Police officer salaries have made no real improvement over the last ten years, according to information recently released by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Average starting salary in cities of 250,000 population or greater declined to $34,556 in 2002, down from $35,002 in 1990. Pay for police chiefs moved up about two percent to an average of $95,393 over the same time period.
The comparative salary data was adjusted for inflation by converting all amounts to "2000 dollars." BJS used a multiplier of 1.3393 to represent the change in cost of living over the last decade. Consequently, while real salary numbers have improved, actual buying power has remained unchanged for the nation's police officers.
The data, contained in the recently published Police Departments in Large Cities, 1990-2000, was gathered as part of BJS's periodic Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey.
During this period the percentage of large-city departments that require new officers to meet some type of college education requirement rose from 19 percent to 37 percent, and those that required a two-year or four-year degree increased from 6 to 14 percent.
The percentage of full-time sworn personnel in large cities who were members of a racial or ethnic minority increased from 30 percent to 38 percent. Hispanic officers increased from 9 percent to 14 percent in 2000 and blacks from 18 percent to 20 percent. Female officers rose from 12 to 16 percent.
From 1990 to 2000, the 62 departments serving cities with a population of 250,000 or more increased their number of full-time sworn personnel by 17 percent from 130,242 to 152,858, accounting for 22 percent of all state and local officers nationwide. These departments served a population of almost 50 million people in 2000, about 18 percent of all U.S. residents.
A near national crisis in filling police positions has begun to take its toll on federal law enforcement agencies as well. As state and local police departments have scrambled over the last few years to find qualified applicants to fill an increasing number of vacant police officer positions, the federal government has largely been immune from the problem. No more. While the lead investigative agencies, such as the FBI, DEA, and BATF, have not reported difficulty in retaining personnel, other units have not been so lucky.
The U.S. Border Patrol recently lost 100 officers in the South Texas region alone. The Secret Service Uniformed Division has seen over ten percent of its 1,200 member force depart. The U.S. Capitol Police have received resignations from 29 officers in recent months. Why? They all have become federal air marshals!
The exodus to the airborne positions with the Transportation Security Administration is apparently being driven strictly by money. While many see riding on an airplane as a tedious assignment, the pay is attractive. Although starting salary for air marshals is posted at $31,500, officers with certain skills or levels of experience can earn up to $80,000. In addition, locality pay can add another 25 percent to the pay check. Shifts for air marshals are reportedly to be four days on followed by three days off.
Federal police agencies, particularly those in the Washington area, are responding to the personnel crunch by offering bonuses, tuition aid, and other financial benefits as well as establishing job enrichment programs. Strategic plans include asking Congress for a pay raise for the dozens of federal uniformed police agencies. Most are little known outside of the nation's capital.
Curiously, the staffing problems at the local level may be beginning to relax. The NYPD recently announced that 32,000 have signed up to take its next selection test, the largest number since 1986. One year ago, only 12,292 took the test. The increasing deterioration of the economy along with the events of September 11 are believed by many to be responsible for the upsurge in applicants. Other departments are reporting increased interest in the police profession.
Steve Young, Grand Lodge President of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) has been named to President Bush's Homeland Security Advisory Council. The White House made the announcement June 11.
Of the 16 members of the council, only Young and James T. Moore, Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, are actively involved in police work. Other members include business leaders, former government officials, and public policy experts.
Young, who is in his first term as the FOP's leader, is employed as an administrative lieutenant on the Marion, Ohio, Police Department. The council, which also includes the ex-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation William Webster, was established by executive order to provide President Bush with advice on homeland security matters following the terrorist attack. The council was created as part of the restructuring of national security agencies.
New York City _ where the men are men, and apparently so are the women. At least that is the view of members of the nation's largest local police union, the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA). A motion to change the name to a more gender neutral term failed, falling 16 votes short of the required two-thirds vote of union delegates.
The name change had a great deal of support, including that of PBA president Patrick Lynch. Opponents claimed that obtaining a new labor contract, not a name change, should be the first order of business. The PBA contract expired in July 2000.
