Collective bargaining, the goal of most public safety unions and the nightmare of many governmental administrators, continues to be an active issue nationwide. In recent weeks, political momentum for a national bargaining bill has continued to build while a California court has struck down the cornerstone of its state law, binding arbitration.
Recently, Senator Jim Inhofe, an Oklahoma Republican, has become the 23 rd Senate co-sponsor of the bill and the 59th vote toward the 60 needed to end procedural blocking maneuvers. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) has pledged to bring the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (S.952) to the Senate floor if the public safety unions are able to secure the 60 votes needed for cloture, the procedural term for closing debate and ending any filibusters. Last year, the bill was blocked from a floor vote despite having a 56-vote majority support. Shutting off the Republican-engineered filibuster could virtually assure passage of the act in the Senate. A companion bill, H.R. 1474, has 221 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives, three more than a majority. If the proposal becomes law, states will be compelled to allow police officers and fire fighters to negotiate with their employers over wages, hours, and working conditions. At least 18 states, mostly in the South, do not permit bargaining by public safety employees.
Meanwhile, a California appeals court last month voided the state's binding
arbitration law for county public safety personnel, ruling that the act
violates home-rule provisions of the state constitution.
The law was enacted in 2001 after years of lobbying by fire fighter and
police officer unions. The Court of Appeal in Riverside ruled that granting
a panel of arbitrators the ability to set wages based on the last/best offer
of the parties interfered with local governmental authority over finances
and employee compensation. The California Constitution provides that the
legislature may not delegate to private parties the power to appropriate
funds. Additionally, the law conflicts with a 1933 amendment specifically
granting the county board of supervisors "complete authority" over employees'
compensation.
Judge Betty A. Richli, writing for the three-member panel, noted that while public sector labor relations may be a matter of statewide concern appropriate for state legislative control, the state constitution is clear as to the setting of salaries. Likewise, the court found it a bit ironic that the legislature asserted that the public welfare is endangered unless public safety personnel cannot compel interest arbitration yet the legislature has failed to grant the same arbitration right to state-employed fire fighters and police officers.
Prior to the enactment of the statute, many cities had voluntarily entered into memoranda of understanding with their local police associations. However, binding arbitration in case of an impasse in negotiations was generally not available.
The decision in County of Riverside v. Superior Court of Riverside County sets aside an arbitration order on behalf of the Riverside Sheriff's Association. A decision to appeal the ruling is pending.
Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao on May 15th, announced a new scholarship
program for spouses of fallen law enforcement officers who seek to enter
the workforce or enhance their current career situations. She announced
the RISE scholarship -
Resources and Investments in Spousal Employment - at the New York State
Fraternal Order of Police dinner held in conjunction with the annual national
tribute to officers killed in the line of duty.
Chao said, "This $2 million scholarship program is in tribute to the courageous fallen officers who have made the ultimate sacrifice to maintain peace and freedom in our country. It is a promise to them that our country will take care of the loved ones they leave behind. Through this scholarship program, the Department of Labor, through our one-stop career centers, will help these spouses regain their footing, access new job opportunities and begin to rebuild their lives."
The department will award a grant of up to $2 million to the National Fraternal
Order of Police Foundation to develop and administer the scholarship program.
The scholarships for spouses would cover education and training costs related
to preparing spouses for employment or career advancement in high-growth
industries. The funds could also be used for supportive services such as
childcare and transportation while the spouse is enrolled in the
career development program.
Eligible recipients will be spouses of sworn law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty between Jan. 1, 2001 through Dec. 31, 2004. Also included will be divorced spouses who are beneficiaries of the fallen officers and are the parents of the officers' dependent children.
The National FOP Foundation, a not-for-profit organization, will receive up to $500,000 a year for four years to administer the program through local One Stop Career Centers. The scholarships would allow spouses to pay for such education and training at four-year university degree programs, community college certification courses, and customized on-the-job training. The financial assistance will be available to help new entrants into the workforce as well as those looking to upgrade their skills or explore new career opportunities.
The U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled that police unions must be allowed to participate in consent degree negotiations when the federal government sues police departments. However, the ruling benefiting the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) was only a partial victory for the union as the judicial panel refused to make the holding retroactive.
