Saying the federal government's program of funding of community police officers had achieved its original goals, the Bush administration announced this month that its budget proposal for the next fiscal year would eliminate the direct payment of local police officer salaries. Instead, the budget proposal calls for expending community policing funds on school resource officers. The administration's budget proposes $4.2 billion to help state and local governments fight crime, including $575 million to assist crime victims. This level reflects a $1 billion reduction in discretionary spending on state and local law enforcement assistance, which grew 500 percent between 1992 and 2001. Overall community policing programs would see a 17 percent funding reduction. 

Beginning in 1994, the Clinton administration set a goal of 100,000 additional community police officers by 2000. The federal government agreed to fund salary and equipment costs of up to $75,000 per officer for three years. The program afforded many small agencies the opportunity to add two or three additional officers. Some large cities, such as Baltimore which used grants to hire nearly 300 officers, greatly increased department strength. 

While the program is widely recognized as dramatically changing the philosophy of policing 

in many local agencies, it has not avoided criticism. While requiring that the federally funded officers work as "community police officers," the federal government never adhered to a rigid definition of the term. Critics also point out that many of the 100,000 officers were "virtual officers" - monies were used to purchase technology to make existing officers more efficient. Only about 60,000 new personnel were actually added to the country's police departments. 

Bush administration officials point out that the program was never intended to be open-ended. In his budget plan, the President is asking Congress to divert the funds to hire 1,500 school resource officers, improve crime labs, and pay for prosecutions of drug dealers and gun-law violators. Whether Congress adopts the President's proposal is open to question. The community policing program has been politically popular and is credited by many as being one factor in the significant decrease in crime in recent years. 

Loss of federally-subsidized salaries could mean furloughs in many police agencies. However, in a touch of irony, a nationwide shortage of qualified police applicants may virtually guarantee currently employed police officers will have little trouble finding work. Officers will move to hard-funded slots or find work in neighboring agencies. 

HUD slams door on "Officer Next Door" program 

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in coordination with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), National Education Association, and American Federation of Teachers announced last month that it is imposing an immediate 120-day suspension of home sales under its "Officer Next Door" and "Teacher Next Door"  programs after uncovering numerous instances of fraud by homebuyers. 

"The vast majority of officers and teachers who buy houses through these programs play by the rules," HUD Secretary Mel Martinez said. "Both programs are proven winners for the communities. Officers and teachers get homeownership 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

opportunities, young people get excellent role models who live nearby and communities grow stronger and healthier." 

Gilbert G. Gallegos, National President of the FOP, which represents more than 293,000 law enforcement officers, was also quick to praise the program that the FOP helped to develop. "The Officer Next Door program underscores what we in law enforcement have always known - having a stable, consistent police presence in a community is a powerful deterrent to crime," Gallegos said. "Criminals simply cannot flourish in a neighborhood where the police and the community are bound together in the interest of the common good. It's a program designed to help police officers buy homes and to help communities become safer. But until we prevent further fraudulent abuses of the program, neither of these goals can be met." 

Martinez directed senior HUD officials to review the programs' guidelines and make whatever changes are necessary to ensure that these well-intended programs do what they were designed to do. "The oversight measures simply need strengthening," he added. 

The suspension will begin 12:01 a.m., on April 1 and last through July 31. HUD will honor 

all sales contracts it has signed on properties offered for sale prior to April 1. 

HUD's announcement comes on the heels of nine felony convictions and 15 indictments involving the purchase of homes under the programs. In addition, in February, HUD's Office of Inspector General reported that both programs were vulnerable to fraud and that management controls were inadequate. 

Through the programs, officers and teachers can buy HUD-owned, single family homes at a 50 percent discount in certain designated revitalization areas. The homes are FHA-insured houses on which the owners have defaulted. Since HUD created the officer and teacher programs in 1997 and 2000, respectively, approximately 6,000 police officers and teachers in 41 states and the District of Columbia have purchased the homes. 

To be eligible, law enforcement officers and teachers must be employed full-time and agree to make the homes their sole residence for three years after purchase. To make the properties even more affordable, HUD reduced the down payment to $100 if the home was purchased with an FHA-insured mortgage. Homes may be purchased directly through HUD or through a real estate broker. 