Nearly 3,500 female officers are employed by the NYPD. The PBA is the labor representative for those holding the rank of police officer.
The so-called Fireman's Rule that prohibits public safety workers from recovering damages from a landowner for negligence when injured while performing their duties is not and has never been the law in South Carolina, the state's Supreme Court ruled in May. The ruling clears the way for fire fighters and police officers to sue when injured on the job because of a property holder's negligence.
Over two dozen states have adopted the rule in some form. Known as the Fire Fighter's Rule and the Professional Rescuer's Doctrine, the rule was created in 1892 and generally bars fire fighters and police officers injured in the line of duty from obtaining money damages from individuals whose very negligent behavior is the reason the public safety worker was called to the scene. Most states that have considered the matter in recent years have adopted the rule, although several states have abolished or limited by statute the application of the concept. Among the reasons cited for the rule are that public safety workers are aware of the risks inherent in their profession and that public policy is best served by having society as a whole pay for these job-related injuries.
The South Carolina case arose when Jeffrey Minnich, a university public safety officer, was injured when he jumped aboard a runaway truck. At the time, Minnich, as part of his normal duties, was assisting the loading of medical waste into the truck. He subsequently sued the truck's owner in federal court. The federal court requested that the Supreme Court of South Carolina advise it on the status of the Fireman's Rule in that state.
Justice Costa Pleicones, writing for the unanimous five-member tribunal, found the matter to be one considered for the first time in S. Carolina. After reviewing the various policy reasons for the existence of the rule, the justice concluded that nationwide there is no universal reason or consistent application of the concept. In rejecting the rule, the justice opined that the tort law of the state adequately addressed negligence claims brought by fire fighters and police officers. "The more sound public policy _ and the one we adopt _ is to decline to promulgate a rule singling out police officers and fire fighters for discriminatory treatment," he concluded.
A recently filed case of interest is Barrio v. Florida Board of Regents, No. 01-1560. This matter concerns a campus police officer who was transferred from being a plainclothes investigator on the day shift to uniformed patrol working rotating shifts. He lost no pay or benefits. Barrio contends, however, that the transfer was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and in violation of federal fair employment law. The lower federal courts ruled that such transfers without economic penalty were not "adverse employment actions" within the coverage of federal civil rights laws. Various other lower federal courts have issued conflicting holdings on this issue in other cases. Barrios is seeking Supreme Court review of the matter. No action has been taken as yet by the justices. A review decision may be delayed as the court is close to adjournment.
Four individuals applied for collective bargaining agreement each officer received $850 stipend upon receipt of the EMT certification. They received no compensation, however, for the off duty attendance of the course work. Following their certification, the officers did use their EMT skills to assist citizens with various medical emergencies. Commonly, they were assigned to be an attendant or driver on an ambulance as part of their regular police officer duties at the university. The officers subsequently sued the university claiming that they were entitled to overtime compensation under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Trial court agreed and awarded the overtime. The university appeals.