Following allegations of use of excessive force, false arrests, and illegal searches, capped by the so-called Rampart Scandal, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) sued the City of Los Angeles under a 1996 law prohibiting a "pattern or practice" of unconstitutional behavior. Over objections of the LAPPL and certain community activist groups, city officials and DOJ agreed to a proposed settlement. Prior to approval of the consent decree by the federal District Judge, the LAPPL and the community groups sought to intervene in the proceedings to make their interests known. Judge Gary Feess denied the effort and the two groups appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The three-judge appeals panel ruled in late April that because the consent
decree might contradict provisions of the LAPPL's memorandum of understanding
with the city, the union had a right to present its views to the court.
However, since no
stay had been issued to stop implementation of the decree, the court is
not required to "turn back the clock or rescind the consent decree." LAPPL's
right to intervene will be prospective only.
As to the community activist groups, the panel found they had no absolute right to intervene in the case but remanded the matter to the trial court for a factual hearing on whether they should be allowed to intervene permissively.
"We are pleased with the decision and it supports what the league has been saying all along, that neither the federal government nor the City of Los Angeles were in a position to represent the interests of rank-and-file members of the police department," said LAPPL general counsel Enrique Hernandez. LAPPL represents officers through the rank of lieutenant.
The consent decree places the LAPD under a federal monitor. The department is required to record all uses of force, pursuits, internal investigations and citizen complaints, awards and commendations, civil lawsuits, performance evaluations and training history and maintain the data in a computerized information system. Integrity audits are to be conducted and new rules are in place concerning police interaction with mentally ill persons and criminal informants.
While the ruling is not legally binding outside of the federal Ninth Circuit,
the decision serves as a precedent for police unions in other communities
to have a voice in the creation of settlements between their employer and
DOJ after DOJ has filed a "pattern or practice" suit against the police department.
In the last few years about a half dozen such suits have
been filed and several other major police agencies are believed to be under
investigation. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the Ohio cities of Cincinnati,
Columbus, and Steubenville, and the New Jersey State Police as well as Los
Angeles have been recent defendants in these cases.
The 27-member board of Lodge 7 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) unanimously rejected a call by Chicago City Hall to take one unpaid furlough day to help ease the city's financial crisis. Mayor William Daley has threatened to order 425 layoffs of non-safety employees if budget issues cannot be solved.
Newly-elected President Mark Donahue said, "There's still a great deal
of resentment (about the FOP contract). Our membership is not willing to
assist at this point." Earlier this year officers rejected a
proposed four-year contract only to have very similar terms imposed by
an arbitrator. Contention over the contract assisted Donahue in defeating
vice president Robert Podgorny in the race to succeed William Nolan who
was barred from running for re-election. Donahue, a Chicago detective,
has been the president of the Illinois State FOP lodge for several years.
Donahue suggested that the city start charging the city's professional sports teams for the police protection that the city currently provides without charge.
Informational billboards are a common union practice to educate the public about labor issues in their police department. Whether such outdoor advertising produces its desired effect is unknown. However, the Fraternal Order of Police's (FOP) recent display of a billboard in Huntington, West Virginia, may have precipitated an unintended consequence — the firing of the chief of police.
Police Chief Gordon Ramey II was terminated in May after the mayor of West Virginia's second largest city said he had lost confidence in the chief. The move came two days after the local lodge of the FOP began running billboards that asked, "Are you ready to lose one-third of your police department?" The billboards displayed four Huntington officers in front of a police car. The campaign was prompted by the approval of a city budget calling for furloughs of 22 officers and eight support personnel.
Chief Ramey had publicly stated that the department could not function
with the layoffs. "So basically, anything short of a homicide or domestic
violence won't be investigated," the chief had said. The chief announced
that the detective bureau within the 91-officer department would be reduced
from 18 to five. Ramey suggested that detectives would not
have time to investigate burglaries. Mayor David Felinton suggested that
such comments send a message to burglars and added to his lack of confidence
in the chief.
"Everyone is shocked because he (Ramey) didn't have anything to do with what the FOP did," said Vernon Casey, leader of Gold Star Lodge 65. Casey called the chief's dismissal retribution for speaking out. "It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out [the mayor] was trying to put pressure on the FOP," he added. "This is just the coup de grace. I don't know where we're supposed to go from here."
The FOP paid $1,800 for the billboards that urged residents to contact city officials to express displeasure over the layoffs that are scheduled for July 1.
The city is anticipating a $900,000 budget deficit despite several previous rounds of budget cutting. The furlough of police personnel and 13 other city workers would save about $2 million.
Police staffing was authorized at 103 officers when the current administration
came to power. The department now employs 91. The furloughs will produce
an overall 30 percent reduction in force.
