The “S” word - strike - has begun passing through the ranks of the New York Police Department (NYPD). Talk of striking follows an August 15 rally demanding a pay increase and a new contract. Chanting “too much praise, too little raise,” thousands of off-duty New York City police officers and fire fighters packed Times Square and demanded salary increases that the city has resisted. A crowd estimated at 15,000 invoked the sacrifices of September 11 with placards that read, “They say, ‘Never forget.’ We say, ‘Already forgotten.’” In the days following the rally, rumors of a wildcat Labor Day strike began circulating.
The two-hour rally was organized by the New York City Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) and the Uniformed Firefighters Association (UFA). Neither union has endorsed a strike or other job action.
The PBA, whose contract expired over two years ago, are awaiting an award from a state arbitration panel. Mayor Michael Bloomberg publicly revealed that the panel is poised to award only five percent in each of two years and increase the number of workdays by ten per year. This is in line with an earlier proposal by the financially strapped city.
PBA officials reacted immediately. The union, which successfully gained legislation moving its interest arbitration away from local control to the jurisdiction of the state Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), announced plans for a court battle if the proposed award stands.
“The most outrageous aspect of this is to ask our police officers to appear at work ten more times each year,” said Patrick Lynch, PBA president. “They are already the most underpaid and overworked police department in the country.” The PBA has been seeking a 23 percent pay boost over two years.
Meanwhile, the New York Daily News quoted several unidentified NYPD officers as saying they are ready to strike, setting Labor Day, September 2, as the target date. “Everyone is disgusted. They feel the fix was in with the PERB. I talked to five officers and four out of five said, ‘Yeah, we’re willing to strike,” an unidentified officer said.
In response to the strike talk, the mayor’s office said the city was “prepared to deal with it” without further elaboration as to its strike preparation plan. As in most states, strikes by police officers are illegal in New York.
Joining in the fray was U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) who urged President Bush to allow the city to use $500 million in federal aid to supplement raises for fire fighters and police officers. The money would fund an additional 10 percent pay hike over two years, on top of whatever fire fighters and police officers gain under current wage negotiations. Police and fire union officials endorsed the proposal while a White House spokesman said only that the request will be reviewed.
City officials assert that the city is facing a $5 billion budget deficit
and simply cannot afford to substantially increase police officer pay.
The PBA, which was in negotiations prior to September 11, asserts that officers
are grossly underpaid compared to neighboring departments and that the terrorist
attacks and subsequent deaths of NYPD officers make the case for a substantial
wage increase. Base salary for a patrol officer currently ranges between
$31,305 and $49,023.
The orbits of police labor and corporate finance rarely cross but the country’s best-known financial newspaper apparently thinks its readership needs to know about the “most powerful local law enforcement official in the nation.” That is the characterization that The Wall Street Journal recently gave to Steve Young, President of the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). Young and the FOP were featured in the August 1st issue of the newspaper. Reporter Gary Fields noted that the FOP is “enjoying extraordinary access to the corridors of power” in Washington. Fields attributes the group’s political clout to their endorsement of George W. Bush in the 2002 election when virtually all other police unions supported Al Gore. The paper notes that the rank-and-file membership overrode the recommendation of the FOP executive committee in backing the future President.
The article charts the FOP’s recent success in lobbying Congress. Young, it is noted, is the only active law enforcement officer on the President’s elite Homeland Security Advisory Council while other FOP officials have been appointed to the Federal Salary Council, the Federal Advisory Council on Occupation Safety and Health, the Federal Prison Industries Board of Directors, as well as the Medal of Valor Review Board.
The article notes that the FOP has 20,000 members in Florida, the state that ultimately decided the 2000 election. President Bush won the state by 537 votes.
A critical need for officers in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has prompted a campaign to encourage recently departed officers to return to the department. The department, which has suffered scandal and criticism in recent years, is experiencing a severe manpower shortage. In the past few months, the LAPD and the Los Angeles Police Protective League have sent letters to 400 recently resigned and retired officers offering them the opportunity to return to the department.
To assist the effort, Los Angeles City Council recently approved two ordinances streamlining the process. Under the new ordinances, returning officers start at the Police Officer II rank instead of the previously required lower paying slot. Probationary period is reduced from 18 months to six months.
The program apparently is showing marks of success. To date, nearly 200 ex-officers have responded and 68 have submitted applications for rehiring.