Flu bug hits Rhode Island police department 

The arrival of spring may mean the end of the flu season for some but apparently not for officers on the Johnston, Rhode Island, Police Department. Twenty-three officers, including the entire second shift, called in sick on April 4. Mayor William Macera called the mass absences a strike while Police Protective League president John Nardolillo insisted there was no organized union job action. 

Officers, who have gone for three years without a pay raise, have been embroiled in a series of disputes with the mayor. Most recently, the police union sued unsuccessfully to prevent the town from implementing a $88,000 severance package for a former deputy chief. At issue is the manner in which 

the retired executive's unused sick leave will be paid. The city is proposing a lump sum payment, a move the union objects to because recently retiring line officers have been required to receive accrued sick leave in two-week increments until the leave is exhausted. Further adding to frustration are contract negotiations for 1999, which are currently in the hands of an arbitrator. 

Although most officers who called in sick returned to work the next day, sick leave usage exceeded normal rates throughout the first week of April. Officers were called in or held over on overtime to provide normal staffing levels. 

As in most states, police strikes are unlawful under Rhode Island law. 



April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

New York union official named unindicted co-conspirator 

A federal grand jury last month named Thomas Scotto an unindicted co-conspirator in an alleged scheme by elements of organized crime to use kickbacks to union leaders and mob threats to tap into union pension funds and to inflate stock prices. Scotto, who has led the Detectives Endowment Association (DEA) since 1986, is also the current president of the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO). 

While Scotto and officials of several other unions were described as co-conspirators, the indictments did not accuse them of taking bribes or even being approached with bribe offers, according to the New York Times. The court papers noted that Scotto and the others "may or may not have known they were targeted as bribe recipients." 

Scotto denied any wrongdoing, saying he had never been approached with any bribe or spoken to any of the defendants in the case. He emphasized that no DEA pension money had been invested with the defendants. Scotto called the government's action as "outrageous" and vowed to rectify the "unfair, unjust, and unsubstantiated attack on my reputation." 

Philip Karasyk, Scotto's attorney, told the 

newspaper that the government's naming of his client as an unindicted co-conspirator was baseless and unsupportable. He said the identification apparently stemmed from two taped conversations by a government informant in which Scotto's name was mentioned. Scotto was not present during the conversations, Karasyk said. "It is essential for the public to understand that the designation of unindicted co-conspirator is one that is made solely at the discretion of the prosecutor," the lawyer said. He further noted that such designation is used for tactical purposes at trial. 

The papers naming Scotto are a small fragment of an investigation that federal authorities described as one of organized crimes most aggressive forays into the stock market. Mobsters allegedly used a Manhattan investment firm to defraud investors of $50 million over several years. 

A former DEA officer was indicted last June, accused of using his police contacts to provide confidential information to mobsters about investigations. At the time of the indictment, prosecutors acknowledged that the scheme to use DEA funds was never carried out and the union never lost any money. 

A constitutional right to honk your horn? 

"Honk if you support the police" could well read bumper stickers in Biddeford, Maine. According to Maine Attorney General Steven Rowe the city's unionized police and public works employees were exercising their constitutional right to free speech when they honked their car horns in protest last month. Rowe stated the position recently in a letter to the town's chief of police. 

Chief Roger Beaupre, relying on an earlier email from a member of Rowe's staff, had informed city employees that "prolonged horn tooting" could result in criminal charges of disorderly conduct. 

Following a meeting of the City Council on 

March 20, municipal union members, who have worked without a contract since July, honked their car horns in protest for about 15 seconds. The police chief later warned the city employees that their conduct might be considered criminal if neighbors complained. 

"On the contrary," the Attorney General wrote. "We believe that their conduct, under the circumstances, involved the expression of free speech protected by First Amendment." 

At the heart of the dispute is city attempts to require its workers to pay more for health benefits. 



