In the year 2002, 147 law enforcement officers across the nation were killed in the line of duty, well below the decade-long average of 165 deaths annually, and a major drop from 2001 when 230 officers were killed, including 72 officers in the September 11th terrorist attacks. In general, deaths have declined since the 1970s, when an average of 220 officers died each year. In the 1980s, 185 officers were killed on average, while the 1990s saw an average of 155 killed in the line of duty.
According to preliminary figures released jointly by the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) and the Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS), the states that suffered most were Texas (15 fatalities), South Carolina (nine fatalities), California (eight fatalities), North Carolina (seven fatalities), Maryland (six fatalities), New York (six fatalities) Arizona (five fatalities), Florida (five fatalities), Illinois (five fatalities), and Missouri (five fatalities). The figures also include ten federal law enforcement fatalities.
Of the 147 officers killed during 2002, 55 were shot to death; 44 died in automobile accidents; 14 were struck by automobiles while on duty outside their vehicles; eight succumbed to job-related illnesses; seven died in motorcycle accidents; seven were killed in aircraft accidents; three officers drowned; two officers were struck by a train; two officers were beaten to death; two officers were stabbed to death; one officer was killed in a bomb-related incident; one officer was killed by a falling object and one officer was killed in an accident involving a horse. Fourteen of the fallen were women, which tied the record high total set in 1998 for female officer deaths.
"Law enforcement remains the most dangerous occupation in America today,
and those who serve and make the ultimate sacrifice are true portraits
in courage," declared Craig W. Floyd, Chairman of the NLEOMF. "While fatality
numbers are thankfully lower this year, our nation's law
enforcement officers are facing new and increasing risks and responsibilities,"
he added. Floyd suggested that various factors are responsible for the
decline:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation annually issues a detailed study of
law enforcement officer deaths. The Bureau recently released its 2001 report,
which may be found at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2001leoka.pdf. Because
the FBI uses different criteria than the NLEOMF, it reported the 2001 police
death total as 142.
impasse
"A point, especially in labor negotiations, at which reaching an agreement is impossible because neither party is willing to compromise or change position."
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law
Steve Young, President of the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), died January 9 following a bout with cancer. Young, 49, was elected in 2001 to lead the largest police labor association in the country. Until his death he served as a lieutenant on the Marion, Ohio, Police Department.
“Steve Young was the finest of our nation’s finest,” said Chuck Canterbury, the F.O.P.’s National Vice President. “Though Steve did not complete his term, he leaves a record of accomplishment that future National Presidents will find difficult to match. He forged an excellent working relationship with the Bush Administration and, in so doing, has made the Fraternal Order of Police the most prominent and influential law enforcement organization in the United States.”
During his tenure as the FOP’s leader Young worked to improve ties with the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and the White House. At the time of his death he served as a member of the White House’s Homeland Security Advisory Council and the public safety Medal of Honor Review Board.
President George W. Bush issued a statement praising Young and offering condolences to this family. “Laura and I are saddened by the news of the passing of Steve Young, National President of the Fraternal Order of Police. Steve made important contributions to our country as a police officer, President of the Fraternal Order of Police, and as a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Steve was a true hero for his dedication to ensuring the safety of our communities. He was a great friend and an honorable and loyal man. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family during this difficult time.”
Prior to his election as president of the 300,000-member FOP, Young had served 11 years as president of the Ohio State FOP Lodge and four years as a national vice president. He is credited with helping create the Ohio labor council and working to improve labor-management relations in the state.
Young is survived by his wife, Denise, and two sons. Burial occurred in Marion following a 90-car funeral motorcade.
While the FOP Grand Lodge has issued no formal statement concerning Young’s successor, Vice President Chuck Canterbury of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, is first in the line of succession. A new president will be selected at the national convention scheduled for August 4 - 7 in Providence, Rhode Island.
An Anaheim, California, police officer is not entitled to a disability retirement because he “blew the whistle” on misconduct by fellow officers, a California appeals court ruled in December. The court found that “fear arising out of a fear of retaliation by individuals in one department does not translate into an incapacity” for the purposes of the statement’s disability retirement law. The decision means that Steven Nolan, a ten-year veteran officer who quit the force in 1994, will have to make do with the money he previously gained for being wrongfully forced off the job.