The only high court action of note in the last month was the justices' denial of review of Johnson v. New York City Police Department. This leaves intact a lower court ruling refusing to allow a 14th Amendment liberty interest claim by an unsuccessful police candidate. Johnson has claimed that the NYPD provided untrue and stigmatizing statements about him to other police agencies after he was found unfit to be hired. Lower federal courts dismissed the action finding adequate state procedures existed for Johnson to press his complaint.
Delgado was a 15-year veteran of the Milwaukee Police Department assigned to the vice control unit. Following the execution of a search warrant, Delgado received a letter from one of the individuals arrested claiming that the arrestee had information about the buying and selling of drugs by public school employees and the patronage of a drug house by a close relative of a public official. The letter also stated that the chief of police was a close friend of a public official whose immediate relative was alleged to have frequented the drug house. When Delgado showed the letter to his supervising lieutenant, the lieutenant commented, “What district do you want to be transferred to?” Delgado inferred from the supervisor’s comments that investigation of a politically sensitive matter often resulted in unfavorable treatment, including unwanted transfers. Nonetheless, Delgado was subsequently ordered to interview the author of the letter and wrote a memorandum summarizing the contents of the interview. The memorandum moved up the chain of command where the deputy chief recommended that it be investigated by an outside agency. However, when the chief of police read the memorandum, he instructed that the matter be contained within the department and told Delgado’s captain not to discuss the memorandum with Delgado or anyone else. The following day, the chief issued an order transferring Delgado from the vice unit to the criminal investigations unit retroactive to the previous day. This transfer took effect while Delgado was on vacation and departed from the normal practice of beginning on the Sunday following the end of a pay period. When Delgado returned from vacation, he was ordered to undergo a urine test and informed that he was under investigation by the internal affairs division. Superior officers refused to tell Delgado why he had been transferred. The detective subsequently sued the chief of police and various other superior officers claiming that his transfer was in retaliation for his First Amendment protected conduct. Chief and deputy chief moved for dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity. Trial court denied the motion and the chief and deputy chief appeal.
HELD: Qualified immunity protects from civil liability public officials who violate a constitutional right that was not clearly established at the time of the violation. In this case, the chief and deputy chief argue that Delgado’s conduct was not protected by the First Amendment and that even if it were so protected, the law was not clearly established at the time that transferring him violated his rights. Supreme Court has held that for the speech of a government employee to enjoy First Amendment protection the speech must address a matter of public concern. Prior case law has determined that police protection and public safety are generally a matter of public concern. Certainly communication by law enforcement officers that contains information essential to complete an objective investigation of serious criminal activity implicates public concern. The defendants argue, however, that prior case law holds that communications as a part of an employee’s regular job duties are not matters of public concern. While that is a correct statement of the law, it is narrowly applied. Such a position is limited to the routine discharge of assigned functions where there is no suggestion of public motivation. In this case, detective work would be hopelessly compromised if police officers could be retaliated against for communicating factual details that bear on the department's ability to conduct an objective investigation. The fact that the officer's job responsibilities may overlap with his motivations of a well-meaning citizen does not change his analysis. Thus, Delgado's report of the allegations was protected by the First Amendment. As to the question of whether the alleged violation of his constitutional rights was clearly established, prior case law holds that a public employer may not retaliate against an employee who exercises his First Amendment speech rights, including retaliation through a transfer to a less desirable position. Since the police chief allegedly ordered the unwanted job transfer and the change in Delgado's vacation schedule, the defense of qualified immunity fails as applied to him. The defense of qualified immunity also fails with respect to the deputy chief due to insufficient facts to determine the role that she played in any retaliation against Delgado. Trial court denial of qualified immunity affirmed. [Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2002)]
Smith was the president of the police officers' union. Prior to his death,
he repeatedly called in sick or left work early. He also lost 35 pounds
in six weeks. Smith began to exhibit erratic and emotional behavior at home
that led his wife to phone his supervisor and express her concerns. Several
other officers noted the changes in Smith's behavior and spoke to him on
several occasions regarding his emotional state and whether he needed assistance.
No assistance was sought, however. Smith subsequently committed suicide
with his service pistol. Smith's estate and his widow filed suit against
the town and several named employees including the chief of police, alleging
that the city failed to properly intervene in Smith's personal life and
thereby deprived him of his constitutional right to life. Secondly, the
estate alleged a retaliation claim under the First Amendment against Smith
because he was union president and the department failed to follow proper
procedure in light of his mental and emotional state. Allegations of negligence
and violations of state law were also made alleging that the city should
have referred Smith to a professional counselor and that it was negligent
in failing to address alleged obvious signs of potential suicide. City
moves for summary judgment.