HELD: The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees for all "hours worked." However, the Portal-to-Portal Act provides that an employer need not pay an employee for activities that are "preliminary or postliminary" to the principal activity the employee is employed to perform. The Supreme Court has interpreted this act to mean that activities performed before or after the regular work shift are compensable only if they are an integral, indispensable part of the principal activity for which the individual is employed. Prior case law rejects the notion that training is integral and indispensable to the employee's principal activities simply because the employee can be terminated for failing to complete it in a satisfactory manner. Here the officers performed no productive work for the university during the training sessions. Nor is there any question that rather than providing such training to its employees during their probationary employment, the university could simply have made successful and were hired as police officers by the university, a private not-for-profit institution. As a condition of employment, the university required that the individuals receive and retain state emergency medical technician (EMT) certification within one year of their appointments as probationary police officers. This certification required over 100 hours of classroom work as well as 10 hours of in-hospital observation time and successful completion of written examinations. Cer-tification was good for two years after which time refresher training was necessary. In order to fulfill the requirements, the four officers attended an EMT course over a three month period. They completed the course work as well as the hospital observations. The majority of their training time occurred outside their regular work hours. Pursuant to the attainment of the EMT certification a pre-condition of employment. The university is not liable for overtime pay to its employees for the time spent as students rather than workers simply because the university decided to hire the employees prior to their completion of the required training. Reversed for university denying overtime claim. [Bienkowski v. Northeastern University, 285 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2002)]
Strahan was a sergeant on the sheriff’s department. The internal affairs lieutenant began to collect information about Strahan’s activities based on statements from other employees. Among the information was a letter apparently authored by another deputy and forwarded to a local newspaper complaining about a number of incidents in which Strahan’s conduct had been allegedly covered up by the department, including Strahan’s alleged association with the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang. The lieutenant prepared a memorandum about the information he had gathered, including information that Strahan had associated with a convicted felon and also wore Hell’s Angels tee shirts. The lieutenant also expressed concern that the Blind Justice Motorcycle Club of which Strahan was founder and leader had joined the Confederation of Clubs of Nevada, which was led by a convicted felon. The sheriff met with the lieutenant and discussed the possibility that Strahan was associating with ex-felons in violation of the general order prohibiting such association. The general order required a deputy who had direct contact with an ex-felon to submit a written report to a supervisor specifying whether he intended to associate with that person. The next day, Strahan was directed to produce property related to the motorcycle club, including a list of members. The second day, the sheriff removed the lieutenant from the investigation because of concerns that he had focused on Strahan’s involvement with Blind Justice and Strahan’s association with that club was likely protected by the First Amendment. A new investigator was assigned to the case. This investigator subsequently said he focused on Strahan’s right to associate with ex-felons. During the investigation, over 40 people were interviewed. Some of the questions focused on Strahan’s association with Blind Justice, but others focused on Blind Justice’s membership in the Confederation of Clubs whose by-laws provided that “no cops shall sit on the federation board.” Strahan was interviewed about his association with the ex-convict, which he admitted. Strahan continued to associate with the individual without filing official reports about the association. Ultimately, Strahan received notice of disciplinary action, listing a variety of instances of misconduct ranging from operating his motorcycle without a license to filing false articles of incorporation for Blind Justice and failing to file required written reports regarding his association with the ex-convict. The notice also seriously questioned Strahan’s truthfulness during the investigation, but gave him the benefit of the doubt. Strahan was demoted to deputy sheriff and reassigned due to a pattern of conduct that included defiance, arrogance, insub-ordination, lack of accountability, and inability to remember details. Strahan eventually resigned from the department, but then filed suit claiming that the sheriff’s actions violated his First Amendment right to associate with others. Trial court granted the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment concluding that Strahan’s association with Blind Justice deserved First Amendment protection but that Strahan had not shown evidence to support the inference that the protected expression was a substantial factor in motivating his demotion. Former deputy appeals.
HELD: A claimant alleging an adverse employment action in violation of his First Amendment rights must show that his protected conduct was a substantial and motivating factor for the employer’s action. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to demonstrate they would have acted the same way even in the absence of the protected conduct. Strahan did produce evidence that the sheriff knew of his association with Blind Justice, but that alone is not enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Strahan would have to show additional evidence that the adverse employment action was the cause of his discipline or the sheriff’s reasons were merely a pretext. The evidence shows that while the sheriff knew of Strahan’s association with the motorcycle group, he was careful to distinguish that association from Strahan’s violation of departmental general orders. There is no evidence that the sheriff’s legitimate reasons for disciplining Strahan were a mere pretext. In fact, the sheriff changed internal affairs investigators because of concerns about Strahan’s First Amendment rights. The sheriff eliminated any possible taint regarding the first investigator’s involvement in the investigation and focused clearly on Strahan’s association with ex-felons and his failure to report his contacts. Summary judgment for sheriff affirmed. [Strahan v. Kirkland, 287 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2002)]
Bates and Mahoney were deputy sheriffs. Both were married and living with their respective spouses when they began a romantic, extramarital relationship. The sheriff’s department that employed them did not have any rules prohibiting officers from dating one another. Subsequently, both Bates and Mahoney filed for divorces from their spouses. About the same time, however, Mahoney’s supervisor Denehy began to publicly berate the two deputies for their relationship. The tension between them erupted at a wedding of a colleague with a sharp exchange of words and a near fistfight. Mahoney reported the incident to his captain. Over the next weeks, Denehy engaged in a variety of behavior which both Mahoney and Bates found to be harassing. The two deputies were subsequently ordered transferred from their day shifts to the evening shifts. Denehy allegedly hassled Mahoney whenever he came into the work area and also yelled things at Bates. Denehy also issued an order that effectively prevented Mahoney from bringing lunch to Bates during the course of the work day. After a continuing series of allegedly harassing behavior as well as transfers off of desired shifts and desired assignments, Mahoney and Bates filed suit against Denehy and various other officials in the department. Defendants moved for summary judgment.
