December 2001 
Volume 20, Number 7 

Are Crown Vics really Pintos on steroids? 

Twenty-five years ago Ford Motor Company experienced a surge of litigation over its compact offering the Pinto. An extraordinary number of the vehicles ignited in flames when struck from the rear. Not only did numerous wrongful death suits arise but the State of Indiana even sought, unsuccessfully, to convict the company of reckless homicide. While the Pinto, and its twin the Mercury Bobcat, saw little police service, some current officers have begun to question the safety of the nation's most popular police car - the Ford Crown Victoria. 

Police in Arizona have raised questions about the vehicle's safety following rear-end crashes over the past three years that have killed two officers and severely burned a third. Several lawsuits have been filed in Arizona as well as Florida and Louisiana alleging that the gas tank placement is unsafe. Ford has denied liability for the accidents but has recommended modifications to the cars. 

The placement of a police vehicle during a traffic stop makes it particularly vulnerable. The Crown Victoria's gas tank sits vertically behind the 

rear axle. In a rear-end crash the tank can wrap around the axle and be ruptured by protruding objects. In October, Ford issued a recommendation that hex-head bolts attached to the rear axle be replaced with round-headed fasteners and that a protruding tab be ground down. 

Both the Arizona Department of Public Safety and the Phoenix Police Department have begun modifications to their fleets. 

A Ford spokesman said the company had sold more than 500,000 of the full-size Crown Victorias and that accident data suggests the model's experience with rear collision fires is comparable to other automobiles. 

But Greg Fower, an assistant police chief in Mesa, told the Arizona Republic newspaper that he has heard of 14 officers who burned to death in rear-end collisions nationally since 1990. He believes that better protected gas tanks would help. 

The basic design and chassis of the Crown Victoria is expected to remain largely unchanged through the 2005 model year. 

Gallegos: from management to labor to management 

Many police chiefs have risen to their positions after having served as officers in their local police unions. However, that path took an unusual and exceptional quirk last month when Gilbert Gallegos was named chief of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). Gallegos has been best known in recent years as the high-profile President of the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the nation's largest law enforcement labor organization. 

During his six years leading over 250,000 police officer members, Gallegos pushed Congress to expand labor rights of officers. He made passage of a national collective bargaining bill a high priority 

for the FOP. 

Gallegos, who retired as an APD deputy chief in 1988, had served as an FOP national officer until his election as president in 1995. Mayor-elect Martin Chavez chose Gallegos as chief over 13 other applicants. His selection was met with approval by the Albuquerque Police Officers Association, an FOP affiliate, which had endorsed Chavez in the October 2 mayor's race. 

The new chief recognizes he has his work cut out. The department is facing a $6 million budget deficit and low morale. "It's my intent to really dissect the department," the new chief said. 


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Volume 20, Number 7 

Anthrax hoax nets criminal charges for Philly officers 

Two Philadelphia police officers have been charged with sending an obscenity-laced anthrax hoax over their patrol cars' computers. The message was transmitted to every police vehicle and dispatch center in the city. 

Officers Gina McFadden and Dawn Norman, both 25, surrendered November 20 after arrest warrants were issued charging criminal mischief and making terroristic threats. McFadden subsequently was admitted to a hospital following the onset of a "panic attack." Neither officer has a prior disciplinary record. 

The incident arose in response to a report of a stolen truck containing hazardous materials. Norman's attorney, Jeff Kolansky, said that McFadden typed the message that read in part, "We don't care . . . We can't stand America. We have anthrax in our car…" Norman tried to delete the message from the computer but McFadden batted 

her hand away and sent the message, according to Kolansky. 

Department officials traced the message to the two officers' car. They initially denied sending the message. The police car was subsequently processed as a crime scene. No anthrax was found in the vehicle. 

Kolansky said the message was intended as a joke. But the district attorney's office and the police department are not viewing the matter as funny. "I believe it was something that got out of hand," said Deputy Police Commissioner John Norris, head of the department's internal affairs division. "I think after they sent it they realized it was a mistake." 

Both officers have been suspended for 30 days with intent to dismiss. They face nine criminal charges that carry a maximum punishment of 46 years in prison. 

Just in time for Christmas! 

There may be a police officer in Barbie's future. The union representing Los Angeles police officers has come up with a unique piece of LAPD memorabilia: its own action figure. "Patrol Officer West" is the first of several "Elite Force" one-sixth scale figures to be offered for sale by the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL). 