“The benefit to the community is that we’re getting back senior officers, experienced officers,” said Police Chief Martin Pomeroy. “They want to affiliate with the best, and they want to be with number one. And now they’re coming back to number one.” But, City Council member Nate Holden, who voted for the changes, cautioned that the officers might leave again if times get tough. “I see them as fair-weather friends and they should not come back.”
LAPD currently has about 1,100 vacant positions, including that of a permanent chief of police. Twenty-one applicants for that position have been identified as meeting the minimum qualifications. Among the 14 applicants who have publicly identified themselves is former LAPD Chief Daryl F. Gates. Rehiring of the controversial Gates - a decision seen as highly unlikely by LAPD observers - would be the ultimate homecoming.
What do you do when everybody wants the same day off - and they want to charge it to their compensatory time bank? That was the decision faced by the San Diego Police Department on August 21 as the San Diego Police Officers Association (SDPOA) encouraged each of its members to request the day off as part of “comp day.”
According to the SDPOA website, “comp day” was “to coordinate our efforts in the upcoming election including a rally at the POA Building.” In fact, the job action appears to be primarily a protest against failed contract negotiations and a forced pay hike. Earlier this summer, the city council mandated a one-year contract containing a two percent wage hike when a “take it or leave it” contract offer was rejected by the POA.
In the ensuing weeks, officers have reportedly been working under a non-cooperation
environment. They have been less than accommodating with scheduling
changes, call back, and the like. Over two hundred of the four hundred
officers scheduled to work Memorial Day had asked for that day off as part
of the union’s campaign.
No information was immediately available regarding the number of officers
actually granted permission to be off on August 21.
A committee formed to examine ways to improve morale, recruitment, and retention in the New Orleans Police Department failed to resolve the residency question but came forth with some unusual recommendations. While the committee made some obvious suggestions, such as raising base wages and paying an educational incentive, it also suggested two atypical programs. The report suggested that a panel be created to study creating a charter school exclusively for the children of police department employees and that the city study the cost of operating a 24-hour day care center to accommodate officers’ nontraditional work schedules.
On the question of requiring officers to maintain residency within the city limits, the panel split and proposed no change. Currently, all officers must live with the corporate limits of the city. Many claim the availability and cost of appropriate housing makes compliance with the rule thorny and serves as a disincentive for new applicants and makes retention of officers more difficult.
A charter school is privately established and operated but receives substantial government aid. Many New Orleans children currently attend church-affiliated or independent schools.
Similarly, the existence of police department-provided daycare facilities is rare. Such facilities are available to some federal law enforcement employees.
A substantial increase in the uniform allowance was also suggested. An official with the Police Association of New Orleans claimed that 70 percent of police recruits take out a loan to pay for their initial sets of uniforms.
Pappas was a New York City police officer assigned to the computer system division and responsible for maintenance of computers. On at least two occasions, he received letters from suburban auxiliary police departments soliciting charitable contributions and enclosing reply envelopes for use in sending the contributions. Instead of sending money, Pappas stuffed the reply envelopes with offensive, racially bigoted materials. These materials included printed fliers conveying anti-black and anti-Semitic messages. Upon receipt of these materials, the local police department undertook an investigation in the hopes of identifying the sender. It sent out a charitable solicitation mailing with coded return envelopes. Once again the response envelope was returned stuffed with similar racist materials. The department traced the material to Pappas’ home address. Upon learning that he was a New York City police officer, the matter was turned over to the NYPD internal affairs bureau, which conducted a similar dummy mailing. Again, Pappas returned the reply envelope stuffed with provocative material. Subsequently, Pappas was charged with violation of departmental regulations. At his hearing, he said he sent the materials because he was protesting being “shaken down” by so-called charitable or-ganizations. The incident gained widespread local media coverage. Ultimately, Pappas was found guilty of violating department rules and was dismissed from the force. He filed suit claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights. Trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment and the former officer appeals. ]
HELD: There is no dispute that Pappas was terminated because of
his speech and would not have been terminated were it not for his speech.
When a government employee sues for violation of his First Amendment right,
he must establish that the reason for termination was his speech upon a matter
of public concern. The court’s task is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the citizen in commenting on matters of public concern and
the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the
public service. The governmental employer may defeat a claim of a First
Amendment violation by demonstrating that it reasonably believed the speech
would potentially interfere or disrupt government operations and that the
potential for disruptiveness sufficiently outweighed the First Amendment
value of the speech. The effectiveness of the city police department
depends importantly on the respect and trust of the community and on the
perception that it enforces the law fairly, even handedly, and without bias.