HELD: The two deputies assert that their relationship is protected under the First Amendment and that the sheriff’s department unduly interfered with their constitutional right to engage in such a relationship. In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that certain kinds of highly personal relationships were protected by the Constitution from unjustified interference by the state. The courts have not, however, clearly defined the contours of that relationship. The Supreme Court has explained that the personal affiliations underlying the intimate association right are those that attend to the creation and sustenance of a family, marriage, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one’s relatives. In this instance, the relationship between the two deputies was the sort that served to bring families apart and that is apparently what upset Denehy. It is open to debate whether the deputies’ relationship enjoys constitutional protection under the right to intimate association. Consequently, even with an alleged violation of their rights, Denehy enjoys qualified immunity. A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Such was the case here as the reasonable person could not discern whether the plaintiff’s relationship was entitled to First Amendment protection. Similarly, the deputies enjoy no First Amendment protection for the alleged retaliation based on their filing of their internal grievances. Their grievance alleged they were unjustly transferred for their complaints about Denehy and that the transfers interfered with their personal and professional lives. These grievances are not protected under the First Amendment, however, because they involve only an internal departmental dispute and do not relate to any manner of concern to the community. Only matters touching upon public concern are covered by the First Amendment. A public employee’s speech on matters of personal interest or internal office affairs does not constitute a matter of public concern. Summary judgment for sheriff’s department officials. [Bates v. Bigger, 192 F. Supp.2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)]
In 1975, the Arizona legislature enacted a statute providing that any person engaged in law enforcement activities shall be compensated for each hour of work in excess of 40 hours in one week by paying time and a half cash or time and a half compensatory time off at the option of the employer. Two years later, the legislature enacted statutes providing that county employees were eligible for overtime under the conditions prescribed by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Consequently, Yuma County calculated overtime entitlement for its deputy sheriffs based on 171 hours in a 28-day work period. This method of calculating overtime required deputies to work an average of 43 hours a week and is authorized by the FLSA provisions governing overtime calculation for law enforcement personnel. A group of deputies filed suit, however, claiming that the county’s policy, while comporting with federal law, violated Arizona’s statute. Trial court ruled that the county could use either the 40-hour Arizona statutory requirement or the broader statute authorizing overtime payment consistent with the FLSA. The court ruled that it was the county’s option to choose which statute applied. Deputies appealed.