The doll, dressed in the dark uniform of a LAPD corporal and wearing sunglasses, carries a miniature badge, pistol, duty belt, baton, radio, flashlight, pepper spray, and handcuffs. "We try to make it look as authentic as possible," said LAPPL director Peter Repovich. 

So far over 500 of the dolls have been sold over the union's website, www.lapd.com. Another 200 have been bought at the LAPPL office. 

While checking out the doll at the union's office, one patrol officer reportedly remarked, "Does he come with a complaint form?" The statement made in apparent reference to the highly publicized rash of citizen complaints lodged against LAPD 

personnel in recent years. 

LAPPL President Mitzi Grasso credits her husband Mike, an LAPD training officer, with conceiving the idea for the action figure about a year ago. "Why a doll?" asked Grasso. "Most of our officers are heroes, and we wanted an action figure." 

Next in line for release is "Officer Sommers," a female patrol officer. Others planned in the series are a canine officer complete with dog, a motorcycle officer with his own two-wheeler, and an air support officer with a helicopter. A mounted officer, a bike officer, a SWAT officer, and a narc are in the planning stages. 

Timing of the introduction of the doll could not be better. Toy retailers across the country report that G.I. Joe figures and the Fisher Price line of "Rescue Heroes" are the leading items on many childrens' Christmas wish-lists. 

"Patrol Officer West" costs $32, substantially less than the hiring of a full size LAPD officer for an hour! 



December 2001 
Volume 20, Number 7 

Litigation 

Cases of interest 

Selection procedures 

Supreme Court update 

Stidham was a certified Utah police officer who had completed all appropriate training and examination procedures established by the state peace officers' standards and training commission (POST). When the agency for which he was working established a residency requirement, Stidham decided to seek employment as a police officer elsewhere. He applied for positions with other law enforcement agencies. Despite ranking third in the testing for one of the agencies, it refused to hire him. Stidham was advised that the basis for the rejection was certain information provided by the POST alleging that he had raped a young girl, assaulted a resident in his prior job, had resigned from his prior position under threat of termination, and was considered an at-risk peace officer. Stidham sought copies of this information from the POST but was denied. He also applied for other law enforcement positions but was repeatedly rejected due to the information provided by the POST. At no time, however, did the POST initiate proceedings to revoke his peace officer license. Subsequently, Stidham filed suit against the POST, its directors and various employees claiming that not only had they violated the Utah open records act by refusing to provide him copies of his POST records but deprived him of due process by effectively revoking his certificate as a peace officer and foreclosing employment opportunities. Trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and peace officer appeals. 

HELD: The U. S. Supreme Court has held that a license to practice one's calling or profession is a protected right. Consequently, the state may not constitutionally deprive an individual of that right without procedural due process. Stidham's certification as a peace officer is also required and enables him to work as a peace officer. He thus retains a protected property right in that certificate. Utah law that establishes the POST grants the commission the authority to revoke a peace officer's 

This month the justices heard arguments in a private sector labor case that could have an impact on public safety agencies. The case, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, No. 00-1250, raises the question of whether the reasonable accommodation requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires disregarding a bona fide seniority system, if necessary, when reassigning disabled personnel. Since shifts and work assignments within public safety organizations are often bid based on seniority, a requirement to ignore this system in order to accommodate disabled personnel would constitute a major change in the organizational culture. While few individuals employed in public safety normally fall within the protection of the ADA, the legal definition of "disability" continues to develop with some courts taking an expansive viewpoint. A decision in Barnett is expected in the spring. 

In a recent filing, the survivor of a deceased police officer is questioning the Department of Justice's (DOJ) denial of claim under the Public Safety Officers Benefits Act (PSOB). The dead officer's widow claims that his suicide was the product of duty-related stress. The stress and subsequent suicide allegedly occurred after the officer was falsely accused of sexually inappropriate behavior with a young boy. The DOJ ruled that such a death does not qualify for payments under the PSOB because it was self-inflicted and did not occur in the line of duty. The widow is asserting that DOJ misapplied the statute. This case is Yanco v. United States, No. 01-674. 

In Lee v. McKenzie, No. 01-675, a sheriff is contesting a lower court ruling that dismissal of a white deputy was racially motivated and thereby a violation of federal racial anti-discrimination law. The deputy claimed that he was terminated to appease the black community. 

No review decision has been made in either of the cases. 



