August 2001 
Volume 20, Number 3 

FOP selects Young as president 
Marion, Ohio, police lieutenant Steve Young is the new president of the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). Young, a 25-year veteran, was selected earlier this month at the organization's 55th biennial conference in Phoenix. Young, who was unopposed for the position, will serve a two year term. 

Young has served as national vice president for four years and was Ohio State Lodge president from 1988 to 1999. Young is regarded as an expert on police pension plans. 

He succeeds three-term president Gilbert Gallegos. Gallegos, a retired Albuquerque deputy 

 chief, was recently nominated by President George W. Bush to serve as a member of the U.S. Parole Commission, which makes parole decisions for the District of Columbia. 

In addition to other conference business, the 4,000 FOP delegates conference also heard a speech by Attorney General John Ashcroft. The Attorney General presented the administration's position on racial profiling and community policing. 

With Young's selection, two out of the last three FOP presidents have hailed from Ohio. Dewey Stokes, a former Columbus officer, preceded Gallegos in the post. 

IBPO leader suspended by parent union 
Ken Lyons, the president and long-time leader of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO), was placed on indefinite leave this month by the parent organization, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), AFL-CIO. Lyons, president of the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) of which IBPO is a sub-unit, is suspected by SEIU officials of destroying vouchers showing that he bought lunch for Massachusett's chief labor negotiator, undersecretary of administration and finance James Harnett, Jr. 

Ethics laws forbid state officials from accepting gifts from those who do business with the state. Harnett, who was placed on administrative leave, is reportedly being investigated by the state Ethics Commission. SEIU officials accused Lyons of destroying the expense accounts to obstruct the investigation of Harnett. 

Lyons initially denied taking Harnett to lunch but later amended his story and admitted treating Hartnet to free meals on several occasions, 

 including one $200 dinner at Boston's Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Lyons has denied using union funds to pay for the meals, noting that the $200 dinner was paid with a gift certificate Lyons had received from a family member. 

A NAGE member has also accused Lyons of diverting funds meant for a health care account in order to purchase new computer equipment for his office. 

"Union members are entitled to a full investigation of these charges to make sure their interests are protected," Andrew Stern, SEIU president said in a statement regarding the incident. 

A 40-year veteran union leader, Lyons told the Boston Globe newspaper that he remains confident that he will be cleared of any wrongdoing. "They've never asked my side for anything. There's not a dime missing from anywhere," Lyons said. "This whole thing is a bag job. If you think I'm going to take it lying down you're crazy." 

Lyons, 82, has led NAGE since 1962. IBPO affiliated with NAGE in 1970. 
August 2001 
Volume 20, Number 3 

HUD resumes sale of discounted homes to officers 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) announced earlier this month that it is resuming its Officer Next Door and Teacher Next Door home sales programs after taking a number of corrective measures to prevent homebuyer fraud. HUD suspended the programs on April 1 following nine felony convictions and 15 indictments involving police officers who purchased homes. The HUD Inspector General also released a report criticizing the programs' management controls. 

The programs offer police officers and teachers a 50 percent discount on HUD-owned, single family homes in certain designated revitalization areas. The homes become available to HUD after homeowners default on their FHA-insured mortgages. 

"Both programs are proven winners for the communities. Officers and teachers get homeownership opportunities, young people living nearby get excellent role models and communities grow stronger and healthier," said HUD Secretary Mel Martinez. "While most of the officers and teachers who purchase houses through these programs play by the rules, there is no doubt we needed to implement more aggressive monitoring 

 and tighten controls in the program." The Secretary expects that heightened program controls will greatly reduce or eliminate future program abuse, and that ongoing investigations by HUD's Inspector General may result in additional charges being filed against some individuals who purchased homes before the stronger management controls were implemented. 

"We are extremely gratified that Secretary Martinez has reinstated this important program," said Gilbert G. Gallegos, outgoing national president of the Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police. "The Officer Next Door program has a positive impact on public safety, and strengthens the ties between America's law enforcement officers and the communities that they are sworn to protect and serve." 