HELD: A cursory reading of the law would indicate that the 40-hour week statute controls the situation. Surely, in enacting the other statute two years later, the legislature did not intend to eliminate the benefit it had just previously bestowed upon county law enforcement personnel. However, a closer examination of the enactment of the seemingly two conflicting laws creates a less than clear reflection of the intent of the legislature. A later statute is usually presumed to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature and is intended to modify an earlier statute. Logic would suggest that if the legislature intended to exclude deputy sheriffs from the 40-hour workweek basis of other law enforcement agents, it would have so stated. This inaction precludes a clear finding of intent on the part of the legislature. It is also argued that the legislature’s intent to modify the law can be found by implication. However, modification by implication is disfavored by the courts when construing statutes. The court is unwilling to assume such implications absent a clear reason being manifested for the legislature to treat deputy sheriffs differently than other law enforcement personnel. The original 40-hour statute appears to have the purpose of discouraging government employers from routinely working their law enforcement officers for extended periods of time beyond the normal 40-hour workweek. The legislature is no doubt aware of the significant physical and mental demands made upon law enforcement personnel in performance of their duties. The legislature could logically conclude the public interest is better served when the crisis to which officers respond are handled by individuals with alert minds and fresh bodies. A legislative intent to discourage extended work hours is not served by permitting employers to use the 171 hours in 28 days formula to calculate overtime compensation. In the absence of a clear indication that the legislature intended the second statute to apply to county deputy sheriffs, the court will not make such an interpretation. Reversed for deputies holding overtime eligibility after 40 hours of work per week. [Pijanowski v. Yuma County, 43 P.2d 208 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)]
Louisiana’s Constitution provides that civil service employees have a right of appeal for any “disciplinary action.” In 2001, Burkhart, a major on the New Orleans Police Department, received a letter of reprimand from the superintendent of police. The letter contained a finding that Burkhart, who was also a licensed attorney, represented a plaintiff in civil litigation against the city in violation of departmental general order. Burkhart sought to have the city civil service commission review the action but the commission refused on the ground that it did not review letters of reprimand. The commission took the position that a letter of reprimand was not a “disciplinary action” within the meaning of the Louisiana Constitution. Burkhart appeals.
HELD: Burkhart complains that while letters of reprimand may have been only temporary in the past, they now form a permanent part of the employment record and may be treated as prior offenses in subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Thus, he contends a letter of reprimand should be treated as disciplinary action and such should be reviewed by the civil service commission. No prior case law in Louisiana exists on this question. The argument can be made that review of letters of reprimand will increase a flood of hearings and litigation while on the other hand the same could be said of demotions, suspensions, and terminations where the right of appeal is not disputed. For lawyers and judges, letters of reprimand and censure are considered a form of discipline subject to the review process. Following the reasoning of this analogy and the common sense understanding of the term “disciplinary action,” the court finds that the constitutional coverage of “disciplinary action” is broad enough to include the letter of reprimand complained of in this case. The city does not contest that Burkhart’s letter will remain as a permanent black mark in his personnel record. It might be weighed against him in subsequent employment decisions. Given he has no other means of correcting that record, it is appropriate that it be treated as “disciplinary action” subject to review by the civil service commission. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on behalf of the police officer. [Burkhart v. New Orleans Police Department, 811 So.2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 2002)]
In September 1998, Herzog, a police officer, was suspended without pay for allegedly reading a confidential internal affairs document and disseminating it to a newspaper. He sought to have the suspension converted to “with pay,” but the department denied the request. Five months later, a departmental hearing was held and Herzog was terminated from his employment. He appealed the termination and sought payment for the time under which he was suspended. Trial court upheld the termination and refused to order any back pay. Former officer appeals.
HELD: New Jersey statute provides that when a police officer is charged with a violation of a law, he may be suspended from the performance of his duties with pay until the case against him is disposed of. However, if a grand jury returns an indictment against the officer or the officer is charged with a high misdemeanor or other offense which involves moral turpitude or dishonesty, the officer may be suspended without pay. Herzog argues that the department’s authority to suspend him under the statute is limited and applies only when there are violations of state or federal law. The township counters that an employee may be suspended even when charged with departmental violations and that such suspension may be made without pay. A review of the legislature’s history of the statute makes it clear that the statute was not designed to limit the department’s discretion on whether or not to suspend an employee pending the resolution of charges. Rather, the purpose of the statute was to protect a police officer from the loss of income and other benefits while the charges against him were pending, unless the charges were of special gravity. Closer reading of the law reveals that suspensions without pay are precluded for officers charged solely with violations of departmental rules unless their conduct is the equivalent of a serious crime involving moral turpitude or dishonesty. Thus, while the ultimate termination of Herzog was not improper, he is entitled to back pay for the period of time from which he was initially suspended until the date of his termination. Reversed for former officer. [Herzog v. Township of Fairfield, 794 A.2d 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)]
Township and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) reached impasse on issues of discipline and wages. They sent the matter to arbitration under Ohio’s last-best offer procedures. The arbitrator issued an award selecting the FOP’s proposal for binding arbitration for employee suspension, demotion, and termination as well as the FOP’s proposal for wages. The township filed a motion with the trial court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision on the grounds that discipline is not a mandatory subject of bargaining that can be imposed upon the township. Trial court affirmed the decision on discipline but remanded the wage award for a rehearing. Both sides appeal.