Nolan, then a seven-year veteran, transferred to the gang unit. He encountered trouble with colleagues when he reported what he believed were incidents of excessive use of force. Because his claims strained his relations with fellow gang unit members, he returned to patrol work the following year. While an internal affairs investigation did not support the excessive force claims, disciplinary action was subsequently brought against Nolan for violating a variety of department regulations, the most serious of which was unauthorized erasure of 53 tape recordings from victims, witnesses, and suspects. Nolan was terminated from the force but an arbitrator ultimately altered the dismissal to a five-day suspension. Nolan never returned to work, however, because he received several threatening phone calls, believed to be from fellow officers. Nolan subsequently sought help from several mental health professionals because of depression.
The officer resigned at age 32 and filed a whistleblower suit alleging wrongful termination. He ultimately gained $180,000 in compensation. Nolan subsequently sought a disability retirement award on the grounds of mental incapacity. He claimed he could never work in policing again because all officers would treat him as a pariah. In 2000, a trial judge found that Nolan, then 38, faced continuing trauma and possible danger if he were to return to work in any police department and granted the partially tax-free retirement benefit.
Not so, said the California appeals court. The assumption that most police officers in the state will behave badly toward Nolan is without an empirical basis in fact. “The ‘code of silence’ is a stereotype of police officers in which most police officers are presumed to be bad guys in the sense that they will cover up wrongdoing in the department even to the point of exposing a fellow officer to harm,” Presiding Justice David Sills wrote. “The assumption is untenable,” the judge concluded because no evidence supports the conclusion. Indeed, the law presumes that police officers “will do the right thing, not the wrong,” Justice Sills said. To obtain a disability retirement the former officer must establish that he is mentally incapacitated from performing police services anywhere in the state, without resorting to assumptions that other officers will retaliate against him. This he failed to do.
Denver sheriff’s deputies say they put on their pants just like Denver police officers - one leg at a time - but the dispute over the pants worn by the community’s law enforcement officers escalated earlier this month when a sheriff’s deputy learned he might be reprimanded for disparaging comments he made about city police.
Deputy Daniel Wilburn, treasurer of Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 27 that represents many of Denver’s deputies, criticized Denver police in a letter written on FOP stationery and sent to the Rocky Mountain News.
Wilburn, citing police handling of certain high-profile cases, said the police have given “inaccurate information in the courts” and that “perhaps worst of all, (Denver police) were unable to solve the (1991) United Bank murders” of four guards. “A quick historical review of the Denver Police Department hardly suggests any reason why we would want to be confused with them,” wrote Wilburn, whose organization represents roughly 500 of the 800-plus Denver deputies.
Deputies and police have been squabbling over whether deputies should be allowed to trade their khaki-with-a-hint-of-rose pants for more police-like blue pants. Deputies say the blue trousers look more professional, wear better, and are less expensive, about $35 a pair compared to $80 for the current uniform.
Some police officers, who wear blue uniforms, worry that Denver residents might confuse city officers and deputies if the deputies were to change the color of their pants. Roughly 600 deputies work inside jails, managing inmates, and escorting them to court appearances. Wilburn, 44, who has been a sheriff’s deputy for 12 years, could face anything from a written censure to removal from the FOP for the letter, an FOP spokesman said.
When the pants issue first arose, Mike Mosco, president of the Police Protective Association, Denver’s primary police union, said, “Police officers are the ones who wear blue pants, not deputies. If (a deputy) is working another job doing security and something happens, someone’s likely to ask him for help because he looks like a police officer. If there’s a problem . . . a deputy has to pick up the phone and call us.”
Following Wilburn’s letter, Mosco said his union would ignore the comments. “We understand that their job is as hard as ours,” he noted.
Wilburn said he wrote the letter to the newspaper, in part, because his union wants the blue-pants option to save the taxpayers money. He said he regrets any problems the letter might have caused. He now must answer to state FOP officials.
Safety Manager Tracy Howard, who likely will have the final word on the matter, has indicated that the trousers will not be changed. “Deputies aren’t suppose...to be police officers,” he said.
One Denver commentator drew the deputies’ attention to the fact that the
Broncos, the city’s professional football team, had altered their uniforms
18 times since 1960.
In recent weeks Supreme Court justices declined to consider the case of Perez v. Miami-Dade County, Florida, No. 02-269. This leaves in place a lower court ruling that a female police officer did not state a fair employment claim when she alleged that she suffered differential treatment compared to male officers in use of sick leave, performance evaluations, assignments, and supervisory monitoring. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit found that these allegations of retaliatory action, even if true, fell short of the threshold level of severity necessary to state a claim under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Two recently filed cases seeking review are Macklin v. City of New Orleans, Louisiana, No. 02-741, and State of California v. Paige, No. 07-765. In Macklin, a New Orleans police officer claims that he was not afforded due process in the course of a 120-day suspension that arose from aggravated assault allegations against him. Two lower federal courts have rejected his claims on a variety of procedural grounds.