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license. Such revocation, however, must be done following notice to the officer and a hearing. The statute does not provide any authority for the POST director to release information concerning an individual officer. In this case the POST director has allegedly disseminated false and fatally damaging allegations about Stidham to his potential employers. This action has been taken in lieu of statutory procedures and in excess of the director's authority. The POST cannot escape liability for depriving an individual of a legitimate property interest merely by arguing that it has not actually revoked or destroyed his license. The officer also alleges a violation of his constitutional right to privacy. The due process clause protects an individual from state intrusion to fundamental aspects of their personal privacy. One area so protected is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. In determining whether a certain type of information is given such protection, the court must consider if the party asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy, if the disclosure serves a compelling interest, and if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner. The POST alleged that Stidham resigned from his position under threat of termination and was an at-risk employee. Neither of these allegations contains information requiring constitutional protection. The court does not consider reasons for resignation or employee evaluations to be highly personal or intimate. Previous case law holds that police internal investigation files are not protected by the right to privacy when the documents relate simply to the officer's work as a police officer. These harsh allegations may invoke liability for defamation but are not protected as part of an expectation of privacy. The defendants correctly allege that the state is immune from suit for money damages in this case. However the state may be subject to an injunction regarding the provision of copies of their records to Stidham as well as ceasing to disseminate information that is not authorized by statute. The director of the POST claims qualified immunity  from the suit in his personal capacity. Qualified immunity in this case is not available because the officer has established sufficient legal linkage between the director and his complaint. Case remanded for further proceedings. [Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2001)] 

Overtime 

The City of Chicago and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Under the agreement the city agreed to make overtime payments no later than the first and sixteenth of each month and to make holiday premium pay to officers no later than the 22nd day of the month following the month in which the premium was earned. The department utilized a manual time keeping system to track the daily work hours by officers. The manual system was utilized because it was difficult to implement an automated system because of the complexities of computing overtime benefits. Ultimately, the FOP filed suit against the city, contending that it was not paying overtime in a timely manner as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Parties move for summary judgment. 

HELD: The FLSA does not specifically define when overtime payments must be made. An interpretive bulletin issued by the Department of Labor requires prompt payment of overtime. The bulletin states that the general rule is that overtime compensation earned in a particular work week must be paid on the regular payday for the period in which such work week ends. The FLSA will be satisfied if the employer pays the excess overtime compensation as soon after the regular pay period as is practical. This bulletin is not a regulation and does not have the force of law. However, it is persuasive on the issue of interpreting the FLSA. Prior case law holds that although the general rule is that overtime compensation earned in a particular work week must be paid on the regular payday for the period, nothing in the FLSA prevents a collective bargaining agreement from providing a different 



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rule. Thus, if the parties have negotiated for and agreed to the timing of such payments in their labor agreement, there is no violation of the FLSA. Similarly, a review of the city's policy on paying holiday pay by the 22nd day of the following month from which it was earned reveals that this procedure also does not violate the FLSA. Judgment for city. [Nolan v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 162 F. Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2001)]  suffers from breathing difficulty outside of his current work environment, only that he has constantly been medicated since being diagnosed with asthma. Similarly, it has not been shown that he is unable to work in a broad class of jobs or actually in his particular job as a corrections officer. He only alleges that his current work area is dirty, dry, and unventilated making it difficult for him to function. In addition, his employer does not perceive him to be disabled because the employer has treated him not as someone with a limited ability to work but as someone capable of performing his job as currently constituted. The mere denial to transfer him because of his asthma problem does not mean the employer perceives him as disabled. Motion to dismiss claim granted. [Saunders v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 163 F. Supp.2d 564 (D. Md. 2001)] 

Handicap discrimination 

Saunders was diagnosed with asthma at birth and was continuously medicated for it. He received twice weekly asthma shots and used an inhaler. Ultimately, Saunders began working as a county corrections officer. He was assigned to an area that apparently was poorly ventilated, dry, and dirty. He suffered an asthma attack and was subsequently hospitalized. Upon return to work he asked for reassignment to a better ventilated area but the request was denied. He also met with the commander of the detention center and presented a doctor's letter requesting an accommodation. Again his request was denied. Saunders subsequently filed suit against the county alleging discrimination based on disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The county moves to dismiss the claim. 