April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

Litigation  service it performs through the employee. In determining whether speech touches on a matter of public concern, the court will consider the content, form, and context of the speech. In this case the alleged speech in question, the reports of the OPS investigations, was required by the employer and, as such, lacked First Amendment protection. Gonzalez was clearly acting entirely in an employment capacity when he made his reports. The form of his speech (routine official reports), the content of the speech (required opinions on misconduct), and the context (pursuant to duties of the job), all indicate that Gonzalez did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern. While police misconduct is certainly a matter of public concern, the internal reports were simply a summary of his findings following his official investigations. Speech by police department internal affairs' employees made in the course of day-to-day professional obligations is not protected by the First Amendment. Had Gonzalez failed to carry out this particular speech, writing accurate reports, he would have been subject to discipline for dereliction of duty. Speech was clearly made as an employee not as a citizen. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001)] 

Civil liability 

Supreme Court update 

No police labor-related cases were filed with the Supreme Court within the last month. 

Cases of interest 

Dismissal grounds 

For several years Gonzalez was employed 
as a civilian investigator for the police department's 
Office of Professional Standards (OPS). As an OPS investigator, he looked into public complaints alleging police misconduct and brutality and, following his investigations, summarized his conclusions in written reports. Gonzalez completed some 50 to 100 such reports per month. After seven years in this role, Gonzalez resigned his position and joined the police department as an officer. He graduated from the police academy and was assigned to a police district. During his tenure at OPS, Gonzalez had investigated several officers at this particular police district. One such investigation had resulted in termination. Apparently because of his OPS work, Gonzalez was greeted with hostility at the district. During his ten weeks of field training Gonzalez received two negative performance reports. As a result of these evaluations he was terminated from the force. After he was terminated Gonzalez sued the city claiming that the termination was in retaliation against him for his "speech" - the written reports- while an OPS investigator. Trial court concluded that because his "speech" at OPS was that of an employee performing his job, it was not protected by the First Amendment. Gonzalez's claim was dismissed. Former officer appeals. 

HELD: First Amendment claims by public employees asserting a violation against protected speech are analyzed under a two-step test. The first step is to determine whether the employee speaks as a citizen upon matters of public concern. The second step is to balance the interest of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 

Cowgill became engaged in a verbal altercation at a store. The argument arose as a result of the store declining to take back a defective telephone which Cowgill had purchased. When the argument escalated, the police were called. Two different police vehicles responded to the call. Upon the officers' arrival, Cowgill was waiting outside the store attempting to calm down. He informed the officer who began questioning him that he had a heart condition and that his heart was hurting then. The officer instructed Cowgill to move a short distance away and wait for him while he spoke to the owner of the store. A short time later, Cowgill was observed by his wife lying on the parking lot. She screamed, "He's having a heart attack." Neither 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

of the police officers responded. Each officer remained seated in his respective vehicle. One officer leaned forward and saw Cowgill on the ground about eight feet away but did nothing. Mrs. Cowgill screamed at the police officer to call an ambulance. Shortly thereafter, a woman who identified herself as an EMT appeared on the scene and began to work to resuscitate Cowgill. She told one officer that the man was not breathing and she needed his help. The officer responded, "I'm not doing that" and neither officer got out of their vehicles. A short time later a fire fighter responded to the scene to assist the EMT in her efforts. Cowgill was subsequently transported to a hospital where he later was declared dead. Cowgill's wife sued the officers and the city alleging a violation of Cowgill's constitutional rights. Defendants move for summary judgment. 

HELD: The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deny any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The U. S. Supreme Court, however, has noted that the due process clause confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to a secure life, liberty, or property interest of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. This is so because if the due process clause does not require a state to provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the state cannot be held liable for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide the services. The court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule. Each of these exceptions involves a situation where a special relationship is created that imposes a duty to protect the individual. One exception focuses on individuals who are in custodial settings in which the state has limited the individual's ability to care for himself and the other is when the state affirmatively places the individual in a position of danger that the individual would not have otherwise faced. In this case, Cowgill's heirs argue the special relationship was created under the custody theory. While the court has not 