In Paige, the state is attempting to gain appellate review of a lower court’s statistical method of determining the existence of racial discrimination in the promotion of highway patrol officers. Specifically, the state objects to the inclusion of race and promotion data from earlier timeframes that are not now actionable because of the statute of limitations. Additionally, the state opposes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s procedure of comparing the promotion rates of all non-whites against that of whites, instead of conducting comparison with each individual racial category. The Supreme Court has not acted on either appeal as of yet.
Arndt, a detective, was one of the first officers to arrive at the crime scene in the famous JonBenet Ramsey murder case. Arndt was the only officer present when the child’s body was ultimately discovered in the basement of the home. She was assigned as an investigator in the matter for approximately six months until the police chief removed her from the case.
During the investigation, the case was subject to widespread media attention. Various media representatives criticized Arndt and the other investigators. The criticisms generally alleged that she and her fellow officers made mistakes or otherwise mishandled evidence, which contributed to the police department’s inability to identify and apprehend a suspect. Arndt asserted that these criticisms were false and harmed her reputation. However, neither the police chief nor anyone else in the department took any action in response to the alleged criticisms. Additionally, the chief had imposed a gag order prohibiting police employees from speaking to the media about the investigation.
At one point, Arndt’s attorney wrote a letter to the police chief listing eight allegedly false statements made about Arndt and requesting permission to either speak out in response to the criticisms or urging the chief himself to defend Arndt publicly. After the chief declined each request, Arndt filed suit claiming that the gag order violated her First Amendment right to speak out on a matter of public concern. Trial court found that Arndt’s speech was not a matter of public concern and dismissed the case. Police detective appeals.
HELD: It is established law that a governmental entity cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. However, when the government acts as an employer, the First Amendment does not apply with full force. The government, as an employer, may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large. If the government restrains free speech rights of its employees, the court must assess the validity of the restraint by balancing the interest of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern with the interest of the government, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service. A matter is of public concern if it is of interest to the community, whether for social, political, or other reasons. By contrast, speech of purely personal interest or involving internal personnel disputes is not of public concern.
The record in this case reflects that Arndt’s efforts at speaking out were motivated by her concern about the alleged harm to her reputation alone. She did not claim a right to speak out about the reputation of the department, or about other investigators, or the case as a whole. She sought to speak only because of the effect the criticisms had upon her personal reputation. Arndt counters that even if the content of her speech was primarily to restore her personal reputation, the performance and integrity of a highly visible public official necessarily is a matter of public concern.
This overstates the case. To presume that all matters that transpire within a government office are a matter of public concern would mean that virtually every remark and every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case. This is just not the law. The fact that Arndt was a police detective working on a high profile murder investigation does not alone transfer her speech designed to refute media criticism of her personal competence into speech on a matter of public concern. Media publicity of a dispute is not determinative of whether a public employee’s speech touches on a matter of public concern. Circumstances surrounding the speech do not overcome the fact that the content of her speech overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that it was purely personal. Dismissal of suit affirmed for employer. [Arndt v. Koby, 309 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002)]
In 1997, a Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, was beaten and tortured by New York police officers assigned to the 70th precinct station. Louima was black and the assaulting officers were white. Two days after the assault, police and city leaders met with community leaders to discuss the appropriate response to the incident. Following that meeting, the police commissioner decided to assign additional black police officers to the 70th precinct.
When news of the incident first appeared, several public demonstrations were held at the precinct. Police officials grew concerned that the protesters might become violent. Over the next few days, several large protests occurred outside the precinct station. Meanwhile, the department began transferring black officers into the precinct. Subsequently, the police unions filed suit on behalf of various African-American and other black officers alleging that their transfers to the 70th precinct violated federal fair employment law, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race. The matter went to trial.