HELD: The ADA prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Likewise, the statute requires that an employer provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual with a disability. To establish an initial case under the ADA the plaintiff must prove that he is "disabled" under the meaning of the act. Saunders fails to meet this threshold test. Even assuming he has an impairment that remains partially uncorrected and thus disables him, he has failed to allege that his impairment has substantially limited his pursuit of a major life activity. Prior case law holds that two major life activities are implicated in asthma cases: breathing and working. In this case Saunders has not alleged a limitation on his ability to work or his ability to breathe. He has made no claim that he 

Dismissal procedures 

The city implemented a new method of distributing payroll by electronic transfer to employees' bank accounts. The plan was initially undertaken on a voluntary basis but was eventually made mandatory for all employees. Out of more than 400 employees, Hensley, a police officer, opted not to have his paycheck handled in this way because he objected to the process. Since he refused to designate a bank account into which the paycheck would be deposited, the city deposited his paycheck in an account at a local bank. When Hensley went to the bank to obtain the proceeds of his paycheck, the bank paid him his wages by cashier's check but charged him a $5.00 fee for the issuance of the check since he was not a bank customer. Apparently because Hensley objected to this procedure, he began a criminal investigation and prepared 52 probable cause affidavits to summon defendants into court. He served these affidavits charging the town treasurer and an officer with the bank with felony theft for each occasion when $5.00 was withheld from his weekly paycheck. These affidavits served as a summons to the two individuals to appear in court. The town treasurer became upset by 


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Hensley's actions and filed a complaint with the chief of police. As a result of the incident the chief terminated Hensley. The termination was upheld following a hearing by the public safety board. Hensley appealed the decision to a trial court which reviewed the determination. Trial court upheld the dismissal and Hensley took no appeal from that decision. Rather, he filed suit in federal court alleging that he had been deprived of his right to free speech. The city moves for summary judgment. 

HELD: Hensley contends that his termination was punishment for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court has long held that a public employee maintains a First Amendment right to speak out on matters of public concern even though he works for the government. A public employee can be punished for exercising that right only if the facts of the case indicate that the employer's interest in promoting efficiency of public services outweighs the employee's interest in free speech. The statement is characterized as a matter of public concern and not merely a personal employment grievance if it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. When an employee speaks only as an employee upon purely personal matters, the speech is not protected. To determine whether or not a particular speech relates to internal workplace issues or to public matters, a court looks to the content, form, and context of the speech. Content is the most important of these factors. When a court reviews speech cases, deference to the employer's judgment is given. Such deference is particularly important in the context of law enforcement and it has been recognized that a police department has a more significant interest than the typical government employer in regulating speech activities of its employees in order to promote efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public confidence. Police departments, because they are paramilitary organizations charged with maintaining public safety and order are given more latitude in their 

decisions regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary government employer. While an allegation of theft can be fairly considered to be a matter of public concern, here Hensley was the only alleged victim. In assessing the content of his communication the court must conclude that it was a private concern not a public concern. Similarly, the affidavits Hensley prepared and delivered were not given to the public prosecutor but rather to the individuals he was charging. Giving the affidavits to the individuals was not necessary to bring the matter to the public's attention. Finally, the context of the speech related to Hensley's dispute over the method of paying municipal employees. As he was the only objecting employee, this was a purely private dispute. In addition to the balance on the First Amendment claim coming down on the side of the city, Hensley does not have an actionable due process claim either. While he held a constitutionally protected property interest in his job as a police officer, and there was some evidence of possible bias on the part of the hearing officer, Hensley did not pursue his state remedy. His termination became final due to a lack of appeal. The doctrine of res judicata prohibits Hensley from litigating his case in a federal court. The principle of res judicata requires a federal court to grant judgments of state courts full faith and credit. The state judgment has the same res judicata effect in federal court as it would have in another state. Given that the issues were fully and fairly litigated in the Indiana state court, Hensley is barred from seeking re-litigation in federal court. [Hensley v. Jasper, Indiana, Police Department, 163 F. Supp.2d 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2001)] 

Dismissal grounds 

Maus was hired as a patrol officer by the city. He was given a copy of the city personnel handbook. The handbook stated, "All employees are considered to be at-will employees for the purposes of city employment." During the course of his employment Maus alleged the city created a hostile work environment. Specifically, he alleged 


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that the chief of police and the mayor created the hostile situation. Ultimately, the city council voted to terminate Maus' position. He filed suit claiming that he had been deprived of property without due process of law. City moves for summary judgment. 