Since HUD created the officer and teacher programs in 1997 and 2000, respectively, approximately 6,000 police officers and teachers in 41 states and the District of Columbia have purchased the homes. To be eligible, law enforcement officers must be employed full-time and agree to make the homes their sole residence for three years following the purchase. Many of the homes are located in inner city neighborhoods. 

NYCPBA contributes to settlement with abused immigrant 
To avoid potentially more costly litigation, the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) has paid $1.65 million to Abner Louima who was tortured with a broken broomstick in a police station bathroom four years ago. The PBA contribution, which will be paid by its insurance carrier, is part of a $8.75 million settlement Louima made with New York City. 

Louima's 1997 case received nationwide attention when two police officers sodomized the Haitian immigrant with a broomstick. Criminal charges resulted in a 30-year sentence for former officer Justin Volpe and a 15-year sentence for ex-officer Charles Schwarz. Schwarz and two other 

 officers were also convicted of obstructing the investigation into the incident. 

Louima subsequently sued the city and the PBA for misconduct. The allegations against the union charged the PBA with promotion of a "blue wall of silence" that served to obstruct the official investigation into the incident. While lawsuits against municipalities alleging police misconduct are fairly common, including the offending police officer's union in the suit is virtually unknown. 

While Louima's attorneys - including famed California lawyer Johnnie Cochran - hailed the settlement as "precedent setting," PBA lawyers emphasized that the agreement was purely an effort 
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Volume 20, Number 3 
to put the matter behind. "No court has ever found anything adverse against the PBA, and I deem it very unlikely that this settlement is going to be cited as a legal precedent," said PBA attorney Thomas Puccio.  The agreement is the largest police brutality settlement ever paid by New York City and the first time a police union has borne part of the financial burden. 

Philly FOP giving up the doughnuts 
The relationship between doughnuts and police officers has attained legendary proportion in American culture. But Philadelphia police officers have decided to abandon at least one brand of the artery-clogging confection as a way of supporting striking workers. Late last month at a news conference held jointly with officials of the United Food and Commercial Workers, Lodge 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police announced a boycott of Dunkin' Donuts. The boycott was called in support of striking drivers and warehousemen at a Logan Township, New Jersey, bakery distribution center. The company distributes baking supplies to 1,400 donut shops in eight states. 

"We don't believe that anyone is above the rule of law," sad lodge president Rich Costello. Costello was referring to a ruling by an 

 administrative judge on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board. The judge ordered the distribution center to rehire several workers and bargain with the union. The distribution company, which is operated by franchisees and is not owned by Dunkin' Donuts, has appealed the ruling. 

Nancy Sterling, a spokeswoman for the bakery distribution center, said, "I guess we will finally see if the old adage about police and doughnuts and coffee consumption is true, at least in Philadelphia." 

When asked if he were concerned about the jokes that are sure to be made, Costello stated, "We don't need doughnut shops to get ridiculed. It comes with the badge." He added that the boycott "might help a few cops slim down. Lots of times, when you do a good thing, you get many benefits." 

Officer assignments challenged in two cities 
For many years federal fair employment law has prohibited unlawful discrimination in the workplace. For police departments, most litigation has come from challenges to hiring and promotion procedures based on race or sex discrimination. Two recent incidents highlight a slowly increasing complaint - unlawful discrimination in assignments. 

In Denver, an African-American officer has complained to the U.S. Department of Justice that he was singled out for an assignment because of his race. Henry Jones, a 12-year veteran who works as a patrol officer at the airport, claims that he was assigned to work a neighborhood Juneteenth celebration solely because he is black. Juneteenth commemorates the day that Texas slaves learned of the Emancipation Proclamation. 

A police department spokesman said that Jones was assigned to the celebration along with 50 

 to 60 other officers because insufficient personnel volunteered for the job. Unclear is whether the festival organizers specifically requested black officers. 

The Denver Police Protective Association is backing Jones' complaint. A previously filed grievance was rejected by the department. 

