"Visually wearing a cross pin _ religious speech that receives great protection in civilian life _ takes on an entirely different cast when viewed in the context of a police uniform," Judge Jacque Wiener, Jr., wrote for the court. The decision upholds two lower court rulings that former officer George Daniels's rights were not violated when he was fired after refusing to remove the pin from his police uniform. 

Daniels, a 13-year veteran of the department, began wearing the cross pin, a sign of his evangelical Christian faith, while assigned as a plainclothes investigation. Daniels continued to wear the pin after being transferred to a uniformed assignment. Department policy banned the wearing of adornments without the approval of the chief of police. Daniels's request for a waiver of the rule 

In rejecting his constitutional claim the appeals court found that prior case law allows government agencies to place appropriate restrictions on the First Amendment rights of public employees. The Supreme Court has specifically upheld that authority in regard to police uniform standards. The judge noted that prohibiting the wearing of the pin would have only an incidental effect on Daniels's exercise of his religious beliefs. 

The court further found that the department had met its statutory responsibility to try and accommodate Daniels's religious beliefs. When Daniels rejected the proposed solutions, he did not fulfill his duty of cooperation as required under fair employment law. 

"A police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms," Judge Wiener concluded in affirming the case for the city. 

The case is titled Daniels v. City of Arlington, Texas, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 00-11191. 

In a 661-518 vote, patrol officers and corrections personnel chose the LVPPA over the 

The board ordered the election after an April hearing at which LVLEA leaders claimed they were 

The LVPPA has been the chief bargaining entity for Las Vegas officers for more than 20 years. But the union has been a source of controversy in recent years primarily due to allegations that a former union leader, Andy Anderson, had mismanaged millions of dollars of public money 

Las Vegas police officials have worried about the financial stability of the health plan since 1999, when its cash reserves at one point dipped from $3 million to $100,000. 

As designed, the proposal would require the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to determine if existing state laws meet statutory standards. If a state did not have a qualifying collective bargaining law, fire fighter and police officer labor issues would fall under the jurisdiction of the FLRA. The key points of the bill include mandatory bargaining with police officers and fire fighters and use of mediation, not arbitration, in case of impasse. Strikes are prohibited under the proposal. 

A Congressional committee conducted a hearing on the bill last year. Supporters and critics were permitted to state their views on the legislation. . 

Gilbert Gallegos, National President of the Fraternal Order of Police, hailed the introduction of the legislation. "Law enforcement officers take their sworn oaths and their commitment to the protection of the public very seriously," Gallegos said. "We do not engage in work stoppages or slowdowns. Threats to public safety are not used as bargaining chips by police or fire fighters. The absence of collective bargaining rights leave these critical employees, these dedicated men and women, with no avenue to influence important decisions affecting their jobs and livelihoods." 

The proposal currently has 120 sponsors, including 21 Republicans. Last year, a majority of the members of the House of Representatives signed on as cosponsors but the matter never was brought to the floor for a vote. Companion legislation received only tepid support in the Senate. 

Cases of interest 

HELD: To prevail on an ADA claim a plaintiff must prove a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual. Prior case law holds that such determination must be made after taking into account corrective measures such as medication. In this case, Stumbo's hypertension is fully correctable. He is not precluded from any major life activity, even working. As such, he does not fit the definition of a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. Similarly, since he is not disabled, Dyncorp is under no obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. The court cannot conceive of any reasonable manner by which Dyncorp could have accommodated the working conditions of Bosnia to the medical needs of Stumbo. Without demonstrating the existence of a disability, Stumbo's claim must fail. Summary judgment for defendant. [Stumbo v. Dyncorp Technology Services, Inc., 130 F. Supp.2d 771 (W.D. Va. 2001)] 

HELD: The city moves to dismiss Beck's claim on the grounds that as an at-will employee he has no protected property interest in continued employment, or job assignment and as a result, no right to procedural due process. Certainly, federal law requires that in order to state a cause of action a plaintiff must allege that the conduct complained of deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. Beck argues that although he was an at-will employee, he nonetheless had a property right in his job. Beck argues that under North Carolina law there exists a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. North Carolina law does indeed recognize an exception to employment at-will status where an employee is discharged in contravention of North Carolina public policy. However, the fact that the public policy exception creates a right of action in certain limited circumstances does not mean that an employee discharged for reasons that violate public policy is 

HELD: Under the FLSA an employee who has accrued compensatory time off and requests the use of such time shall be permitted to use the time within a "reasonable period" after making the request, if the use of the time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the agency. The officers in this 