HELD: Ohio statute provides that all matters pertaining to hours and wages or terms and other conditions of employment are mandatory bargaining subjects. Also covered is modification to the terms of an existing contract. The statute excludes from mandatory subjects a series of topics, including the authority of a public employer to suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause. An employer is not required to bargain on these subjects except as they affect wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. Prior case law holds that parties are not obligated to bargain on permissive subjects of bargaining but they are required to bargain on those subjects if they affect wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. Trial court in this case reasoned that serious discipline acts upon or produces a material influence on working conditions. It further found that a demotion or discharge or suspension without pay relates to conditions of employment and thereby becomes a mandatory subject of bargaining. The court further found that the prior contract included a broad arbitration provision for all disputes that might arise out of the contractual relationship. Since Ohio statute requires bargaining over modifications of existing contract provisions, then arbitration for disciplinary action topic was also subject to mandatory bargaining. There is a dearth of Ohio case law on the issue of mandatory versus permissive subjects for collective bargaining involving disciplinary procedures. Consequently, it cannot be said that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it relied upon the state public labor board’s opinions in deciding that the instant case involved a mandatory subject of bargaining. The trial court also rejected the argument that the Ohio statute setting the disciplinary procedures for certified police officers is the exclusive means by which they may be removed from office. The collective bargaining agreement did not specifically eliminate the right provided by statute nor did it specify that binding arbitration was the exclusive remedy for appealing discipline. Thus, trial court did not err as a matter of law in rejecting the argument that the statutory disciplinary procedure was the exclusive remedy available to police officers. Disciplinary procedures are a mandatory subject of bargaining in this case. Affirmed for FOP, partially reversed on other grounds. [Board of Trustees, Union Township v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge 112, 766 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)]
The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and the city were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Two police officers, who were members of the FOP, were terminated from their employment one day prior to completing their probationary period. The FOP filed grievances on their behalf but the city refused to participate in the arbitration process on the grounds that the officers were probationary employees who did not enjoy the rights regarding discipline listed in the labor agreement. FOP filed a complaint with the state labor board, which decided that the probationary officers upon termination are not entitled to invoke the grievance arbitration provision of the labor contract. FOP took the matter to the trial court which upheld the ruling. This ruling was affirmed by an intermediate appellate court. FOP appeals.