Meanwhile, a former Indiana state trooper has complained that the department fired him after he refused to work at a casino. In a federal court suit filed recently in South Bend, Ben Endres seeks reinstatement and back pay for being fired for insubordination. Endres, a Baptist, claims working in casinos conflicts with his religious beliefs. Last year, Endres was fired after disobeying two direct orders to report to the Blue Chip Casino in Michigan City. A condition of state gaming permits requires presence of an on-duty trooper. 
August 2001 
Volume 20, Number 3 
Litigation 
majority. Price simply argues that the city should use a tie breaking procedure that has less adverse effect on minorities in order to counteract the under representation of minorities on promotion lists in the past. However, if Price believes the initial test had a disparate racial impact, she should have attacked the test directly. Rather, she expressly chose not to attack the test but to simply attack the age as tiebreaker rule. Her argument does not excuse the fatal failure to establish the most basic element of a prima facie case: she has failed to show that the city's use of the birth date had any adverse impact. As to the equal protection claim, the city counters that it has a rational basis for use of date of birth as a tiebreaker. First, many officers are familiar with this method of breaking ties because it is used to determine seniority, to bid on certain shifts and unit assignments, as well as days off. In fact, the city's practice of using date of birth to determine seniority is contained in the collective bargaining agreement. Additionally, the city uses the policy to protect itself against age discrimination claims. The city's arguments on this question are persuasive. Such a tie-breaking rule is a neutral criterion accepted by officers in the department and is not perceived as favoring one officer over another. The city's method is eminently rational. Dismissal of case affirmed for city. [Price v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 251 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2001)] 

Cases of interest 

Promotion procedures 
Chicago Police Department determines promotion by rank ordering officers based on their performance on certain tests. Officers who receive the same score on the test are further ranked based on seniority. If ties still persist among officers with the same score and the same seniority, they are ranked by age with the older officer being promoted first. The department decided to promote 156 officers to sergeant. On the qualifying exams, Price, a female African- American, scored the same as 38 other officers. Of those 38 officers, only 33 were eligible for promotion at the same time as Price. One other officer had the same score and seniority as she. The position on the promotion list for which Price and the other officer were tied was the last space available. The department, in accordance with its age-based policy, promoted the other officer rather than Price because he was two years older. Price was subsequently promoted a year later. Nonetheless, she filed suit against the city claiming that the department policy of using officers' dates of birth as a tiebreaker had a disparate impact on African Americans. She also alleged the policy violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it had no rational basis. Trial court granted summary judgment for the city on both issues and officer appeals. 

HELD: To succeed on her disparate impact claim Price must make out a prima facie case by showing that the method of promotion she challenges has an adverse impact on minorities. If she makes this showing, the city must then demonstrate its method is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Price does not challenge the city's use of tests to identify officers eligible for promotion but rather challenges the use of the date of birth as a tiebreaker. However, no evidence was offered to show that the date of birth criteria affected minority officers disproportionately to the 

Substance abuse testing 
In 1994, the municipality enacted a policy that required police officers and fire fighters to submit to urine testing upon the occurrence of certain events. These individuals were subject to urinalysis upon employment application, promotion, demotion, and transfer, as well as following a vehicular accident. The policy also provided that they could be tested based on a reasonable suspicion and at random. The police officers' and fire fighters' unions sued the city arguing that the suspicionless testing was unconstitutional. Trial court determined the policy to be constitutional and public safety employee unions appeal. 
August 2001 
Volume 20, Number 3 
HELD: The Alaska Constitution, like the U. S. Constitution, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. But, the Alaska Constitution also creates a right to privacy. These provisions afford broader protection to Alaskan citizens than their federal counterparts. Thus, the question presented in this case is whether the suspicionless substance abuse testing violates the state constitutional provisions. Prior case law has held that the primary purpose of these two Alaska provisions is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by governmental officials. Prior case law also holds that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy and are consequently a "search" within the meaning of the law. Case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment has allowed suspicionless testing of public safety employees under a "special needs" theory. A "special needs" theory attempts to balance an individual's constitutional interests with those of the government. A special needs theory that recognizes that neither probable cause nor a warrant is required to govern searches is particularly appropriate in highly regulated safety essential fields of work. Workers employed in such fields necessarily expect reduced privacy in the job-related activities and implicitly agree to a diminished level of privacy when they accept employment. Both police officers and fire fighters undeniably hold safety sensitive positions in extensively regulated fields of activity where they discharge duties fraught with risk of injury to others and even a momentarily lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. The court believes that workers in such positions could reasonably expect that their conditions of employment would be subject to exceptionally close scrutiny. Likewise, the unions argue that there is no compelling government need absent a showing of a substance abuse problem in the public safety services. No such history of substance abuse is necessary to establish a "special need" for suspicionless testing in situations involving heavily regulated, safety sensitive job duties. The lower court was correct in finding that the municipality's  interest in assuring public safety is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the relatively modest intrusion on the privacy of police officers and fire fighters that occurs when they are subject to suspicionless testing upon application for employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, or after a vehicular accident. However, the public employer has failed to meet its burden of establishing special need for its random testing provision. There is no documented history of substance abuse problems by police officers and fire fighters in the city and the city fails to establish that the policy's goals will not be adequately addressed by its remaining suspicionless testing provisions. Random testing under this circumstance is unreasonable and violates the state constitution. Affirmed for municipality except as to random testing of police officers and fire fighters. [Anchorage Police Department Employees Association v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001)] 