definitively defined "in custody" for the purposes of such suits, it has ruled that more is required than merely a person riding in the backseat of an unlocked police car for a few minutes. Certainly, if riding in the back of a police car does not constitute "custody," then a police officer's directive that a citizen await questioning likewise does not constitute custody. Even if Cowgill were found to have been in custody, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects the officers from liability. Qualified immunity shields the officers from suit insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Qualified immunity gives public officials the benefit of the doubt in close cases. Cowgill's heirs have not established that the officers should be denied qualified immunity. Likewise, as to the city, a municipality is liable for a constitutional deprivation only if it is shown that the city maintains an express policy of depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. In the present case there is no showing that the city had a policy of failing to provide medical care to individuals in custody. Nor is there a showing of a deliberate intent to violate Cowgill's rights. Since the police officers did not deprive Cowgill of a constitutional right, the city likewise did not do so either. Summary judgment for officers and city. [Cowgill v. City of Marion, Indiana, 127 F. Supp.2d 1047 (N.D. Ind. 2000)] 

Handicap discrimination 

Richey, a female, had previously worked for 
the county police department. In 1997, a sergeant on the city police approached her and informed her of an opening as a dispatcher and encouraged her to apply. Richey was subsequently interviewed by the chief of police. During the meeting she disclosed that she suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS) and also that she had been convicted of driving under the influence a year earlier. The chief reviewed her prior work experience favorably and informed her that he did not believe the drunk driving conviction 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

or her MS would keep her from getting the job. He forwarded her application to the merit board. When the merit board convened, two dispatcher vacancies existed. The board ranked Richey as one of the top three applicants along with another female. Their recommendation was forwarded to the city council. However, when the mayor learned of the drunk driving conviction, he stated that he would not support Richey's application for employment. Thus, she was not hired. Subsequently, another female was hired for the dispatcher position. Richey filed suit claiming sex discrimination, age discrimination, and handicap discrimination. The city moves for summary judgment. 

HELD: The age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) must be dismissed because Richey failed to first file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Federal statute requires that allegations of age discrimination first be processed through the EEOC. Failing to do so bars her claim. Likewise, the sex discrimination claim must fail. The evidence reflects that the position Richey sought was in fact ultimately filled by another female, not by a male. Thus, it could not be said that she was discriminated against based on her sex. As to her claim of handicap discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from discriminating based upon physical or mental impairments of a qualified individual with a disability. To establish a case, a plaintiff must show that she has a disability, that she is qualified to serve in the position, with or without reasonable accommodation, and that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of the disability. The city contends that Richey is not qualified to perform the essential functions of the dispatcher job because she suffers from a type of reoccurring seizure known as a Trans-Ischemic Attack (TIA). Richey admits that these attacks occur weekly and at random times and she is unable to function for a period of 30 seconds to three minutes. The city asserts that a dispatcher must be able to react quickly and calmly in emergency situations 

and that if Richey were to suffer a TIA during an emergency call, it would put the public and other police officers at risk. To be considered a qualified individual with a disability Richey must show that she is able, with or without accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the position. Consideration is given to the employer's judgment as to what functions are essential and a written job description is evidence of those essential functions. The job description for dispatcher includes the ability to speak clearly and concisely and to act calmly and accurately during an emergency. The ADA permits an employer to use a qualification standard that screens out individuals who pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. Although Richey may be fully capable of performing dispatch duties most of the time, her inability to react or communicate coherently during a TIA poses a direct threat to officers and the general public seeking emergency assistance. Thus, she is not a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. Likewise, no reasonable accommodation can resolve this problem. Dispatchers work alone in the radio room and there is no way to keep a watchful eye over her to ensure that she does not suffer a TIA during a call. Additionally, Richey's ADA claim must fail because she cannot prove that she was rejected for employment because of her disability. The evidence indicates that city council members did not even know of her disability until after her application was disapproved. An employer cannot fire an employee "because of" a disability unless it knows of the disability first. Summary judgment for city granted. [Richey v. City of Lilburn, Georgia, 127 F. Supp.2d 1250 (N.D. Ga. 1999)] 

