March 2003
California disability bias suit settled for $250 million
Police officers and fire fighters whose disability pensions were slashed
because they started their careers at 31 or older will receive $250 million
in a record age discrimination lawsuit settlement, California’s main public
employees retirement system announced January 30. The settlement of
the suit by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ends
an eight-year dispute initiated by a police officer in the San Francisco
suburb of Fremont, which eventually became a class-action suit on behalf
of hundreds of officers and firefighters.
The case alleged that police officers and fire fighters were unfairly given
reduced disability pensions if they started their careers after 30 - as prescribed
under a 1980 state law. The agreement effectively kills the law and
says that all employees must be paid under the same formula if they are injured
while performing their duties as police, fire fighters, prison guards, or
other public safety officers.
The agreement pays $50 million in back benefits to 1,700 public safety officers
who retired with job-related disabilities under the disputed law between
1992 and 2001. The same group is expected to accrue an additional $200
million in future benefits. Until 1980, public safety officers sidelined
by a job injury were eligible for a disability retirement equal to 50 percent
of their salary. But the state lifted the age limit of 30 that had
been in force for starting public safety jobs, at the same time implementing
a formula that reduced disability retirement benefits for officers hired
at 31 or older. Benefits were cut under the formula by about 2 percent
for each year over the age of 30.
“I’m glad it’s changed,” said former Fremont officer Ron Arnett, the lead
plaintiff in the suit. “It shouldn’t have taken 11 1/2 years.”
As part of a fitness policy, the department allowed officers to work out
at a local gym while on duty. Arnett was doing sit-ups when he hurt
his back in 1992. Arnett assumed that he would collect half of his
base pay for the rest of his life. “And then I got a letter from PERS
[Public Employee Retirement System],” he said. “It was 32 percent.
I called and said, What’s up with this? I’m paying into PERS just like
everyone else and you’re telling me I’m going to get less? And they
said, ‘Yes.’”
The settlement, approved by U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer in San Francisco,
frees the nation’s largest retirement fund from the age-based benefit scheme.
PERS viewed the age formula as inequitable and supported several unsuccessful
efforts to repeal the law. Legislators justified the pension limits
by suggesting that older hires were more liable to be injured and also more
likely to feign injuries to curtail their careers with large benefits.
The EEOC granted Arnett and others permission to sue, a prerequisite for
federal anti-discrimination cases.
Arnett estimates his monthly disability payments will increase by $600 to
$700. As a real estate agent in a part of California where starter
homes sell for $700,000, he does not need the money.
EEOC officials said they are not aware of any other states that have such
age biases in their disability payments.
Labor Lexicon
"me too clause"
A provision in a collective bargaining contract that guarantees during
the term of the contract the same gain in wages or benefits that other
bargaining units may subsequently obtain from the same employer.
Florida confirms bargaining rights for deputies
Saying collective bargaining is a “fundamental right” of all workers in
Florida, the state Supreme Court on January 30 voiced a 1977 statute that
said sheriff’s deputies were not entitled to bargain collectively because
they were appointed and were managerial extensions of the sheriff.
The new decision allows deputies to vote for representation by the union
of their choice. Deputies in 61 of Florida’s 67 counties are affected
by the decision. Exemptions from the state prohibition already exist
in the other six counties and bargaining is permitted.
The decision resulted from a lawsuit filed by the Coastal Florida PBA
against Brevard County Sheriff Phil Williams. The PBA had petitioned
to represent Brevard deputies, which the state granted, but the sheriff appealed
the decision. In its ruling, the state Supreme Court called collective
bargaining a “fundamental constitutional” right under the 1968 Florida Constitution.
In referring to the constitutional provision granting the “right of employees,
by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively,” the justices
stated, “It is apparent to this Court that the plain meaning and use of the
term “employees” was intended to be applied in the broadest sense . . .”
Further, no compelling state interest exists to deny deputies the right to
bargain.
The opinion had been foreshadowed in 2000 when the same court decided
that the label “deputy” and the fact of “appointment” were meaningless distinctions
in determining whether a public employee had the right to bargain collectively.
That decision involved court clerks.
The Florida Police Benevolent Association, the Fraternal Order of Police,
and several other labor groups are expected to vie for representation rights.
Deputies will be sent blue postcards to sign and indicate whether they wish
representation. If 30 percent or more want the union, the cards will
be delivered to the Public Employees Relations Commission in Tallahassee
for certification. After that, a vote is set up among eligible deputies,
in most cases from the patrol officer level to captains. A majority
vote is required to obtain collective bargaining.
“We’re very excited about this,” said Gary Bradford of the West Central
Florida PBA. “This decision fundamentally changes the dynamics of labor
relations in law enforcement for the foreseeable future. It’s a huge
decision.”
Hillsborough County Sheriff Cal Henderson said that he was against
a union but that he expected the ruling. “We were ready for it,” Henderson
said. He said he plans to lobby his deputies to vote against the union.
About 1,200 deputies and 900 corrections officers in Hillsborough County
are eligible to vote.
The state director of the Florida PBA said the ruling might increase his
association’s membership of 30,000 by one-third.
NAPO joins Ford suits while some "going green"
The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) has joined the litigation
parade against Ford Motor Company over allegations that the best selling
police vehicle in America is defectively designed. NAPO, which claims
to represent over 1,000 police unions, filed its suit in New York City January
29 on the heels of the death of state trooper Robert Ambrose whose cruiser
was rammed by a sport utility vehicle on the New York State Thruway in December.
The suit alleges that despite promises to do so, Ford has failed to fix a
defect that can cause the Crown Victoria model to burst into flame when struck
in the rear.
Ford has called the approximately half dozen lawsuits around the country
“meritless,” but has agreed to retrofit the vehicles with shields around
the gas tanks. About 350,000 police vehicles, approximately 80 percent
of all police cruisers, are Crown Victorias.
Ford has argued that the real problem is not the design of the vehicle but
the manner in which police utilize them. “Police officers are using
their vehicles as shields and these vehicles are not designed to be shields;
they’re designed to be cars,” a Ford spokesperson said.
One alternative to the Ford virtual monopoly on police cruisers is coming
from an unexpected source. According to The Wall Street Journal, some
law enforcement agencies are “going green” by rejecting traditional gas-guzzling
sedans in favor of environmentally friendly hybrid cars. Hybrids combine
a small gasoline engine with an electric motor to produce a gas-saving, pollution-reducing
vehicle.