HELD: Complainants maintain that the city's failure to properly intervene
violated Smith's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and
were also in retaliation for his participation in union activities protected
by the First Amendment. City argues, however, that in absence of some custodial
relationship, the due process clause imposes no duty on the state to protect
an individual against himself. The city is correct. Prior case law holds
no constitutional obligation under the due process clause to prevent Smith's
suicide. In the absence of any restraint on Smith's liberty, there was no
constitutional obligation for the city to protect him from himself. Similarly,
the mere fact that Smith was the president of the police officers' union
does not implicate a claim of First Amendment retaliation. The estate has
failed to show the relationship between the exercise of Smith's First Amendment
rights as union president and any alleged retaliatory conduct by the city.
No connection was established between the union activities and the city's
failure to take appropriate action to prevent Smith's suicide. Summary judgment
for city. State law claims dismissed without prejudice. [Smith v. Town of
West Hartford, Connecticut, 186 F. Supp.2d 146 (D. Conn. 2002)]
Madrigal was employed as a police officer by the City of Perris. During that time the city received a complaint to the effect that Madrigal had engaged in illegal conduct while on duty. This complaint qualified as an adverse comment possibly affecting Madrigal’s status and the city had an obligation under California statute to allow the officer to view and respond to the complaint. The city, however, never informed Madrigal of the complaint. A possible reason for the inaction on the part of the city was that in 1996, it disbanded its police department, discharging all of its officers including Madrigal. Law enforcement duties were transferred to the sheriff’s department. At the same time, the sheriff’s department became custodian of the city’s employment records including the complaint against Madrigal. In order to staff its new unit, the county hired on a probationary basis almost all of the former city officers to be deputy sheriffs. In connection with the change of department, Madrigal signed a number of documents, including a notice that he would undergo a background investigation and that he was waiving his right to review background investigation reports. The county extended Madrigal a conditional offer of employment subject to completion of the background investigation and polygraph. Thus, he was hired as a deputy sheriff prior to the completion of his background. Shortly after the hiring, the county asked Madrigal to submit to a polygraph exam regarding his alleged misconduct while an officer for the city. Madrigal signed a consent form in which he stated that he voluntarily submitted to the exam. At that time Madrigal learned that the allegations against him concerned alleged sexual relations with a prostitute and illegal drug use. A few months later the county dismissed Madrigal. Since he was still on probation, the county did not give Madrigal any reason for the dismissal. He subsequently sought jobs with other law enforcement agencies but without success. Ultimately, Madrigal sued the county. Shortly after the suit Madrigal sought to subpoena the county’s background investigation files, including the polygraph report. While the county provided some records it objected to a portion of the records sought, particularly the county and city’s background investigation files. After several hearings the trial court ordered edited versions of the files to be provided to Madrigal. On appeal, the order was upheld. County further appeals.
HELD: California statute provides that peace officers shall be of good moral character as determined by a thorough background investigation. Statute further provides that current and former employers are to disclose employment information to requesting law enforcement agencies. Prospective employers frequently require applicants to waive any right to review this background information. At the same time, the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act permits police officers to review any adverse comments placed in their personnel files. The county argues that Madrigal waived his right to review the files. California law provides that anyone may waive a right intended solely for their own benefit, but a law established for a public reason cannot be waived. The bill of rights act explicitly declares its purpose to promote effective law enforcement and was clearly established for public reason. Thus, there cannot be a waiver of the rights by a peace officer. However, an officer may make a limited waiver as to those matters that arose prior to his employment. This is consistent with the position taken in conducting background investigations on prospective employees. Since state law requires the county to share its background information with other law enforcement agencies to which Madrigal might apply, enforcement of the waiver bars Madrigal from seeing that file himself. Under these circumstances it would be essentially unfair to enforce the waiver absent the showing by the county that the waiver was made with full awareness of the severe consequences. In this case, Madrigal knew or should have known the consequences of his waiver. He was an existing peace officer who was in the process of applying for a new peace officer position. He agreed to let the county obtain background investigation done by his former law enforcement employer. By waiving his right to view this background investigation file, he should have known he might find himself in the current situation. This waiver is enforceable. By hiring Madrigal prior to conducting a background investigation, the county subjected the background information to disclosure requirements of the bill of rights act. In this case, however, Madrigal's express waiver of his right to view the investigation file is enforceable because he should have known of the full consequences of the waiver. Reversed for county. [County of Riverside v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 42 P.3d 1034 (Cal. 2002)]
Departmental policy set forth rules prohibiting sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming an officer, and a requirement requiring truthfulness on the part of police officers. Sexual harassment was defined as unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature under certain circumstances. Each supervisor was explicitly responsible for preventing acts of sexual harassment. McGehee was a sergeant on the police department. A female corporal filed a complaint alleging McGehee engaged in an act of sexual harassment. Specifically, he allegedly told a sexually offensive joke. An investigation into the matter revealed that the complaining officer asserted that the punch line of the joke commented on her breasts, using a slang term. McGehee claimed that the punch line referred to her "boobs." Subsequently, McGehee was suspended for three days. On appeal to the civil service commission the suspension was reduced to one day. Nonetheless, McGehee appealed. Trial court upheld the suspension and police sergeant appeals.