Handicap discrimination 

Davis was a veteran police officer. In 1993, she was involved in a line of duty shooting in which she shot a suspect. Over the next year she suffered anxiety attacks which worsened as a trial involving the shooting approached. Ultimately she sought 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

medical assistance and was diagnosed as having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression with panic attacks. She was placed on medical leave and received outpatient treatment at a counseling center for a month. When she received a medical release to return to work, she resumed her duties as a patrol officer. Approximately two years later Davis participated in a police-training seminar. The seminar consisted of several simulated shooting exercises where a videotape scenario was projected on a large screen. As Davis participated in the simulations she became upset and stressed and began crying, having chest pains, and experiencing breathing difficulties. After the third scenario she was crying and handed her simulation weapon to the range officer saying she was done with the exercise. She stated she was having an anxiety attack. The chief of police was advised of the situation and Davis was sent home for the rest of the day. Subsequently, the chief instructed Davis to meet with the department's psychologist. Following an examination, the department placed Davis on temporary administrative duty until a full psychological evaluation could be completed. While on administrative duty she continued to receive her full pay and benefits and retained her service weapon. As she was receiving psychological counseling Davis claimed she was harassed by three fellow officers. The harassment consisted of the officers asking her questions such as whether she was studying for the psychological exam or if she would make ashtrays for them when she went to the counseling center. One officer said he would certify her as crazy so she could pension out. The village had an anti-discrimination policy in place that prohibited harassment in the workplace based on, among other things, disabilities. The policy instructed employees who felt they were being harassed to report the harassment to the village manager. Ultimately, Davis was found fit for duty and returned to work. Nonetheless she filed suit against the city claiming it had violated the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against her because of her PTSD.  The village moves for summary judgment. 

HELD: The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. Under the law an employer is entitled to inquire into the mental health of its employees when there are legitimate concerns about the employee and public safety. The ADA does not provide a shield from fitness for duty examinations for employees with jobs that affect public safety. Employers do not violate the ADA by ensuring that police officers are physically fit for duty. The village had a valid reason for placing Davis on administrative leave after the simulator event. The village had concerns about her ability to function as a police officer in a stressful shooting situation. Davis argues that the village was not really concerned about her psychological circumstance because it allowed her to retain her service weapon while performing administrative duties and that this is evidence of discrimination. Contrary to Davis' argument, however, the steps an employer takes to address concerns about fitness for duty are not evidence of discrimination. In this case, the village took steps that were narrowly construed to address its concern about her ability to handle shooting situations, placing her on administrative duty where she was unlikely to encounter such a situation. The village should not incur liability for allowing her to retain her pay and benefits in this situation. Davis admits that she has PTSD and that she suffered an anxiety attack during the shooting simulation. She has failed to establish that the village intentionally discriminated against her based on her disability. Davis also claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her disability. While the federal courts are not consistent in ruling whether a hostile environment claim can be brought under the ADA, some circuits allow such a claim. Davis' allegation has to do with the insensitive remarks made by fellow officers. While such comments were uncalled for and insensitive, they were not threatening, humiliating, or of a nature that would disrupt Davis' ability to perform her job. The most that can be said is that Davis was insulted by the 



April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

other officers' comments. Such insults do not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The village had in place an anti-harassment policy that prohibited discrimination based on disability. A reporting mechanism was established but Davis did not report the alleged harassment. An employer is entitled to an affirmative defense in such cases if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid the harm. Davis offers no valid reason for failing to report the alleged harassment to management. Summary judgement for village granted. [Davis v. Village of Carpentersville, Illinois, 128 F. Supp.2d 575 (N.D. Ill. 2001)]  officers. The hearing officer concluded that there were crucial omissions from the investigative report and that the report was a convenient pretext to punish the PBA for its protected political activities by dismissing the three officers. Finally, the hearing officer found that the city had produced no evidence demonstrating it would have taken the same action absent the chief's recommendation, which was motivated by an impermissible reason. The hearing officer concluded that the city had committed an unfair labor practice. The full state labor board, however, when reviewing the ruling, remanded it to the hearing officer with orders to revisit his factual analysis on the question of whether the city would have fired the officers regardless of the protected conduct. On remand, without altering findings or conclusions, the hearing officer changed his ruling. He found that the PBA had not established by the preponderance of the evidence that the police chief's discharge recommendation was unlawfully motivated. Full labor board affirmed this order and PBA appeals. 