The Martin County, Florida, Sheriff’s Department has purchased 11 Toyota
Priuses and four Honda Civic hybrids for its 311 car fleet. Sheriff
Robert Crowder told the newspaper that he intends to purchase another 50
in the coming year or two. With the hybrids costing $10,000 less than
a Crown Victoria and averaging 50 miles to the gallon (compared to about
11 for the Crown Vic), the cost savings in gasoline is over $100 per month
per unit. Currently, most of the hybrids are assigned to command personnel
and specialty divisions such as investigations and civil process.
The fleet manager for Marion County, Florida, who handles bulk purchases
of cars for the Florida Sheriffs Association, said law enforcement agencies
in the state bought about 100 of the hybrids last year. He expects
a ten-fold increase in orders this year. In a most ironic twist, the
fleet manager’s name: Wyatt Earp, a descendant of the legendary lawman.
Meanwhile, police officials in Knoxville, Tennessee, have ordered officers
to remove all stickers and personalized license tags--including American
flags--from police vehicles. Deputy Chief Gus Paidousis issued the
order in January because of his concern that officers were overdecorating
police cars.
“Everything from ‘DUI Kills’ to ‘Buckle Up For Safety’ has to be removed,”
Paidousis said. “It’s an attempt to clear the fleet and later we can
determine what we will allow for the cars.
Officers are complying with the order, but some have complained about removing
September 11 commemorative flag stickers. Workers at the city garage
had put most of the flags on the windshields of police cars.
While Paidousis anticipated flak from officers about the removal of American
flag stickers from cruisers, he thought the biggest uproar would be over
personalized license plates officers use. Specialized units, such as
the Special Operations Squad and K-9 officers, have personalized license
plates on the front of their cruisers denoting their training. Some
K-9 officers have their dog’s name on the cruiser.
Indiana troopers union resurrecting collective bargaining
Representatives of a union for state law enforcement officers met with Indiana
state officials in January, the first in a series of labor negotiations on
behalf of Indiana state police, excise police of the alcoholic beverage commission,
and conservation officers. The union, the Indiana State Police Alliance,
is aimed at providing a unified voice for officers in contract negotiations
and legal representation on issues such as discipline.
The decision to form the union and pursue collective bargaining came after
a vote by over a thousand Indiana state troopers, excise police and conservation
officers last November met with 91 percent approval. The union, which
is Local 1041 of the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO,
claims membership of over 90 percent of state troopers and motor carrier
inspectors.
The union’s president, Keith Gill, a 24-year veteran of the Indiana State
Police, said the next meeting with state officials will address issues such
as salary increases, equipment upgrades, and cost of living increases for
retirees.
Six years ago, a law enforcement officers’ union disbanded after members
were not consulted on the terms of their new contract. Gill said that
officers reconsidered in part because they have not received pay raises since
2000. Gill says that Indiana State Troopers receive about $18,000 below
the average salary of the surrounding four states. “We saw what states
around us had: collective bargaining,” Gill noted.
Indiana state employees have had the right to bargain collectively since
1990, when then-Governor Evan Bayh issued an executive order that also included
language prohibiting strikes.
Membership in the union is open to conservation officers, state troopers,
and excise officers below the rank of lieutenant, who are also included in
the same state-appointed bargaining group.
Currently, state employees hired after Oct. 1, 1997, must pay to a union
their “fair share” of the costs of providing representation, though they
cannot be asked to pay the amount that would go to fund political lobbying
activities.
Litigation
Supreme Court update
In recent weeks the Supreme Court justices declined to consider Evans
v. DeRidder, Louisiana, Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board,
No. 02-650, an attempt to challenge the admissibility of polygraph evidence
at a civil service hearing. The high court declined to review the acceptability
of polygraph evidence despite changing judicial standards for evaluation
and admissibility of scientific testimony.
Also rejected was Macklin v. City of New Orleans, Louisiana, No. 02-741,
wherein a police officer, who was working an extra detail while on suspended
status, allegedly beat a citizen with his baton. Although acquitted
by a jury on the criminal charge, the police department terminated the officer.
The rejection of the case likely ends the ex-officer’s efforts to sue the
city for discrimination and false arrest.
Dismissal procedures
Gaumond had served as city marshal for four years. City council voted
to hire a consultant, a police officer from a nearby city, to review the
marshal’s department procedures and personnel and submit a five-year plan
for its future law enforcement needs. Gaumond was notified about the
hiring of the consultant and was told that the consultant was to have access
to all records. The city also provided the consultant with written
complaints against Gaumond and videotapes pertaining to the complaints.
When the consultant completed his study, he recommended that Gaumond be terminated
from his employment as city marshal. City council upheld the city administrator’s
termination of Gaumond. The former marshal filed suit claiming deprivation
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process as well as an invasion of
his right to privacy. Town moves for summary judgment.
HELD: Gaumond alleges that the acts of the city concerning his termination
deprived him of a protected property interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. To succeed in such claims, a plaintiff
must prove a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and that
the deprivation of the right was by the defendant acting under color of state
law. A plaintiff asserting a due process claim in the public employment
context must demonstrate that he has a clearly established property interest
in his employment. Such interests are established by state law.
Texas is an employment at-will state. Absent a specific contract to
the contrary, employment contracts are terminable at-will by either party.
A property interest may be created by expressed or implied contract.
Gaumond cites the department personnel manual to support the claim he had
a property interest in his position. One particular section states
that every new employee shall complete a probationary period of three months.
Based on this fact, Gaumond argues that on completion of the probationary
period he has a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment.
However, prior case law holds that such phrases in an employee’s manual create
no entitlement to continued employment. Additionally, the manual itself
explicitly states that nothing in the manual should be considered to create
a property right in employment.
Gaumond further alleges that his privacy rights were invaded because the
department manual states that a personnel file will be confidential and not
divulged for purposes unconnected with city personnel management except with
the employee’s permission. Gaumond alleges his file was released to
the consultant without his permission, thereby violating his privacy rights.
However, the city manual, once again states that personnel records may be
used, without the employee’s consent, for the purposes of personnel management.