Overtime 
County correction officers worked 8½-hour shifts and the county treated the one-half hour as an unpaid lunch break. During the lunch break correction officers were at least implicitly required to carry their portable radios and service revolvers, if they possessed one, were expected to respond to emergency situations or criminal activities that might arise, respond to citizen inquiries, and remain subject to call or interruption from fellow employees, inmates, or visitors to the jail. In addition, as a practical matter, the correction officers remained in uniform during lunch breaks. About 300 of the officers brought suit against the county alleging that the county's failure to compensate them for the unpaid lunch breaks violated the overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment finding that the correction officers were completely relieved from duty during the lunch breaks and not entitled to overtime compensation. Correction officers appeal. 
August 2001 
Volume 20, Number 3 
HELD: The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation at 1½ times the regular rate to employees who work more than 40 hours a week. Law enforcement activities, including security personnel in correctional institutions, however, may have their overtime eligibility calculated on a tour of duty that does not exceed 171 hours in a 28-day period. Here, the county correction officers argue that the trial court applied a standard that relates to the 171-hour work tour as opposed to the 40-hour workweek by misinterpreting Department of Labor (DOL) regulations. However, a review of those regulations and prior case law show little distinction between tests for determining whether meal breaks are compensable. While the DOL regulations speak of being completely relieved from duty as part of a bona fide meal period, the test is not actually so rigid. Most federal courts have adopted a "predominate benefit test" under which meal periods are considered "work" and, therefore, compensable only when an employee predominantly spends the time performing duties for the employer's benefit. This standard of compensability is a flexible and realistic one where the court determines whether the employee's use of mealtime is for his own or the employer's benefit. In the instant case, the county correction officers have not established that they spent their mealtime for the predominate benefit of the county. The fact that some correction officers are required to perform job-related duties during their meal periods when circumstances arise does not establish that all correction officers are predominantly engaged in work activities for the county's benefit during the meal breaks. At most, the record reflects that the officers enjoy something less than unfettered freedom during meal periods. Although the county imposed certain expectations and informal requirements on the officers during the breaks, the record does not reflect how often and to what extent such theoretical restrictions actually interfered with the officer's primary lunch break activity: eating. Reasonable people could not find that the officers primarily performed work  during their lunch breaks for the predominate benefit of the county. Summary judgment in favor of county. [Hahn v. Pima County, 24 P.3d 614 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)] 

Disciplinary grounds 
Pursuant to an anonymous telephone tip to the police department internal affairs division, an investigation of Officer Williams was begun. Surveillance was set up of Big Daddy's, a topless bar on Bourbon Street. Just after midnight Williams was observed parking his police unit and entering Big Daddy's. While Williams was inside Big Daddy's, one of the investigating officers heard an emergency call for backup go out to which Officer Williams should have responded. He did not. Shortly thereafter, Williams was observed leaving Big Daddy's, driving his partner to the police station, and returning to the club. An FBI agent assigned to assist the police department was working undercover as part of the investigation. He observed Williams talking with a female employee at the club. It was very noisy but the agent was able to hear radio transmissions over Williams' radio. Once he observed Williams stand up quickly, put the radio to his ear, and then shrug his shoulders and sit back down. When confronted with the allegations of misconduct, Williams testified that a previous supervisor had given him permission to enter Big Daddy's to contact a female employee who wished to give information to the police. He claimed that this information had in the past culminated in an arrest. He also insisted that he had not intentionally failed to note the visit to Big Daddy's on his activity sheet. He explained that sometimes he just commits activities to memory. When questioned about not answering the emergency call, Williams claimed that he did have to monitor the radio when he was assigned to proactive patrol and that he did not hear the particular radio transmission because the club music was too loud. The department filed disciplinary charges against Williams and ultimately he was suspended for 32 days for unprofessional conduct, filing a false report, neglect of duty, not 
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devoting entire time to duty, and failure to follow instructions from an authoritative source. Civil service commission dismissed Williams' appeal and he appeals. 