HELD: Under Florida law, in order to determine whether evidence sustains a charge alleging an unfair labor practice when it is grounded upon an asserted violation of protected activity, two standards must be met. First, the burden of proof is on the union to present proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct was protected and that the conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision taken by the employer. Second, if the hearing officer determines the decision was motivated by a non-permissible reason, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show by the preponderance of the evidence that notwithstanding the existence of factors relating to protected activity, the employer would have made the same decision anyway. In this case, the hearing officer initially found that the PBA had met its burden of proof. Additionally, the officer found that the city had not presented any evidence that the same decision would have been made independent of the protected activity. Thus, the labor board erred in remanding the case for a second hearing. The hearing officer's 

Dismissal procedures 

Three police officer who had been active in union activities were interrogated and subsequently discharged from the force. The Police Benevolent Association (PBA), their representative union, filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city, alleging that the officers had been discharged for engaging in protected activity under Florida law. The city countered that their activities were not protected and that the sole basis for dismissal was an internal investigation report that had been written by an outside investigator. A hearing was conducted on the matter. The hearing officer found that the officers all had exemplary records prior to their dismissal and they had been actively engaged in PBA activities, including supporting certain candidates for city elections. The hearing officer further determined that the police chief had publicly acknowledged his displeasure with their activities. The chief believed the PBA was attempting to discredit him and that PBA involvement in municipal elections could affect his job security. The PBA successfully supported city council candidates who might terminate the city manager. The new city manager then would, in turn, fire the police chief. The police chief hired an experienced law enforcement officer to investigate the officers' election activities. Basing his decision on a subsequent report, he recommended dismissal of the 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

conclusion in the second review is clearly erroneous. That conclusion contradicted the unaltered findings of the original order and cannot stand. Reversed for officers, reinstating original finding of unfair labor practice. [Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association v. City of Riviera Beach, 774 So.2d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)]  benefit that must be paid upon an employee's separation from employment. Consequently, the city argues that for Ingram to be entitled to be paid for unused sick leave there must have been an express agreement between the parties for such payment. Ingram counters that the employee handbook issued by the city is silent on the issue of unpaid sick leave. He argues there must be express written statement indicating that unused sick leave will not be paid as a fringe benefit in order for the city to avoid liability. Prior case law holds that state law does not make payment of fringe benefits mandatory and that the terms and conditions of fringe benefits are controlled by the agreement between the employer and the employee. Terms of employment concerning the payment of unused fringe benefits must be express and specific so that employees understand the amount of unused fringe benefit pay to be owed them in case of separation from employment. The evidence is undisputed that the city did not have a written statement on the issue of payment of unused sick leave. Further, the city had an unwritten policy of never paying unused sick leave to separated police officers. Apparently, no officer had ever been paid unused sick leave. Thus, the evidence establishes that the terms of employment between Ingram and the city did not obligate the city to pay him unused sick leave. There is no ambiguity in the terms of his employment. State law could not be used to enforce the payment of the unused sick leave and it was error for the court to allow the verdict to stand. Reversed for city denying payment of unused sick leave to police officer. [Ingram v. City of Princeton, 540 S.E.2d 569 (W.Va. 2000)] 

Sick leave 

Ingram was employed as a police officer for approximately ten years. Upon resignation from his employment he requested payment for unused sick leave that he had accumulated. He had recorded over 99 days of sick leave. The city refused to pay Ingram for his unused sick leave citing an unwritten policy of not paying unused sick leave wages to officers who left city employment. Ingram filed suit under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. This act sets forth particular rules that employers must follow in paying employees. The city countered that the act was inapplicable to municipal government. Additionally, the city claimed it had never agreed to pay unused sick leave as part of separation pay. Trial court ultimately ruled in favor of Ingram, awarding him the back sick leave wages. The court rejected the city's efforts to overturn the verdict. City appeals. 