Additionally, the consultant was hired under the authority of the city council
for the purposes of reviewing personnel and their qualifications. The
city authorized the consultant to review Gaumond’s personnel record.
Therefore, there was no invasion of his privacy. Summary judgment for
city. [Gaumond v. City of Melissa, Texas, 227 F. Supp.2d 627 (E.D.
Tex. 2002)]
Dismissal grounds
McGreal was a veteran patrol officer. In 1994, he encountered an individual
who was the owner of a local nightclub. Later, McGreal ran a criminal
history of the individual and found that he had two drug arrests. McGreal
could not determine the disposition of the cases, but nonetheless reported
the matter to the chief of police because Illinois law barred ownership of
a liquor establishment by a convicted felon. McGreal requested an official
investigation of the situation. A sergeant was assigned to do the follow
up investigation, but did not conduct a very complete investigation.
When McGreal subsequently made an inquiry about the investigation, he found
certain reports missing from the file folder. Eventually, the reports
appeared and McGreal dropped the issue because he had no proof of any misconduct
by his superiors. A year later, however, he returned to the issue of
the alleged ownership of the bar and launched his own unofficial investigation
by contacting an assistant attorney general.
A few months later, McGreal announced he was running for mayor of the town
and made critical statements to the press about the incumbent mayor.
McGreal also made public statements about purportedly missing confidential
police files. When the assistant attorney general contacted the police
department regarding the liquor investigation, the police chief was startled
to learn that McGreal was conducting the investigation. McGreal subsequently
lost the mayor’s race by several hundred votes.
A few months later, he arrested the son of a local prosecutor for driving
under the influence of alcohol. About the same time, McGreal observed
illegal gambling devices in the local Elks club. He requested an external
investigation of the Elks Club because he had heard a rumor that the mayor
was receiving kickbacks from the machines. The DWI case was resolved
with a plea of guilty and twelve months intensive supervision. McGreal
was disturbed at the disposition of the case and sent a formal complaint
to the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board complaining about the presiding judge.
In his complaint McGreal compared the case to corruption that led to a major
federal investigation into lawyers and judges in Chicago some years earlier.
A state investigation determined that the Elks Club did indeed have illegal
gambling devices, but the rumors of the kickbacks to the mayor were unfounded.
About the same time, McGreal claimed that the chief began a pattern of retaliation
against him attempting to terminate him. McGreal subsequently was ordered
to submit to a psychological examination and undergo therapy or be terminated.
The department later put McGreal on indefinite medical leave pursuant to
the psychologist’s report. The officer then filed suit against the
city and the chief of police claiming a violation of his First Amendment
right of free speech. The city moves for summary judgment.
HELD: To prevail on a free speech claim, a public employee must show
that he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern and that, on balance,
his interest in speaking out outweighed the interest of his employer in maintaining
the efficiency of service that it delivered.
Here, McGreal asserts that his speech touched on a matter of public concern.
Indeed, prior case law holds that speech that accurately exposes public impropriety
or misconduct receives the highest protection under the First Amendment.
Certainly McGreal spoke about public corruption, in the form of the mayor
possibly accepting kickbacks, and the perceived leniency on the prosecutor’s
son in the DWI prosecution as well as possible mishandling of the investigation
into the bar ownership. While McGreal may have had some personal interest
in raising these issues, particularly given his race for mayor, the court
assumes that he spoke on matters of public concern.
The speaking out, however, must be balanced against the rights of the village
to operate its police department in an efficient manner. The need for
close teamwork and esprit de corps in the field of law enforcement means
that speech that might not interfere with a less demanding work environment
takes on far greater implications in a police department. A police
department has a far greater interest in regulating the speech of its employees
than a typical government employer has. This interest promotes internal
efficiency, loyalty, and morale, as well as instilling public confidence
in law enforcement. Police departments are given more latitude in their
decisions regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary
government employer. A police officer’s comments on matters of public
concern that have the potential to disrupt the operation of the police department
will not be protected by the First Amendment.
Here, the police chief faced a situation where a patrol officer was making
serious accusations of misconduct against the mayor, other police officers,
prosecutors, and a judge, all of which proved to be false alarms. McGreal’s
conduct was threatening the relationship between the department and justice
agencies. His comparison of alleged leniency in sentencing to a major
investigation regarding police corruption was not warranted. It is
well-established law that police departments have authority to discipline
officers whose speech threatens to disrupt the important mission of law enforcement.
Faced with the repeated conduct of McGreal acting in a manner that was potentially
disruptive of the police department, the chief of police had no reason to
believe that disciplining McGreal violated his constitutional rights.
Summary judgment for defendants. [McGreal v. Ostrov, 227 F. Supp.2d
939 (N.D. Ill. 2002)]
Grooming standards
Riggs was a police officer who had a large number of tattoos on his arms
and legs. He was assigned to a bicycle unit on the Fort Worth Police
Department. He was authorized to wear bicycle shorts and a short-sleeved
shirt.
One day, after discussion with his supervisor, Riggs ordered the towing of
a green Cadillac, which later turned out to belong to the mayor. A
month after the incident, Riggs received notice that he was no longer authorized
to wear the shorts and short sleeve shirts, but was only authorized to wear
the police uniform consisting of long sleeves and long pants. The chief
allegedly told him that the mayor brought his tattoos to the chief’s attention
after the mayor’s vehicle had been towed.
A few months later, Riggs was transferred from the bike unit to a DWI unit.
Over the next several months, he suffered heat exhaustion while on duty.
He continued to be required to wear long sleeved shirts and long pants through
various assignments he received. He sought transfer to a motorcycle
unit, but that transfer was denied. When Riggs again suffered heat
exhaustion and was ordered by his physician not to wear long sleeves in weather
over 90 degrees, he was suspended from the department without pay.
Riggs filed suit claiming that his right to equal protection of the law as
well as his First Amendment right of free speech were being violated because
of the requirement that he keep his tattoos covered. He further alleged
that his transfers were retaliatory in nature because he was singled out
as a white male of Celtic descent. The city moves for summary judgment.
HELD: Riggs alleges a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, claiming that he was being discriminated on the basis of his
race, sex, and national origin. To succeed in his claim, he must prove
that he was singled out of a particular group and treated differently than
other members of the group.