At trial, the police commissioner testified that his concern for the potential for violence and his desire to establish better community relations prompted him to assign the African-American police officers to the 70th precinct. City experts also testified that race-based transfers could play an important step in defusing the volatility of the situation that existed in the community. Plaintiffs’ experts, however, testified that black officers were not necessarily better at policing black communities than white officers. Plaintiff experts also suggested the city could have responded to the crisis in other ways such as asking for volunteers or providing additional training in police-community relations. Ultimately, the matter went to a jury. The jury found that only one of the plaintiffs, a Hispanic officer, had suffered an adverse employment action in violation of federal fair employment law. The jury further found, however, that all twenty-four of the plaintiff officers had been denied equal protection of the law in violation of the Constitution and awarded $50,000 in damages to each. City appeals.
HELD: In the case of the single fair employment claim, to constitute an adverse employment action in violation of federal law, a change in working conditions must be “materially adverse”. A materially adverse change must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A lateral transfer that does not result in a reduction of pay may be an adverse employment action so long as the transfer alters the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment in a materially negative way. Here, the lone officer testified that he had been trained and was successfully working in a domestic violence unit. Upon being transferred to the 70th precinct, he no longer was permitted to work in domestic violence. He further testified the community members shouted abusive comments at him and he feared for his safety because of the level of mistrust among other officers in the precinct. This testimony was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the transfer had sufficiently material negative impact on the conditions of the officer’s employment to constitute an adverse employment action. Thus, evidence supported the jury determination that this lone officer had been discriminated against in violation of federal fair employment law.
As to the equal protection claims of the other officers, prior case law holds that racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and must be analyzed by a reviewing court under the strict scrutiny standard. To survive strict scrutiny, a racial classification must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly recognized only one compelling governmental interest: remediation of past discrimination.
The city here, however, does not seem to justify the race-based transfers on this ground. Rather, the city argues the transfers were justified by its compelling interest in effective law enforcement. While the courts have recognized that a law enforcement body’s need to carry out its mission effectively with an unbiased work force may constitute a compelling state interest, such has not been established in this particular case. A justification for race-based transfers must be substantiated by objective evidence, not speculation or conjecture.
The jury heard testimony that there was no rioting, looting, or other violence in the 70th precinct following the incident. One expert testified that the city could have more effectively responded to the community concerns by improving community relations or by training of the current officers. Thus, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury by which it could have concluded that the city did not demonstrate that the transfers were narrowly tailored to fit a compelling state interest. There may indeed be occasions where race-conscious transfers of police officers is a constitutionally permissible means of improving law enforcement, whether as a long term strategy to create a diverse police force or as an immediate response to an emergency situation. The jury concluded that this case was not such an occasion. Since the evidence reasonably supports the jury verdict, judgment for officers affirmed. Further, the $50,000 per plaintiff award was well within the range of acceptable rewards for emotional distress in civil rights cases. Affirmed for police officers. [Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York v. City of New York, New York, 310 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 2002)]
Atteberry, a state trooper, became pregnant. Her physician sent a letter to her supervisor stating that Atteberry was to be placed on light duty and not do patrol work. The supervisor advised Atteberry that no light duty was available. Atteberry contacted the state police equal employment office and her union to report what she perceived as a case of discrimination. Two weeks later, the physician sent a second letter stating that Atteberry was not to wear a gun belt or do patrol work. Additionally, she could do truck inspections, write tickets, and do background checks. Atteberry claimed that despite the letter, she was physically capable of performing numerous functions of the state police and that she was discriminated against when she was denied the opportunity to work available duty within her physical disability. Atteberry further claimed that other employees who had requested light duty were granted such status. Ultimately, Atteberry was compelled to use 46 days of leave during her pregnancy. She filed suit against the state police alleging sex discrimination. State police move for summary judgment.
HELD: Federal fair employment law makes it unlawful to discriminate against women affected by pregnancy or childbirth. This law was specifically designed to address the stereotype that women are less desirable employees because they are liable to become pregnant. The law, however, does not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to offer maternity leave or to take other steps to assist pregnant workers. Rather, it does require the employer to treat the pregnant employee as well as it would if she were not pregnant. To prove a pregnancy discrimination case, a plaintiff must show that she was pregnant, she was performing her duty satisfactorily, she suffered an adverse employment action, and similarly situated employees not in a protected class were treated more favorably.
Atteberry cites four other state employees that she alleges were treated
more favorably. One was placed on light duty because of a broken arm
and spinal surgery, while another was on light duty due to complications
from post-polio condition. The third suffered a brain tumor that resulted
in a loss of motor control while the last was placed on light duty due to
knee surgery. Each of these individuals experienced medical conditions
that resulted in medical-based restrictions. They were incapacitated
in some way due to their various ailments. No evidence exists, however,
that Atteberry was incapacitated.