HELD: Maus argues that an implied contract arose during his employment with the city. He bases his claim on procedures set forth in the personnel manual stating that employees shall have notice of a hearing when misconduct is alleged. Under Kansas law, employment is at the will of the employer and employee. The general rule is that employment is terminable at the will of either party in the absence of an express or implied contract. An implied contract creates an exception to the at-will employment rule. Under an implied contract theory, the contract for employment is read broadly so that the employer cannot terminate an employee arbitrarily where a policy or program of the employer restricts at-will termination. To establish an implied contract Maus must show a mutual understanding that the employer would terminate the employee only for cause. Maus asserts that the city had a common practice of terminating only for a cause but provided no proof of this practice. Secondly, he contends that the existence of the disciplinary procedure outlined in the personnel manual creates a for cause employment relationship. However, the manual expressly states that employees are considered to be at-will. Due to this explicit language the court finds that the manual does not, in itself, give rise to any contractual rights on the part of the former officer. His evidence of implied contract only serves to establish unilateral expectations, not an enforceable contractual relationship. Summary judgment for city. [Maus v. City of Towanda, Kansas, 165 F. Supp.2d 1223 (D. Kan. 2001)] 

after objections were made by the assistant district attorney the court did not allow Lynch to testify, although he was willing to do so. Six months later Lynch's testimony was requested at the trial of another police sergeant. This sergeant was accused of perjuring himself before the grand jury by denying that he saw a fellow officer beat a prisoner. Lynch testified as a character witness and the trial ended in a hung jury. When the sergeant was retried, Lynch again testified as a character witness. This trial ended in an acquittal. Some months later Lynch was transferred from his post in the inspection division to a command bureau that oversaw department operations during nighttime hours. The assignment to the command bureau was traditionally seen as undesirable and had been used for disciplinary reasons or as a holding place for command-level personnel who were in transition. Consequently, Lynch filed suit against the city and the police commissioner alleging a violation of his First Amendment right of free speech. Defendants move for summary judgment. 

HELD: Prior case law holds that a public employee's appearance in court as a witness qualifies as "speech". It is a well-established law that public employers cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes on an employee's constitutionally protected interest in free expression. However, a public employer does have more authority to regulate an employee's speech than it does the speech of the general public. For a public employee's speech to be protected speech, it must be about a matter of public concern and the employee's interest in expression not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the state as an employer. A public employee's speech will be considered a matter of public concern if it can be fairly considered to be relating to a matter of political, social, or other concern of the community. Once again, prior case law has found that testifying in court is a matter of public concern. Thus, Lynch satisfies this requirement. When considering the balancing requirement the court must balance Lynch's significant interest in 

Disciplinary grounds 

Vassallo was a police officer who was arrested for shoplifting. At the time of the arrest Lynch was Vassallo's captain. Vassallo requested that Lynch testify at his shoplifting trial. However, 


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testifying against the potential harm caused to the police department. The city asserts that there was a significant potential for interference with the operation of the department as evidenced by the complaint of the district attorney's office as well as questions raised by Lynch's subordinates as to why he was supporting a criminal. However, a close review of the facts reveals that Lynch testified as a character witness for a fellow officer. There is no indication that he testified falsely or in a manner that could undermine the police department. His testimony was specifically character testimony brought to show the good character of a fellow officer. The city has presented no specific examples of how the testimony could or did impair discipline by superior officers or harmony among coworkers. The court finds that the potential for disruption of police affairs based on the testimony was minimal. Thus, Lynch's speech was considered a protected activity. A jury could also find that the department retaliated against Lynch by transferring him. Testimony by various police officials indicated that the transfer might be for disciplinary reasons. The city argues, however, that the transfer would have occurred regardless of Lynch's testifying on behalf of fellow officers. This position appears to be a pretext. Given that a reasonable jury can find that Lynch's testimony was a motivating factor in his transfer the city's motion for summary is denied. [Lynch v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 166 F. Supp.2d 224 (E.D. Pa. 2001)]  test, and a half mile shuttle run. Passing scores were gender normed, meaning that female candidates need attain a different score than male candidates in order to pass. The female standards were less than the male qualifying requirements. Two individuals who worked as county correctional deputies took the performance skills test but did not receive passing scores. Consequently, neither was eligible to enter a police academy and become certified as an officer. The individuals, both males, would have received passing scores if their performances had been evaluated pursuant to the standards applicable to female candidates. They filed suit claiming that the COLES standards violated Michigan equal protection law. They also alleged that the performance standards should be age- normed to account for the relative decrease in muscular strength and fitness as a result of the aging process. Trial court granted summary judgment for COLES and two male want-to-be police officers appeal. 