As part of the evidence, Riggs provided a list of 15 individuals, their sex,
race, and the location of tattoos. This list of tattooed officers shows
that other white male officers that had tattoos were not required to wear
long sleeves and long pants. However, this evidence directly contradicts
Riggs’ claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race or
gender. Since other whites and males were permitted to have tattoos,
Riggs was not the victim of race or gender discrimination. Likewise
he provided no evidence to indicate that his claimed Celtic origin was the
basis of any discrimination.
As to his claim that his freedom of expression was being violated by having
to cover the tattoos, prior case law holds that tattoos are not protected
speech under the First Amendment. Further, the police chief testified
that he enforced the long sleeves/long pants policy to ensure a professional
uniform appearance of the city’s police officers. The chief further
stated that he felt the display of the tattoos distracted from the uniform
appearance necessary to good police work.
Over a quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement
agencies’ choice of organization, dress, and equipment for its personnel
is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of validity as are
legislative acts. The city, through its police chief, has the right
to promote a disciplined, identifiable, and impartial police force by maintaining
its uniform as a symbol of neutral government authority, free from expressions
of personal bent or bias. The city has given a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for requiring the only officer on the department who has tattoos covering
his legs and arms to wear a uniform that is not required of other police
officers. Summary judgment for city. [Riggs v. City of Fort Worth,
Texas, 229 F. Supp.2d 572 (E.D. Tex. 2002)
Privacy rights
The police officer’s association and the deputy sheriff’s association filed
suit against their respective civil service commissions alleging that the
commissions’ practice of routinely disclosing personnel records of officers
at public disciplinary appeal hearings violated the California Penal Code.
Civil service commissions argued that the statute in question did not prevent
disclosure of such personnel records in an administrative proceeding because
prior case law so held. Trial court ruled for civil service commission
and police associations appeal.
HELD: California Penal Code provides that peace officer personnel records
are confidential and shall not be disclosed by the agency that employs the
police officer in any criminal or civil proceeding except pursuant to state
rules of evidence. The statute exempts from the confidentiality requirement
disclosure to a grand jury, the district attorney’s office, and the attorney
general’s office.
Additionally, the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (PSOPBR)
states that no punitive action may be taken against a police officer unless
the officer is provided an opportunity for an administrative appeal.
The statute, however, does not articulate the details of the appeals process,
leaving that to be formulated by the local government. Prior case law
holds that a neutral fact finder must conduct such hearings and the hearings
must be open to the public if the officer requests a public hearing.
Since the original appeals court ruling that the penal code section did not
preclude a public entity from disclosing peace officer personnel records
at disciplinary hearings, two state appellate courts have reached the opposite
conclusion.
A review of all the court decisions leads to the conclusion that it would
be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to put strict limits
on the discovery of police personnel records in the context of civil and
criminal cases, but broadly permit any member of the public to easily obtain
those records that are made public at a disciplinary hearing. Second,
it appears that the legislature, in enacting the penal code section, was
intending to recognize the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records
regardless of the context in which the records were sought.
Whatever the public policy desirability of disclosing personnel records in
a disciplinary hearing, a reading of state statute requires that such records
be considered confidential. Thus, under California Penal Code, personnel
records of police officers are confidential in the context of disciplinary
appeal hearings. Reversed for police association. [San Diego
Police Officers’ Association v. City of San Diego Civil Service Commission,
128 Cal. Rptr.2d 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)]
Dismissal grounds
Johnson was a veteran police officer who had worked for several different
agencies. In 1994, he was assigned as a detective to investigate a
robbery that occurred in his town. It was one of a series of robberies
of restaurants in western Illinois and eastern Iowa. Johnson and a
detective from a nearby department determined that Constantino was a suspect
in the restaurant robberies. The two detectives interrogated Constantino
and, after several hours, Constantino provided information about the robberies.
Unbeknownst to Johnson, however, the first 90 minutes of the interrogation
was recorded on audio tape. Ultimately, Constantino and three others
were charged in federal court. At trial, the judge ruled that Constantino’s
statements were voluntary and that he had waived his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel. The judge did comment, however, that some
of the testimony given by Johnson conflicted with the audio tape recording.
Subsequently, Constantino’s federal case was dismissed because of procedural
violations on the part of the prosecutor.
A day after his release from federal custody, however, Constantino was arrested
and charged in state court with the local restaurant robbery. In that
case, the judge determined that Constantino had made an unambiguous request
for counsel during the interrogation and that the detectives should have
terminated the interview at that time. Without the availability of
Constantino’s confession, a jury acquitted him of the robbery charge.
Constantino then filed suit against Johnson and the city alleging he had
been subjected to false arrest and a variety of deprivations of his rights.
The city settled the case. The settlement upset Johnson and prompted
him to file suit against the city.
Shortly after the settlement of the lawsuit with Constantino, the police
chief ordered an internal affairs investigation of Johnson. Ultimately,
some dozen allegations were investigated, primarily regarding truthfulness
and honesty concerning the interrogation and investigation of Constantino.
The chief of police, as a consequence, terminated Johnson. Civil service
commission upheld the termination. But on appeal, trial court sustained
only three of the allegations and reduced the discipline to a 30-day suspension.
Civil service commission appeals.
HELD: Under Iowa law, a chief of police may remove, demote, or suspend
a police officer for neglect of duty, disobedience of orders, misconduct,
or failure to properly perform duties. “Misconduct” has no fixed meaning
but is a broad term that includes relatively minor or innocuous behavior
or more flagrant or injurious breaches of decorum. A chief’s dismissal
of an officer, however, must be for conduct detrimental to the public interest.
A police officer does not have a constitutional right to his employment and
is subject to reasonable supervision and restrictions. Rules and regulations
are necessary to maintain order and discipline among officers and to ensure
and improve public service. The purpose of these rules is not merely
punitive; they also exist to protect the public. The public has every
right to expect officers to conduct themselves with good character, sobriety,
judgment, and discretion. Additionally, grounds that justify discipline
of an officer are not confined to violations of a criminal statute or a departmental
rule. Prior violations of rules may be considered in determining whether
the cumulative effect of an officer’s misconduct is sufficient to warrant
discharge.