Rather, Atteberry requested light duty because, in her physician’s
opinion, the job was too dangerous to perform while pregnant, not because
Atteberry was physically incapable of performing the job. Testimony
shows that the physician’s focus was on protecting Atteberry and the unborn
child from the risk inherent in police work. Atteberry experienced
a medical condition without medical restrictions. She was pregnant,
but there is no evidence that she was physically affected by the pregnancy
in a way that prevented her from performing the duties of her profession.
As such, she is not similarly situated to individuals who have experienced
medical conditions with medical restrictions.
Atteberry further contends that her employer retaliated against her because of her pregnancy claim. The record reflects that her captain counseled her about the poor choices she had made in her personal life that were affecting her work. Additionally, her supervisor gave her a negative promotional skills evaluation, noting that she was unable to write clear and concise incident reports and exhibited an inability to listen and convey facts effectively.
Prior case law holds that counseling statements or reprimands without further discipline are not “adverse employment actions” within the meaning of federal fair employment law. Counseling statements are similar to negative performance evaluations and arguably are even less significant. Absent some tangible job consequence accompanying these reprimands, the court declines to broaden the definition of “adverse employment actions” to include counseling statements. Since Atteberry presented no evidence that the counseling or performance evaluation was accompanied by any tangible job consequence, her claim fails. Summary judgment for state police granted. [Atteberry v. Illinois Department of State Police, 224 F. Supp.2d 1208 (C.D. Ill. 2002)]
Thomas was an 18-year veteran of the police department. He served as a detective on a major case response team, a group of detectives that handled homicides, kidnappings, and rapes. He was also a member of the multi-jurisdictional regional major case squad. In early 1998, Thomas was temporarily assigned as acting sergeant of detectives in the department’s crimes against persons unit. These duties involved supervising other detectives in their work. Thomas remained active as a member of the major case squad. Essentially, he had been assigned two full-time jobs and was the only person to hold two roles in the department. On numerous occasions Thomas unsuccessfully requested to be relieved either of his duties with the major case team or his duties as acting sergeant. His requests were denied because of an apparent promotion freeze in effect.
Over a six-month period, an unprecedented number of homicides occurred in the city, which intensified the workload of the major case squad. One of the cases involved the slaying of a pregnant mother and her unborn child along with three minor children while another involved the asphyxiation of a child by her mother in the course of an unsuccessful suicide attempt. In the latter case, Thomas was the lead investigator and was scheduled to testify in a nationally televised murder trial. A defense attorney who had a penchant for attacking the personal credibility of police officer witnesses represented the defendant. Thomas, who had in the past received voluntary treatment for alcohol abuse, feared that his past might be revealed during the testimony on television. He became moody, withdrawn, and unable to sleep in the days leading up to the trial and increasingly apprehensive about embarrassing himself and his family.
The night before the trial, Thomas retreated to his bedroom, retrieved his service revolver, and lay down on the bed. He decided to shoot himself in the heart. He decided against shooting himself in the head believing it would create too much of a mess for his wife and child. Thomas fired one shot into his chest while lying on the bed. Hearing the noise, his son and wife came into the bedroom. Thomas instructed them to leave him alone but they summoned an ambulance nonetheless. The detective survived the wound but the bullet severed his spinal cord, resulting in paralysis. Thomas ultimately required daily nursing and was confined to a wheelchair. Thomas filed a claim for worker’s compensation alleging that his injury was due to performing extraordinarily and unusually stressful job duties that led to a mental injury that caused a physical injury.
After hearing testimony on Thomas’s state of mind, as well as testimony from medical experts, a hearing officer concluded that the stress Thomas suffered was not so extraordinary and unusual as to be compensable under Missouri worker’s compensation law. His claim was rejected. The full worker’s compensation commission upheld the hearing officer’s determination and disabled officer appeals.
HELD: Court review of worker’s compensation claims is limited to questions of law. A court may reverse a commission finding only if the commission exceeded its powers, awarded a benefit fraudulently, or if there are no facts or evidence to support the award. Missouri statute specifically prohibits compensation for injury or death due to an employee’s intentional, self inflicted injury. The key to this case is whether or not the injury was “intentionally inflicted.”