HELD: McGehee was suspended for violating department rules about sexual harassment and about
tuthfulness. During the disciplinary hearing, the chief of police testified that following the investigation he found that McGehee had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer, sexual harassment, and untruthfulness. McGehee complains that the discipline was erroneous because it involved only a single infraction, the complaining officer had not informed him that his actions were unwelcome and offensive and that the accusations were retaliatory. A close reading of the department general order on sexual harassment reveals that a single incident is sufficient to initiate a complaint. Similarly, the wording of the provision does raise questions as to whether the victim's previous receptivity to sexually-related and obscene jokes should be considered on the question of "unwelcome sexual conduct." The court need not resolve that ambiguity because the evidence is sufficient to establish that McGehee was untruthful in the investigation. The police chief found him guilty of failing to tell the truth regarding the nature of the comments he directed to the subordinate officer. This alone is sufficient to sustain a one day suspension. Discipline affirmed. [McGehee v. City of East Baton Rouge, 809 So.2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 2002)]New Jersey statute limits the hiring of police officers to applicants between the ages of 18 and 35. Constantino began working as a part-time officer in 1986 and was reappointed each year to that position. In 1996, the borough began to employ full-time officers. At that time, Constantino allegedly applied for the full-time position but did not receive it. Constantino subsequently filed suit claiming that the borough's refusal to hire him was age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey statute barring such discrimination. Trial court granted borough's motion for summary judgment and part-time officer appeals.
HELD: Since 1971, the statutory maximum hiring age for police officers has been 35. In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) making it unlawful to refuse to hire a person on the basis of age. In 1983, this law was ruled to be applicable to local government. In 1986, Congress amended the law to allow states to refuse to hire police officers based on age if such a restriction was in place in 1983. In 1983, Constantino was forty-three years of age and beyond the state limitation of thirty-five years of age for hiring new officers. The effect of the amendment to the ADEA was to permit states to hire for those positions using age restrictions without violation of federal law. However, the ADEA amendment had a sunset provision and, indeed, the law expired in December 31, 1993. Once again, the ADEA became fully applicable to the hiring practices of local governmental law enforcement. Nearly three years later, Congress repealed the sunset provision thereby reinstating the exception to the ADEA relative to age as criteria for police officers. Constantino's claim arises based on alleged age discrimination during the time from the expiration of the exemption to its reinstatement by Congress. When Congress repealed the sunset provision to ADEA, the age restriction on hiring police officers was again immediately enforceable. When a state law is preempted by a federal law, it still exists, but becomes unenforceable and suspended. Thus, when the federal law is repealed, the state law that was once preempted re-arises. Although retroactive application of law is generally disfavored, Congress' intent in this case was clearly to permit retroactive application. Congress recognized the public need for an efficient police force and allowed the states to enforce maximum age requirement laws. Thus, the reinstatement of the police officer age exemption cut off claims against states during the time window when no exemption existed. Summary judgment for borough confirmed. [Constantino v. Borough of Berlin, 791 A.2d 1118 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)]
The city and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided a multi-step grievance procedure in cases of discipline or dismissal. Initially, the grievance was provided through the FOP to the immediate supervisor of the officer. Ultimately the FOP took the matter through the process to the chief of police and to the city manager. The last step provided that if the FOP decided a valid grievance existed it could request the matter be submitted to arbitration. Wilcoxson was a police sergeant who was notified that she was being terminated. She was not a member of the FOP although she was covered by the bargaining contract. Wilcoxson, with the assistance of the FOP, completed the first few steps of the grievance procedure. When she was not reinstated, she sought to take the matter to arbitration. The FOP sent Wilcoxson a memo informing her that she could take her grievance to arbitration without the lodge's support and provided her with $200 for legal expenses. The $200 payment was a traditional action taken by the FOP in such cases for non-members. Wilcoxson personally notified the city manager that she wanted to arbitrate her dismissal. The city manager refused saying only the FOP had a right to request arbitration. Wilcoxson filed suit requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the matter to go to arbitration. Trial court issued the order for arbitration. City appeals.