Here, the egregiousness of Johnson’s untruthfulness regarding promises of
leniency made during the interrogation of Constantino, together with Johnson’s
prior violations, justify termination. Even the federal judge in the
original case raised questions about the conflict between Johnson’s testimony
and the content of the audiotape. The civil service commission transcript
reveals that Johnson flatly denied making statements of promise to Constantino
when the transcript clearly shows that such statements had been made.
These questions of truthfulness and Johnson’s prior disciplinary record justify
his termination. Reversed for civil service commission reinstating
termination of police officer. [Civil Service Commission of Coralsville
v. Johnson, 653 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 2002)]
Dismissal procedures
On September 15, Banks was hired as a police recruit. He successfully
completed the police academy on March 7, however, he was not put on the job
as a police officer until June 29. In late June of the following year,
shortly before a year had passed, Banks was terminated from his position
as police officer. He appealed the termination to the city civil service
commission, which ruled it had no right to review the termination because
Banks had not completed a one-year probationary period. Banks appealed
the decision arguing that he completed one year because his time at the academy
should be counted.
HELD: Under Louisiana law, there is no provision for an appeal of personnel
action by a probationary employee. Civil service rules speak of regular
employees being individuals who have completed the “working test period.”
The working test period for police officers is one year. State law
further says that a working test will commence immediately upon appointment.
Further, the job notice for police recruit, which was given to Banks when
he was hired, stated that upon completion of the academy, he would be promoted
to police officer and serve a one year probationary period in that class.
All of this leads to the conclusion that the one-year working test period
for a police officer is the period when the city can observe a police officer
on-the-job performance or work in the field. Such a test period does
not take place until the officer is working on the job rather than training.
Thus, Banks did not complete the one-year test period at the time he was
terminated.
Banks argues in the alternative, however, that he had completed one year
measured from the time he graduated from the academy until the point at which
he was terminated and thus has a right to appeal. However, Banks is
entitled to be considered as a police officer from the time he was appointed
because he was working as a police officer after that time. The period
of working test commences upon appointment according to Louisiana law.
Since Banks was not appointed until June 29, his termination on June 28th
was within the one-year working test/probationary period and he is not afforded
a right of appeal. Dismissal of officer affirmed. [Banks v. New
Orleans Police Department, 829 So.2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 2002)]
Sick leave
In the early 1970’s, the chief administrative officer of the City of New
Orleans issued several policy memoranda that authorized conversion of accrued
sick leave by a retiring city employee to either credit toward retirement
or lump sum payment at one day’s pay for every five days of sick leave.
Despite this official policy, in practice, police officers were allowed to
“run out” their sick leave at retirement. They were awarded day-for-day
time and did not officially retire until the sick leave had been exhausted.
This policy apparently was well known by supervisors in the department and
the officers who were running out their accumulated sick leave were recorded
in the roll book. This practice occurred despite the fact that a civil
service regulation required a physician’s certificate for absences in excess
of six consecutive days.
In 1980, the civil service commission adopted a rule that provided that
employees could convert unused sick leave to cash according to a specified
formula under the five-to-one policy. This rule effectively ended the
“running out” of sick leave at retirement. Subsequently, a group of
retired officers, who had been on the police force during the ten-year period
when sick leave could be run out, filed suit claiming that the sick leave
they earned during that decade should be converted at a rate of one to one
for purposes of their lump sum payment, not five to one as the existing policy
stated. The retired officers argued that the practice of allowing sick
leave to be run out during the 1970’s formed a valid and enforceable contract
as it was well- known and routinely followed. Trial court ruled that
a vested property right existed and granted a judgment for the officers.
Intermediate appeals court essentially affirmed the decision. City
appeals.
HELD: The New Orleans Civil Service Commission was originally created
by the state constitution in 1921. Among the commission’s powers is
the exclusive authority to adopt rules regulating city employees in classified
service, including police officers and fire fighters. The city cannot
infringe upon the commission’s explicit exercise of this power. During
the decade in dispute, sick leave conversion under city policy was limited
to retirement credit or a five-to-one cash payout while the actual use of
sick leave by a civil service employee was governed by the civil service
rule requiring the employee actually to be ill in order to use sick leave.
Under Louisiana law, a contract can be either oral or written. Indeed,
a binding contract can be formed when employees perform pursuant to an employer’s
unwritten policy, if such policy is well known and routinely followed.
For example, when an employer promises a benefit to an employee and the employee
accepts by actions meeting the conditions, the result is not a mere gratuity,
but a vested right in the employee to the promised benefit. However,
such an obligation cannot exist without a lawful basis. A valid contract
cannot be formed as a result of a legally unauthorized employer policy.
Consequently, an invalid contract cannot create a vested property right.
Because the practice of running out sick leave was in direct contravention
of applicable civil service rules, a valid contract was not formed between
the police officers and the city. This legally unauthorized practice
cannot serve to create a vested right to compensation on a one to one basis.
Although the court record clearly establishes the existence of a departmental
policy that might have constituted a benefit in the form of deferred compensation
had the policy been authorized by law, the fact that the policy violated
express provisions of civil service rules prevents the establishment of a
right in favor of the retired officers. Reversed for city. [Lafleur
v. City of New Orleans, 831 So.2d 941 (La. 2002)]
Dismissal procedures
The internal affairs unit of the Baltimore City Police Department conducted
a series of random undercover sting operations. Officers placed what
appeared to be a package of crack cocaine on a bench, made calls to the police
department about the package, and waited to observe the officers who responded.
As a result of this incident, Sewell, a veteran officer, was alleged to have
handled the drugs inappropriately. Specifically, he was alleged to
have taken the drugs and later planted them on another individual.
Sewell was subsequently indicted for perjury and misconduct in office.
The criminal charges received extensive publicity, including 33 different
newspaper articles. Ultimately, the state dismissed the charges against
Sewell.
The dismissal was a disappointment to the police commissioner and an intensive
political battle over the matter subsequently ensued between the mayor and
the local prosecutor. At one point, the police commissioner characterized
Sewell’s misconduct as a horrible breach of public trust. The mayor
publicly stated that Sewell was “not going to serve in my police department.”
When the department instituted administrative charges against Sewell to terminate
his employment, Sewell requested that officers from an outside law enforcement
agency sit on his review board. Police commissioner denied that request.
Sewell filed suit attempting to gain a court order appointing external police
personnel to the hearing board. A trial court ultimately ruled it lacked
the legal authority to do so. The hearing board proceeded on the case
on the merits and ultimately found Sewell guilty of all administrative charges.