HELD: Under Louisiana law employees with permanent status in the civil service may be disciplined only "for cause" expressed in writing. Disciplinary action against a civil service employee should be deemed arbitrary and capricious unless there is a real and substantial relationship between the improper conduct and the efficient operation of the police service. "Arbitrary or capricious" means in the absence of a rational basis for the action taken. The evidence presented at the civil service hearing clearly supports all charges. It is undisputed that Williams entered Big Daddy's in uniform and while on duty. The evidence suggests he was socializing with female employees rather than conducting police business. This is a lack of professionalism. Although Williams denied hearing the radio transmission and the call for assistance while in Big Daddy's, the testimony of the FBI agent was to the effect that he heard the radio go off and saw Williams react. This evidence would seem to support the charge of neglect of duty. Officer Williams' explanation of why he did not record his visit to Big Daddy's on his activity sheet is also not credible, particularly in light of the fact that he recorded that he was at another location at that particular time. The integrity of the New Orleans Police Department has been called into question on many occasions. For this reason, rules and regulations have been put into operation to protect officers and to ease the public's mind. The French Quarter was particularly targeted as a problem area because of the proliferation of bars, clubs, strip joints, and the like. The rules are not to be taken lightly and a police officer should not be allowed to disobey or bend the rules unless he has specific instructions from the appropriate supervisor to do so. Disciplinary action affirmed. [Williams v. Department of Police, 784 So.2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 2001)] 

Civil liability 
Jordan, a police officer, was assigned to the communications section. During his paid lunch break he was driving his personal vehicle home to attend to his ill son. He was in uniform at the time. His car struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. The pedestrian subsequently sued Jordan and the city for negligent conduct. Trial court rejected the city's efforts to be dismissed from the suit on the grounds that Jordan was not on duty at the time of the accident. A judgment resulted in favor of the injured party and the city appeals on the question of whether Jordan was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 

HELD: Under New Jersey law a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. The legal doctrine of respondeat superior renders an employer vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employees only when the employee acts within the scope of employment. An employee is acting within the scope of employment only if the conduct is of the kind he is employed to perform, the conduct occurs substantially within the authorized time and space, and it is at least in part serving the purposes of the employer. An employer is not liable for an employee's conduct unless the employee is, in fact, acting in his employment or for the employer's purposes. Jordan's duty requirements necessitate him to always be subject duty even when periodically relieved from regularly scheduled duty. Additionally, he was deemed on duty when he was actually engaged in the performance of his assigned duties during designated hours of the day and off duty when he was authorized to leave, free of his specified responsibilities. When applying these rules to the facts of the case it is clear that Jordan, though subject to duty during his lunch break, was off duty as he was authorized to leave and free from his specified responsibilities as a communications officer. His 
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subject to duty status would consider him to be on duty if during his lunch hour he encountered circumstances requiring him to act as a police officer. The fact that an officer is subject to duty if a crime is witnessed does not mean that he or she is on duty while performing an act of purely personal nature. The resolution of the issue turns upon what the employee was doing at the time the injury-producing accident occurred. The undisputed facts of this case lead to the inescapable conclusion that at the time of the accident Jordan was on his way home during lunch break for a purely personal purpose and his actions were neither the type he was employed to perform nor serving any purpose for his employer. Thus, his actions were not within the scope of his employment as a police officer and the city is not vicariously liable for his negligent behavior. Reversed, dismissing city from suit. [Rogers v. Jordan, 773 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)]  drugs indicated an intent to deliver them. The arbitrator further noted that Denoble had passed a urine test for drugs. The arbitrator stated that he felt that he was restricted to either returning Denoble to his former position and making him whole or to upholding the determination. The arbitrator concluded that while Denoble made a mistake, he admitted it, and since there was no question that the city had not proven just cause, the grievance should be sustained. The arbitrator then ordered that Denoble be made whole in every respect and "his record should be expunged and cleared to the fullest extent." The city did not appeal the award and reinstated Denoble to his former position and expunged all reference to his termination from his personnel file. The city did not, however, remove the information from a separately maintained internal affairs file. The Fraternal Order of Police, on behalf of Denoble, filed an unfair labor practice charge asserting that the city had violated state law by refusing to comply with the arbitration award. Hearing examiner concluded that indeed the city had committed unfair labor practice by continuing to maintain the internal affairs record. City appeals. 