While all states require that worker’s suicides be caused by work-related mental or physical stresses in order to be compensable, there is considerable disagreement as to the degree of manifestation of derangement necessary and the directness of the causal relationship between the derangement and the injury. The majority of states define the term “intentional” in terms whereby a suicide is compensable if the injury and its consequence directly caused the employee to become devoid of normal judgment and dominated by disturbance of the mind. Missouri, however, follows a different test. This rule, which is harsher than the majority rule, provides that a suicide or attempt is compensable only if as a result of a physical injury, the worker was possessed with an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, did not consciously intend to kill himself, and did not realize the consequences of his act of self destruction.
Here, Thomas knew the gun was loaded and he intentionally pointed it at his chest. He knew it would fire and he pulled the trigger. He testified that he shot himself with the hope he would end his life. He admitted using his chest as a target rather than his head in order to avoid making a mess with which his family would have to contend. This evidence was sufficient for the worker’s compensation commission to find an intentional, self-inflicted injury. While the facts of this case create a tragic loss to Thomas, his family, and the police department, state law is clear regarding the award of worker’s compensation benefits for self-inflicted injury. Given that the shooting by Thomas was intentional, the nature of his work related stress becomes moot. Denial of work compensation benefits affirmed. [Thomas v. City of Springfield, 88 S.W.3d 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)]
Chamberlain, a police officer, and Whisler, a police sergeant, both served as advisors in the department’s police explorer program. Their duties included accompanying the explorers to national and regional conferences.
Following attendance at the 1998 national conference, Whisler and another officer discussed the trip with their commander. The commander ordered Whisler to prepare a written report for him concerning Chamberlain’s behavior during the conference. When the report was completed, Whisler gave it to her supervisor who then forwarded it to the commander.
Subsequently, Chamberlain, asserting that the content of the report was false and defamatory, filed suit against the city and Whisler alleging defamation. Trial court granted summary judgment to the city based on the defense of absolute immunity. Police officer appeals.
HELD: Executive officers of public entities have an absolute privilege that in some circumstances acts as a complete bar to a claim for defamation. Chamberlain argues that Whisler was not an executive officer because her position was merely that of sergeant and the legal privilege does not apply.
While historically the absolute privilege has been limited to governors,
heads of departments of cabinet level and the like, prior case law
holds that such a limitation is neither logical nor desirable. The
privilege is designed to free public officers from intimidation in the discharge
of their duties. Consequently, to empower this policy, the privilege
should apply to inferior as well as high-ranking officers. Thus, the
absolute privilege against defamation applies to inferior officials no matter
how low their rank or standing. As a sworn police sergeant, Whisler,
therefore, was an “executive officer” protected by legal privilege.
Chamberlain further alleges that the defamation did not occur in the course
of Whisler’s official duties because the statements related to alleged behavior
at the out-of-state conference. Pleadings in the case, however, reveal
that composing reports are a routine job duty of police officers and sergeants.
Because Whisler was attending the national explorer’s conference as part
of her duties as advisor to the post, her statements amounted to an undisputed
assertion that she was performing her duty when she prepared the report containing
the alleged defamatory matter. The statements were made in the performance
of her duties. Whisler, and consequently the city, were protected from
a claim of defamation by the defense of absolute privilege. [Chamberlain
v. City of Portland, 56 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)]
police officers
A minimum salary of $35,000 is the result of an 11.1 percent wage increase granted in December 2002 to Annapolis police officers. The across-the-board raise came six months after signing of a new labor accord that promised to raise yearly salaries by at least $3,500. Police were surprised by the pay jump, which will grant some officers more than $3,500. The raise is an attempt by the city to make Annapolis salaries competitive with surrounding agencies. The department has run about 20 officers short during the past two years because of the loss of personnel to better paying agencies. Local 400 of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO represents the 114 unionized officers in the state's capital city.
police officers
A new four-year labor agreement between the Borough of Chambersburg and its police officers means threatened arbitration will be avoided. The pact grants a two percent pay raise this year followed by three percent in 2004, 3.5 percent in 2005 and four percent in 2006. Unusual contract provisions include one compensatory day for every six-month period that an officer does not use sick leave and a $200 annual residency bonus for officers who live in the borough limits. All officers must reside within a 15-mile radius of the police station. Additionally, retiring officers will earn a special incentive of $2,500 if they give at least one year notice prior to their retirement date. Such notice will give the department time to hire and train a replacement. Members of the Chambersburg Police Officers Association approved the pact in early January.
police officers
Members of Lodge 158 of the Fraternal Order of Police recently inked a
new labor contract with the Village of Palatine. In addition to the two-year
pact, the village council granted a three percent pay hike to the officers
and most other city employees.