He was terminated from his position as a police officer. Former officer
appeals judicial ruling.
HELD: The Maryland Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights, enacted
in 1957, guarantees certain procedural safeguards to police officers in disciplinary
actions. Among the safeguards is the right of an officer to have a
hearing board in cases of disciplinary action. The act further provides
that an officer may file suit in court to enforce his rights. The officer
bill of rights describes a hearing board as consisting of not less than three
members, all to be appointed by the chief and selected from law enforcement
officers in that agency “or law enforcement officers of another agency with
the approval of the chief of the other agency.” In reading this statute,
it is clear that a law enforcement officer facing department charges has
a right to an impartial hearing board and a trial court has the authority
to determine whether the hearing board must be composed of members of another
law enforcement agency. Trial court erred in concluding that it lacked
such authority.
Sewell also argues that his due process rights were violated when he was
deprived of the impartial hearing board consisting of members from the other
department. Prior case law has repeatedly stated that procedural due
process in administrative hearings requires that the agency performing the
function observe basic principles of fairness. Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as the Maryland Declaration of
Rights requires due process of law. Deliberate selection of a hearing
board that is biased against an officer would constitute a violation of the
procedural safeguards required by due process.
No reasonable person would challenge the proposition that, whatever the outcome,
the fact that a hearing board is composed of members of another agency would
bolster public confidence in that board’s decision. The pressure would
be great on Baltimore officers who might serve on the board given the intense
publicity about the statements made by the police commissioner and the mayor.
The police department does not have a particularly strong interest in trying
Sewell before only members of the department. While it is obvious the
department has the interest in rooting out corrupt officers, all police forces
share this interest. The cost of utilizing members from another agency
would be minimal. This procedure would simply involve a request to
the other agency. Since a necessary component of a fair trial is an
impartial judge, fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias but
also even the appearance of bias. Sewell is entitled to a new hearing
before a board composed by officers who are not members of Baltimore City
Police Department. Reversed for officer. [Sewell v. Norris, 811
A.2d 349 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)]
Bargaining subjects
Several off duty officers became involved in an altercation in a casino.
The altercation resulted in the arrest of two officers for disorderly conduct
and battery. The police department instituted disciplinary proceedings
against the officers. Prior to the incident, the city had used three
factors, known as the Robertson criteria, when disciplining officers for
off- duty misconduct. In reviewing the incident, however, city officials
added a fourth factor to the Robertson criteria. The police union filed
an unfair labor practice complaint alleging that the city, by adopting the
new criteria for disciplining off duty personnel, violated Nevada law because
it did not negotiate the new criteria prior to their implementation.
The state labor board deferred hearing the complaint because the union was
simultaneously arbitrating whether just cause existed to discipline the officers.
The arbitrators ultimately found that just cause did indeed exist to discipline
the officers.
During the hearing before the labor board, the board admitted into evidence,
over the city’s claim of attorney-client privilege, a memorandum. The
city’s labor relations manager authored the memorandum and sent it by email
to the deputy city attorney. A union official had found the memorandum
sometime after the arbitration. Ultimately, the labor board concluded
that documents transmitted by email were not covered by the attorney-client
privilege. Without deferring to the arbitrators’ findings, the labor
board found that the city’s use of the three-part Robertson criteria was
an established practice that could only be changed in negotiation.
Thus, the city had engaged in a prohibited practice by unilaterally changing
the disciplinary criteria. Trial court, on the city’s appeal, found
the decision supported by substantial evidence. City appeals.
HELD: When reviewing an administrative decision, an appeals court is
limited to determining whether the decision is legally sound and is based
on substantial evidence. State labor board has exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practice issues. One function is to determine whether
matters fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining. The Nevada statute
provides a list of subjects of mandatory bargaining, including discharge
and disciplinary procedures.
The labor board found that the contract between the parties did not include
the criteria nor did it mention disciplinary procedures for off-duty conduct.
However, the board found that the so-called Robertson criteria were a past
practice that had been used over a substantial period of time and had thus
become part of the contract. The board had substantial evidence on
which to base this determination. Consequently, when the city added
the additional criteria to the Robertson criteria without negotiation, it
failed to comply with state law.
However, the labor board did err in ruling the email in question was not
protected by attorney- client privilege. Courts have generally looked
to the content and recipients of the email to determine whether the email
is protected. The American Bar Association has found that email posed
no greater risk of interception or disclosure than any other means of communication.
The legal protection afforded the email transactions should be the same as
other forms of communication. A document transferred by email is protected
by the attorney-client privilege as long as the requirements of the privilege
are met. The fact that the city has in place a policy stating that
employees have no expectation of privacy in using email is not controlling.
This policy was meant to deprive an expectation of privacy only as to personal
use and to warn employees that the city has a right to review personal documents
on city hardware. Such policies are common in workplaces. In
fact, the city policy specifically encourages the use of email for city business
to increase efficiency of communications. It seems unlikely the city
would encourage such use for business if the city did not view the transmissions
as confidential. The memorandum sent to the deputy city attorney was
confidential and privileged and the labor board erred by admitting the memorandum
into evidence. However, this error was harmless because substantial
evidence supports the labor board decision even without the memorandum.
Affirmed for police union finding alteration in disciplinary criteria was
mandatory bargaining subject. [City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective
Association, 59 P.3d 1212 (Nev. 2002)]
Bargaining subjects
The state troopers’ association and the state had agreed to a promotional
procedure for promoting troopers to the rank of sergeant. The procedure
consisted of a written test comprising 35 percent of the total score, performance
evaluation comprising ten percent of the total score, and an oral examination
component comprising 55 percent of the total score. In 2001, the state
began administration of the oral component of the promotion procedures.
In doing so, it unilaterally changed the process by increasing the weight
assigned to the oral exam to 60 percent while decreasing the written component
to 30 percent. The troopers’ association was not asked to bargain the
matter. Subsequently, the association filed an unfair labor practice
charge claiming that the state had the obligation to bargain the change in
promotion procedures. Labor board dismissed the claim stating that
while promotional procedures are a mandatory subject of bargaining under
Pennsylvania law, promotional criteria are a managerial right regarding the
selection and direction of personnel and are not subject to bargaining.