If the police department treats a segment of the population with contempt,
that particular minority comes to regard the police as an oppressor rather
than a protector and respect for law enforcement is eroded and the ability
of the department to do its work is impaired. For a New York City police
officer to disseminate leaflets containing bigoted messages expressing hostility
to Jews and ridiculing African-Americans tends to promote the view among
the citizenry that those are the opinions of police officers. The capacity
of such statements to damage the effectiveness of the police department in
a community is immense. The fact that Pappas attempted to hide his
identity and works in computer maintenance as opposed to street law enforcement
does not matter. Not only is Pappas subject to being reassigned within
the police department but his efforts to cause racial tension and strife
could affect fellow police officers. It makes no difference whether
he is assigned to patrol or to programming computers. The governmental
employer’s right to discharge an employee by reason of his speech on matters
of public importance does not depend on the employer having suffered actual
harm resulting from the speech. The employee’s speech must be of such
nature that the employer could reasonably believe that it is likely to interfere
with the performance of the employer’s mission. Consequently, the fact
that no demonstrable harm was shown does not sustain Pappas’ First Amendment
claim. The department’s reasonable perception of serious likely impediment
in the performance of its mission outweighed Pappas’ interest in free speech.
Summary judgment for city affirmed. [Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 142
(2nd Cir. 2002)]
Vasquez was a police officer who was dispatched to a railroad crossing because the crossing gate arms at the track were stuck in the down position and traffic was backing up. While Vasquez was directing traffic, another officer manually lifted the crossing arm gate across the street from where Vasquez was standing. The arm on Vasquez’s side also responded to the manual movement and all of the crossing arm gates moved into a vertical position. Seeing that traffic could flow again normally, Vasquez turned his back on the crossing and began to return to his police car. Unfortunately, the crossing gate arm nearest him broke and fell striking him in the head. Apparently, bolts holding the arm had broken. Vasquez filed suit against the railroad claiming personal injury. Trial court granted summary judgment to the railroad on the grounds of the Fireman’s Rule. Police officer appeals.
HELD: Fireman’s rule generally bars fire fighters and police officers from suing those whose negligence caused or contributed to a fire or dangerous condition that in turn caused the officer’s injury or death. The principal reason for the rule is assumption of the risk, namely that one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby. In California, however, the Fireman’s Rule does not prevent recovery by officers in all situations. One of these exceptions is the independent cause exception. Under the independent cause exception, the Fireman’s Rule does not shield a defendant from liability for acts of misconduct that are independent from those which necessitate the summoning of the officer. In this case, the independent cause exception would apply if Vasquez can prove two separate negligent acts. The record reflects that a factual question exists as to whether the broken crossing arm is an independent act of negligence separate from the malfunctioning of the crossing arm. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the railroad and Vasquez should have the opportunity to establish the independent cause exception to the Fireman’s Rule. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. [Vasquez v. North County Transit District, 292 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2002)]
Myers was employed as a part-time police officer. In 1998, Myers investigated a retail theft. A department detective was called upon in accordance with department rules to process evidence related to the crime. Following the investigation, a suspect was arrested and charged with the crime. The suspect was subsequently convicted despite the fact that the detective, who had been subpoenaed to testify, did not appear at the trial. Following the trial, Myers sent an internal memo to the police chief expressing his dissatisfaction with the manner in which the detective had handled the case. Specifically, he questioned the detective’s ability to find fingerprints as well as his failure to appear to testify, which Myers asserted potentially jeopardized the case. A few days later, Myers received a letter requesting he resign his part-time position because he allegedly had insufficient available hours to work. When he refused to resign, Myers was removed from the work schedule, effectively terminating his employment. Myers filed suit claiming that his termination was in retaliation for First Amendment protected activity, specifically, the memo criticizing his fellow employee. City moves for summary judgment.