HELD: Michigan law prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, race, national origin, and sex. Plaintiffs in this case claim that the state physical fitness standards are unlawfully discriminatory based on sex. Classifications based on sex are reviewed under an intermediate or heightened scrutiny test and will pass constitutional muster only if the classification is substantially related to an important government objective. Merely because the state engages in a practice that treats men and women differently does not necessarily mean that it engages in unlawful gender discrimination. The test is whether the gender based treatment serves a sufficiently important governmental interest. The evidence submitted in this case establishes that the performance skills test is a test designed to assess general physical fitness and not to delineate specific minimum fitness standards required to become a police officer. The gender norming insures that the most physically fit female candidates are placed into the larger pool of qualified applicants. This creates the act of inclusion not exclusion. The test is designed and appropriately 

Sex discrimination 

Michigan's Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (COLES) established minimum physical fitness standards for law enforcement officers. Individuals seeking to attend a police academy to qualify to become a police officer were required to pass a physical skills test. A candidate could retake the test as frequently as the candidate pleased until a passing score was received. The physical test involved a grip strength examination, an obstacle run, a 160-pound dummy drag, a 95-pound carry and lift exercise, a pushup 


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normed to assess general physical fitness and takes into account the immutable physiological differences between males and females to insure that the most physically fit from each group is eligible for eventual certification as police officers. The only harm to male candidates occasioned by gender norming in this case is that to obtain certification as a police officer, the male candidates must compete against a larger pool of qualified applicants. Having such a larger pool is an important governmental interest. It is also important to the government not to disproportionately impact females in the area of employment. Accordingly, the COLES process of gender norming physical performance standards does not unlawfully discriminate against male candidates in violation of Michigan law. Likewise, the tests do not discriminate against individuals based on their age. Plaintiffs in this case are excluded from the group of eligible individuals for certification not because age is a determining factor but because they failed to attain an accepted level of general physical fitness. The determining factor is not their age but their lack of overall physical fitness. Lower court decision upholding the state physical standards for police officers affirmed. [Alspaugh v. Commission on Law Enforcement Standards, 634 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)]  insistence of the AFSCME, refused to implement the pay raise for the narcotics investigators. They received their pay raise only after the FOP entered into a contract with the office of the attorney general. Subsequently, the FOP filed suit against the AFSCME and the office of attorney general seeking interest on the money that was not paid as raises. The FOP also claimed monetary damages for having to pursue grievances that allegedly the AFSCME refused to arbitrate during the dependency of the certification fight. The AFSCME filed a preliminary objection to the FOP suit. 

HELD: The AFSCME asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction over the FOP claim that the union retaliated against employees by failing to properly process their grievances. The AFSCME argues that such an allegation is an unfair labor practice charge and should go before the state labor board. Prior Pennsylvania case law holds, however, that a union's bad faith refusal to submit a grievance to arbitration does not fall within the statutory categories of an unfair labor practice. A public employee's remedy for a union's refusal to submit a grievance to arbitration is an action against the union for a breach of its duty of fair representation. Thus, the court has jurisdiction on that issue. The AFSCME also asserts that none of the investigators filed the grievance when they failed to receive their pay raise. Consequently, the union claims that the investigators failed to exhaust their contractual remedies. The rule of exhaustion of internal remedies applies when a dispute arises between a union and a member. However a person will not be required to pursue internal remedies that can be considered illusory. Since the employer refused to provide the pay raise at the insistence of the union, filing a grievance with the union would have indeed been purely illusory. There was no need for the individual employees to seek exhaustion of their contractual remedies. Whenever a union breaches a duty of fair representation any remedy for the employee must be complete and adequate. Normally, the legal remedy would be an order directing arbitration of the underlying grievance. However, in this matter 

Duty of fair representation 

Narcotics investigators for the attorney general's office were represented by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). However, in early 1999 a new association of investigators was formed and filed a petition with the state seeking to represent these employees. Ultimately, the state labor board certified the new association as the bargaining agent. A few months later the association affiliated with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). During the certification proceedings AFSCME negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement that called for a three percent raise for all employees. Although the AFSCME still represented the narcotics investigators, the attorney general, acting at the 


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the investigators should be permitted to seek monetary damages against the union as that is the only adequate remedy available. Finally, the AFSCME asserts that the FOP lacks standing to assert a claim for breach of duty of fair representation. Normally, only individuals may challenge a breach of duty of fair representation. In this case, however, the FOP is representing all employees who were injured as a result of the alleged breach of duty of fair representation. This is not a case where the FOP is seeking to substitute itself for a specific member having an individual claim. The FOP does have standing to pursue the claim on behalf of all of its members. Preliminary objections overruled. Matter to proceed to trial. [Narcotics Agents Regional Committee v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 780 A.2d 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)]  after initially checking out for his meal break. A report was made on the incident and following an investigation, the township police chief recommended termination of Powell's employment. The chief claimed that Powell committed conduct unbecoming an officer and violated various rules of the department. The township board upheld the termination and former officer appealed to the trial court. Trial court affirmed the termination. Powell appeals. 