Union appeals contending that unilateral changes constitute an unfair labor
practice.
HELD: Prior Pennsylvania case law holds that a unilateral change
in the minimum service requirements for promotion is not a subject of bargaining
but rather a managerial prerogative. Here, by altering the weight of
scores, the state made a substantive decision regarding the selection of
officers to be promoted to sergeant. This issue is bargainable if it
bears a rational relationship to the employee’s duties. On the other
hand, an issue is deemed to be a managerial prerogative and not a mandatory
subject of bargaining if the managerial policy substantially outweighs any
impact the issue will have on the performance of the duties of the officer.
Clearly, the weight assigned to the oral and written components of the test
have no impact upon police duties. Test scoring is strictly a managerial
function. Similarly, test scoring does not appear among the statutory
list of items subject to bargaining. The facts of this case do not
give rise to a change in promotional procedures but merely a change in promotional
criteria. No unfair labor practice was committed when the state failed
to bargain the change. [Pennsylvania State Troopers Association v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 809 A.2d 422 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)]
Dismissal procedures
Olson was appointed as a probationary police officer for the borough.
Under Pennsylvania law, police officers could be required to serve a one-year
probationary period. They could be dismissed only for cause listed
in the statute. The law further provided, however, that at the close
of the probationary period, if the officer’s fitness was not satisfactory
to the town council, the officer would be notified in writing and he would
not receive a permanent appointment.
In Olson’s case, the police chief advised the town council that he did not
intend to give Olson a permanent appointment because of various allegations
of rudeness and misconduct in dealing with citizens. As a result of
this notice, the borough council decided that Olson was not qualified for
a permanent appointment. The council then held a hearing to determine
whether Olson should be retained as an officer. At the hearing, Olson
presented evidence in his behalf. Nonetheless, the council determined
that Olson’s conduct was not satisfactory, and he was not qualified to be
permanently appointed as an officer. The council directed that Olson
be so notified in writing. Olson appealed to a trial court, which determined
that due to a 1989 appellate court ruling, Olson was entitled to a post-termination
hearing. Borough appeals.
HELD: In the 1989 litigation, the court found that the due process
rights of a probationary police officer were not violated when he was denied
a pre-termination hearing. Court noted that probationary employees
do not enjoy the same job security as tenured employees.
As a consequence, a pre-termination hearing is not necessary where the officer
has the opportunity for a post termination hearing. In the case at
hand, the trial court assumed that even if a pre-termination hearing were
held, a post-termination hearing was still required from the probationary
officer. Borough argues, however, that prior law does not require a
post-termination hearing when a pre-termination hearing has already been
held and that the 1989 case in question has in fact been implicitly overruled
by another Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling. Olson was a probationary
police officer. Implicit in the term “probationary” is that employees
are being tested or evaluated on the job. This situation creates a
strictly at-will relationship between the employer and the employee.
Pennsylvania law provides that probationary employees are not entitled to
register a grievance should they not be retained beyond the probationary
period.
Constitutionally, whether a person is entitled to an appeal is not determined
by the language in a statute stating that an appeal cannot be taken, but
on whether the state confers a property right on an individual. A review
of case law reveals that, indeed, the 1989 decision upon which the trial
court relied has been implicitly overturned. Olson had no property
right in continued employment and, thus, was not entitled to either a pre-termination
or a post- termination hearing. The borough’s decision to dismiss him
was not an act subject to appellate review. Therefore, trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and erred in ordering a post-termination
hearing. Reversed for borough upholding dismissal of police officer.
[Olson v. Borough of Avalon, 811 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)]
Arbitrator's authority
Green, a police officer for the housing authority, was involved in an arrest
of an individual. Two hearings were scheduled regarding the prosecution
of the individual. While Green was subpoenaed to attend the first hearing,
he received no subpoena for the second hearing. Nonetheless, he appeared
at the second hearing even though the prosecutor had not requested his appearance.
He was paid court time for this appearance. Subsequently, the department
instituted an investigation to determine whether Green had engaged in theft
of court time. When the investigator did not find a subpoena for Green
for the second hearing, he recommended that Green be dismissed from the force.
Ultimately, Green was discharged for theft of time and falsification of records.
Green’s union filed a grievance challenging the termination and submitting
the matter to arbitration. The stipulated issue for arbitration was
“whether or not the Philadelphia Housing Authority had just cause to dismiss
the grievant from employment. If not, what should the remedy be?”
At the hearing, Green testified that someone at police headquarters had called
him to tell him to appear in court. He additionally stated he did not
recall whether he testified that day and did not know who signed him out
for the day. He also testified that someone at the district attorney’s
office asked him to appear at the hearing and told him that a subpoena would
be issued for him. Arbitrator found that Green had indeed been subpoenaed
to the first case hearing and the circumstances were such that he might reasonably
assume he was supposed to appear at the second hearing. Thus, the arbitrator
concluded that Green had not engaged in dishonesty with respect to the court
attendance or the paperwork generated. Finding no proof of intent to
defraud his employer, the arbitrator reduced Green’s dismissal to a 90-day
loss of pay. Employer appealed the ruling to a trial court but the
trial court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision. Employer appeals.
HELD: Employer contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by modifying the discipline from a discharge to 90 days suspension.
The employer argues that under the stipulated statement of the issue, the
arbitrator was limited to determining whether just cause existed to discipline
Green. Once he determined that the employer could discipline Green,
he was without authority to revise the discipline chosen.
The judicial standard of review in cases involving arbitration awards is
the “essence test.” There is a strong presumption that the arbitrator
will judge disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement and the
court must give great deference to the arbitration award. In reviewing
the award, the court will determine if the issue is properly defined within
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and if the arbitrator’s
award could rationally be derived from the agreement. The court will
only vacate an arbitrator’s award when the award indisputably and genuinely
is without foundation or fails to logically flow from the contract.
Here, the labor agreement provided that disciplinary action would only be
imposed upon an employee for just cause. The agreement, however, did
not define “just cause.” It further defined the authority of an arbitrator
to make findings and render a decision to resolve the grievance. The
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to add to, modify, vary, or change,
or remove any terms of the agreement.
The stipulated issue in this case is whether the employer had just cause
to dismiss Green from employment. The parties specifically defined
the issue as just cause for dismissal, not just cause for discipline.