HELD: Mandamus is an extraordinary equitable remedy the issuance
of which is strictly controlled by state statute. Under Oklahoma law,
mandamus will issue only where a petitioner has a clear legal right to the
relief sought and the defendant a plain legal duty that he refuses to perform.
Here, Wilcoxson argues that the city had a clear legal duty to submit to arbitration
and that she had a clear legal right to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement and under state law. Certainly state law requires
an arbitration procedure be put in place but that is commonly done through
collective bargaining agreements. Traditional labor law limits the
duty to arbitrate to the parties to the agreement (i.e., the bargaining agent
and management). An individual right to arbitration does not necessarily
follow. The Supreme Court has ruled that individual employees do not
have an absolute right to have a grievance taken to arbitration. Rather,
final adjustment is to be made by a method agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the method was the collective bargaining agreement. Given
that the contract clearly contemplates the arbitration must be requested by
the bargaining agent, the trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus was
an abuse of discretion and against the weight of the evidence. The
former officer has other potential remedies available to her in the ordinary
course of law. Reversed and writ ordering arbitration dismissed.
[Wilcoxson v. Tackett, 41 P.3d 1024 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2001)]
Donahue leased a house to Grinkis. Donahue had installed a fence around the property and consented to Grinkis’ request to keep a dog in the fenced portion of the yard. One day the dog escaped through a gap in the fence, ran onto the neighbor’s property, and attacked the neighbor. The following day, Sobanski, a police officer, was on the neighbor’s property investigating the biting incident when the dog again escaped the fenced yard and attacked him. The officer suffered physical injuries. The officer subsequently filed against Donahue alleging premises liability and negligence. Trial court granted summary judgment to Donahue on the grounds that he owed no duty to Sobanski because he had no control over the dog. Injured officer appeals.
HELD: Although Sobanski raises several issues on appeal, the case is covered by the Rhode Island Fireman’s Rule. Under Rhode Island law, for a police officer injured in the course of performing tasks related to his employment, if the risk of injury is one that could reasonably be anticipated to arise in the dangerous situation and the alleged party responsible was the individual responsible for bringing the officer to the scene of the potential crime or emergency, the officer is barred from recovering civil damages. The facts in this case are undisputed that Sobanksi was a police officer who at the time the dog attacked him was on duty investigating a complaint concerning the very same canine. At the time of the attack, Sobanski had been directed to the neighbor’s house so he could conduct the investigation. The officer’s injuries are in the risks that are inherent in police work and the foreseeable consequences of performing his duty to protect the public and investigate vicious dogs. The officer was aware that the dog was kept in the neighboring yard, that the dog had recently escaped, and attacked the neighbor. Both Donahue and Grinkis were responsible for the officer's presence in the neighbor's yard because they permitted a vicious dog to be housed on their premises. This set in motion the events leading up to his injury. Accordingly, the officer is barred from recovering by the Fireman's Rule. Dismissal of case affirmed. [Sobanksi v. Donahue, 792 A.2d 57 (R.I. 2002)]
police officers
Members of Local 400 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, the bargaining agent for Annapolis police officers, have approved a labor contract. All personnel will receive a two percent cost-of-living adjustment while most officers will also be eligible for a 5.36 percent wage boost. In other aspects, retirees will have 80 percent of health care costs covered by the city. A wage study will be conducted mandating a minimum $3,500 increase in salary for the entire force by the end of the year.
police officers
After being unable to reach an accord with the San Diego Police Officers' Association (SDPOA), the San Diego City Council imposed a one year pay raise of two percent. The city had offered 13 percent over three years but the leadership of the SDPOA had requested at least one percent more. Since no agreement had been reached, the raise was unilaterally awarded. The increase bumps veteran officers to a base of $60,296 while top of scale for sergeants moves to $73,238.
police officers
City fathers in Seekonk have approved a three-year contract with the town's
police officers. The pact, which runs from July 1, 2001, to June 30, 2004,
provides for a salary increase of four percent the first year and 4.5 percent
in each of the two other years. Officers will now have to cover ten percent
of health care costs, up from five percent under the prior contract. Lodge
5 of the Fraternal Order of Police represents the department's 32 officers.