HELD: Powell contends that the board's finding that he committed conduct unbecoming an officer and violated department rules are not supported by substantial evidence. The courts have defined the term "conduct unbecoming an officer" as conduct tending to destroy public respect and confidence in the operation of municipal services or affecting the morale or efficiency of the police department. The public demands that law enforcement officers adhere to demanding standards which are higher than those applied to many professions. It is a standard which demands more than a forbearance from overt and indictable illegal conduct. It demands that in both an officer's private and official lives he do nothing to bring dishonor upon his noble calling and in no way contribute to a weakening of public confidence and trust. Consequently, even off duty conduct of a police officer may be a basis for finding conduct unbecoming. Conduct unbecoming an officer constitutes just cause for terminating an officer's employment under Pennsylvania law. Pointing the firearm at the fellow officer, even as a joke, was clearly inappropriate behavior. It violated departmental policy and could have caused serious consequences. The police chief testified at the hearing that there was absolutely no excuse for an officer to engage in this type of conduct. Likewise, Powell neglected his official duties by spending four hours at the diner and by failing to respond as a backup officer even though he was closest to the scene of the call. Each of these circumstances is sufficient grounds to terminate Powell as a police officer. Termination of officer affirmed. [Powell v. 

Dismissal grounds 

Powell was working the nightshift as a patrol officer. During his 12-hour shift he was permitted to take a 45-minute meal break. At approximately 2:15 a.m. Powell signed out for his meal break and went to a local diner with another officer. While at the diner the two officers sat at a booth with two women. Two other officers entered the diner approximately an hour later. One of the officers jokingly asked Powell what would happen if his wife saw him sitting with the women. Powell pulled out his service pistol from his holster and pointed it directly at the inquiring officer for a few seconds. Although his finger was outside the trigger guard, the magazine had not been removed from the weapon. Powell later said that he was joking at the time of the incident. Shortly thereafter, a domestic disturbance call was received. One of the departing officers responded to the call. Under normal circumstances the officer closest to the domestic disturbance must respond as a backup. Although Powell was at the diner at the time and closest to the scene he failed to respond as the backup. Powell later admitted that he was still at the diner two hours 


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Middletown Township Board of Supervisors, 782 A.2d 617 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)]  interviews. The first day the city began the investigation the union filed a complaint with the state labor board charging the city with an unfair labor practice. Specifically, the union alleged that the city's investigation was interfering with employee rights protected under Washington law. The labor board hearing examiner concluded that no union member could have reasonably perceived the city was interfering with their collective bargaining rights in the course of the investigation and dismissed the complaint. The union appealed to the full labor board, which reversed the hearing examiner's decision. The full board indicated that the city had not established a legitimate basis for safety concerns for Sharma and that union members could reasonably perceive that the interrogation would limit their ability to conduct union business within the confines of the private union meeting. The city appeals. 

HELD: Under Washington law the decisions of the labor board must be reviewed on the basis of substantial evidence. Washington statute provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer to interfere with or coerce public employees in the exercise of their labor rights. The police union advocates a rule that the right to collectively bargain includes the right to be free from any employer questioning regarding any discussions or conduct taking place at union meetings. No such absolute privilege exists, however. An employer unlawfully interferes with union activities if the employer's action would tend to coerce a reasonable employee. The evidence does not need to show that the employer actually intimidated or coerced the employee by the conduct. An employer's interview of employees with respect to union activities is not per se unlawful. An employer with a legitimate reason to inquire may interrogate employees on matters that are related to their collective bargaining rights without incurring liability. The interrogation becomes illegal when the words themselves, or the context in which they are used, suggest an element of coercion or interference with union protected activities. In determining whether an employer's 