The parties also agreed in the stipulation that if there was not just cause
for dismissal, the arbitrator was to fashion the remedy. Here, the
arbitrator did not find just cause for dismissal and thus created a new remedy.
Since the arbitrator was permitted to set aside the discharge, he was also
authorized to impose suspension once he found the employer lacked grounds
to dismiss Green. Enforcement of arbitration award affirmed.
[Philadelphia Housing Authority v. The Fraternal Order of Housing Police,
811 A.2d 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)]
Fireman's Rule
Trousdell was a South Carolina state trooper who attempted to pull over
a speeding vehicle. When the offending driver did not pull over, a
chase ensued. As Trousdell approached the North Charleston city limits,
he advised the police department dispatcher of the pursuit but did not request
assistance. Nonetheless, officers from the police department and the
sheriff’s department joined in the chase. At some point, the offending
vehicle came to a stop. Before Trousdell’s cruiser reached a complete
stop, a sheriff’s department cruiser hit him from behind. Trousdell
suffered injuries as a result of the collision. The trooper received
worker’s compensation benefits as well as a permanent disability award.
He then sued the sheriff’s department for negligence in the car wreck.
Trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff’s department ruling
the suit was barred by the Fireman’s Rule. Former trooper appeals.
HELD: The Fireman’s Rule generally bars public safety personnel
from recovering money damages for injuries sustained in the performance of
their duties. However, in 2002, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that the Fireman’s Rule was not part of the state’s common law. The
court held that the tort law of the state adequately addressed negligence
claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries incurred
by police officers during the discharge of their duties. The court
refused to single out police officers and fire fighters for what it characterized
as “discriminatory treatment” under the state tort law.
Given this refusal to recognize the Fireman’s Rule, the trial court erred
in holding that the suit was barred. Further, a review of the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act reveals that the state’s governmental entities are
liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as private
individuals, subject to certain limitations. This case does not fit
under any of those limitations. Thus, the case is reversed and remanded
for the former trooper to continue his tort suit against the county.
[Trousdell v. Cannon, 572 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. 2002)]
Settlements
Huber Heights, Ohio
police officers
Police officers in Huber Heights are in line for raises of three
percent, 3.5 percent, and 3.5 percent respectively under their new three
year labor agreement. The Fraternal Order of Police negotiated the accord,
which mirrors that obtained by other city workers
Laredo, Texas
police officers
The Laredo Police Officer's Association (LPOA) approved a five-year contract
with the city that will give them four percent pay increases in the first,
second, and fourth years of the pact. The third and fifth year raises will
be determined after a wage survey has been completed, but officers will not
receive more than a seven percent increase the third year and nine percent
in the fifth year. The city also agreed to pay the maximum pension contribution
allowed by law. The city anticipates that this will allow some officers
to retire in the next five years, which will allow other officers to be promoted
and move up the ranks more quickly. If approved by city council, Laredo
will be the third Texas city to sign a five-year contract. The LPOA is
affiliated with the Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas.
Marblehead, Massachusetts
police officers
Marblehead's new contract with its police officers calls for a 2.5 percent
wage hike as of the first of the year, two percent on July 1, 2003, and
three percent on July 1, 2004. Although the prior contract expired last
July, the wage hike is not retroactive to that date. Effective January 1,
2003, outside detail assignments will pay $36 per hour, going to $38 in
July. On July 1, 2004, the rate for the secondary employment assignments
moves to $40. The town will retain a ten percent administrative fee for
each hour.
McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania
police officers
Nearly eight months after the newly-formed McConnellsburg Police Association
proposed its terms for a three-year labor contract, both parties finally
agreed to a contract, just moments before a scheduled binding arbitration
hearing was to begin. The new contract effective January 1, 2003, through
December 31, 2005, gives the police chief a 15 percent pay increase the
first year, increasing his salary from $27,360 to $30,500 and gives a sergeant
a 22 percent pay increase from $25,360 to $30,000. Each officer will also
have $1,000 each in longevity pay added to his or her salary, as well as
a $500 one-time signing bonus. In the second and third years of the contract,
each officer receives a $1,000 pay increase, bringing the chief's and sergeant's
salaries to $32,500 and $32,000 respectively in 2005. The contract also
sets salary rates for newly hired officers at $26,000 for a new probationary
patrol officer and a beginning salary of $28,000 for a patrol officer, with
increases of $1,000 in the next two years of his or her contract.
North Kingstown, Rhode Island
police officers
The North Kingstown town council approved a three-year contract extension
with the police union, which extends status quo salary raises, but
cuts out an expensive health insurance option and requires recruits leaving
the force early to pay back training costs. Pay raises for police officers
will remain as they were in the past contract with a salary increase of
two percent on July 1 and January 1 of every year through 2007. Detective
and sergeant salaries at the top step will rise by 2.5 percent and an additional
6.6 percent raise in patrol officer salaries will be given after completion
of three years of service. Nearly 50 officers are covered by the contract
with Local 473 of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers.
Omaha, Nebraska
police officers
Omaha police officers have ratified a deal that will change their current
contract but save the city over $1,000,000 while improving officer pensions.
Starting salaries will drop by $800 per year and increase slowly in future
years. Current officers will forego scheduled raises and pay back $10 to
$2,700 of their salaries this year, depending on seniority. In exchange,
retiring officers will now be able to be paid up to 69 percent of their
highest salary. Senior officers will also be able to retire up to ten months
early by using accumulated sick leave and vacation time. The Omaha Police
Union, Local 101, International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO represent
officers through the rank of captain.
San Diego, California
police officers
A 96 percent approval vote on a new two-year memorandum of understanding
will provide over 2,000 San Diego officers with pay hikes topping 11 percent.
The boosts come on top of a two percent raise unilaterally granted last
year by the city council. Under the pact, a two percent raise will be forthcoming
in July followed by another two percent in December. Four percent will be
added in July 2004, while a final three percent comes in December 2004.
Most officers will also receive an additional 2.5 percent boost for advanced
training they receive. When the first raise comes in July, base pay for
a beginning patrol officer will go to $39,900 while a senior officer will
earn a base of $61,500. The San Diego Police Officers Association represents
the bargaining unit that contains all ranks through lieutenant.