HELD: The city first contends that the wage law is not applicable to municipalities. The city cites differences in various sections of the law where the term "employer" in some instances specifically mentions local government and in other instances does not. The court is unpersuaded by the city's argument, however, that the expansive definition of "employer" in one section indicates a legislative intent to limit the definition of "employer" in other sections of the law. Courts may venture beyond the plain meaning of a statute when the literal application would defeat or thwart the statutory purpose. The court believes the legislation intended its statutory wage payment and collection guidelines to be applied to both governmental and non-governmental employers alike. The city next argues that unused sick leave is not a mandatory fringe 

Settlements 

Baltimore County, Maryland 

police officers 
Members of Lodge 4 of the Fraternal Order of Police this month overwhelmingly approved a wage reopener for the third year of their four-year 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

contract. The adapted contract provides a 10.25 pay boost in the coming fiscal year, compared with a 5 percent hike originally scheduled. The reopener was activated when pay dropped below that of surrounding jurisdictions. Starting pay will go to $34,577 on July 1. The revised agreement also improves death benefits for surviving spouses and creates a lump sum retirement option. About 1,200 officers are covered by the contract.  proposal also calls for creation of a priority response shift, which would overlap the evening and night shifts Wednesday through Saturday. A core group of 32 officers would be assigned to this shift. 

Orchard Park, New York 

police officers 
Orchard Park officers will receive a 9.25 pay boost over the three-year life of their first long-term contract. The Orchard Park Police Benevolent Association (PBA) and the town board reached accord earlier this month. The contract, retroactive to January 1, will boost starting pay to $46,953 by the end of its term. Top pay for police officers will rise from $51,580 to $56,640 over the contract's life. Detectives will receive 4.25 percent additional. Officers will also receive four additional personal leave days per year. About two dozen PBA members will benefit from the pact. 

Bellevue, Nebraska 

police officers 
Six months after the old contract expired, Bellevue officers have reached accord with the city on a new one-year pact. Officers will receive a pay jump of 3 percent retroactive to October. Police officer base pay will now range between $28,776 and $44,616. Sergeants will draw a base between $48,012 and $55,620, while lieutenants will earn between $56,100 and $64,944, depending upon years of experience. 

Tonawanda, New York 

police officers 

Glendale Heights, Illinois 

police officers 
The Tonawanda Town Council last month approved a new four-year contract with its police union. In exchange for lower pay boosts, the officers will receive a sweeter retirement package. Wage hikes will be 2.5 percent for this year, 2.5 percent in 2002, 1.5 percent in January 2003 followed by another 1.5 percent in June of the same year. Raises of 1.75 percent will be awarded in January and June of 2004. Pension payments will now be based on the officer's highest salary, not an average of the three highest consecutive years as was the previous rule. A four-year veteran will now earn a wage just short of $50,000. 
The 44 Glendale Heights officers, represented by the Fraternal Order of Police, will receive lump sum checks this month as part of a retroactive wage settlement. A new three-year contract provides an 8.2 percent pay jump retroactive to May 1, 2000. A 4.1 percent raise will be awarded May 1 of this year. Another 4.1 percent will come in the final year of the agreement. Starting pay next month reaches $39,322, going to $40,913 in 2002. Officers with seven years experience will draw $56,326 beginning next month. 

Omaha, Nebraska 

police officers 
Next month's 
Salary Tracker 
features 
Detective and Police Officer 
salaries 
The Omaha Police Union has accepted the city's offer of wage adjustments exceeding 10.7 percent over three years. The tentative pact calls for pay increases of 3.75 percent in 2001, 4.17 percent in 2002, and 4.43 percent in 2003. The 


April 2001 
Volume 19, Number 11 

Police Labor Monthly has been advised by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) that contrary to earlier press releases, the matching monetary requirement for participation in the federal body armor purchase program remains in place. A BJA representative has advised that the waiver for small and rural agencies announced in the December 2000 issue of Police Labor Monthly was erroneous. Departments interested in the federally-supported program can obtain information at http://vests.ojp.gov/.