HELD: The city argues that the labor board erred in determining that the arbitration award required it to remove the notation from the internal affairs record. The city argues that the opinion of the arbitrator shows that he considered only the narrowly framed question of whether the termination was for just cause. For the arbitrator to fashion a remedy beyond the question of termination exceeded his authority. Likewise, the city claims that the award makes no mention of purging the internal affairs record. The labor board counters that the arbitrator's direction was to clear the officer's record to the fullest extent possible and that necessarily included the internal affairs investigation as well as the personnel record. The court agrees with the city, however, that the arbitrator's decision, when read as a whole, does not indicate an intent to fashion an award beyond reaching the narrow question presented of whether the termination was for just cause. There is no reason to believe that the record 

Dismissal procedures 
An unannounced search of Officer Denoble's patrol jacket in his locker revealed 27 plastic vials containing cocaine. The district attorney declined to prosecute the officer for illegal possession of cocaine. Rather, the officer stated that he found the drugs on the highway while participating in an arrest of 14 males for disorderly conduct. He admitted that he failed to prepare a report for taking possession of illegal drugs or to notify any supervisor and that he improperly retained control of the contraband. The department terminated Denoble for conduct unbecoming an officer, violating departmental reporting requirements, and violating department rules prohibiting storage of contraband in a locker. The officer appealed the matter to an arbitrator. The issue presented was whether the officer was terminated for just cause. In making his ruling, the arbitrator stated that the city's allegations that the officer might be dealing drugs were purely speculation and he declined to apply the presumption that arises in criminal cases that possession of a large amount of 
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be cleared "to the fullest extent" referred to anything other than the record of termination. For the city to expunge the internal affairs file it would mean Denoble, alone among police officers who had been accused of misconduct, would have no internal affairs notation. Without some express basis for intrusion into the internal affairs files, the language of the award should not be interpreted to indicate an intent to affect matters beyond the narrow question of just cause for termination. At most, the award was ambiguous as to the question of whether the arbitrator intended for the file to be expunged. The Fraternal Order of Police did not meet its burden to show that the city failed to comply with the award. Labor Board order reversed. [City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 772 A.2d 460 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)]  for an unrelated physical problem. When he returned to work he was informed that after 26 years in the same district he was being transferred to a different district. On the first shift in the new district Ryder began to experience anxiety and feeling he was unable to function. He developed concerns that he was going to be killed or was going to have to kill somebody else. He did not return to work after his first day at the new district. Ryder again contacted the employee assistance program and was referred to a psychologist. Ultimately, Ryder was diagnosed as suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He began treatment for the disorder. After clearance from his psychologist Ryder sought injury-on-duty status with the department but it did not find his disability to be service related. He appealed that determination to the civil service commission. The commission sustained Ryder's appeal concluding that his disability was service connected and that the work- related stress was caused by abnormal working conditions. The city appealed that determination. Ultimately, two reviewing courts concluded that Ryder had sustained his burden of proof regarding his psychic injury and that the incident in which he was involved was an extraordinary event that caused his PTSD. City appeals. 