Disciplinary procedures 

The police department commenced an internal affairs investigation regarding the conduct of a sergeant at a training session. Various officers were interviewed about the incident. One of the officers, Sharma, apparently relayed accurately what had occurred. His comments became the subject of discussion at the police union's board meeting and later at the general membership meeting. Officers who attended the general membership meeting allegedly told Sharma about the discussion and expressed concern for Sharma's safety. Sharma reported the matter to his lieutenant. The lieutenant subsequently filed administrative charges against the officers that had made the various comments about Sharma at the union meeting. The deputy chief who reviewed the allegation conferred with the city attorney and other city officials about the proper way to proceed with the investigation. The deputy chief was concerned about Sharma's safety and the city ultimately approved a stress-related disability leave for Sharma. As part of the subsequent investigation the city questioned 26 union members including five who were union board members. The city actually utilized some supervisors who were represented by the union to question the union members. A union representative was invited to attend the interviews and the investigators were instructed not to ask any questions about union strategy or policy. Additionally, the investigators were required to show their questions to the legal department prior to utilizing them in the investigation. Finally, the officers being interviewed were read a statement that reiterated that the department was not asking questions regarding union policy or strategy but was merely focusing upon gathering facts relating to alleged violations of department policy that may have occurred at the union board meeting. Officers faced disciplinary proceedings if they failed to answer the questions. Legal representation was allowed to witness the 


December 2001 
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interrogation amounts to interference the courts consider the following factors: (1) the history of the employer's attitude toward its employees; (2) the type of information sought; (3) the rank of the questioner; (4) the place and manner of the conversation; (5) the truthfulness of the employee's responses; (6) whether the employer had a valid purpose for obtaining the information; (7) if so, whether the employer communicated the reason to the employee; and (8) whether the employer assured the employee that no reprisals would be forthcoming should he support the union. In looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case the court holds that substantial evidence does not support the labor board's finding that a reasonable employee could perceive that the employer was interfering with his collective bargaining rights. Using the traditional test, the evidence shows the city did not have a history of questioning union members about activities at union meetings. Likewise, the investigators informed the interviewees that they were not interested in union strategy or business and the questioning was formal and conducted at the police station. The city had a valid purpose in investigating possible retaliatory conduct against an officer and possible concern for an officer's safety. Investigators also read to the interviewees a limiting statement prior to the interview. No reasonable employee could have perceived that the city was interfering with his collective bargaining rights or future union activity. As such, the findings of the labor board were arbitrary and capricious and must be overturned. Reversed for city. [Public Employees Relations Commission v. City of Vancouver, 33 P.3d 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)]  panel sided with members of Lodge 10 of the Fraternal Order of Police in rebuffing efforts by the city to reduce retirement benefits from 70 percent of salary to 50 percent. The city had claimed that a court interpretation of a state statute required the city to lower the pension benefits. That argument was rejected. The wage hike moves sergeant's pay to $42,971 and adds a nickel to hourly shift differential. Longevity pay was also increased. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday was added as a paid holiday. The three-year award expires December 31, 2004. 

El Paso, Texas 

police officers 
More than a year of negotiations has resulted in a tentative contract between the El Paso Municipal Police Officers Association and the city. The pact grants a four percent wage hike next February - the start of the contract - and another three percent in September 2002. The agreement ends in October 2003. Another provision allows officers to incur overtime credit after 40 hours, even if some of the hours were holidays or vacation time. An 80-hour cap is placed on the accumulation of compensatory time. Other economic gains include educational incentive pay, doubled shift differential, and increased pay for field training officers. 

Lakewood, Ohio 

police officers 
Pay raises of 4.5 percent in the first year and 4 percent in the remaining two years highlight the new labor contract approved last month by Lakewood police officers. The approval by the 75-member department avoided the matter going to a conciliator following the union's rejection of a fact-finder's recommendations. The contract was settled after the parties agreed to handle shift scheduling as a policy rather than contractual issue. Schedules will be set by seniority but the police chief will be permitted to make changes based on need. 
Settlements 

Allentown, Pennsylvania 

police officers 
An arbitration panel's ruling last month grants annual four percent raises and preserves pension benefits for Allentown police officers. The 


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West Brookfield, Massachusetts 

police officers 

Wage boosts of at least three percent for each of the next three years are the cornerstone of a new agreement between the Town of West Brookfield and Local 170 of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers. The pact, retroactive to July 1, also revises the longevity and job classification portions of the pay schedule. The new procedure no longer grants annual cost of living hikes on top of longevity step increases in the six-step chart. Only officers in the top pay step will gain the cost of living hikes. While the contract provides for annual three percent boosts, a "me too" clause is included that grants the same pay boost to officers as non-union employees might gain in the future. A beginning police officer will now earn about $28,600.