HELD: The FLSA requires employers to compensate their employees who work in excess of 40 hours per week at a rate of 1½ times the regular rate at which they are employed. The regular hourly rate is the rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime workweek. Under the FLSA an employer is not required to pay shift differential. However, once an employer decides to make payments in addition to the minimum wage, it must do so in accordance with FLSA. In computing overtime, the FLSA requires that the overtime rate be not less than 1½ the bona fide rate established for like work performed during non-overtime hours. Once a rate has been agreed upon for the particular type of work, the parties cannot lawfully agree that the rate will be lower simply because the work is performed during statutory overtime hours. The city argues that shift differential is not part of the "regular rate." Instead the city claims shift differential is a bonus. However, under the FLSA, "regular rate" is defined to include all remuneration for employment paid to or on behalf of the employee. Excluded from this regular rate are bonuses "which are not measured by, or dependent on, hours worked." Here, the shift differential does not reach the definition of a bonus. The FLSA overtime provision serves two purposes. The first purpose is to spread employment by placing 

HELD: Bailey argues that the city's action breached his employment contract because it breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a general rule, Delaware law creates a heavy presumption that a contract for employment is at-will in nature. The courts have identified four situations in which an employer's authority to terminate an at-will employee is limited by a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. One, where the employees termination violates public policy; two, where the employer misrepresents an important fact and the employee relies on it when deciding to accept the position or remain at the position; three, where the employer uses its superior bargaining power to deprive an employee of identifiable compensation related to an employee's past service; and four, where an employer through deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation manipulates the record to 

HELD: The city claims it is immune from liability for the dog handler's alleged negligence pursuant to the law enforcement immunity provision of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). Davis contends the city is not immune because the use of the dog under the circumstances did not constitute "enforcement" of the law within the meaning of the act. A review of case law reveals that governmental immunity has been redefined by Indiana courts several times. Part of the redefinition has come in the courts' interpretations of the ITCA. The ITCA grants immunity to a governmental entity or employee if the loss results from "the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt a law unless the enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." The current view is that the term "enforcement" is limited to those activities in which the government entity attempts to compel the obedience of another to laws or attempts to sanction a violation thereof. Here, the city deployed the dog to assist in locating and apprehending an individual who escaped from the juvenile detention facility. The use of the dog under the circumstances plainly constitutes an effort to compel obedience of another to laws and, therefore, amounted to the "enforcement of a law" within the meaning of the ITCA. The police officer and the city are immune from suit under the ITCA. [City of Anderson v. Davis, 743 N.E.2d 359 Ind. Ct. App. 2001)] 

HELD: The elements of a cause of action for defamation are: (1) defamatory words, (2) publication, (3) falsity, (4) malice, and (5) resulting injury. A defamatory communication is one that tends to harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Accusations of criminal conduct are defamatory per se and proof of actual malice is not required. To be actionable, the defamatory words must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff or directly or indirectly cast a personal reflection on the plaintiff. The only dispute in this case is whether the defamatory words were "of and concerning" the plaintiffs. Ward argues that since no individual member of SCU was named and the group is so large, the statements could not be "of and concerning" any individual plaintiff. Generally, Louisiana courts recognize the principle that defamatory words must refer to some ascertainable person. Group defamation, however, is generally not a recognized cause of action. When the defamed group is sufficiently small, the words may be reasonably understood to have personal reference and application to every member of the group. While there is no definite limit on the size of the group, most authorities agree the group must consist of 25 or less members in order for the 

HELD: The Fireman's Rule bars recovery against a property owner or occupant for injuries related to the risk fire fighters and police officers are expected to assume as part of their jobs. The rule is grounded on the policy that, unlike members of the general public, public safety personnel are specially trained and compensated to confront hazards and, therefore, must be precluded from recovering damages for the various situations that create a need for their services. The New York legislature opened a narrow passageway around the common law rule by affording public safety personnel and their survivors a statutory cause of action for line of duty injuries resulting from negligent noncompliance with the requirements of governmental statutes, ordinances, rules, and orders. Prior case law holds that this phrase refers to a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties. Here, the plaintiff argues that the police department patrol guide fits under this definition. However, prior cases hold that the patrol guide is not part of a duly enacted body of law. The patrol guide is an internal manual containing thousands of rules and procedures adopted by the police commissioner for the governance, discipline, and administration of the police department. It is not a body of law or regulation establishing clear legal duties that should serve as a basis for civil liability of municipalities. The patrol guide does not prescribe the specific action to be taken in every situation encountered by individual officers. If such a book of regulations could be the foundation of a monetary damage suit, it would operate as a