HELD: Myers does not dispute his status as an at-will employee, but rather claims that he was discharged in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment constitutional right. He additionally asserts that his termination was in violation of public policy under Pennsylvania law. Certainly, public employees have a constitutionally protected right to speak on matters of public concern without fear of retaliation. However, in such cases, a plaintiff must show that his interest in speech outweighs the governmental employer’s countervailing interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service it provides. Public employee First Amendment protection is generally limited to matters of public concern. In determining whether the memorandum was a matter of public concern, its content as well as its form and context is examined. The content of the speech may involve a matter of public concern that attempts to bring to light actual wrong-doing or breach of public trust on the part of governmental officials. However, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices without intrusion by the judiciary when employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. A public employee’s complaint about inappropriate conduct of a co-worker does not share the level of importance as other circumstances where courts have found speech regarding matters of public concern. Here, the memo is not a discussion of practice or policy of the police department. It is a complaint regarding a fellow employee’s performance. It does not appear that Myers was speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public concern, but more so on his personal dissatisfaction with the conduct of a superior. The complaint does not concern a matter of dissatisfaction with the department or its policies and does not raise genuine questions as to the state of public trust or welfare. The single assertion that the detective failed to appear in court with a subpoena is insufficient to warrant First Amendment protection. Summary judgment for township on First Amendment claim. As to the allegation that he was discharged in violation of Pennsylvania public policy, Myers must show that some state-created public policy from the constitution or legislation or judicial opinion was violated. The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine is applied only in extremely limited circumstances where there is a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Such is not the case here. The complaint about the detective’s performance does not rise to the level of a clear violation of state public policy. Judgment for township. [Myers v. Wilkes-Barre Township, 204 F.Supp.2d 821 (M.D. Pa. 2002)]
Devoney, a police officer, became friends with an individual who was a career criminal and made his living by filing fraudulent insurance claims. Some years later, Devoney’s wife slipped and fell at home and broke her ankle. Devoney and the friend conspired with another individual to defraud that individual’s home insurance carrier by claiming that the wife had actually injured herself at his residence as a result of his negligence. The scheme ultimately netted $70,000 in settlement from the insurance company. The money was split among the conspirators. The fraudulent claim involved the assistance of Devoney who personally spoke with the insurance adjusters regarding the claim. When the scheme was uncovered, Devoney, along with several other people, was indicted for conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. Within a month, he resigned from the police department. He then entered into a written plea agreement with the federal prosecutor. He ultimately received a prison sentence as well as a requirement of paying restitution. At the time of his resignation from the police force, Devoney was entitled to receive a pension. However, after his guilty plea, the retirement board began to withhold his pension benefits. Devoney applied to have the benefits restored, but, following a series of hearings, the board issued a decision denying reinstatement of his benefits. The basis of the denial was an Illinois statute that provides that a person who is convicted of a felony relating to, or arising out of, or in connection with his service as a policeman shall not be eligible to receive benefits. Devoney sought judicial relief but was unsuccessful. He appeals.
HELD: The pension bar was enacted pursuant to the legislature’s
power to deter felonious conduct in public employment by affecting the pension
rights of public employees convicted of work-related felonies. The
key question is whether a nexus exists between the employee’s criminal wrongdoing
and the performance of his official duties. Lower courts in this case
suggested that the requirement was satisfied because Devoney’s participation
violated his sworn duty to report crime and arrest persons engaged in criminal
conduct. Although a duty to report crime and arrest criminals does
arise from an officer’s service, a breach of that duty is not what triggers
disqualification for a pension. Under the unambiguous language of the
statute, what triggers disqualification is the existence of a connection
between the actual felony conviction and the officer’s service as a policeman.
This distinction is important because the two sets of events - breach of
the duty to report and arrest and conviction of a felony - are not equivalent.
If the statutory connection could be established solely on the officer’s
breach of his duty to arrest and report, every felony committed by a police
officer would render him ineligible regardless of the nature of the offense
or the circumstances under which it was committed. Such an interpretation
of law would yield a standard indistinguishable from one where an officer
lost pension rights for simply committing a felony. Devoney’s indictment
did not identify him as a police officer nor was proof of his employment
as an officer necessary to establish his guilt. Nevertheless, the circumstances
do establish that the offense was related to Devoney’s work. The condition
that gave rise to his conviction was a friendship established with a known
criminal. Devoney was not naïve or unsuspecting about this individual
but rather had a long and unsavory relationship with him. Devoney used
his position on the police force to benefit the individual in a variety of
ways over an extended period of time. Under these circumstances, there
certainly was ample ground for the retirement board to find that but for
the fact that Devoney was a police officer he would not have been in a position
to be selected to participate in the scheme to defraud the insurance company.