HELD: An employee seeking recovery of injury-on-duty benefits has the burden of proving the existence of a disability and that the disability is service connected. To recover worker's compensation benefits for a psychic injury, the claimant must prove by objective evidence that he has suffered a psychic injury and that such injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. A psychic injury caused by normal working conditions does not establish a compensable injury. In this case, Ryder has failed to establish that the PTSD was caused by abnormal working conditions. There is no evidence that the investigative and patrol duties he performed or his experiences were unusual for a law enforcement officer. Ryder's involvement in a standoff with an armed suspect does not rise to the level of abnormal 

Worker's compensation 
Ryder, a 26-year veteran police officer, was dispatched to a disturbance at a house where there was a man with a gun. Although the call originally was sent to a two-officer unit, Ryder, who was closer to the location, arrived first. While he initially intended to wait for other officers to back him up, he decided to enter the house when he heard a woman screaming. The woman told him her son was upstairs with a gun. About that moment a man yelled that he had a gun and started to come down the stairs, carrying a semiautomatic rifle that he pointed towards Ryder. Ryder aimed his own weapon at the man and ordered him to put down his rifle. There was a standoff that lasted approximately five minutes until the man ran back upstairs. Ryder requested assistance over the police radio, but before help arrived, the man came back downstairs without the weapon. Ryder subdued him and placed him in the police car. Backup help arrived approximately twelve minutes after the initial request. The criminal charges against the man were eventually dismissed. Ryder became angry about the dismissal and was referred to the department's employee assistance program. After the incident Ryder continued to work his routine schedule until he underwent surgery 
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working conditions. Confronting an armed suspect may be anticipated in the course of an officer's duties. Accordingly the award of worker's compensation benefits is reversed. [City of Philadelphia v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Philadelphia, 772 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2001)]  four percent each year. Members of Capital City Lodge No. 9 of the Fraternal Order of Police had rejected the proposal in May but, following fact-finding, the matter was returned for a revote last month. The contract is retroactive to December 1999, and runs until December 2002. On non-economic issues, the Safety Director was granted more say in making modifications in the police department and the time frame for citizens to file complaints against officers was extended from 28 days to 60 days. 
Settlements 

Bogota, New Jersey 

police officers 

San Francisco, California 

police officers 
Four percent pay hikes in each of the next three years highlight a new labor accord reached between Bogota and its police officers. The contract, retroactive to January 1, also provides an annual increase of $25 in uniform allowance. The allowance will reach $875 by contract's end. The pact also sets up a separate pay scale for newly hired officers. They will start at a lower pay than on the previous schedule but will recapture the difference after seven to eight years on the force. 
San Francisco police officers are in line for pay raises exceeding 17 percent over the next two years thanks to a new memorandum of understanding between the city and the San Francisco Police Officers Association. In addition, officers with 25 years or more of service will receive a two percent bonus. Patrol officers, who currently receive $62,640, will climb to $73,284 by the end of the contract. Nearly 2,500 police department employees are affected by the changes which are expected to cost the city more than $43 million. 

Canby, Oregon 

police officers 
Members of the Canby Police Association will receive three percent wage jumps this year and next under a new labor agreement approved this month. Under the new pact, which is retroactive to July 1, a patrol officer will earn $32,880 while a sergeant will draw a base of $40,368. By contract's end, a ten-year veteran sergeant will earn $57,936. The agreement also retains a three percent supplement for canine officers and for the ability to speak Spanish. Added to the language premium is the ability to speak Russian. The pact also includes a light duty assignment provision for injured officers. As in the past, the chief's position will continue to be filled by promotion from within the ranks. 

Suffolk County, New York 

police supervisors 
An arbitration award this month will cost Suffolk County, New York, over $5 million to fund raises for its 470 sergeants through captains. After working for two years without a contract, the county police supervisors will receive a 4.6 percent wage boost for 2000 and a 4.75 percent hike for 2001. The award also authorizes random alcohol testing of personnel and a change in department disciplinary procedures. Officers will now be permitted to go to binding grievance arbitration when threatened with discharge. The economic pact means that the highest ranking member of the Suffolk County Superior Officers' Association - the Chief of the Department - will earn a base of $137,710. 

Columbus, Ohio 

police officers 
Columbus police officers have approved a new three-year labor pact that grants pay boosts of