Senate Republicans threatened to kill consideration of the spending bill with S.952 attached by filibustering and other procedural tactics. In such cases, the procedural blocks can be overcome with a successful cloture vote. Under Senate rules, however, a three-fifths "supermajority" is necessary to shut off the stalling tactics. The effort to consider the first national public sector bargaining law was defeated 56 to 44. Despite an apparent majority of Senators favoring the measure, full consideration of the matter was blocked. 

The bill would assign the Federal Labor Relations Authority to oversee collective bargaining by emergency service workers in states that do not currently permit union contracts. Supporters of the measure, including Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D.-S.D.), said it would ease labor restrictions in 22 states. Republican opponents claimed that passage of the bill would preempt local laws in 27 states. While the cloture vote generally followed party lines, 

Senator Dashcle, who proposed the amendment, argued that granting bargaining rights to fire fighters and police officers was particularly appropriate in light of recent events. Republicans responded by insisting that such matters are best left to the states. Republicans had earlier produced a memo that claimed that passage of the Daschle proposal could lead to strikes by fire fighters and police officers during a terrorist attack. 

Harold Schaitberger, General President of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO, labeled the strike argument "trash." Passage of a national collective bargaining bill is the number one legislative priority of the IAFF. Various national police groups including the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, and the National Association of Police Organizations have also lobbied for passage of S.952. 

Whether the proposed bargaining law will receive additional consideration by either body of Congress during this term is unknown at this time. Over 180 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives have signed on as co-sponsors for the companion bill. That measure has not been considered by the full House. 

FOP Lodge 3 leader Michael Marcoccio said Providence officers will not budge until the department develops formal policies on handling potentially hazardous materials. "We're not trained in hazardous materials at all. What did they expect us to do - go in and grab it? It's crazy," said the five-term lodge president. 

The concern arose when a resident reported that her son had received a suspicious letter from a baseball camp in Florida. A letter and white powder were in the envelope. A fire officer told the police that because the letter had been opened, the police had to seize it. A patrol officer placed the letter in a plastic bag and brought it to the station. The detective division commander placed the bag in an evidence locker. When other officers heard about the suspicious letter and the powder, some detectives left the building. Another sent emails warning about the bagged powder. 

In the nation's capital, police labor leaders filed an official complaint over officers being sent to deal with an anthrax-laced letter without proper safety equipment. The complaint centers on three incidents of alleged improper actions by supervisors in handling the letter delivered on October 15 to the office of Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle. 

Following the response to Senator Daschle's office and the subsequent evacuation of the building, 28 staffers and police officers tested positive for anthrax spores. These individuals were reportedly allowed to leave the building in their contaminated clothing. 

The complaint also cites two incidents where officers were ordered to enter buildings that had already been sealed off. Mike DeCarlo, chairman of the Capitol Police Labor Committee, argued that potentially exposed areas should first be contained and individuals should not be allowed to depart until completion of decontamination procedures. 

"The analogy to the studio `blacklists' of the forties and fifties is a fitting comparison. The officers wake up one day to find that their careers have essentially been ruined and they have no way of 

In the promotional process, officers must follow a series of steps outlined by the civil service commission and the LAPD to be considered for promotion. This includes taking a test for the desired position and being ranked among one's peers who also took the test. LAPD's Promotional Assessment Board also reviews the personnel information, including disciplinary histories, of all of the certified eligible candidates. Subsequently, the Promotional Assessment Board places officers within "bands," or ranked groups, of those eligible for promotion. This list of eligible bands is then forwarded to Chief Parks for the final decision. 

In the case of the two named plaintiffs in the LAPPL's complaint, LAPD officers Darryl Brown and Rodney Gregson, Parks delayed this final decision by directing their promotions to Boards of Inquiry. These boards were convened in order to review their merit for promotion, as well as already adjudicated allegations of misconduct. At the conclusion of the Boards of Inquiry, Parks wrote letters to each of the plaintiffs indicating that he would make the final decision as to each of their merits for promotion. 

Parks later issued additional letters to both officers informing them that, based on the findings of the Boards of Inquiry, they would not be promoted as originally indicated by the list released by the Human Resources Bureau. Officer Gregson later 

The LAPPL complaint alleges that Parks has unilaterally implemented this policy whereby eligible candidates can be subjected to a Board of Inquiry. "By doing so, Parks has invented a process for vetting candidates for promotion which is not contemplated under the City Charter or manual," reads one section of the complaint. 