Consequently, there was sufficient connection between Devoney’s employment
and the conviction to justify denial of his pension. Affirmed for pension
board. [Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 769 N.E.2d 932 (Ill. 2002)]
Evans was a police officer who became involved in the investigation of a drive-by shooting. In the course of interviewing a suspect, the suspect identified an individual who allegedly was dealing drugs. The information indeed led to the recovery of illegal drugs. A few days later, the original source of the information - the drive-by shooting suspect - was found murdered. As the murder investigation developed, there was an allegation that Evans had disclosed the identity of the deceased as the source of the drug information. The individual in whose home the drugs were found was ultimately prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter. Evans’ son was also convicted of murder in the case. An internal affairs investigation was launched of Evans, who denied he identified the confidential source. Evans was ordered to take a polygraph exam. Evans sat for the exam and the examiner reported back to the police chief that he had not told the entire truth on all pertinent questions. As a result of the examination, Evans was dismissed from the force. Upon judicial review of his termination, an intermediate appeals court reversed, finding that the polygraph was inadmissible as unreliable. Police department appeals.
HELD: Under the Louisiana Constitution, employees with permanent
status in the civil service may be disciplined only for cause expressed in
writing. The primary issue in this case is whether the evidence introduced
at the administrative hearing to prove that Evans disclosed confidential
information was legally admissible. Evans claims that polygraph results
are inadmissible at administrative hearings before a civil service board.
However, police officers throughout the land are routinely subjected to polygraph
tests in both pre-employment screening and investigative actions involving
official misconduct. In fact, the federal law that generally prohibits
private employers from using polygraphs in the workplace contains specific
exceptions for governmental employees. Further, Louisiana has long
recognized that a civil service employee may be ordered to take a polygraph
and may be suspended for failing to sit for the exam. Here, the chief
of police was faced with a serious accusation against one of his officers
as it involved the possible disclosure of confidential information, which
may have led to the murder of an informant. In face of Evan’s denial,
the chief had a right to order Evans to take a polygraph. Correspondingly,
he should have the right to use this evidence at an administrative hearing
to justify his decision in recommending that Evans be terminated. There
is no reason why the polygraph information should not be admitted at the
administrative hearing. The civil service commission had the discretion
to determine the proper weight to be given the polygraph results based on
the cross-examination of the polygraphist. The commission found that
the evidence and testimony established that the alleged violation did occur
and that the department acted in good faith and for cause in disciplining
Evans. If a police officer can be fired for failing to submit to a
polygraph when ordered to do so if the request is reasonable, officers can
also be fired if they fail a polygraph. The chief was entitled to submit
this evidence to the board and the board evaluated it appropriately.
The board was not clearly wrong in admitting the polygraph results into evidence
in order to determine if Evans should be dismissed for cause. Although
not 100 percent reliable, the results of a properly administered polygraph
are competent evidence and are the type upon which reasonable persons can
rely. Dismissal of officer upheld. [Evans v. DeRidder Municipal
Fire and Police Civil Service Board, 815 So.2d 61 (La. 2002)]
Best was a corrections officer at the county jail. He was fired for allegedly violating several department rules. Since the terms and conditions of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement, his union sought reinstatement through a three-step grievance procedure. Not satisfied with the results from the early steps, the union submitted the matter to arbitration, which was the third and final step of the procedure. The arbitrator concluded that Best had violated the department rules and that his conduct was just cause for severe disciplinary action. However, the arbitrator concluded that there were mitigating factors that warranted a reduction in the penalty from termination to a long-term suspension. Consequently, the arbitrator ordered that Best be reinstated without back pay or benefits. The sheriff, however, refused to reinstate Best and the union filed suit to enforce the award. Sheriff countered claiming that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. Trial court reversed the arbitration award on the grounds that indeed the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. Specifically, the judge ruled that once the arbitrator found just cause, he had no authority to reduce the level of discipline. Union appeals.