HELD: The Oklahoma Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA) applies to “permanent members” of a municipal police department. The act, however, does not define the term “permanent members.” The legislature’s inclusion of the adjective “permanent” indicates the intent to set those employees apart from “non-permanent” personnel. Reference to “permanent employees” and “permanent police officers” appears in several other state statutes, however. For example, the police officers’ pension statute refers to permanent members. Under rules of statutory construction, a definition will apply in every instance in which the same term is found anywhere else. Because the pension statute recognizes both probationary and permanent members of the police, then that distinction applies with equal force to the state labor law. In short, it is clear that the legislature did not intend probationary officers to stand in the class of permanent employees of a bargaining unit for invocation of grievance arbitration rights. This is the rule followed by neighboring states as well as federal courts which hold that probationary employees are not treated as permanent employees. It matters not that the officers were voting members of the FOP as was the case here. Such membership does not alter their probationary status. The probationary period is a vital tool that allows municipal authorities to ensure only fit individuals serve as police officers. Legislatures recognize the distinction between probationary and permanent officers. That distinction withholds from a probationary officer the benefits of grievance arbitration until such time as one in that position completes the required probationary service. Affirmed for city denying necessity of arbitration. [Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 108 v. City of Ardmore, 44 P.3d 569 (Okla. 2002)
The police association served as the exclusive bargaining agent for police officers and police/fire dispatchers. In early 1999, the borough informed the officers of its intention to construct a new municipal building to house the officers. The borough made the designs of construction plans available to the officers for comment. A few months later, construction began on the building. At the close of the year, the police department and the dispatchers relocated into the new building. In the prior building, the basement had been converted to a locker room for police officers. In the new building, each police officer had his/her own locker but the lockers were not large enough to accommodate their uniforms, footwear, and equipment. Additionally, dispatchers were told that lockers were available for them at the firehouse across the street. These lockers were made of wire mesh and did not have a storage component that could be secured. Police union notified the borough that the insufficiency of the new lockers was an issue of safety under the collective bargaining agreement. Municipal officials responded saying that nothing could be done regarding the lockers and the design plans had been readily available for comment for some time. They also denied any workplace safety issues, asserting that the lockers were the property of the municipality. The police union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the borough by failing to provide the officers with lockers of equivalent, securable space had effected a unilateral change in working conditions. Following a hearing, the labor board determined that the borough had committed an unfair labor practice because the matter of adequate, securable locker space was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Borough appeals.
HELD: Pennsylvania law identifies six different terms and conditions of employment subject to mandatory bargaining, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement pensions, and other benefits. The act does not specifically identify locker space as one of those topics, even though it falls within the broader category of working conditions. The law in Pennsylvania is well settled that the labor board must apply a rational relationship test to determine whether an issue is deemed bargainable or is a managerial prerogative. Under this test, an issue would be bargainable if it bears a rational relationship to employees’ duties. For an issue to be a managerial prerogative, however, the managerial policy must substantially outweigh any impact an issue will have on the performance of the duties of a police officer. In this case, there is abundant evidence that the issue of locker size is rationally related to the duties of a police officer. The officers are required to wear clean uniforms on a daily basis and must maintain a change of clothes in event their uniform becomes soiled during a shift. An officer also must carry various equipment, such as a gun belt, flashlight, and nightstick. Lockers in the old municipal building were large enough to accommodate all aspects of the officers’ uniforms and civilian clothing. In contrast, the new lockers could not meet that need. The borough’s interest in the construction design of the physical plan does not substantially outweigh the impact on the officers’ duties. Labor board did not err in concluding that the matter of adequate, securable locker space is a mandatory subject of bargaining. While the borough may have made the design plans available to all who wish to view them, there is no evidence that it disclosed the size and dimension of the new lockers or made any serious effort to discuss the matter with the police union. The borough did not satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith. Affirmed for police union finding unfair labor practice. [Dormant Borough v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 794 A.2d 402 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)]
police officers
City fathers have granted Knoxville officers a pay boost beginning July 1. The amount of the hike depends on the pay grade of the officer. Senior officers will receive an 8.9 percent boost, pushing their base wage to $46,800, while starting pay will be upped by only 2.9 percent, to $28,455. Lieutenants will watch their pay checks climb by 9.5 percent. They will now earn between $40,000 and $59,000. The officers do not have a labor contract but many are members of Lodge 2 of the Fraternal Order of Police.
police officers
The 11 police officers and supervisors in a newly established Fraternal Order of Police lodge have signed their first labor agreement with the township. The three-year pact retroactive to April 1 grants pay hikes of two to 15 percent depending on which of the seven pay steps an officer occupies. The earlier steps received higher increases. Over the life of the contract all personnel will receive a total of at least seven percent in wage hikes. Top pay for sergeants will now be about $44,400 while top of scale patrol officers will earn $40,370.
police officers
The Totowa Borough Council has ratified a new contract with the Policemen's Benevolent Association Local 80. The three-year pact calls for 3.9 percent raises in 2002, a 4.1 percent boost in 2003, and another 4.1 percent in 2004. About two dozen officers are covered by the agreement.