According to the department's regulations, Boards of Inquiry are convened for the purpose of investigating a particular matter or alleged incident involving department personnel or equipment. 

"I have been told that the department justifies this practice by claiming that these boards serve a public interest by `weeding out' undesirable officers," said LAPPL General Counsel Hank Hernandez. "Of course, this raises a pretty obvious question: If these boards are making legitimate decisions, why keep them cloaked in secrecy?" 

The LAPPL is seeking punitive damages on behalf of officers Brown and Gregson, based on allegations that the LAPD and Chief Parks acted with malice, oppression, and fraud toward the officers and in conscious disregard of their rights. 

The LAPPL also filed class action allegations on behalf of all past, present, and future sworn Los Angeles police officers who hold or have held the rank of lieutenant and below and whose promotions have been withheld as a result of an adverse finding of a Board of Inquiry. 

The measure essentially lifts the mandatory 

The NYSP has been placed in a manpower crunch since September 11. About 700 of the department's 3,800 troopers have been assigned to anti-terrorism activity. Most have been working 12-hour shifts for over a month. 

HELD: The ADA prohibits discrimination only against qualified individuals with disabilities. A qualified individual with a disability is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. If a disabled person cannot perform a job's essential functions, then ADA protections do not apply. If, on the other hand, a person can perform the job's essential functions and, therefore, is a qualified individual, then the ADA prohibits discrimination against them. The question presented in this appeal is whether making forcible arrests and subduing suspects constitutes an essential function of all specialized assignment positions of the police department. Essential functions are fundamental duties to a job, not the marginal functions of the position. While an employer's job description is to be given deference, it is not conclusive on the question of essential functions. Depositions in this case raise questions as to whether plainclothes investigators, for example, ever are called upon to 

Supreme Court update 

Cases of interest 

HELD: The FLSA provides that employees must be paid overtime wage for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. Uniform change time would normally be included within these hours. However, the statute provides an exclusion from the calculation of hours worked for changing clothes and washing at the beginning or end of the workday, if there is either an express provision or a custom and practice under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement not to compensate for such time. The trial judge 

HELD: For over thirty years the Supreme Court has consistently held that while government enjoys significantly greater latitude when it acts in its capacity as employer than when it acts as sovereign, the First Amendment nevertheless prohibits it from punishing its employees in retaliation for the content of their protected speech. To make out a claim of illegal retaliation, a plaintiff must 

HELD: To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she is a member of a protected class, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and similarly situated employees not within the same class were not subject to the same action by the employer. In this case, Raymond did not comply with step two, showing that she suffered an adverse employment action. While an employee need not be fired, demoted, or transferred to make out a case of retaliation, there must be some adverse action taken against them. Raymond alleges discrimination because she did not receive a courtesy. The failure to receive a courtesy, without more, does not constitute an adverse action under federal fair employment law. The issuance of the tickets was not an adverse employment action because Raymond has never contested that she parked illegally or that the tickets were improper. Both tickets were canceled. The withdrawal of the tickets means no adverse employment action was taken against her. As to her hostile work environment claim, that too must fail. Raymond cites the single incidence regarding the officer referring to her in a derogatory manner. She claims that fellow officers gave her the "cold shoulder." But being ostracized by coworkers does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Such behavior creates no material change in the conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Additionally, she left the workplace the very day of the alleged harassment. She remained on leave until she was mandatorily retired. It is difficult to make out a case that she was ostracized when she was not present in the workplace. Summary judgment for employer dismissing case. [Raymond v. U.S. Capitol Police Board, 157 F. Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C. 2001)] 

HELD: The city admits that it has used the selection procedure for fire fighters and police officers for over twenty years. It argues that the term "beginning position" as used in state civil service law does not include trainees at the fire and police academies. A review of prior Texas law, however, suggests the contrary. Various cases have granted seniority time and probationary service time to individuals while in training academies. Thus, the term "beginning position" refers to trainees, not to individuals who have just been sworn in as fire fighters or police officers. Accordingly the city's hiring scheme violates state civil service law. The city counters that the plaintiffs cannot challenge the recruiting policies of the police department because the collective bargaining agreement between the police union and the city specifically authorizes the city to continue to use the old procedure of giving the civil service exam to cadets after completion of the training academy. The city argues this collective bargaining agreement supercedes the provisions of state statute. While it is true that a labor contract may supercede certain provisions of state law the labor contract is not relevant in this case. The police officer's union is the bargaining representative for current police officers only. The union has no authority to bargain away the rights of non-employees. Since the plaintiffs in this case were not members of the police union and were not employed 