HELD: Labor arbitration is a product of contract and an arbitrator’s authority to resolve a dispute arising out of the appropriate interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is derived exclusively from the contractual agreement of the parties. It is well settled that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited. A court may not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits. Rather, a court may only decide the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the contract. The powers of an arbitrator are not unlimited. His award should be upheld so long as it does not disregard or modify the plain and unambiguous provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Here, the contract between the union and the county stated that the employer had the right to “direct generally the work of the employees, subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement, including the right to hire, to discharge, to demote, to suspend or otherwise discipline employees for just cause.” This contractual language acknowledges that discipline can take many forms including discharge, demotion, and suspension. In context, the just cause requirement set forth relates to all of the potential forms of discipline. Thus, there is not just one just cause analysis that an arbitrator is empowered to make. Rather, an arbitrator is given the authority to determine which violations amount to just cause for discharge, or just cause for demotion, or just cause for suspension, or just cause for any other form of discipline. In other words, the agreement gives the arbitrator the authority to determine if there exists just cause for discipline and, if so, the level of appropriate discipline. Consequently, the arbitrator was free under the contract to conclude that while Best’s misconduct served as just cause for discipline, it did not amount to just cause for discharge. The arbitrator was also empowered to fashion an appropriate level of discipline. The award draws its essence from the language of the contract. Reversed for union reinstating arbitration award. [Police Officers Association of Michigan v. County of Manistee, 645 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)]
Over a four-year period, the city police department hired 39 police officers. Each officer hired signed a three-year training agreement that provided that the city would pay each a wage specified in the city’s compensation plan. The pay step specified was identical to the pay schedule incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the police union. The newly hired officers, however, were not members of the bargaining unit when hired, but became members after the one-year probationary period. In 1994, the labor agreement with the police union expired. Nearly three years passed until a new contract was signed. During that term, the city did not pay any pay step increases to any bargaining unit employees. When the new labor deal was inked, it was made retroactive to the expiration of the prior contract. However, no pay increases were made retroactive for that period. Subsequently, the 39 officers in question filed suit claiming a breach of contract in seeking the pay increases they would have received under the city salary schedule during the term of the contract’s lapse. Trial court ruled that once the officers completed the one-year probationary period and they became members of the bargaining unit, their individual training agreements, including the salary specifications, were suspended by the union’s labor contract. Officers appeal.
Held: The trial court was correct. Prior case law holds that employers cannot use individual employment contracts to defeat or delay collective bargaining or to exclude a contracting employee from the bargaining unit. Conversely, it follows that the collective bargaining agreement supercedes the individual contract in most circumstances. Such is the case here. The training agreements conflicted with the new collective bargaining agreement and became unenforceable with respect to wages once the bargaining agreement became effective. To hold otherwise would interfere with the principles of collective negotiation. The Supreme Court has noted that the very purpose of providing by statute for the collective bargaining agreement is to supercede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. In return for certain pay and benefits, the police union agreed that no bargaining unit employee would receive retroactive step increases. To uphold the plaintiffs’ training agreements with respect to their pay would upset the bargain struck on behalf of all bargaining unit employees. The training agreements with respect to wages are unenforceable. [Collins v. City of Manchester, 797 A.2d 132 (N.H. 2002)]
In 1993, the Texas legislature granted Houston fire fighters the right to enter into a meet-and-confer agreement with the city covering wages and working conditions. In 1997, the legislature granted the same right to police officers. Subsequently, over fifty arson investigators employed by the fire department sought to be considered as police officers and covered under the police labor contract. The police officers’ union refused to represent the arson investigators in the course of its negotiations and the arson investigators filed suit. Trial court granted summary judgment to the city, rejecting the arson investigators’ claim. They appeal.
HELD: Arson investigators primary argument is that the nature of their employment is closer to police work than fire fighting. However, state civil service law defines fire fighters and police officers not according to their duties, but according to the department to which they are assigned. A “fire fighter” is defined as a member of the fire department, while a “police officer” is defined as a member of a police department or other peace officer. Arson investigators point out that the civil service statute includes the phrase “other peace officers” and that they are considered to be “peace officers” under Texas criminal procedure law. A wide variety of public officials are considered to be peace officers under Texas law and the legislature could not have intended for the police officers’ union to negotiate for all of these far flung officers. Because state civil service law deals with the relationship between employer and employee, it is the nature of the employer that should control the construction of the statute rather than the duties of the employee. Since all of the investigators are appointed to and employed by the fire department, they are not considered to be police officers within the meaning of state labor law. Dismissal affirmed. [Paul v. Houston Police Officers’ Union, 76 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. App. 2002)]
police officers
An overwhelming majority of members of the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association (CPPA) has approved a new multi-year labor contract with the city. A 3 percent retroactive wage increase is immediately forthcoming followed by 3.5 percent for 2002. Another 4 percent will be awarded in 2003. The pay hikes will boost a veteran officer's wage to nearly $46,500 this year.
police officers
After some debate and a few pickets, the Huntsville City Council has granted
its police officers a pay raise. Patrol officers will receive $1,500 to
$3,000 more per year depending on experience. No wage boost was awarded
to police supervisors or dispatchers. Officers will now earn a base wage
between $29,000 and $41,000 annually.