HELD: The trial court noted that where parties have an equal opportunity for knowing the truth, a party grossly failing to inform himself must take the consequences of his negligence. In this case, however, a jury could reasonably find that Dodd did not have an equal opportunity to determine the amount of the pension. Before he retired Dodd was certainly provided with a retirement system handbook. The handbook included several examples of how benefits were calculated. However, throughout the handbook it emphasized that it was an informative guide only and a general outline of the major provisions of the plan. The handbook further stated that benefits were ultimately determined by the detailed provisions of the plan legal documents. The handbook expressly advised employees seeking more information to contact the city clerk or the retirement board. The city clerk testified that the method of calculating pension benefits was complicated and involved a variety of data about the retiree, his spouse, and various mortality rates. Dodd consequently did not have an equal opportunity to determine the exact amount of benefits he would receive. Likewise, the trial court erred on the breach of contract claim. Dodd's breach of contract claim was not based on his oral employment contract. The claim was based on a contract to pay retirement benefits. A retirement plan may represent an enforceable contract between an employer and employee. Even an at-will employee may have certain enforceable rights pursuant to the policies of an employment handbook. Because the trial court based its ruling on erroneous legal theories, the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. [Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 551 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. App. Ct. 2001)] 

HELD: Illinois law provides that a police officer who is injured "resulting from the performance of an act of duty" is entitled to 65 percent of his salary as a disability pension. The law further defines "active duty" as "any act of duty inherently involving special risks, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman." White argues he is entitled to the line of duty disability benefit because he sustained the injuries in the performance of an act of duty. It is a well-stated law, however, that to qualify for line of duty benefits it is not enough that a police officer was injured while on duty. The benefits accrue only if he becomes injured while on duty performing an act involving a special risk not shared by ordinary citizens. Just filling out police reports does not involve a special risk, nor does exiting a car to place a traffic ticket on a windshield. Both involve activities that numerous civilian occupations engage in. In fact, non-sworn civilian personnel often write traffic citations for illegally parked cars. Thus, placing a citation on a vehicle does not inherently involve special risks not ordinarily assumed by citizens in the ordinary walk of life. There is a legal difference between an "act of duty" and being "on duty." Not all officers injured while on duty would qualify for the line of duty benefit under Illinois pension law. Reversed for pension board denying line of duty disability benefits to officer. [White v. City of Aurora, 753 N.E.2d 1244 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001)] 

HELD: The police department rules specifically prohibit department members from engaging in secondary employment that could result at anytime in a conflict of interest. In addition, the order prevents police officers who are also attorneys from representing individuals who are targets of criminal investigations. The facts in this case are conflicting as to whether Holden served as the alderman's attorney as he has continually asserted. Throughout the internal investigation Holden has claimed that the attorney-client privilege prevented him from answering the questions of the investigator. However, whether an attorney-client privilege exists is of no consequence to the determination of whether Holden violated department rules. While it is true that if in fact an attorney-client relationship existed, Holden's assessment that he is caught in a "catch 22" is correct. However this "catch 22" should never have occurred. The record is clear that Holden was a police officer prior to becoming an attorney. Department policy specifically states that the duties 

HELD: Among other issues raised, the former officer claims that the finding that he was insubordinate is not supported by substantial evidence. Insubordination has been described as "a constant and continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with the proper authority. Employers have a right to compel their employees to answer questions that reasonably relate to the employees fitness to perform duties or relate to their job performance. Determination that insubordination has occurred presents a factual issue for the police commission to decide. The chief warned Wolny in a letter that his refusal to respond would be treated as insubordination or violation of a direct order. The trial court found there was no uncertainty regarding the chief's order or the consequences of refusing to answer. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to find Wolny was insubordinate. The former officer also complains that the department did not follow its progressive discipline policy. The chief had testified that termination was the only possible remedy for Wolny's actions. The record reflects that the question of failure to comply with the progressive discipline policy was never raised at the police commission hearing. Consequently, it cannot be now raised in court. Wolny was terminated not for his past actions but for his insubordinate behavior and his violation of the use of force policy. There is sufficient evidence to uphold the termination of the officer. [Wolny v. City of Bozeman, 30 P.3d 1085 (Mont. 2001)]